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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the status and the role of Multinational Corporations in the Arab World. Its main
hypothesis is that the Multinationals today represent a permanent feature as the major world-wide source
of modern technology. As such, the Arab countries will continue relying, into the foreseeable future, upon
technology produced, owned or controlled by these global firms.
The research finds that a century of increasing integration with the western industrialised countries,
primarily shaped by the activities of the multinational corporations, has nevertheless left the Arab region
less industrialised and more technologically and institutionally backward than many other parts of the
world. The Arab Nation as a whole, in all its diversity of countries and regions, has failed to economically
or industrially advance at the same rate as other newly industrialising regions. The lack of commitment to
national and regional development needs in the Arab World on the part of most multinationals, is matched
by an equal absence of any clear sense of purpose and dedication on the part of the Arab countries
themselves.
Despite the proposition by some Arab professionals and elites that the Arab States must consider breaking
with any development strategy that substantially relies on access to capital and technology provided by
foreign multinationals, the research contends that, in view of the current underdeveloped state of
indigenous technology in the Arab World, the contemplation of the option of "de-linking" from the
multinationals is neither possible nor desirable. The fact is, that the Arab States, individually or as whole,
are not as yet prepared for the challenges that such a go-it-alone development strategy would imply.
The research also finds that, as the multinational' behaviour is governed by diverse objectives, helping out
the developing countries of the Arab World to build-up their technological base is not generally one of their
distinctive goals. They have their own "growth" strategy while each of the individual Arab States has its
own "development" policy. The objectives of each differ, as shown in this thesis, and are often
incompatible. Yet, for a multinational corporation to secure profit, growth and security, it will need the
goodwill of the Arab countries, while the latter, in order to start building their technological base, need the
multinationals. Thus, objectively, they need each other and a fruitful cooperation between the two parties
depends on the convergence of two strategies, which usually need to undergo many changes in order to
accommodate each other's diverse interests.
This means that, what a foreign multinational can really offer depends on how much an Arab country,
individually or in collaboration with other Arab countries, may actually be prepared or able to take. From
the latter's viewpoint, the ability to take is dependent on the extent to which the Arab countries can
cooperate effectively together. The recent trend in the region towards forging economic integration, in the
form of regional groupings among neighbouring Arab countries, is widely heralded to be an essential step
in the right direction. However, in view of the considerable variations in natural resource endowments
which exist among the countries of the Arab World, it has been increasingly suggested by the Arab
participants of our main survey, that inter-Arab multinational joint ventures constitute a highly desirable
form of organising economic activity, and of accomplishing effective economic cooperation among the
countries of the region.
Most importantly, the thesis demonstrates that there arc many areas in which conventional economic
theories are deficient in explaining multinationals' behaviour and impact on the Arab World. Deficiencies
between theory and practice arc referred to throughout the work and discussed in particular detail in
Chapters 4 and 12.
A major conclusion of this study is that, the Arab governments which once feared the multinationals are
now actively interested in seeking to court and accommodate them more effectively to local development
needs. There is increasing evidence that the Arab countries have learned to bargain with multinationals to
make them better serve their specific objectives and interests. Through more ccntacts and interactions,
previously contrasting positions have softened and a wave of pragmatic attitudes on both sides is
emerging to promote greater recognition of the mutual interests involved.
It is the hope of the author of this thesis that his work will encourage even greater mutual understanding
and cooperation between the Arab States and multinational partners in the future. Indeed it is only through
such cooperation that joint efforts can be effectively used to promote beneficial development and growth
for the future prosperity of the Arab Nation as a whole.
';i911:4`611
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CHAPTER 1
PREFACE AND MAIN THEMES
The focus of this work is the complexity of relationships which currently exists between
the member states of the Arab World and the diverse range of international companies
normally described in academic literature as Multinational Corporations (MNCs).
The author's main hypothesis, explored throughout this thesis, is that decision making by
MNCs' head offices and boardrooms has a major impact on the nature of economic and
industrial development in the Arab States. Internationally—based decisions by
multinational corporations affect both short—term market activities and also, more
importantly, long—term patterns of industrial investment. In turn these activities have a
major impact on economic, social and political development of the Arab World as a
whole.
Traditionally, much of Arab public and academic opinion has been highly critical of the
effects of the MNCs' "neo—colonial" practices on their economics and ways of living.
This theme of Arab distrust and dislike of domination by foreign influences has been
repeatedly emphasised to the author during his survey work in the Arabian Gulf States.
At the same time, he has also identified other examples of willingness to accommodate
and recognise the need for international companies to assist with local development efforts
in the Arab States as a whole.
During the course of his detailed research enquiries, which extended between 1985 and
1991, the author also became strongly aware of the fact that the majority of the Arab
States arc incapable, on their own, of pursuing effective independent industrial
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development programmes, without major cooperation and reliance on advice, know—how,
technology and capital from overseas. In the process of industrial transformation, the
MNCs are increasingly recognised by many Arab commentators, as having an important
part to play in assisting with local development programmes. Likewise, for many local
companies, the market access to overseas, provided by contacts through MNCs, is also an
important consideration, encouraging a greater awareness of the need for enhancing
interdependency between Arab and overseas interests.
A further reality that has become apparent to the author during the course of his work, is
that neither the Arab States nor the MNCs are in any sense homogenous entities. The
Arab States are widely varied in nature and extent and have historically lacked the ability,
or political will, to devise effective common external policies on trade or industrial
investment programmes. Their leaders, while using strong rhetoric about the desirability
of political and social unity, have at the same time, often pursued highly independent and
competitive national development programmes. For instance, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC), established in 1981 as a direct consequence of the Iraq—Iran War, has
subsequently failed to pursue any highly coherent set of development or trade policies by
its member states. Likewise, the Maghreb Arab Union States have traditionally pursued
competitive industrial development policies.
Looking at the MNCs, a similar pattern of diversity of theory and practice applies.
Companies from many different origins (North America, Western Europe, Japan, Taiwan,
etc.) are involved in many different activities and markets and pursue widely diverse
policies and practices in terms of their long—term investment programmes. However, the
general pursuit of profit maximisation gives them an apparent overall unity of purpose,
sufficient to convince Arab commentators of their general unity of impact on the region.
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Profit in these terms has been perceived not as a valuable indicator of effective industrial
or commercial performance, but rather as a guide to the degree of exploitation pursued
by the foreign companies, in captive and/or often quasi—monopolised market situations.
The author's field survey work, undertaken in the Gulf States, has been aimed at exploring
in detail the possible contribution of joint ventures betWeen the Arab and their MNC
partners, against the difficult context of the Arab aspirations for regional development on
the one hand, and economic integration and self—sufficiency on the other. His survey
results demonstrate some possible ways of enhancing greater mutual co—existence between
the Arabs and their foreign international partners in the future. Of particular significance
is his emphasis on the need for both sides to seek greater unity of purpose in their
strategic planning processes, and to look for ways of minimising damaging conflicts of
interest. The qualification underlying this is for the leaders of the Arab World as a whole
to agree amongst themselves on minimum possible degrees of economic integration and
cooperation, especially where it applies to industrial development and trade policies. Only
by establishing this type of common minimum standard of practice and behaviour will it
be possible for the Arab States to cooperate effectively with MNCs in the future.
Particular recommendations for assisting such cooperation are identified and listed in
Section 12.4 of Chapter 12, featuring general conclusions and policy recommendations.
Prominently featured among issues highlighted by this study, arc questions pertaining to
joint ventures, technology transfer, jobs and local personnel training, and foreign
investment policies, applied both by MNCs and the Arab host countries. This study
outlines the analytical framework and provides a general discussion on how the interaction
between MNCs and the Arab countries shape the strategic policy choices available to both
partners.
3
A further regard of this study is to carry out a brief historical evaluation of past policies
pursued by the Arab states, in order to draw lessons from them. The past experiences of
other countries, which, in similar stages of their development, have successfully managed
to cope with challenges of a similar nature to that confronting the Arab world today, are
also analysed. The study then attempts to promote and argue the case for new policies,
as and when necessary. The work proceeds as follows:—
Chapter 2 defines the geographical extent and nature of the 'Arab world', and reviews the
main common features of its countries, their attitudes towards foreign multinationals and
principal investment legislations applied by individual Arab countries to foreign
corporations.
Chapter 3 surveys the information incorporated in the literature and in the writings of
Arab scholars, with particular emphasis on the work of Samir Amin and Riad Agami,
together with what western international economists and theorists have to say about the
perceived and actual role of multinational corporations in the Third World, of which the
Arab world occupies an important part.
Chapter 4 assesses the historical and theoretical framework of MNCs. It focuses
attention on definitional clarification of the most commonly used terminologies in this
study, to avoid possible confusion. It also reviews different theories of trade and
economic development and their possible applications in the Arab countries.
Chapter 5 complements this by assessing the most prominent issues concerning
multinationals in the Arab world, including their special contributions to economic
development and attempts to assess the future prospects of the multinationals in the
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region, in view of the increasingly changing developments, both on a regional level as
well as worldwide.
Chapter 6 identifies the impact of the operations of MNCs on the paths of development
in the Arab world, with particular reference to industrialisation. Again, technology and
knowledge transfer feature prominently in this chapter, which concludes its assessment by
suggesting some recommendations to tackle the many challenges which face the
overwhelming majority of the Arab countries in their inquest for industry—inspired
development.
Chapter 7's major concern is with Joint Venture Partnerships in the Arab context. It
emphasises related issues, such as channels of technology transfer, research and
development and the Arab potential to benefit from the interaction with MNCs in terms
of technological acquisition and know—how.
Chapter 8 identifies the rcscarch hypothesis, the methodology adopted to test thcir
validity, and the main rationale behind thc choice of its subject. It also identifies the
scope and limitations of the main field work undertaken in the Gulf States.
Chapters 9 and 10 detail the statistical framework of the study, by presenting the results
of detailed analysis of the main survey. They analyse the information gathered from the
overall sample of Arab professionals, Arab companies and foreign MNCs operating in the
Arab world; and draw the implications of strategic choices, by analysing in some detail
the causes and implications of different policies of both MNCs and the Arab countries.
All these arc discussed at some considerable length, and an overview of thc findings is
made and presented in the light of previous studies and literature search.
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The principal findings of the Gulf empirical work, are further supported in Chapter 11. by
selected case studies of four joint venture models involving foreign multinationals in the
Arab world. Three such cases deal with the manufacturing industry in the sector of
petrochemicals, steel and fertilizers, in the state of Qatar. The fourth case analyses the
international joint venture experience of Kenana Sugar Factory, between Sudan
Government and Lonrho International. Chapter 11 reviews and assesses the cases in such
a way as to enable the test of hypothesis, advanced by the research, with respect to the
performance of MNCs in the Arab rcgion. It also supports, on balance, the principle
findings of the previous two chapters.
Chapter 12, the final chapter, draws together the main conclusions of the entire study, and
attempts to drive some policy implications of the existence of MNCs for governments of
both home and host countries to MNCs. It reviews the implications of the research,
together with the inferences from the results, for policy formulation. It also assesses the
implications of the research conclusions for management educational development and
explores potential further research. Finally, this concluding chapter proposes an approach
to increase the Arab world's strategic capability to relate better to thc contemporary nature
of the multinationals and to enable them to more effectively relate to the development
aspirations of the Arab world.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ARAB WORLD TODAY
2.1 The Nature of the Arab World
This chapter deals with the most common features which characterise the countries of the
Middle East that form what is today known as the Arab World.
For the purpose of this study, we will define the Arab World as those twenty two
countries which comprise the membership of the "Arab League", whose birth was given
under British auspices in 1945. It was Peter Mansfield [The Arabs : 1983] who defined
the name Arab as being "The inhabitant of Arabia". But the people of Arabia have been
very important in the history of the world, and have gone on to live in many other
countries, so the name is also used to mean anyone who speaks Arabic, and claims that
he is descended from Shem, who was one of the Sons of Noah.
The Arab countries are geographically located in two continents: Asia and Africa. The
Asian Arab States are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen; while in Africa
we have Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and
Djibouti.
Geographically, the Arab World stretches over 5.25 million square miles (equivalent to
1.4 million Hectares or 14 million square kilometres) [see table 2-1], within the
semi—arid area which reaches from the Atlantic to the Arabian Gulf. It occupies a
specific part of the arca, isolated from Europe by the Mediterranean, from Black Africa
by the Sahara, and from the Turkish and Persian Worlds by the Taurus mountains.
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While predominantly muslims, the Arab World is not exactly congruent with the Muslem
World. The latter occupies almost all of the semi—arid area shared by four peoples (the
Arabs, the Turks, the Persians and the Indo—Afghanis), overspills a little into tropical Asia
(Bengal, Indonesia) and more recently into certain areas of Black Africa (West and East
Africa). Nor can the Arab World be reduced to some or other ethno—racial phenomenon,
for Arabism has mixed together many peoples with different origins and different racial
components.
It was a relatively centralised political entity only during a very brief period of its history:
two centuries. And even then, at the time of the Ommayids and the first Abbassids, from
150 to 350, linguistic unification was far less advanced than it is today. After 350 the
Arab World expanded into relatively stable regional political entities which were only to
be reunited under Ottoman rule.
2.2	 Commonalities and Differences
To talk about the Arab World is not to argue that its countries arc necessarily a
homogenous group, notwithstanding all they have in common. In reality, the Arab League
is not a power block or even a cohesive interest group. It is a loose association linked
largely by history and language. Its members represent a wide range of geographical
areas, colours, levels of development and political structures; hence it is always held up
by the lack of consensus in its desperate attempts to have a common approach to the
regional, as well as world, problems. When they do agree, however, their views acquire
an extra dimension of moral force, which represents more than the sum of their individual
powers as states.
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Economics and politics are closely interrelated in the region that forms the Arab World.
Both political and economic challenges impinge on the domestic economy in terms of
priorities for national expenditures, for exchange earnings and the degree of top—level time
available to focus on domestic economic questions.
There are, nevertheless, some common factors which, in theory at least, are bound to
"pull" them together, if only to attempt to achieve the much talked about economic
integration between them.
The most common features among the twenty two states of the Arab World could be
summarised as follows:
1. Have a total population of about 214 million (1989) projected to exceed 290
million by the turn of the century. (See Table 2-1)
2. Speak one single language — Arabic.
3. Share one religion — Islam (over 90%).
4. Have 42 percent literacy rate on average. [According to "The World Almanac",
New York, 1984.]
5. Have a total area of uninterrupted stretch of land of 5.25 million square miles that
extends from Oman on the Indian Ocean to Morocco on the Atlantic. The Arab
States overlook the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean,
the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of Bab El—Mandeb (by Adcn), Strait
of Hormuz and the Suez Canal.
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6. In terms of infra—structure and communications, the Arab countries, particularly
the oil—rich ones, enjoy quite a lead over the great majority of developing
countries.
7. In terms of agricultural produce, it enjoys both the availability of fertile land and
diversification of products, thanks to the diversity of climatic weather, i.e.
Meditcrrancan climate, Savanna, tropical, etc.
2.3	 Economic Integration
On the basis of the above commonalities, economic integration has been an historical
objective for the Arab countries. Some forty five years ago, the Arab League sought to
achieve economic integration between its member states through the abolition of tariffs
and other non—tariff barriers and through other means of economic and political
cooperation. Due to political differences that characterised their relationship in the 1950s
and 1960s, twenty years of political growth in economic cooperation between them were
practically lost, although admittedly, exchange of trade was sometimes encouraged by
bilateral rather than multilateral agreements.
The potential for such cooperation, nevertheless, has increased in the late 1960s and early
1970s. The basis of the establishment of an Arab Common Market is the ideal
complementarity and diversity of the Arab economies, i.e. the non—GCC States (GCC:
Gulf Cooperation Council consists of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UA.E., Qatar, Bahrain and
Sultanate of Oman) have relatively large industrial bases, manpower, infrastructure and
agricultural resources, while the oil—rich Arab countries have abundance of capital and
financial resources.
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The Sudan could be ideally cited as an example in this connection, for its enormous
potential for the development of its agricultural sector. With an area of approximately one
million square miles, and more than 200 million acres of fertile cultivable land, the Sudan
could become an important regional exporter of agricultural products, provided that
appropriate technology and capital are made available.
Of this huge expanse of land, only 20 million acres (10%) are currently being used for
agricultural production and at a low yield efficiency. The heavy dependence on cotton
proved to be dangerous for Sudan and there is an urgent need for diversification and the
opening up of new lands. The trouble is that this will require investments on
a scale which the Sudanese economy is quite incapable of generating on its own.
2.4	 Classification of The Arab Countries
Different researchers refer to the Arab World, categorising its countries into different
groups, but there is no single or best way of going about that. Each one tends to
distinguish between them differently, according to the research objectives. So, depending
on whichever angle you look through, the Arab World could be divided in a number of
alternative ways. Sub—geographical groupings, according to Kubursi [1987, p.56] may
be formed as initial mechanisms of coordination, but the eventual realisation of a larger
Arab cooperative strategy remains critically needed to meet international challenges in a
tightly controlled world market.
In looking at general policies in the 22 Arab States, the countries can be grouped in three
different ways:
1.	 By geography (North Africa, Arabian Peninsula and Levant).
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2. By type of economy (oil and non—oil countries).
3. By political system (broadly free enterprise countries against controlled
economies).
The most obvious classification of the Arab countries for an economist, is between states
with oil and those without it. Riad Agami (1979) proposed a fourfold classification,
somewhat similar to the one used by a U.N. Study in discussion of the prospects for
regional integration in the Arab World:—
1. Group (1) : GCC countries, comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, U.A.E., Qatar,
Sultanate of Oman and Bahrain, which are characterised by an abundance of oil
and capital, limited agriculture, relatively small population, and an acute shortage
of indigenous skilled personnel.
2. Group (2): Consists of Algeria, Iraq and Libya. In addition to oil and capital, they
enjoy a significant agricultural potential and slightly larger population base. They
too suffer from a shortage of technical skills, with a possible exception of Iraq.
3. Group (3): Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia. These countries arc
characterised by a limited amount, or a complete absence, of oil and a shortage of
capital. They do have, however, a reasonable endowment of agricultural and other
resources and a significantly larger population base.
4. Group (4): Comprises Jordan and Lebanon, which are characterised by a
limited Agricultural base, small light industry and, unlike the other countries, a
substantial endowment of skilled labour, primarily in the service sectors.
Samir Amin [1982, p.41], perceives the Arab World today as neither a political nor an
economic unit, and as a particularly hetcrogenous sample. Bascd on this background, his
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categorisation of the Arab World takes a rather different form, even if his groupings
partially overlap with Agami's ones in one or two respects.
The author's own classification, however, stems from a different proposition. Economic
integration between the states of the Arab World is thought to be best realised via
cooperation between sub—regional groups of relatively like—minded countries, sharing
common features in general, and/or perhaps geographical boundaries, which in turn make
it most likely that they also share a common history accumulated throughout centuries,
by virtue of neighbourhood.
Our proposed grouping is, therefore, meant to serve a definite purpose, as it is imperative
that the most viable form of economic integration between the Arab countries, can only
be envisaged through a step—by—step process, whereby each of the proposed sub—groups
can have its own organisation of some form, perhaps somehow similar to that of the Gulf
Cooperation Council. This is, in a way, synonymous with saying that the economic
cooperation between four or five distinctive groups would be rather easier, less
problematic and more politically viable than one between twenty two independent
sovereign states.
Along the above line of logic, the author proposes the following five sub—groupings:-
1. Group (I).	 The Arabian Peninsula: The six members of the Gulf Cooperation
Council, together with Yemen.
2. Group (II). The Fertile Crescent: comprising Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan (and
Palestine).
3. Group (III). The Nile Valley: Egypt and Sudan.
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4. Group (IV). The Maghreb Countries: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and
Mauritania.
5. Group (V).	 East African Arab States: Somalia and Djibouti.
In deciding upon the above, we have taken political, economic, geographical and historical
considerations into account.
Whilst a precise criteria of distinction is not obvious, it is evident that the proven
difficulties to maintain the theoretically desired unity among the Arab—countries to act as
a homogeneous market group, do justify the breaking down of the countries into a kind
of sub—grouping. Each group of countries may need a set of distinctive trade and
invcstmcnt policies, but only within a generally accepted framework of a coherent strategy
that will have a built—in capability of accommodating minor differences while capitalising
on the common unifying factors as a major source of policy decisions, particularly in so
far as their relationship with the outside world is concerned.
2.5	 Economic Integration and Regional Trading Blocs
Hardly is there any country in the world which is not a member of one kind or another
of a wider collection of a group of other neighbouring countries, which have voluntarily
decided to form an association among themselves to pursue common interests, either on
economic or political fields. It is however, inconceivable that any such regional grouping,
will be solely political, or economical in the nature of its objectives as politics and
economics often converge. The accelerating growth of regional organisations has been
a feature of the world scene since thc 1940s. "Today there are about 27 organisations
of neighbouring states, designed to promote economic, political and other forms of
cooperation." [Brooke, 1990, p.2591
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This section briefly reviews the world regional groupings which have grown up as a result
of treaties and agreements among their members, to regulate economic cooperation of one
sort or another between themselves. Many of these organisations, have traditionally
sought to promote economic integration, a subject which this study has particularly
emphasised as an instrument to enhance the Arab world's economic development. In a
world in which regional groupings have become a growing and permanent feature, the
least any developing country can do is simply to attempt to become part of it.
M. Brooke [1990, p.259] classifies regional organisations under three categories:
1. Those that aim to be economic communities;
2. Those that aim to be free trade areas;
3. Those with more modest aims.
As the growth of various regional groupings is likely to be a permanent and important
feature on the world trade and investment map, we have set out in Appendix A a list of
the already existing organisations, in different continents, with a view to providing some
idea of how they came into being and what objectives they are intending to achieve. Thc
remainder of this section deals with the major Arab organisations and the possible lessons
they can, and have, learned from the past experiences of similar organisations worldwide.
2.6	 The .4.rab World and Regional Cooperation
2.6.1	 The Arab League
The Arab League was founded in March 1945 to encourage progress towards
regional cooperation and unity and to formulate a joint Arab response to the
Zionist colonisation of Palestine. There were seven founder members: Egypt,
Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Ycmcn and Saudi Arabia. Membership has sincc
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expanded to include 22 independent Arab states including Palestine, which is
considered an independent state and is represented by the PLO at League
meetings.
The supreme authority of the League is the Council, in which each member has
a single vote. The Council has sixteen committees, including the political
committee and those dealing with communications, health, information and social
affairs. On the economic level, a joint economic cooperation treaty was concluded
in 1950, to complement the Arab League Charter, and bodies established under
this include an Economic Council, linking economic Ministers or their deputies.
Over the years a series of other specialised agencies have been established under
the League auspices or as a result of its resolutions. These include a Council of
Arab Economic Unity (CAEU), set up to implement the Arab Economic Unity
Agreement, which came into cffcct in 1964. In early 1965, the CAEU launched
an Arab Common Market, although this has not been a resounding success. Apart
from Egypt, only Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania and Syria have joined. Four
joint ventures have been set up by the CAEU: The Arab Company for Drug
Industries and Medical Appliances; and the Arab Mining Company, both based in
Amman (Jordan); the Arab Company for Industrial Investment, headquartered in
Baghdad; and the Damascus based Arab Company for Livestock Development.
Financial agencies established by the Arab League resolutions include: the Arab
Monetary Fund based in Abu Dhabi; the Arab Bank for Economic Development
in Africa (BADEA), headquartered in Khartoum (Sudan); the Arab Fund for
Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Kuwait; the Arab Authority for
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Agricultural Investment and Development (Khartoum); and the Inter—Arab
Investment Guarantee Corporation (Kuwait).
While Egypt's expulsion, in the wake of its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, which
lasted for over ten years, has diminished the Arab League's political influence
significantly, the Inter—Arab frictions have been of at least equal importance in
explaining the League's comparative eclipse in recent years. In fact the much
heralded economic cooperation between member states has been only reduced to
bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, agreements. Against this background of
weakness and disunity, it was no surprise that the Arab League has virtually lost
its unified voice in its dealings with the outside world, not only on a political
level, but even more importantly on the economic and commercial levels. The
fact that the Euro—Arab dialogue, which began in 1973 made little progress to
date, is a monument of the League's failure to conclude any economic agreements
with foreign partners. The dialogue is mainly aimed at encouraging economic
cooperation between Arab countries and the EC. The administrative framework
is a general committee and working groups on a range of topics, such as industry,
agriculture, finance and trade.
2.6.2	 Fmergence of Arab regional groupings 
The near paralysis of the Arab League, meant that other regional organisations
emerged as increasingly convincing alternatives as agencies for promoting
cooperation between the Arab States. This was highlighted by the controversy
over European tariff and quota barriers, to the entry of Arab petrochemicals to
Europe. Demands for an casing of European restrictions came principally not
from the Arab League, but from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
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The GCC, having been established in 1981, was the first sub—regional group to be
formally constituted within the Arab world. As others appeared later, it may be
worthwhile looking at how and whether the experiences of the GCC arc relevant
to the other two sub—groupings subsequently constituted, namely the Maghreb
Arab Union (MAU) and the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), formally
proclaimed within days of each other in February 1989.
2.6.3	 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Since the signing on May 25th, 1981, of the Charter creating the Gulf Cooperation
Council, grouping together Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), the GCC had a growing impact on the economic life
of these states. "Progress o date still falls far short of the objectives laid down
in the United Economic Agreement (UEA) signed in November 1981. But for
those selling to the Gulf or planning projects there, the GCC is an economic
reality, whose aspirations, policies and future plans must be taken into account,
in the drawing up of a marketing strategy". [The Economist Intelligence Unit,
October 1988, p.22.]
Without going into detail, a brief summary of the most visible features of the GCC
and its objectives and achievements arc given below:—
- The UEA's first three articles provide for the waiving of customs duties on
trade among the GCC states themselves;
- For a product to qualify as nationally manufactured and become eligible
for exemption, its domestic value added must constitute at least 40 per cent
of the finished product, and GCC nationals must own at least 51 per cent
of the equity of the firm producing it;
Oman is seen as a special case, having embarked on its development effort
later than the other GCC member states. It was then allowed to go on
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imposing tariffs on imports of certain products, i.e, cement, aluminium
products and plastics. These exemptions were to have expired in March
1988, but were extended for a further five years;
— Preference is given in government purchases to nationally produced goods,
allowing the latter a price advantage of up to 10 per cent over the foreign
equivalent, and then to GCC goods with a 5 per cent price advantage;
— Other provisions of the UEA, call for freedom of movement, work and
residence, right of ownership, as well as free movement of capital and
business activity. The aim is eventually to create a Gulf citizenship with
the introduction of a Gulf passport. But in this area too, Oman has once
again been a reluctant partner;
— There are serious obstacles to the coordination of development plans as
provided by the UEA. In fact some GCC members do not have a plan,
while the period span of others differ. Despite their apparent homogeneity,
they are all at different levels of development;
— After about ten years since it was established, the GCC has still a lot to do
in the way of progressing towards realising many of its stated objectives:
a. The Uniform minimum customs tariff, on foreign products has not
been as yet applied;
b. Collective bargaining with the outside world has been attempted
both with the EC (over the petrochemicals issue) and the U.S.A.
with whose government, the GCC has held regular consultations
about a possible free trade agreement. Such outside contracts,
while clearly rcgardcd as a step in the right direction, but may have
limited potential for success, at least thus far;
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c. Regarding joint purchasing policy, there have been bulk purchases
of rice and there is an annual tender for medical supplies, but the
policy has not otherwise been widely applied;
d. Other joint projects still awaiting implementation, include a 1700
km oil pipeline to Oman, a joint electricity grid, with an estimated
cost of 2 billion U.S. dollars, cooperation between existing main
airlines and joint establishment of ports, roads, water and power
stations: Currency alignment in the form of unified investment
regulations, a joint investment policy, coordination of fiscal,
monetary and banking policies and the eventual establishment of a
joint currency, is something which appears to be beyond the
immediate priorities of the GCC.
2.6.4	 The Arab Cooperation Council (ACC)
While the six members of the GCC share basic political, even philosophical,
religious and social conviction, as well as having bcncfittcd enormously from the
oil boom, with many other things in common, neither of the two newer sub-
groups in the Arab context (ACC and MAU) have the same sort of homogeneity.
The ACC seems a particularly odd animal grouping, as it comprises Iraq, Egypt,
Jordan and Yemen. It came into existence in the aftermath of the Iran—Iraq war
in 1989. While Egypt has the edge in population, but Iraq, even at the end of a
long and ruinous war (against Iran), emerged still potentially the richest in the
Middle East. It may have fewer proven oil reserves than Saudi Arabia, but has
far more of the two other basic ingredients for long—term success: a native
population and water.
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The ACC, which virtually came to a halt in the wake of the Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait, meant different things to different members. While, as became only too
clear later, it meant to serve political and strategic (military) purposes for Iraq, and
possibly for Jordan as well, only economic considerations were behind the
temptation for Egypt and Yemen to join in; the Egyptians entered the ACC with
no illusions. For them, it was genuinely first of all of economic interest. It
guarantees them an outlet for their surplus labour for a few years to come, and
perhaps a privileged market for exports, including military, which Iraq might be
tempted to forego for more expensive and more sophisticated Western trinkets.
On the political level, Egypt, after the Arab League Summit in Casablanca, has
made a triumphal return to the centre of the Arab world and hardly needed a sub-
stage to play its role.
Jordan's interests in the ACC are simpler. The geographical bridge is transformed
into a political one. It also counted on some economic fall—out: a few more jobs
in Iraq, encouragement of the use of the Jordanian service industries — banking for
example — besides, there is the establishment of the ACC secretariat in Amman,
which will bring jobs and have its political uses, bringing Amman a step closer to
its ideal of being a sort of Middle—Eastern Geneva.
The anomaly in the ACC was North Yemen (later the unified Yemen). Non-
contiguous with the others, it is arche—typically South Arabian, while the others
arc Northern Arabs, and by most standards, considerably less developed. "If truth
be told, Yemen would have liked to have become part of the GCC and there was
some speculation along those lines in the Gulf For both Yemens, the economic
benefits are obvious. They already receive help from the Gulf but it would be
more highly institutionalised. There would not probably be more Yemeni
emigration towards the Gulf than already exists (now much reduced in the
aftermath of the Gulf war). Seen from the Gulf countries' perspective, the idea
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had two major advantages: first, the inclusion of the Yemens in the GCC would
have given the enlarged group control over the Bab el—Mandeb, and in
consequence the Red Sea as well. The second reason is that inclusion of the
Yemens and transformation of the organisation into an Arabian Peninsula Council
would have removed the onus of the GCC, as a rich man's club, in what is
basically a very poor part of the world" [Graz, 1989, p.14].
2.6.5	 The Maeireb Arab Union (MAU)
The third group, the MAU is very different to the two others. It may be brand
new, but at least in the three countries that could be called its heartland, Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia, it has been talked about for about thirty years, that is even
before the independence of Algeria. All three share not only their geographical
fate — and they are very conscious of their nearness to Europe — but also the
cultural outlook of quasi—bilinguism in French; Tunisia and Morocco have never
really made a break with French culture. Algeria, after its years of truculent
'Arabisation', is reconsidering the question. Algeria and Morocco have almost
equal population, 23 and 24 millions respectively. Tunisia is less populous, but
has never been considered a negligible quantity by its neighbours to the west.
Perhaps, in part because of its comparatively high level of development and
excellent educational infrastructure and calibers. Beyond the inner circle of the
club, there were also Libya and Mauritania. In fact Colonel Gadhaffi has been a
full—fledged participant in the game of musical chairs that has been played in
North Africa, first to counteract the influence of Egypt, and then to balance out
between Algeria and Morocco. As for the other members, Libya's membership is
understandably welcomed in view of the fact that, as Gadhaffi's outspoken aim is
inter—Arab harmony, and/or unity, he should be generous in helping those who
give him a chance to practice what he preaches. Mauritania, the fifth member of
the MAU, on the south—western flank, is not really a problem. As one
commentator put it, it is considered a little like "The proud, but impecunious
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Uncle, who must be invited to family feasts, whether one really wants him or not".
[Graz, p.18].
It is still early indeed, to try to analyse whether this latest organisation of the
'grand Maghreb' can go further than being one more incident in the power struggle
for the region. It is in any case, the first that does not try to play the central
players off against each other. While both the GCC and ACC are largely
concerned with relations among the member countries, the Maghreb Union
members put considerably more emphasis on their collective relation with Europe.
That is no doubt a natural result of both their geography, and their history.
2.6.6	 Concluding Remarks about the Arab Organisations 
When the GCC was founded in 1981, it encountered considerable hostility
elsewhere in the Arab world, and particularly in Tunis, where the Arab League,
as an institution, was shaky after the suspension of Egypt two years earlier. It was
condemned as an example of particularism, inherently inimical to the still—reigning
(at least verbally) idea of Arab unity, supposedly rooted in the sense of Arab
identity from the Atlantic to the Gulf.
In fact, four years later, or around 1985, some Arab scholars began talking about
the GCC as a model for other regional groupings. In 1984 Mr. Lakhdar Ibrahimi,
the then Under—Secretary—General of the Arab League, imagined an ideal carving—
up of the Arab world, which was not very much different from what we sec now:
There was a union of the fertile crescent, that included Syria and was ready to
receive Palestine together with Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Egypt and the Sudan
were somchow supposcd to take fraternal carc of Djibouti and Somalia. The
Ycmcns, would indeed have bccn welcome to an Arabian Peninsula Council. The
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five-member greater Maghreb is the one that has come into being, exactly as the
imagined scheme. Even if there are loose ends to be tied up, the major framework
of the imagined scenario is there.
Notwithstanding the political ambitions of the ACC, at least in the subconscious
of its most keenest promoter - Saddam Hussein of Iraq - which eventually lead
to its collapse, the partial success of the GCC and the survival of MAU, against
all odds, can be taken as proof that regional groupings in the Arab context can
function, even though there is no absolute agreement on every policy. A new
wave of pragmatism in the Arab world seems to be shaping a new type of
thinking. There seems to be an acknowledgement that needs, aspirations and ways
of looking at the world, might not be identical from the shores of the Atlantic to
the sands of the Gulf. It is a new and fundamentally more open spirit in the Arab
world, one that no longer demanded that all bow to one leader, nor even agree
perfectly in order to act in concert.
2.6.7	 $	 k	 • II	 II I •	 •I I.
Judging from the detailed account on world economic blocs, as shown by
Appendix (A), regional groupings in different parts of the world have been set up
to tackle similar challenges of development, while the nature of such challenges
varies according to variations in the economic environment, as well as changing
political developments. Africa is a continent of curious paradoxes and extremities,
and its regional organisations are to deal with long standing challenges such as the
high level of unexploitcd natural resources and bottom-of-the-league poverty.
Latin America faces similar problems, and despite the maturity of most of its
countries in terms of the length of their independent existence, it is still regarded
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as unstable. Only recently has their burden of foreign debt started to improve, and
the trend towards liberalism been felt.
Many regional organisations, nevertheless, share common characteristics,
irrespective of their particular locations. On the negative side such characteristics
would include the following:
a. Political tensions always play a damaging role and undermine the integrity
and progress of regional organisations i.e. EAC in Africa, LAFTA in Latin
America and ACC in the Middle East;
b. By their very nature these organisations tend to have built—in constraints,
reflected in the slowness of decision—making and the uneven distribution
of the benefits accrued from the economic integration. Even the EC is not
exempted from these characteristics;
c. All suffer from conflicting interests. Only a well—prepared administrative
infrastructure can successfully handle disputes arising from such conflicting
interests, otherwise a particular organisation will be doomed to failure.
On the other hand, regional groupings have the potential to tackle problems and
face challenges much better than on individual country level. Their most visible
advantage is the fact that they can influence the terms of trade in ways which
member countries find difficult when acting alone. The Arab groupings of GCC
and the MAU, have had partial success in their trade negotiations with Europe.
Despite diversities between members, in terms of economic structure and
performance, the ASEAN group has mostly succeeded in speaking with one voice.
In fact, regional groupings can, at times, be of resounding success as unifying
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forces, particularly if the members' common interests converge against outside
influences. The failure of some economic integration attempts, via the formulation
of regional organisations i.e, EAC and ACC, does not necessarily mark an end to
the attempts of the concerned members to pursue economic integration and
cooperation among themselves, as shown from the Latin American and African
experiences, as well as from the Arab countries unsuccessful attempts for
integration in the past. Any failed attempt is usually followed by resumption of
talks, perhaps after a time lapse, during which political tensions tend to recede.
When new associations are formed, they would have the additional benefit of
learning from past experience, avoiding previous mistakes and emphasising on
policies which are more likely to induce agreements, rather than conflicts. After
decades of trials and errors and repeated attempts and failures, it is hoped that the
relatively new regional organisations, within the Arab context, will learn the
lessons and improve their prospects of success. The experiences which many sub—
groupings (that have been a sort of off—shootings of larger continent—wide
organisations) have clearly shown is that, those associations with limited number
of members have the propensity to progress faster than the larger groups. The
attention is drawn here to the example of 0EAO's six francophone African
countries, who are all members of the larger grouping of ECOWAS. The GCCs
performance, as compared with that of the larger Arab League, is already
impressive enough to advocate and argue the case for such sub—groupings, not
only in the Arab context, but elsewhere as well.
In fact some regional groupings tcnd to invite initial hostility from outside on their
proclamation. When the GCC was established in 1981, not only was it reluctantly
received by the othcr Arab States, but also some of thc wcstcm industrialised
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countries were disappointed. "It would have been so much easier for them", the
argument went "to have to deal with a single entity rather than having to go on
pleasing all the capitals one by one" [Graz, 1989, p.5].
The Arab regional organisations may have some peculiar characteristics, the
parallel of which is hard to find in other similar organisations, the GCCs Unified
Economic Agreement, for instance, provides, as a long term aim, for the creation
of a Gulf Citizenship, possibly with the introduction of a Gulf Passport. In this
respect one can say that the experience of the GCC in integration is more
ambitious, even than the European Community, let alone the other regional
organisations we have hitherto reviewed. Another observation which is
worthwhile noting is the ability to emulate successful experiences elsewhere, as
is clearly the case for the newly formed Maghreb Union. MAU's administrative
infrastructure, has been clearly influenced by the EC experience. It is worth
noting, that the Maghreb agreement is the only one that provides not only for a
Council of Heads of State and ministerial mectings, but also for a popular
assembly. This assembly of 50 mcmbcrs, 10 from each 'parliament' of member
states, no matter how they have been choscn, has no power at all. Theoretically,
it has a 'consultative role', but the very fact that it exists, is a sign that all of the
countries involved feel that their populations must be made to be a part of the
process: This structure bears much resemblance to that of the European
Community.
Any regional organisation in the world stands the risk of failure, as well as the
prospects of success. As shown in Appendix (A), problems often stem from the
diversities in the economic development among respective members. Whenever
a regional organisation is in the process of formation, all talk tends to focus on
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economic cooperation. Soon after initial steps towards the implementation of its
objectives have been taken, disputes among members are likely to focus on
politically—inspired differences. Dissatisfaction, however, often originates from
the fact that the more developed members of a particular association, arc seen by
other members to reap the maximum benefits from the association. We have
already noted some examples of this tendency in a number of regional
organisations, i.e. Nigeria (ECOWAS); Singapore (ASEAN); Kenya (EAC); Ivory
Coast (CEAO) and Saudi Arabia (GCC). This phenomenon should not cause any
undue concern, and rather be put into perspective. The way to deal with such
situations, and to contain any likely adverse repercussions, is to ensure that
provisions are made, that not all members necessarily benefit from the economic
integration at the same rate, or to the samc degree. Special concessions can
always be made for relatively poorcr members. The decisive consideration in
establishing any economic integrating grouping, is not whether the poorcr members
of the grouping benefits more than the richer ones, but whether the latter would
benefit more by being outside rather than inside the grouping. For the
overwhelming majority of the Arab countries, the answer is that none of them will
benefit more by being outside and that all of them will be better of — perhaps with
varying degrees — by being inside the grouping.
2.7	 The Role of Oil Resources in the Arab World
Total world proven reserves of oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs), as at January 1991,
were estimated by Oil and Gas Journal at 1000 billion barrels. Of this, morc than three—
quarters arc in OPEC countries, and more than half lie in just four Middle Eastern
Countries — Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and Iran. In 1989, Saudi ARAMCO announced
an addition of 85 billion barrels, equivalent to more than twice the total proven reserves
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of North America. Reserves in Saudi Arabia are now estimated at around 260 billion
barrels, which amounts to a quarter of total world oil reserves.
That oil is a strategic commodity, is certainly true. As such, its dominant role in shaping
the strategic economic decisions in the developing countries of the Arab World,
particularly in the Arabian Gulf, will continue as long as factories are built, technological
progress continues to seek improvement and development plans in the region and
elsewhere are undertaken. Oil shall remain the pillar of the Gulf States' economics, as
well as of Libya, Algeria and Iraq, the influence of which spreads throughout the rest of
the Arab World, especially in countries where they arc substantial aid donors. Whilst
American and British oil reserves can sustain their present production for less than a
decade, the majority of the Gulf Cooperation Council States can go on producing at
today's levels for around a century. Moreover, they are making out new reserves, while
production elsewhere has already been declining, or is forecast to bcgin its decline, in the
1990s.
The Arab World, having been economically strengthened, thanks to its command of this
strategic commodity — oil has, over the last fifteen years or so, sought to spread its scope
of outside relations worldwide.
According to a detailed survey of over 650 U.K. companies, commissioned by the
Institute of Export and The Market Research Society, conducted in April 1984, [Financial
Times, 2.5.84], the Middle East and North Africa have overtaken the E.C. as the markets
offering the best opportunities for British exporters. Regarding its commercial relations
with Europe, the Arab World, which is considered to be the third largest trade partner of
29
the E.C. (next to U.S.A. and other European countries) [Table 4-3-54 could be
categorised into three distinctive sub—groups.
1. Those with bilateral agreements with E.C., namely Maghreb countries: Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia; and Mashraq countries: Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.
This group accounts for 60% of the entire Arab population, with per capita
income of around $1400 on average (in 1986).
2. The countries signatory to the multi—lateral economic agreement via LOME
agreements. They comprise Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and Mauritania, together
accounting for 15% of the total Arab population and no more than $300 in their
average per capita income.
3. The Arab countries whose economic relations with E.C. are governed by no
particular official agreements. This group includes the rest of the Arab States,
namely Iraq, Libya, the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council, and
Yemen. Together they account for 25% of the total Arab population, with their
average per capita income amounting to around $4000 (1986).
The Mashraq countries of the first group deal with the E.C. according to what are
commonly known as "cooperation agreements", whilst those of Maghreb countries arc
subject to the so called "participation agreement" signed in 1969.
2.8	 Recycling of Arab Petro—dollars
The oil—rich Arab countries have shifted from being net exporters of raw materials,
notably crude oil, during the 1960s and 1970s, to becoming net cxportcrs of capital during
the 1980s. Most of the capital borrowed by developing countries during this period came
from the developing countries themselves (OPEC Members). But most of the surplus
income generated by Arab oil exporting countries has been invested in developed
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countries, particularly in Europe, Japan and the U.S.A. These countries in turn lent the
capital to the developing countries. The high intcrcst rates charged on such loans were
the mechanism to which the industrialised countries resorted to, as a way of reducing the
high risk involved in lending to the developing countries, resulting eventually in the
increased foreign debts of most of the third world countries.
The overall effect has been devastating to the countries of the Third World, whose
inevitable reduced capital investment led to their restricted economic growth and high
unemployment levels. Moreover, servicing such loans became increasingly unmanageable
and a continuous source of friction between the borrowers and the lenders.
When deciding on the ways to utilise and channel financial surpluses, the Arab oil
exporting countries have always sought an optimum balance of the following three
elements:
1. They primarily considered the basic purpose of investment to be for thcir own
economic development. They sought to achieve a structure of investment which
guarantees a certain degree of safety (including political) but also high yielding
and least exposed to inflation.
2. They also tried to achieve the highest possible liquidity of their investment, since
this enables them to adapt as quickly as possible to the changes in the international
financial markets.
3. The awareness that solidarity with other developing countries is an important
factor in changing relations on the world oil market. This has been clearly
demonstrated by their role as aid donors through development assistancc. In the
view of some commentators, this development has been thc most remarkable
fcaturc of South—South financial cooperation in the 1970s.
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However, the Arab financial surpluses of the 1970s were mainly placed into various forms
of investments in the industrialised countries. A relatively small portion of these
investments has been channelled into portfolio and direct investment, while the greater
proportion was held in bank deposits, in view of their high liquidity and relative security.
In addition, this form of surplus deployment was indirectly encouraged by the
industrialised countries themselves (attraction of high interest rates), given that
they have a highly sophisticated financial banking system.
2.9	 Population Growth and the Work Force
According to the World Bank [Mideast Markets, July 9th, 1984], the countries in the
Middle East and North Africa have the second highest rates of population growth and
fertility in the world after sub—Saharan Africa. Between 1970 and 1982, their populations
grew at an average rate of 2.9 per cent a year and in 1982, the total fertility rate (number
of children born per woman) was 5.4. Unlike most of the other Arab countries in the
region, four States have policies to reduce population growth. Recent surveys show that
24 per cent of married women of child bearing age in Egypt, 38% in Turkey and 41%
in Tunisia practise contraception. In contrast, only 5% of all women in Sudan and rural
women in Syria do so. In the vast majority of the Arab countries, and even in the best
case of rapid decline in both mortality and fertility, the growth in population will put
a major additional burden on the economy.
The movement of work force from one Arab country to another, while well placed to suit
at least one aspect of the objectives sought to be achieved by integration, namely, shift
of excess labour force to where it is mostly needed, could well have far reaching political,
as well as economical, effects. "Brain drain" is reported to have been increasingly high
in some labour exporting countries such as Sudan, whose bcst qualified people have left
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the country during the late 1970s and the best part of the 1980s, to seek jobs in the
prosperous Gulf States and Libya. They are attracted by a combination of two motives:
high pay in the countries they have emigrated to and the frustration of political instability,
as well as the financially non—rewarding wages in their own country.
Another example to be cited is North Yemen, the development of which is constrained
by labour shortages. Attracted by the demand for labour elsewhere in the Gulf, some
30% of the country's male labour force has emigrated [MEE) 3.1.87]. In the early
1980s, when investment funds were relatively plentiful, but labour was not, planners
tended to favour capital—intensive, rather than labour—intensive, projects. As revenue
becomes scarcer and demand for Yemeni labour decreases in the rest of the peninsula in
the wake of the falling oil revenues, this policy choice may have to be revised. The
recent discovery of oil in the country, however, may lead to the adoption of a balanced
recourse between capital—intensive projects (installation of oil projects) and those of
labour—intensive ones, geared to accommodate the thousands of Yemenis who have lost
their jobs in the neighbouring Gulf States. One must mention here that the oil sectors
of different Arab countries incorporate only a small number of labour. (Only 1.5% of the
1975 total work force of GCC nationals were engaged in the oil sector, according to
Seragedin et al, "manpower and international labour migration in the Middle East and
North Africa" [Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1981, p.69]. Yet oil exporters pay for
imports which incorporate a much greater number of labour. Similar trends and
implications arc equally evident in the rest of the labour exporting Arab countries, i.e.
Egypt, Sudan, Jordan and Tunisia.
As for the oil countries constrained by labour shortages, the fastest way to increase the
population of working age groups is by immigration, even if on a temporary basis. The
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host country acquires cheaply much of the economic benefit of education and upbringing
at the cost of the labour suppliers. That, however, raises the dangers of ethnic disunity
and cultural dependence, particularly if the emigrants are from countries other than those
of the Arab World. The recent trend of the oil countries to favour labour force imported
from countries such as Pakistan, India, Philippines and Sri Lanka on economic grounds
(cheap labour), to replace the relatively expensive Arab nationals, has already proved to
impinge on the cultural set up of most of the tiny Gulf States. This has been clearly
manifest in the kind of social problems, the parallel of which the people of the region
have never experienced before. Most prominent and far—reaching among these problems,
is that of children's upbringing, which is mostly undertaken by Philippino baby—minders.
According to I.L.O., the labour force in the Arab World does not exceed 25% of the total
population. This is attributed to a number of factors, prominent among which is the
exceedingly low rates of women participation. Due to social and cultural reasons, 90%
of the women population (who comprise 50% of the total population) do not work. But
on the other hand, this is not contributing a lot as a negative effect, since the
unemployment levels arc already very high and the productivity is relatively low owing,
among other reasons, to the inefficiency of the labour force. To this one can also add the
problem of the continuing increase in urbanisation, to the detriment of rural areas, whose
natural resources are left underexploited as a result.
2.10 Principal Policies of Individual Arab Countries towards MNCs and Foreign
Investment
Appendix (B) attached at the cnd of this thesis, reviews the main legislations which
govern the Arab investment activities insofar as they involve foreign MNCs and/or foreign
capital.
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"Relatively little is documented about the codes of conduct and regulations governing
MNCs' activities in the Arab World. There seems to be no apparent distinction between
MNCs and other foreign enterprises, as to the regulations under which they are subjected.
Despite variations between individual Arab countries regarding investment laws, most of
them are working towards the unification of such laws. These efforts usually seek to
fulfil two declared objectives, as the investment laws are designed within the broad
context of the Arab economic integration:
a. taking the criteria to the extent that an investment project can contribute in the
fulfilment of economic and social development plans;
b. Arab joint venture companies are promoted as a vehicle to accelerate industrial
and agricultural development. These joint ventures enjoy a variety of concessions,
as well as legal and financial support.
It is worthwhile noting that the investment legislations of the overwhelming majority of
the Arab countries have undergone drastic changes during the 1970s. Far from responding
to policies adopted by foreign MNCs, there seems little doubt that the sudden growth in
Arab surplus funds, in the wake of the oil boom of the 1970s, and the apparent
availability for development finance in countries such as Egypt and Sudan, had much to
do with the changes in the Egyptian and Sudanese policy on foreign investment from
earlier policies, which had limited private foreign investment and stressed the development
of government planning and public sector enterprises.
Sudan, after undertaking a sweeping series of nationalisations in 1970 that failed to
produce desired results, undertook to formulate a policy of attracting foreign investment.
Accordingly it enacted the organisation of Investment Economic Services Act in 1973,
revised its existing Industrial Investment Law in 1974, and passed the "Development and
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Encouragement of Agricultural Investment Act" in 1976. Moreover, the six year plan
(1977-1983) adopted in 1977, assumed that, out of a total projected investment of $6.5
billion, 52 per cent of that amount would be obtained from external sources. In view of
the country's expressed goal of becoming the "bread basket of the Middle East" and the
oil producers need for a near and reliable source of food, the Sudanese Agricultural
Investment Act of 1976, was largely aimed at Arab investors.
In addition to Egypt and Sudan, other deficit states of the Arab World, such as Morocco,
Tunisia, Jordan and Syria, have also enacted legislations or implemented policies
favouring Arab or foreign investment. Many of the Arab countries have evolved
institutions to finance and participate in projects with domestic and foreign capital.
Towards this end, Egypt in 1971, founded the Egyptian International Bank of Foreign
Trade and Development and the Sudan, in 1974, created the Sudan Development
Corporation, with the aid of a Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority guarantee, which
enabled it to secure a 1200 million Eurodollar loan to use as capital for investment in
commercially viable projects within the country.
Despite the emergence of these new national institutions, a variety of institutional
constraints on the flow of Arab capital has hindered the process. They fall into the
following general categories:
1. Policy and decisional instability on the part of the host country authorities, leading
to change of major declared policies, and the revocation of given guarantees;
2. Bureaucratic problems;
3. Lack of project promotion and formulation — lack of prepared project proposals
(feasibility studies, etc.);
4. Lack of indigenous managerial skills and sources of technology.
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Unlike the ordinary MNC entering a developing country, the typical Arab investment
organisation does not itself have the managerial and technological elements to back up the
proposed investment project. Since the host country cannot provide these elements either,
the Arab investor is dependent on the Western MNCs for management and technology.
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TABLE 2-2
	
OIL INDUSTRY: PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL,
EXPORTS AND RESERVES
PRODUCTION
1000 b/day
EXPORTS
($mn)
OIL RESERVES
Barrels (bn)
1
1986	 19891
1
1986	 ,	 1989 1986	 'JAN 91
1
WORLD TOTAL 59,641	 1 63,843 -	 128,000 724.5	 11000
OPEC TOTAL 18,333	 122,648 -	 120,000 503.2	 750+
ARAB TOTAL 13,150	 ,14,357 54,793 1	 - 415.0
U.A.E. 1,370	 I	 1,936 6,200 I 33.0
BAHRAIN 44	 I	 - 1,772 1 0.1
TUNISIA 106	 - 344 1.8
ALGERIA 600	 I	 1,094 2,500 I 8.8
SAUDI ARABIA 5,042	 5,158 21,700 1 169.2	 260
SYRIA 185	 - 375 i 2.1
IRAQ 1,688	 2,841 6,100 1 72.1
OMAN 558	 - 2,029 , 4.1
QATAR 333	 396 1,500 3.9
KUWAIT 1,416	 1,815 6,6001 94.5
LIBYA 1,034 I	 1,117 4,600 1 21.3
EGYPT 774	 - 3,340 4.3
1
OPEC - NON-ARAB 6,847	 I	 8,291 1 100.5
MEMBERS i I
OTHERS: i
1
BRITAIN 2,602 I	 1,883 1 9.01
CANADA 1,798	 1,962 1 9
NORWAY
U.S.A.
906	 1,541
10,302 I
	
9,160 1
10.
5
1
24.6,
U.S.S.R. 12,384	 12,207 1 59.0/	 59.0
CHINA 2,630	 2,740 1 18.4
MEXICO 2,750
	 2,892 . 1547
OTHERS 6,269	 - 1 25.91
1
% OF ARAB WORLD 22.1% 1 22.5% I 57•3%1
TO TOTAL 1 i I
1
 1% OF OPEC
TO WORLD
30.7%	 35.5%
1
I
I
69.4%
1
1 1 i
ARAB SHARE 71.7% 1 63.4% 1 82.5%1
OF OPEC i 1
.
'
1
	Sources: 1.
	 OAPEC - Data Base
2. Petroleum Economist - April 1987. Pg.156.
3. Petroleum Economist - August 1991. Pg.42.
4. Energy in Profile (The Shell Briefing Service)
Number 3, 1991. Pgs. 2, 3, 8.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
INCLUDING IMPORTANT ARAB VIEWS
ON THE CHANGING GLOBAL ECONOMY
3.1	 Introduction
Investigation of materials, hypotheses and analysis incorporated in the writings of a wide
range of scholars, professionals and economic analysts who have dealt with various
questions pertaining to the economics of the Arab World has revealed a number of
interesting, but also controversial, and occasionally conflicting, views which make further
investigations and analysis a worthwhile endeavour to contemplate. A particularly closer
attention has been paid to the performance, role and contributions of foreign multinational
companies in the inquest of the Arab countries to achieve their national economic
development, a process with which they have been greatly concerned over the past two
decades or so.
It has been noticed, however, that the bulk of literature related to the Arab economy so
far has primarily dealt with the impact on the Middle East region of development
originated in other parts of the world. The Arab World's present and future influence on
developments elsewhere in the world; in other words, its active rather than reactive role
in the world scene, has apparently been played down. It is not as yet clear if such
tendency is due to a perceived conviction that the Arab World as a distinct region can
offer nothing or little of particular significance to the rest of the world and that it can only
respond to events shaped by others without having a great deal in the way of actively
contributing to these events or attempting to change their course.
38
^The absence in literature of a positive role to be assumed by the Arab region has clearly
underestimated the potential economic influence which it can exercise at the international
level, in view of its potential resources and strategic location in the heart of the world
map.
3.2	 Scope of Literature Coverage
It is, however, important to exercise a reasonable degree of caution to distinguish between
two types of literature coverage: those writers and analysts whose entire concern in a
particular work has been the Arab World, or some of its states, as opposed to those whose
reference to the Arab economies has been mainly prompted by the need to elaborate on
particular issues in which some Arab countries could be ideally cited as models for
illustration. The first type could well be illustrated by Samir Amin's contributions in his
pioneering works, as well as in R. Agami's book entitled "Arab Response to The
Multinationals". An increasing number of Third World writers, as well as western
economists have more recently addressed themselves to the questions pertaining to the
interaction between different policies of the MNCs involved in the Third World countries
on the one hand, and those of the Third World's governments and companies on the other.
The Third World countries' policies have been gradually formulated in the process of their
economic development pursued by individual countries in the aftermath of political
independence while others are being adopted in direct or indirect reaction to policies
originated outside their borders and pursued through foreign MNCs. A number of
illustrations will be given later with a view to analysing some of these phenomena.
3.3 The Arab Writers
While the mainstream of the Arab writers tend to focus on the misgivings and the
negative implications on the Arab Worlds economic development of the activities of
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foreign MNCs, only a few have attempted to come up with specified alternative policies
which are capable of warding off the negative effects of the foreign influence exercised
by these multinationals. Even Samir Amin, the Egyptian who certainly has no parallel
in the Arab World in terms of his intellectual contributions as a formidable development
theorist, has done relatively little beyond advocating the potentiality of moving towards
an "autocentric Pan—Arab development" as the one and only viable alternative option to
contemplate.
3.3.1 SamicAmin's outspoken and well articulated criticism against the objective bases
of multinational monopoly capital's domination over the Arab economy, and the
dangers that go with such domination, insofar as it links the Arab economy forever
with foreign interests, is well known. His analysis clearly lends itself to the
mainstream ideas of the dependency theorists among whom Amin is a forceful
pioneer in his own way. Appealing though his call is for an integrated and
dynamic Arab economic unit, his argument seems to fall short of constructing a
detailed scenario of how such an achievement can possibly withstand the many
challenges it is bound to confront. The question of living up to the test of practice
— given the heterogeneous resources and revenues — let alone the wide variations
among different individual Arab Countries in their pursued economic ideologies,
appear to be still crying for an answer despite all the rhetoric and sentimental calls
for autocentricity and self—sufficiency.
3.3.2 Riad Avimi, on the other hand, takes a conciliatory view in his attitudes to the
foreign multinationals operating in the Arab World, perhaps to the point of
asserting their indispensability to the process of economic development in the Arab
World. His findings, bascd on a limited survey conductcd in the late 1970s among
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a selected number of a few elites and businessmen in two of the Arab countries
(Kuwait and Iraq) have established a favourable attitude on the part of the Arab
countries towards the foreign multinationals. He also concludes that:
"even socialist regimes in the Arab World appreciate the contributions of the
MNCs to their societies in their quest for economic and technological growth".
Apparently, Agami has probably confused "appreciation" and "satisfaction" with
what would rather be referred to as a forced cooperation in the absence of viable
alternatives. It is, however, possible to assert that the Arab countries are not
hostile towards the 1VINCs, as indeed our own survey has confirmed, but they are
certainly not as forward—looking and forthcoming to the multinationals as Agami
would like us to believe. One also needs to be precautious about sharing Agami's
optimism regarding the friendly business—like atmosphere in which the multi-
nationals are operating in the Arab World. Since his entire sample was derived
only from those in direct contact with MNCs, there is a case for questioning the
basis on which his findings arc established. In Agami's own words:
"the factor of self—interest is no doubt at work ... and they are more likely to
derive some benefits from that contact".
If that is so, as the author's survey confirms, then the obvious conclusion is that
they will naturally favour and welcome the activities of these MNCs — a fact
clearly manifested in their answers to Agami's questionnaire.
In fact, the extent to which Agami's survey sample has been representative enough
of the population it was intended, cannot be claimed to have been established in
any precise terms.
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3.4	 Market forces vis—a—vis Protectionism
The relevance of the activities and policies pursued by the MNCs to the current debate
on the contrast between free trade and protectionist policies is quite evident. It is the
MNCs, after all, who are more akin to demonstrate in practical terms the actual exercise
of free trade policies worldwide. While the precise definition of free trade can possibly
be controversial, our general concern in this context is the free movement of capital, as
well as goods, in their various forms. The investment opportunities worldwide are clearly
seized by the MNCs, which in a way, do act as agents for individual governments and
virtually carry out their policies. The current debate seems to emphasize the importance
of free movement of trade. Let us, in the following pages, critically review some of these
ideas which generally appear to command a reasonable degree of acceptance.
The Brandt Commission Report regards that, while bilateral reciprocity has value as a
bargaining device to secure improved access in protccted markets, the spread of this
phenomenon can still be a dangerous development. "Multinational balancing", the report
indicates, "is the only way to seek a recovery of world trade". [Brandt Commission
Report, 1983, p.108.] While the report emphasizes the negative effects of the
protectionist mood, and advocates the notion of free trade, an increasing number of
developing countries assume that competition is harmful and should be replaced, wherever
possible, by regulation and that collectives are preferred to individual venture. The
contradiction between the two sides of the argument is self—explanatory. Insofar as
protectionism plays a major obstacle to the Arab countries, whose natural path of
development would be to move from exporting products in primary form to the processed
one, the Arabs seem to be justified in their repeated calls against the protectionism of thc
western industrialised countries, geared to prevent any perceived competition from the
Third World countries. Particularly relevant to this, is the EC policy towards the GCC's
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petrochemical exports to Europe, which has erected high tariff barriers to protect its own
industry.
What is particularly striking is the fact that a double standard view seems to prevail when
particular trade policies arc evaluated, depending on whether these policies are meant to
address the problems of the developing or the developed countries. The west has always
maintained that, stable, orderly and predictable economic relations between the major
powers (U.S.A., Japan and The European Community) are necessary conditions for a
stable international economic order, and that such stability between these major powers
is the most valuable contribution they could make to the development of small countries
i.e. The Arab States. Much as this would sound appealing, one would rather tend to adopt
the argument that, the more the competition is between these major powers in the Arab
World markets (and the Third World Countries in general), the more it is likely that the
Third World would end up deriving more and more benefits. Competition, therefore, is
more conducive to the developing countries than the concerted policy agreed upon by and
among the major powers.
With all the variations among different regions and countries of the world in terms of
economic philosophies and regional aspirations, any concerted policy by a few countries
can only be geared to serve the interests of these few. An alternative way of tackling the
question of the international economic order, must be to broaden the degree of
representation in whatever organisation is empowered to consider the viable alternatives.
Practically, but also theoretically, there are no better candidates to assume such
responsibility than thc already established institutions of the U.N. Perhaps some carefully
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derived mandatory directives, supported with more vested authority, are all that is needed,
if concrete actions are to replace the sheer theoretical and academic efforts which have
been contemplated so far by these organisations.
Professor Lester, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, believes that "The postwar
trend of the world to be more and more economically integrated is bound to recede".
(The Economist, 9th November, 1985, p.21.) He articulates his views by referring to the
fact that the current degree of economic integration has out—turned the world's collective
political willingness to manage it. He also states that there are unsolved domestic
economic problems that can most easily be solved by the major powers each isolating
oneself from world trade. America faces a productivity problem, Europe unemployment,
and Japan faces a trade imbalance problem. Assuming Professor Lester was right, then
it would be natural to envisage a slowdown in the MNCs' activities in the Third World
in the years that followed. Apparently, there has been no evidence to support such
argument, at least during the past six to seven years prior to which the assertion was
originally made (1985).
For all such reasons, and many others relating to protection of national products and
resources, the individual western governments are more and more leaning towards
protectionist tendency. If the developed countries happened to resort to this strategy as
an ideal instrument to protect their own interests, then it will be economically but also
politically logical for the developing countries, the Arab States among them, to turn to the
same defensive weapon. They might even be more justified to do so given the fact that
they would probably be harming nobody in the process. Moreover, they might be
stepping towards the right direction by attempting to lay the appropriate foundation of
their future development of their own resources. After all, they arc bound to start one day
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and somewhere. The appropriate time seems to be now, and perhaps the starting step
should be to consider the sectors in which they most enjoy comparative advantages by
virtue of their abundant natural resources. That makes a great deal of sense insofar as
they will eventually have sovereignty over their resources and the control of their own
destination. Such policies are bound to result in positive responses of different sectors
of industry and agriculture and make it possible to rectify what Dr. K. al—Fayez (1986)
refers to as:
"an unusual situation in which the expenditure by the Gulf governments stimulates returns
not in their own domestic economies, but in the economies of those countries which
provide the goods and services needed for infrastructural development in the Gulf".
In opposition of trade barriers, the official statement endorsed by GATT in 1984 reads as
follows:—
"It is difficult to reconcile some discriminatory measures taken by the European countries,
at least with the spirit of GATT."
Guesses have been made that non—tariff barriers affect close to half of the world trade.
Repeated studies have bccn always concerned about the creeping protectionism which has
characterised the European countries' trade policies in recent years. One such report
argues that:
"the cost of quota restrictions and higher tariffs are likely to outweigh any expected
benefits." [World Economic Outlook, IMF, 1984.]
3.5	 The Arabs : Past and Present
Many Arab writers nostalgically keep referring to their glorious past during which the
Arab nation was a dominant force worldwide. The ancient Arab Technology is repeatedly
mentioned in this respect, implicating that the Arab nation will hopefully revive its past
glories one day and be once again in the forefront of the world nations. In fact some
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-people are so adamant in their belief that history will repeat itself and that the Arabs still
have every chance of being among the world leaders in more than one respect.
Donald R Hill [Arab Affairs, Winter 1986/871 argues that:
"the irrigation system in the province of Valencia (Spain) is substantially the same today
as it was when the Muslims departed. The many words of Arabic origin in modern
Spanish, relating to irrigational matters, bear eloquent witness to the influence of Arab
ideas in this technology. Many other examples are frequently mentioned: dams built
across rivers, providing insight into the skills and methods of the Arab hydraulic
engineers; mills operating by ebb tide in the 10th century, about a century before the first
known appearance of tidal mills in Europe. The 10th—century Arab philosopher Al—Farabi
is mentioned in connection with arithmetic and algebra. Other examples include the
14th—century Egyptian scholar AL—Qalgashandi and his contributions to the construction
of large buildings, optics, burning mirrors, centres of gravity, surveying, the discovery of
(hidden) water, moving of heavy weights ... etc."
Samir Arnin looks at the Arab past civilisation from a rather different angle, introducing
the "commerce and trade" dimension. His views in this respect are based on what he
refers to as a
"civilization generated from surpluses coming from the products of its long distant trade."
"In return", he argues "Arab commercial prosperity affected Arab agricultural
development and enabled it to progress significantly, at least in certain areas at certain
times." [Amin, 1983, pp.12-13.]
A contrast of the past with the present time situation is called for here. One is tempted
to assert that, while surpluses in the past were well benefited of, the Arabs of today have
apparently failed to make much use of their 1970s oil surpluses in furthering their often
talked about aspirations of reviving their past glories. Today, the technological
development seems to be the key factor in any development, and hence every attention
and effort ought to be exerted in directing a considerable portion of the proceedings of
their resources to grasp and develop modern technology and closing the wide gap in this
rcspcct between themselves and the industrialised world.
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1Sincc MNCs are our major concern in this study, the question remains: is there any
alternative recourse before the Arabs to relying upon the MNCs in their quest for
technology acquisition? The answer to this vital question seems to be far from
commanding consensus. While people like Agami place particular emphasis on MNCs
as a major mover of technology, a great deal of Arab scholars tend to place their faith on
the Arab autoccntric development and self—reliant strategies.
"The major force of independent Arab development" argues Ahmed S. Nofal "will come
from the Arab States and not outside them. This will not happen unless Arab funds return
from foreign markets, joint—Arab projects are set up, economic integration between Arab
States is established and our natural resources are brought under our control". [Arab
Affairs, Spring 1987, p.117.]
3.6	 Government, Nationalism and The International Economic Order
Western economists always argue that the developing countries have much to lose from
an increase in economic nationalism. Such argument is based on the proposition that, as
their weight in the world economy has increased, so too has their interest in, and their
responsibility for, a liberal international economic order. In trying to adapt this simple
argument to the Arab world as it stands today, one could emphasize the importance of
Arab nationalism and the economic role it could play in furthering the Arabs' economic
development. In fact the success associated with a coordinated and concerted Arab move
will be in no way different from that previously achieved by others in similar situations.
The Japanese success, and also that of Europe, are at least partially attributed to one kind
or another of economic nationalism. To rule out the role of nationalism in any
forthcoming economic breakthrough in the Arab world, will be to suggest that what
proved to be positive and effective for the industrialised countries in the past, cannot be
so for the Arab World today. Articulation of such hypothetical argument will require a
great deal of imagination and a considerable degree of reasoning. That is something
which is yet to be seen.
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The role of Governments is also a source of controversy. Some people would argue that,
"in the past the government was widely valued as an instrument to resolve problems;
today government itself is widely viewed as the problem". It is our view that to
generalise such a view, on a developing region such as the Arab World, would be a call
to forgo the benefits of pursuing a gradual evolution, with the implication of having to
face the risk of squeezing different stages into one, in an attempt to arrive at the target
destination earlier than would be possible if a natural evolution process is to be allowed.
There seems to be a common misperception, sometimes a harmful one, in the minds of
a great number of western writers and analysts, who tend to overlook the fact that what
is good for the western companies is not necessarily so for the Third World companies.
The essential role of the governments in the Arab world, and indeed in the Third World
countries, in almost every walk of economic, social and political life of their people and
their economics can hardly be overemphasized. In the words of Sir John Harvey James,
the former Chairman of ICI [January 1988], "The cliché that the world is a single market
is in reality not true". Each market requires different responses and it is the ability to
read and apply that response which actually matters.
It was Richard Robinson who said that "different national sovereignties generate different
legal, monetary and political systems" [Robinson 1978, p. 19]. Each legal system implies
a unique set of relevant rights and obligations in relation to property, taxation, control,
monopoly, business organisation and contract. These in turn require the firm to consider
new policies, in the sense of being different from that required in a purely domestic
setting. It is evident that many less developed countries have less faith in the capacity
of foreign private business — in effect, the MNCs — to satisfy national objectives.
"No contemporary nation—state will tolerate unlimited penetration by an alien enterprise
in which control is vested in a management headquartered in another nation—state and
making decisions possibly insensitive to the allocational priorities of the host country".
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[Ibid, p. 7] There is no reason to assume that any part of the Arab World could be an
exception to this widely accepted perception.
3.7	 Future of MNCs in the Arab World
Louis Turner has, a long time ago (1973), argued that:
"the time is not far off when the underdeveloped countries will become net importers of
primary products and new exporters of manufactures".
Now that we are approaching the turn of the century, and judging by the progress
witnessed by some Third World countries, and most notably the newly industrialised
countries, one can only admit that Turner proved to have demonstrated an unmistakable
farsightedness. What seems to be even more likely, in yet a few more years to come, is
probably a combination of "more of the same" trend in the existing NICs, together with
the likelihood of more and more of the Third World countries joining the list of the N1Cs.
While it will be premature at this stage to speculate on the time dimension, it will not be
too overoptimistic to predict, with a reasonable dcgrce of confidence, the possibility of
some three to four countries of the Arab World being well among the newcomers, in the
not too distant future.
In view of the increasing tendency among the Third World scholars to advocate the idea
of strengthening the interaction through the so—called South—South Trade, it may be
argued that, an increase of exports of manufacture of NICs to other developing countries
will eventually reduce the extent of dependence of the developing countries on the
industrialised world, hence the MNCs originated there. Malcolm H. Dunn and Hciko
Korner [Khan, 1986, p.119] have dealt with this. They demonstrated the striking example
of the growing exports of Volkswagen cars manufactured in Brazil and argued against the
original assumption.
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"The growing exports of V.W. from Brazil to other developing countries" they claim,
"represents no reduction in the dependence of the developing countries upon the industrial
countries and the IC multinationals. Rather, the dependence from goods imports (in this
case vehicle imports from F.R., of Germany) is replaced by a new dependence."
The trade—off between exporting technology and transferring it for acquisition by the
beneficiary developing country is an important matter to exercise. It appears reasonable
to assume that while exports by MNCs could be seen as no more than a temporary
short—term balancing of the (Arab) countries' requirements, the supply of technology for
acquisition would rather been seen as long—term investment, hence long—term partnership.
Opinions of individual Arab States can nevertheless be divided, depending, of course, on
the natural differences in perceptions, judgment and political idealogies. While some
Arab states will welcome this type of long—term relationships, others will rather prefer to
see them within the context of one—off contacts during which they can gradually attempt
to build up their own technological capabilities, perhaps via learning by doing. The
misgivings which arc usually associated with dependency on others, and the necessity to
control and contain its influence, have been a major concern of many quarters in the
Arab World. Samir Amin predicts the acceleration of dependent development in the oil
producing Arab States.
According to Amin, even the attempt of some countries, such as Algeria and Iraq, to carry
out an integrated industrialisation, based on capital goods and consumption industry,
would involve advanced capitalist technologies and would run into the problem of finding
foreign outlets if expansion was to continue. It is the author's view that, this particular
type of dependency is not all that harmful, so long as the only viable alternative is to
resort to investing abroad in order to draw dividends, as is clearly the case for the Gulf
oil producing states. After all, the foreign outlets could well be within the Arab region,
which in itself meets the target of the Arab regional integration. If an Arab state depends
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on another within the Arab world in order to meet its own needs, then the situation which
arises from such interaction is one that we would rather call "integration" as opposed to
"dependency", as could be implied by Amin.
As for the manufacturing sector in the Arab World, R. Agami concluded that since 95 per
cent of his survey participants indicated that tvfliCs' participation should not be prevented,
then that confirms the general commitment of the Arab elites to industrialisation and
explains their criticism that the MNCs have tended to stay away from that sector and to
confine themselves to extractive industries. Whilst one agrees with the first proposition
(commitment to industrialisation), the criticism against the MNCs is clearly misplaced.
In fact one can hardly envisage a MNC declining an invitation by any developing country,
so long as the required services arc profitable. It should also be stated here that the
MNCs involved in extractive industries arc different in the nature of their operations from
that of manufacturing industry. They arc not necessarily integrated companies which
combine between different activities, some of which they refrain from in favour of some
others. In fact it is the individual country's own choice which determines the particular
path of development depending, of course, on a number of various factors - such as the
availability of raw materials in the right quantity and quality, together with labour costs
and the size and extent of the market. The blame is therefore to be laid on the shoulders
of individual Arab states and not on the MNCs.
Morris A. Adelman argues that:
"Multinationals will survive and prosper, though not as much as in the past, because their
know-how is, and will remain, a valuable asset." [Kindleberger and Andrctsch, 19831.
While future development of the MNCs in the Arab World, as indeed elsewhere, is by no
means certain, one can only agree with the above proposition insofar as the short-term
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foreseeable future is concerned. As for the long—term view, it is hard to see the MNCs
prospering. Oil MNCs are already witnessing a declining trend in their historical power
in the area. National oil companies have already taken over most of the roles previously
assumed by the multinationals. This leads us to suggest that, apart from assuming
marketing and distribution roles, there seems to be no more power left before the
traditionally strong oil MNCs. There is, however, little doubt that even with regard to the
MNCs outside the oil industry, the same prediction can hold true with a reasonable degree
of confidence. There is an increasingly rising awareness of the need for self reliance
coupled with an equally strong feeling in favour of improving the bargaining power on
the part of the Arab governments and companies alike (improvement in management skills
and built—up experience). Such developments have already contributed in shaping a new
type of mentality which is naturally akin to weaken the foreign companies' strength.
While the vast majority of the Arab governments are far from being hostile to foreign
companies and their influential role in shaping the process of economic development in
their countries, the professional people, who at the end of the day are those who arc
closely associated with the day—to—day running of their country's economies, arc growing
more and more cautious towards MNCs' influence. The general trend does suggest that
before very long the MNCs will be gradually losing their momentum, as their policies will
no longer be endorsed unchecked. The question to be raised is thus related to one of
timing of the end of multinationals' domination, rather than being one of whether or not
they will continue to be prosperous in the Arab World. This view, however, clearly
contradicts John Dunning's contention that:
"no longer is the control of foreign investment the main political issue, as it was in the
period of fast growth of the sixties and early seventies. In many countries new investment
is more likely to come from foreign multinationals than from domestic companies.
Therefore the main issue of the eighties seems to be the struggle of nation states for an
adequate share in the investment cake, which multinational corporations are still
distributing". [Dunning, 1985, p.75.]
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3.8
	 Multinationals and the "Dependency Theory"
Within the framework of the "dependency theory", some ideas, mainly prompted by it
and based on its theoretical foundation, seem to contradict themselves. Since the location
of the Arab World is one concern of this study, one is keen to explore what different
theories attach to the importance or otherwise of any country's or region's location
regarding its connection with the MNCs. Dudley Seers (1983) refers to locational
disadvantage being one of his stipulated four categories when he tackles the possibilities
of the "room to manoeuvre". The closer a developing country is to an industrialised one
the more dependent the former will be on the latter. Nobody doubts the effect of
location on a country's quest for self—reliance but in what way? It should not be
forgotten, however, that it is also true to argue that the closer a country is to those more
developed, the lower the costs of transportation, especially if there arc overland forcign
routes. This makes it easier for its exports to compete in neighbouring markets; but, as
already said, it also encourages dependence on imports. It may be reasonably safe to
assume here that all depends on the degree of development achieved and the extent to
which a developing country perceives its imports and exports. If a region, such as the
Arab World, is so concerned about exporting (raw materials or products) rather than
importing, which is the case at least in a great number of the Arab countries, then
closeness (location) to the developed world could be seen as an advantage. Otherwise,
it will remain dependent as long as it is incapable of exploiting its resources to the stage
whereby they can be exportable. Some kind of analogy is to be sought here to establish
the link between the above analysis and the geographical location of the Arab World's
many countries, particularly those within a close proximity to Europe, notwithstanding the
Mediterranean Sea, which acts as a natural geographical barrier. Going back to D. Seer's
theory about the room to manoeuvre, the vast majority of the Arab countries have
virtually no room to manoeuvre since they arc more or less under the limitation of a small
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population, ethnic dimensions, closeness to industrial Europe, have a culturally subverted
bureaucracy, high consumer expectations and a narrow technological base. The question
we need to raise here is: so what? Does it necessarily mean that these countries are
doomed to be prisoners of their powerful neighbours and are bound to stay so without
even attempting to seek ways and means to pursue their own strategies, leading them to
independent paths of development? The author's instinct is that theories such as these
sometimes overlook the overriding need to come up with alternative scenarios as to how
to face the perceived dilemma. Moreover, they should not be seen as though they do
suggest that all routes arc blocked and that no signs of hope for improvement arc within
sight. It is not so much that theories of this nature arc foundless, but they might be
inappropriate in the context of the developing countries, although not necessarily so within
the framework and experience of the western world in which they have originated.
Regarding the bargaining position of the MNCs, D. Seers postulates that a Multinational
Company will make few concessions, depending on how badly it actually wants to invest
in a given country. Many of the Arab oil producing countries are attractive in a number
of respects, a fact which in itself suggests that more concessions can be forced on the
foreign companies. To go by this theory will lead us to believe that the Arab host
countries are in a relatively favourable position, compared to other developing countries,
regarding the concessional terms they can expect to gain in their relationship with MNCs.
In reality, no evidence seems to support such proposition, as we shall find out in some
detail later on. Apparently no serious attempts have as yet been made on the part of the
Arab countries to exert pressures on the MNCs. It is the authors view that the extent to
which an individual Arab country is prepared to resort to exerting such pressure, is a
function, not so much of its degree of attractiveness it possesses, but of its perception —
economic and political — of the likely outcome of foreign participation and its
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implications on domestic development strategies. The political orientation of an individual
government has also its obvious reflection on the degree of concession a ?ANC is expected
to offer. Libya's success, back in the early 1970s, to exert pressures on oil MNCs, and
the subsequent nationalisation of these companies under the tactful slogan of participation,
could be a case in point. Quazi-socialist governments are known to be concerned about
strengthening their bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with foreign
companies, and the Arab World is by no means an exception from this generally pursued
pattern.
3.9	 Weaknesses of The Arab Industrial Policies
Different Arab scholars and academicians have always taken a critical view of the way
the Arab industrialisation has proceeded in the aftermath of the independence era. Most
of their criticism is focused on the tendency of the Arab capital to seek risk-free
investment outside the Arab market. Professor A. S. Nofal believes that "western
countries have mtvcinased obstacles with a view to guaranteeing plentifid Arab investment
in their institutions". [Arab Affairs, Summer 1987, p.126.] Government bureaucracy and
widespread maladministration, together with weaknesses inherited in local financial
institutions, are always cited as discouraging factors, but no-one is to believe that foreign
markets are free of these failings. S. Amin has also argued along the same lines,
suggesting and advocating the Arab autocentric development option. Ainin's strongest
criticism has been against what he calls the defeatist (passive) attitude among the Arab
countries towards the necessity of what he refers to as "technological autonomy", which
is seen to be either quite impossible or a mere expression of cultural nationalism, rather
than a social and economic necessity. "This disarticulation", Amin argues, "is further
accentuated by development plans articulated around industrialisation for export".
[Amin, 1982, p.76.1
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Industrialisation in the Arab World, and the full analysis of the present policies and future
development strategics being pursued, will be the subject matter of chapter 6.
3.10 Arab World's Capital Markets
The question on Arab capital markets has been intensively posed over the last decade and
has hardly been overlooked. Literature coverage reveals a particularly growing concern
over this issue among the Arabs in the financial and banking fields, as well as among
Arab strategists and economic analysts. It is not an over—simplification of analysis to
suggest that, there is what amounts to be a consensus agreement on the need to develop
capital markets within the Arab countries even to the point of withdrawing money
deposited in international banking. It was Dr. Saddy of Saudi Olayan Group of companies
who once advised that:
"since it is their (Arab's) money that the international multinational banks have
squandered so far, a carefully executed plan calls for lessening this risk by gradually
increasing the OPEC countries' direct access to their deposits" [Journal of Arab Bankers
Association, August 1983].
Some ten years ago, Arab financial institutions began to establish themselves in Europe
and the U.S.A. London, which now hosts an increasing number of these institutions is
by far the most attractive of the world financial centres. Such calls have always been
resisted by the western institutions, on the grounds that any substantial withdrawal of
deposits from the international banking system, would accentuate the liquidity problems
the system is facing, coupled with the over exaggerated difficulties of establishing
sophisticated capital markets in the Arab World. It is the author's view that many of these
perceived difficulties have been already contained or put under reasonable control, and
that some others arc successfully overcome. Inadequate structure, repeatedly referred to
in the past, has been reasonably dealt with, at least in the oil rich Arab States. Different
skills are acquired, commercial laws constituted and reconciliation between Islamic and
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western commercial laws became possible. Moreover, the joint stock concept which was
once alien to Arab culture is no longer so. What then remains is essentially no more than
a determined commitment to the cause of establishing regionai financial institutions to
take over the work of foreign financial institutions operating in the Arab World. Financial
joint institutions among Arab countries, who constitute the Arab league, have already
started to bear fruit. /
./
3.11 The Arab Multinational Corporations
The main conclusion of the Vienna conference, in September 1986, which was organized
by the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting, in association with the Geneva based
Consultant, "Business International" was that "the end of the oil boom is a positive
development for the Gulf region". In fact this very conclusion has repeatedly been
expressed in a number of writings contributed to by different Arab elites, who generally
believe that more realistic attitudes towards development priorities have been created in
the aftermath of the oil recession. The foreign MNCs' established role in the past is now
under assessment, with a view to limiting the effects of their excessive profits realised
primarily due to the poorly managed oil surpluses. More efficient techniques of
management and sound economical paths of development are clearly the order of the day.
Only in a stable and predictable market can long—term strategies be worked out, and this
has been possible only recently, following the end of the oil boom. Re—assessment of the
partnership with foreign companies is apparently under way, with a view to realising and
recognising the importance of the transfer of technology and technical know—how —
slowly but surely.
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Whilst it is premature to suggest that the Arab MNCs are now in a position to assume the
role of foreign MNCs, one is reasonably justified in envisaging their positive future role
in the development process that the region is embarking on.
Reginald H. Green [Khan, 1986, p.54] has argued that the Third World's MNCs are
quantitatively insignificant but, with the exception of two categories, one of which is Arab
Multinationals which, according to him, are substantial in number, range of activities, and
capital deployed. One, however, remains cautiously optimistic about their future
development while one also looks forward to the possibility of success, even though they
are still in their infancy stage. The emergence of Arab MNCs in itself can reveal a great
deal about the future of foreign MNCs operating in the area.
3.12 Importance of Cooperation between the Arab States
Hardly does one review an article or a book written by Arabs on their affairs which does
not emphasize, in one degree or another, the need for cooperation among individual Arab
States. Repeated calls for joint Arab bargaining with MNCs arc noted to have been
particularly emphasized recently. The much talked about joint cooperation necessarily
entails joint development of technology, product, process designs, joint preemptive
investment strategies, joint planning and overseeing of world and local developments
affecting the Arab economies.
3.13 Critique of San* Amin's Analysis on the Arab Economic Development
While Amin's views embracing "Arab autoccntric development" generally command a
wide degree of sympathy within Arab circles, some of his analysis arc bound to provoke
controversy, and occasionally invite criticism, from some quarters. One such view can
be, to take one example, what he calls "Primitive Communism", referring to the traditional
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practices of the masses. His insistence on the overriding need to brcak the family and its
tradition in order to develop individualism, and free him from the chains of tradition, does
not particularly conform to the present Arab World as it stands today. Family traditions
are, in fact, the basis on which any further Arab unity — of which Amin is so much
concerned — can be rcalised. His calls for the reinforcement of small merchant
production, at the expense of collective forms, also contradicts his own views on
socialism. The whole idea of breaking the family traditions seems to make it difficult for
us to adjust our thinking to his repeated call for Arab cooperation and unity. If the
smaller elements of the system (family) are not united, then how could we expect unity
among disintegrated parts? Would it not be more logical to start the unity process at the
smaller circles, first before larger ones are contemplated? As Aidan Foster—Carter [Amin,
1982, p.181 has rightly questioned in his analysis to Amin's works, it would also be
difficult to sce who can be the agent of the transformation Amin repeatedly calls for.
Amin also takes a strong view against the tendency of the Arab countries to promote
export—oriented industry, which further accentuates their costly dependency, and to the
great detriment of Arab autoccntric development. While such views arc generally
accepted, one should not lose sight of the practical difficulties of relying entirely on
import—substitution to the extent of neglecting the need to export, and thus forgoing all
the advantages of having access to foreign currency that goes with it.
An alternative option to be considered could be a scenario of a gradual de—linking
whereby the oil rich Arab States arc to proceed with their export industrics bascd on the
exploitation of their natural resources (essentially minerals), given that domestic or cvcn
regional (Arab) markets arc not sizcablc enough to absorb the locally manufactured
products i.e. petrochemicals and other oil—related products. The rest of the Arab world
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can then base their industries on import—substituting manufacture while at the same time
receiving assistance from the oil states with regard to their needs, which cannot be met
without resorting to imports. Gradually, the oil exporting countries can rid themselves
from the control of the MNCs over marketing. Such arrangements between the resource
rich and poor Arab countries are bound to create a situation whereby their interests will
be strongly interlinked. The resulting convergence of common interests is not only
desired, but also necessary, if the potentiality of the economic integration between the
countries of the Arab World is ever to become a reality. It is only by spreading the
benefits to which the oil proceeds are put, among the entire region, that one can envisage
a way out of the dilemma which It Agami refers to as "The oil enclave". Agami rightly
stipulates that the oil industry tended to be an enclave in the natural economy of its Arab
producers and as such, the industry was not integrated with the rest of the economy.
Among a long list of possible reasons for this state of affairs, the lack of coherent strategy
agreed upon to cooperate and coordinate with the rest of the Arab World must remain the
most obvious of all.
On the other hand, Amin speaks of yet another enclave which in this case is "agricultural
enclave". He stipulates that major progress in agricultural productivity is inconceivable
without heavy investment in irrigation and mechanisation. Let us now turn back to our
original proposition of encouraging the export—orientated industries in the oil rich states
in order to provide capital needed to support different projects and investments in the
non—oil Arab countries. There seems to be no way out of the dilemma of increasing
dependence on foreign MNCs, except by financing modernisation of an enclave
agriculture in countrics such as Sudan, Morocco and Egypt. Only by so doing can the
Arab World rid themselves from the control imposcd on them by the world system
dominated by MNCs. The autoccntric Pan—Arab development will then have moved a
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stage further, by crossing the threshold of empty slogans and transferring hopes and
aspirations of economic unity into reality.
3.14 The Eclectic Theory : Its application in the Arab Context
The "Eclectic Theory of foreign Direct Investment" postulates that "the propensity of a
country's enterprise for engaging in foreign direct investment is determined by ownership,
internalisation and locational advantages that are available to them, as compared to other
nations, and that foreign direct investment of a developing nation is a function of its stage
of economic development". [Kumar and McLeod, 1981.]
The markets in developing countries, according to Dunning, induce entrepreneurs to
develop "small—scale, labour intensive processes and products". What a careful reviewer
of the "Eclectic Theory" senses, is that the premises on which it is based, and the concern
it appears to express, arc the presumption that foreign direct investment for the developing
countries is an overriding necessity, and probably a precondition, for their development.
It is the author's view that this assumption is not relevant to the Arab World. Neither
does it square with the views of the majority of the Arab development and political
academicians for that matter, as our own Gulf survey has clearly established. The
advocates of Arab autoccntric development are obviously not quite keen on foreign
investment of their resources, even if some advantages could be associated with such
trends. Foreign investments, as opposed to domestic ones, may reflect a drainage on a
developing country's resources, and also increase the involvement of MNCs, and their
influence and control on such investments outside the borders of the investing country.
The example of Kuwait's foreign investments, based outside Kuwait, which are meant to
diversify sources of income and reinvest the proceeds of oil exports for future generations,
is worth assessment, but it might be too early to do that, given that the experience is still
in its infancy.
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The question of developing countries' inclination to labour—intensive processes and
products is also debatable. The evidence in the Arab World, and particularly in the oil
producing countries, seems to reveal a tendency to engage in technology—intensive
industries — be it petrochemicals, cement, aluminium or other extractive industries. Not
only arc many of the Arab Gulf States under—populated and lack sufficient indigenous
manpower to cater for their ambitious development programmes, but also most of these
projects they have embarked on are technology—intensive by their very nature. One can
then dispute the proposition of labour intensiveness being a characteristic of developing
countries, which apparently is taken for granted among an increasing number of writers
on MNCs.
Kuwait, as noted earlier, has embarked on a series of foreign direct (and indirect)
investments and on a scale unprecedented in terms of the percentage of foreign investment
to G.D.P. While a large proportion of its investment is directed to financial portfolios,
it can be said that Kuwait's model has little to lend itself to the Eclectic Theory as far as
its three major elements (ownership, internalisation and locational advantages) are
concerned. Nor has Kuwait reached such a stage of development advanced enough to
make its foreign investment a model against which the Eclectic Theory can be testified.
The underlying factor remaining is the financial surpluses which were drawn from the oil
proceedings during the 1970s, to which the domestic market was — and still is — not big
enough to absorb. Foreign investment must not, however, be seen as an end in itself, and
should not be necessarily seen as a sign of success or good management of economic
affairs and be encouraged accordingly. Kuwait's experience should only be taken as an
example of a country opting for a temporary solution outside its national or regional
borders, due to the absence of viable alternative options to turn to. It is in fact ironic, and
in a way pitiful, that the bulk of the Arab oil exporting states' financial surpluses are not
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held within the Arab World. It is particularly so at such a time when the Arab deficit
countries arc forced to look for aid and capital inflows elsewhere outside their borders.
The long-term prospects must always be in internalising rather than externalising the use
of natural resources and any returns resulting from their exploitation. An encouraging
example of the internalisation of various factors of production among the Arab countries,
is the movement of private and public capital, as well as that of labour force among the
countries of the Arab World. In fact, this phenomenon could be considered to be the only
two domains in which some sort of achievement has been realised regarding the long
heralded economic cooperation among the Arab States. It could always be argued that
the movement of these two resources (capital and man-power) should become a powerful
force for integration, and a promising step forwards towards economic integration.
3.15 The Role of Agricultural Sector in the Arab World
According to the former Arab League's Secretary General, Chedli Kai:
"There has been a five per cent rise in agricultural output in the Arab States recently.
Nevertheless, most Arab states are still a long way from achieving self-sufficiency in
food". [CAABU Bulletin, No. 18, 1st October, 1987.]
To deal with food problems in the future, the ideal strategy for the Arab World to pursue
will be nothing less than the "Sudan bread-basket strategy" agreed on in principle some
fifteen years ago. Recently Saudi Arabia has adopted an agricultural strategy whereby its
farmers arc guaranteed financial incentives to grow wheat harvest even to the point of
incurring losses to be met by the government. While it will be hard to see the economic
logic in growing wheat in Saudi Arabia, given the scarcity of water and the high cost of
production, the argument is one of preparing for self-sufficiency in the years ahead.
Some people argue that it is by far better for the Arab countries to incur losses today in
order to create a situation whereby the use of technology that goes with large-scale
agricultural projects, and the process of learning by doing, will eventually lead to profits
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and also make self—sufficiency a reality. Atif A. Kubursi argues that only industrial
experience develops skill and expertise. "A factory", according to him, "is much better
than a school when it comes to the learning process". [Arab Affairs, Winter 1987/1988,
p.41.] Additional benefits are to be sought in terms of value added income as well as
as in the fact that the factories are the best carriers of technology. What remains to be
considered is the question of allocating geographical priorities in such a way that
comparative advantages enjoyed by each individual Arab countries ought to be benefited
of in the best possible way. While some countries of the Arab World have the potential
agricultural resources which are abandoned, owing to the lack of capital and the
technological capabilities, i.e. Sudan, the process of directing financial resources to invest
in the potentially resource poor countries, i.e. wheat cropping projects in Saudi Arabia,
does not appear to make economic sense.
3.16 Lessons drawn from the Arab interaction with the global economy
The Arab World, being an integral part of the Third World, must have enriched its own
experience through its familiarity, created via contacts, with different experiences
demonstrated in various parts of the Third World, as well as the industrialised one. The
question to be addressed should be about the extent to which the Arabs can draw on the
experiences of others in more or less similar circumstances. A number of models can be
cited here to serve as rudimentary examples to simulate.
The example of China and Cuba demonstrated the possibility of having own companies
originated locally as a possible answer to the autocentric approach. To what extent can
such models be repeated in the quest for doing without the help of the multinationals?
Louis Turner (1973), argued that, "this is certainly possible despite the economic cost
involved".
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So long as some Arab countries are financially able, at least they can opt for the transfer
of technology by direct purchase of sophisticated machinery, as opposed to licensed
agreements, which might imply too much dependence on IvE N:Cs. Theoretically this can
be made possible, given that a long—term strategy of gradual delinking can be agreed and
acted upon. In view of the increasing demand for advanced education and training, and
the emergence of an increasing number of experienced technicians, economists, managers,
etc, the relative importance of management contracts customarily arranged in conjunction
with foreign MNCs, will probably witness a declining trend. Similarly, one can also look
up to the Japanese and the newly industrialised countries. In the words of Richard S.
Newfarrner "Perhaps the most persuasive case for seeing MNCs as the institutionalisation
of technological dependence, comes from the experience of Japan, which did not permit
the establishment of multinational companies subsidiaries", [Skully, 19781.
One would also add that the Japanese, who transformed themselves into aggressive world
leaders in a number of industries, could not have been in their present strength had U.S.
and European MNCs been allowed to control technology—intensive industries in Japan,
as they did elsewhere in the world. It is the author's view that the analogy with the Arab
World is not irrelevant. The question which must be posed is: If Japan did it in such a
short term, what is it that makes it so impossible for the Arabs to follow suit? Many
factors could be mentioned in support of seeking a common ground and establishing the
basis for comparison:—
—
Arab nationalism could well correspond to Japanese nationalism, heralded to be
a strong contributing factor in the Japanese success and their technological
superiority.
—
Huge collective natural resources in the Arab World — as against almost non in
Japan. The Arab countries are clearly in a comparatively advantageous position
regarding the availability of abundant natural resources, in terms of both variety
and quantity.
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- Availability of abundant funds to finance R & D.
- Improvement in educational standards and technical and management skills
accumulated through continued contact with western technology and familiarity
and acquaintance with foreign patterns of development and the world economic
system at large.
- The well heralded, and much talked about, self-reliance and independence from
the outside influence of the MNCs.
All of which could well be capitalised on in the attempt to follow the footsteps of other
countries, such as Japan or the South Eastern Asian NICs. Relative advantages enjoyed
by different Arab countries will have to be carefully exploited, and the scattered
uncoordinated efforts by different Arab countries mobilized to optimal levels. Gradual
introduction of tight policies to curtail the negative effects of foreign investments, will
always be among the tempting options before the Arab World to consider.
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CHAPTER 4
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP
TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT THEORIES
4.1	 Introduction
This chapter attempts to provide a theoretical and conceptual framework for an analytical
discussion, to follow in subsequent chapters, of some selected aspects of MNCs.
Questions relating to the relevance of economic theory to explain their emergence, their
structural and functional characteristics and their operational relevance for strategies of
collective self—reliance, are the subject of analysis, as are the practices and policies
pursued both by MNCs and the Arab host countries towards each other.
Geromy Clegg [1987, pp.164-165] has traced the theory of MNE as "a process
originating with the industrial organisation approach". This analysis was over—influenced
by the power of a single source country, the U.S.A. and was committed to the explanation
of the MNE as the product of concentrated market structure alone.
Internationalisation commonly takes place in activities when the external costs of
transferring knowledge or intermediate products are high. As the rights to such items are
traded, such rights could be termed "ownership advantages", the concept of which is
introduced by the "Eclectic Theory" of Direct Foreign Investment (DFI), which determines
the direction of international competition by establishing the link between the national
origin of a particular firm, to the generation of ownership and other locational advantages,
and determining thus the least cost location of international production.
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4.2	 Concepts and Definitions
4.2.1 Multinational Corporation (or Company)
Different people use different terms in their reference to the multinational
companies in general, but the terms Multinational Company (MNC or MNE) and
Transnational Corporation (TNC) are the most commonly used, albeit
synonymously, to mean the same thing. The survey of literature indicates that
there are almost as many definitions of MNCs as there are published papers, and
that there is little or no consensus as to a definition.
Multinationals are defined by OECD (1977) as:
"Companies or entities whose ownership is private, state or mixed, established in
different countries and so linked that one or more of them may be able to exercise
significant influence over the activities of others and, in particular, to share
knowledge and resources with others".
A Transnational Corporation (TNC) invests in more than one country and has a
common management sharing information and resources within the company.
Because TNCs have a home country—base where many functions arc centralised,
the term transnational is more accurate than the commonly used "multinational".
Toyota President, Mr. Shoichiru Toyoda sees multinationals as:
"Companies which can make the best use of manpower, capital and goods all
around the world". [The Economist, June 24, 1989, p.81.]
A stricter definition distinguishes multinational firms from those with overseas
subsidiaries by the amount of control their regional operating units have over their
own R & D, product development and investment plans. In fact, a MNC is
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usually a large undertaking which controls a number of subsidiaries in several
countries and whose strategy and organisational structures arc conceived globally.
The closer one gets to the Third World and the U.N., the more likely such
companies will be called "Transnationals" on the basis that they operate across
("trans") national boundaries, without really being owned or managed by people
from many ("multi") nations. "Multinational" is then used (occasionally) to
describe companies, owned by a number of countries (usually by governments).
According to the United Nations, 'multinational firm' is defined as:
"an enterprise that owns production or service facilities in one or more countries
other than the one in which it is based".
As this definition is undoubtedly less restrictive than those which arc generally
used in studies of American and European Corporations, it would be the one on
which this study dwells as and when it refers to the terminologies of MNCs or
TNCs, which may be used synonymously throughout the whole work.
4.2.2 Technology Transfer/diffusion
The concept of technology we have used throughout is a broad one. It has two
parts: the first consists of all kinds of tools, machines, vehicles, buildings, etc.,
while the second part comprises all kinds of knowledge required for the use,
maintenance, repair, production, change and innovation of the first part. We may
refer to the two parts respectively, either as "hardware" and "software", or as
"equipment" and "technological knowledge".
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In the literature and in economic analysis, equipment is usually referred to as
'capital goods', because it is the physical form in which money capital and labour
value accumulate in industry and infrastructure. Thus to sum up, our definition
of technology comprises capital goods and skills (including managerial, financial,
marketing, process and product know—how, institutional and organisational know—
how).
The process of spreading the product or process innovation from the innovating
firm to other firms in the national economy, is called "technology diffusion".
However, the spreading of new technology within a single country is one thing
and its spreading among countries is another. The transfer of technological know—
how across national boundaries, i.e. "technology transfer", is not the same as
diffusion of new technology within a single country. Diffusion of new technology
is a more predictable and smoother process than technology transfer.
Technology transfer in the case of the Arab World will, in this study, cover most
of the countries' trade in capital equipment, whether industrial, transport,
agricultural or communications. This indicates that technology transfer, as used
in this study, is broadly defined, and as will become clear from the analysis, this
definition is wider in its coverage than that allowed for in the U.N. Code of
Conduct on the transfer of technology. According to the draft code of U.N.,
technology transfer is defined as:—
"the transfer of production, management or marketing technologies by any means"
and does not cxtcnd to transactions involving only the sale of goods. In fact,
given that the largest number of the Arab countries have not yet completed their
economic infrastructures, such an exclusion of capital goods will deprive a large
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part of their imports of manufactured goods, such as those related to power—
generation, construction, transport, communication and other infrastructure
activities, from the favourable impact of the code.
The transfer of technology is appropriate if based on a selection of what is suitable
and supported by the capacity and ability to apply, adapt and improve it. When
those conditions — or most of them — are met, the operation is referred to as a
"vertical transfer" of technology, if not, it is known as "horizontal transfer". It is
evident, however, that most, if not all, technology transfer this study has addressed
itself to, in the context of the Arab World, is of the first type, i.e. vertical.
4.2.3 Joint Ventures
As this terminology is frequently used in this study, it might be worthwhile to
clearly define what it means. The expression is commonly used in multinational
contractual or investment arrangements, but is rarely defined in legislation. The
Arab countries arc no exception in this respect. Joint venture is generally used to
refer to thc establishment of a project with foreign and local capital, involving the
incorporation of an Arab legal entity. However, the expression is also used in a
number of other ways, for example, to describe the situation of two construction
companies carrying out a contract in partnership, without the formation of a joint
legal entity or with reference to the joint company formed between foreign oil
companies and the State oil company, i.e. Egypt Petroleum Company (EGPC) or
ARAMCO, following the discovery of commercial oil resources. Our concern in
this study, however, is primarily focused on joint ventures in the Arab
manufacturing sector, as could be found out in Chapter 11, which deals with some
selected case studies. It should also be appropriate to note here that joint ventures
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are relatively a recent phenomenon in the Arab World. The more common mode
of entering the Arab markets by MNCs has always been through the option of
export — to produce at home and sell in the Arab markets, normally through an
independent domestic—based distributor. Direct investment in the Arab World is
not so common, given the increasing tendency of investment legislations to favour
the joint venture option, which allocate a dominant share of control to the local
(Arab) partner, both in terms of management and capital.
In a description of Joint Venture in Saudi Arabia, Walmsley gave a definition
which could well apply to many Arab countries:
"The Joint Venture as we know it in practical terms in the Middle East today, is
a negotiated arrangement between a company that has technical and commercial
expertise and experience, and a company that does not have these skills relative
to the product or service, but does have local knowledge and general commercial
strengths to help create and maintain a business in its own market area 	  the
strength of participation can generally only vary with the local side, where purely
financial sleeping partners or political partners (governments) can be acceptable
for the strategic purpose of the operation; before any real progress can be made,
a technical partner has to make a tangible input of know—how." Walmslcy [1985,
p.1]
The above definition of 'joint venture' reflects a true picture of the state of most
Joint Venture Projects which have been most recently established in almost all oil—
producing Arab countrics, between foreign MNCs and the local partners.
4.2.4 Direct Foreign Investment (DFI)
The basic definition of DF1 is provided by the IMF being:
"an investment conferring a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an
economy other than that of the investor, the investor's purpose being to have an
effective voice in the management of the enterprise". [Billerbeck and Yasugi, 1977
p.136]. This covers the control of both incorporated and unincorporated foreign
affiliates (branches). It will, in fact, be very rare to apply the terminology of DFI
in the Arab World (or in most of its countries) because, according to the above
definition, they hardly exist. Effective control is inferred from ownership of fifty
per cent or more if the source country owner is a single entity or a group of
owners acting in a unified manner.
There are many motivations which explain the overseas investment drives of
MNCs. Some of such motivations are:
1. To protect their existing foreign markets, or in search for new ones in the
context of the growing trends towards protectionism in both the developing
and the developed world;
2. To secure a continuing supply of the needed raw materials or other
products;
3. To take advantage of lower cost of production in the host nations,
especially for export purposes;
4. To circumvent quota restrictions imposed by some developing countrics by
particularly locating manufacturing industries in such countries;
5. To take advantage of the economy of scale, or to minimise their risks;
6. In a few instances, the national governments' policies designed to prevent
monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions at home, contribute to the
migration of capital to other countries.
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As far as the Arab countries arc concerned, a formal analysis of the patterns of
inward and outward DFI requires an appropriate set of matched data on these
patterns. Unfortunately no such data are readily available.
However, the investment pattern of a typical Arab country, as indeed of many
developing countries, develops gradually. As countries pass from one development
stage to another, not only the role of inward and outward direct investment
changes, but so does the character and composition of such investment. As a
country develops, it will start to emerge as an outward direct investor, and such
outward investment will rise faster than inward investment. In a way, Kuwait has
exemplified this pattern toward the late 1980s. The GNP per capita at which a
country such as Kuwait has started engaging in such investment, may have
depended on:
a. The amount and structure of its resources (mainly oil);
b. Its economic system and the role of non—market forces (while laissez—faire
is the norm, the role of the public sector (Government) is predominant in
the way public funds stemming from the main natural resource are directed
or invested);
C. The extent and form of economic, political and cultural interface with other
countries — Kuwait, generally enjoys a good business—like relationship with
most of the western countries in which it has invested a great deal of its
surplus revenues;
d.	 Its size (in relation to both market and population).
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4.2.5 Economic integration
Whether we speak of economic cooperation or economic integration, we shall, for
the purpose of this study, use the terms interchangeably to mean the process by
which the Arab countries, in pursuit of their common economic development,
voluntarily come together and agree to extend preferential treatment in trade and
investment to each others' production, and to adopt with respect to certain
economic problems, common internal and external policies.
Bela Balassa, one of the most authoritative theorists on integration groupings,
defines economic integration as:
"a state of affairs in which there is an absence of discrimination, as between the
various units of the integrated area."
Another theorists, of equal standing, the Swedish economist, Gunar Myrdal,
defines it as:
"a state of equal opportunities for producers and consumers alike between as well
as within countries".
Both of these definitions, it could be observed, perceive of economic integration
as a "state of affairs", rather than as a process or means towards an objective.
Our concern as far as the Arab World is concerned, is with the fact that both
definitions stress the absence of discrimination, or the equality of treatment within
the integrated area. In fact, in an integration grouping comprising as wider
diversity of economically unequal partners, as is clearly the case within the Arab
World, there is need for explicit discrimination in favour of the relatively weaker
partners. This is particularly true when the theory is applied to poor Arab
countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania, Yemen and even Egypt within the
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larger Pan—Arab framework of a region comprising a number of oil—rich countries,
albeit with varying degrees of wealth and revenue—generating resources. It is also
true even within the sub—regional groupings, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) which comprises relatively poor countries such as Oman and Bahrain.
What the above argument highlights is the fact that it is vital to recognise that all
members of the integrating grouping — the Arab World in our case — do not
benefit from the economic integration at the same rate, or to the same degree. The
decisive consideration is not whether a poor country such as Sudan benefits more
than say, Saudi Arabia, but whether the latter would benefit more by being outside
rather than inside the grouping, on the basis that its interests are closely associated
with the world economy. For the overwhelming majority of the Arab countries,
especially the less economically fortunate ones, the answer is no; but then, this
would be a matter for each country to decide.
It is evident that the Middle East region trades more with the outside world than
it would nccd to if their resources were properly developed and internal trade and
investments encouraged. The more a particular region is developed, the more the
countries constituting that region are inclined to cooperate with each other. The
most obvious example to strike one's mind is Western Europe, which is trying to
be self—dependent, even at the expense of its traditional trade, and investment
partners in the developing countries, thanks to its early development. The Arab
economic integration which this study happened to advocate, is to be based on a
number of factors that favour such integration, prominent among which arc:
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1. To follow a highly independent development stratcgy might well be
catastrophic for the individual Arab countries, given the very small size of
population (market) in most of them that make them heavily dependent on
foreign trade. That is precisely why they have no viable alternative but to
be integrated in one body. It is within this context that the Arab
nationalism is viewed as a possible catalyst for this integration to be
realised.
2. The presence of big multinationals restricts the chances of maintaining
complete freedom of action. It is sometimes advocated that the Arabs need
to take advantage of the 'Japanese model', which has required a dedicated
and sophisticated nationalism (nationalism at one stage has also had its
bearing on Germany and Britain, whose subsequent industrial progress has
been associated with one kind or another of nationalism).
3. Among the common factors which arc shared between the Arab countries
and which arc to be seen as unifying elements, are the Arabic language,
Islamic religion and the common cultural heritage.
4. Apart from the gain in political influence, the economic advantage of
integration lies in the fact that some of the Arab States have vast natural
resources, and labour shortages, while others are poor and over-populated.
The clement of complemcntarity is obvious to be seen and dwelt upon.
5. Within the framework of dependency thcory, "location" profoundly affects
thc possibility of self-reliance. The closer a country is to those more
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developed, the lower the cost of transportation and other factors, which
makes it easier for its exports to compete in neighbouring countries, but it
also encourages dependence on imports from those countries. This is an
argumcnt which is well placed to serve the cause of economic integration
between the countries of the Arab World.
43	 Theories and Practices of International Trade
43.1 Historical background
Most literature on the economic theories related to the international trade is dated
back to the era of "mercantilism" in Western Europe, before Adam Smith (1723—
1790) published his famous book 'The Wealth of Nations' in 1776. While
mercantilism required a nation to export goods in return for precious metals,
Smith's contribution in favouring trade, relied on the theory that an optimum
pattern of specialisation and trade would eventually develop as a result of the
consumer's desire to buy goods at the lowest available prices, and of firms'
reactions to market forces in pursuit of profit — this in turn would imply a shift of
resources into those industries with absolute international cost advantages, hence
the development of a pattern of trade based on specialisation among different
nations. This theory of "absolute advantage" was later modified in 1815, by David
Ricardo (1772-1823), who introduced the concept of "comparative" as opposed
to "absolute" advantage. His main argument postulated that the basis of mutual
beneficial trade between two countries stemmed from them having different
relative costs (opportunity costs). This means that a given country might still
import goods where it was the low cost producer, if it is even more efficient in
producing other (alternative) goods. Ricardo's comparative advantage theory is
still widely acclaimed to date — its application and practical relevance to the
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developing countries of the Arab World today will nevertheless be refuted at a
later stage of our analysis, insofar as the actual performance of the Arab
international investment and trade is concerned.
4.3.2 Trade liberalisation versus protectionism
The cost of protectionism and the benefits of trade and investment liberalisation
have been extensively analysed in the economic literature. It is widely recognised
that protection imposes costs both on the country initiating it and on its trading
partners, while liberalisation results in substantial benefits to all parties concerned.
It was in recognition of this generally accepted notion, that GATT (The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) was established in 1947, to provide a forum to
negotiate reductions in tariffs which, at the timc, were the most applied measure
of trade restrictions. While trade liberalisation was the most publicised objective
of GATT, it can be argued that, in view of the fact that the initiative has mainly
come from the, the major, economic powers in the wake of the Second World
War, and in the absence of the developing countries, the majority of which were
then under colonisation, the implicit, undeclared objective was to accelerate the
process of post—war reconstruction of the European developed countries, by
opening up their economies and increasing the opportunities for international
economic exchange. This argument is further supported by the fact that
protectionist pressures and practices remain high to date in industrial countries, and
in many cases have resulted in an increase in trade—restricting measures. Of
course, that is not to argue that GATT has failed in achieving its declared
objectives. In fact, as a result of seven successive rounds of multilateral trade
negotiations, average tariffs in industrial countries on industrial products have
declined sharply, "from over 40 per cent in 1947 to about 5 per cent in 1988.
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World Trade has expanded markedly, including a twenty—fold increase in the
volume of trade in manufactured goods" [IMF report, December 1988, p.29].
An increasing proportion of developing countries' exports of manufactures was
directed towards industrial countries. Trade trends among the developing countries
show that their share of world exports have declined. [See table 4.3.2.1 and
43.2.2.]
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TABLE 4.3.2.2	 SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND AREAS: RATIOS
OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS TO GDP, 1963-86' (In Percent)
Imports Exports
1963 1973 1981 1085 1986 1963 1973 1981 1985 1986
Oil exporting countries
Kuwait 17.0 19.4 28.9 28.8 31.0 59.8 70.4 66.7 52.7 42.1
Nigeria 14.0 13.6 29.7 12.1 12.6 25.0 27.4 17.1
Oman 10.91 24.0 333 33.6 34.6 431 68.1 64.4 46.9 33.6
Saudi Arabia 16.6 18.0 22.9 24.9 23.6 53.1 71.3 73.7 33.3 28.5
Venezuela 12.9 163 19.7 16.6 18.6 24.4 28.7 30.3 25.3 19.4
Africa
Burkino Faso 16.9 19.8 28.9 32.6 28.3 4.2 5.1 6.3 12.4 12.0
Burundi 7.9 10.2 16.3 16.4 15.7 I343 10.0 7.6 9.7 13.1
COM dlvoire 21.4 27.8 243 21.7 17.4 29.0 33.7 28.9 39.2 34.2
Ghana 23.7 15.0 3.6 10.6 14.2 19.8 20.8 2.7 10.0 14.5
Kenya 25.7 273 303 25.0 23.8 22.0 21.6 173 16.7 17.6
Liberia 46.3 46.7 51.6 35.1 343 78.1 60.8 53.7
Malawl 21.0 313 27.7 23.9 20.1 l6.) 22.1 19.3 18.1
Mauritius 27.0 49.4 48.7 49.6 42.0 40.4 29.4 41.4
Morocco 19.1 18.8 29.6 32.4 25.8 16.4 15.0 16.1 18.2 16.6
Sierra Leone 27.4 32-3 27.9 20.8 34.1 263 26.9 12.0 17.1 32.9
Tunisia 21.4 24.4 45.6 33.1 32.7 12.1 15.2 30.2 203 20.0
Zaire 15.4 26.5 123 26.8 253 18.0 34.3 12.0 32.2 32.2
Zambia 36.2 263 31.7 27.3 41.2 53.1 46.6 26.7 21.0 23.7
Asia
Burma 14.7 4.8 6.3 4.3 3.8 16.9 4.7 8.1 5.0 3.8
Fiji 34.4 51.6 49.6 37.9 33.3 37.8 22.0 24.7 19.7 20.9
India 6.0 4.2 9.0 7.6 6.6 3.9 3.8 4.8 4.4 4.1
Korea 14.6 41.2 acco 35.9 32.1 2.3 23.1 30.9 34.9 35.3
Malaysia 42.5 31.7 473 39.4 39.3 44.3 39.4 48.4 49.4 50.3
Philippines 133 16.9 21.9 16.6 17.0 12.8 17.7 14.6 13.9 15.4
Singapore 153.4 122.6 203.0 150.1 147.0 124.6 87.3 154.3 130.3 129.7
Thailand 18.8 193 27.6 24.1 22.0 14.2 14.9 193 18.6 21.0
Eauope
Hungary 34.4 40.3 39.7 40.4 - 38.3 38.4 39.7 38.6
Turkey 83 8.7 13.1 ... ... 43 5.3 6.9 15.1 ...
Yugoslavia 6.9 24.4 24.8 27.8 17.9 5.2 15.4 17.6 244 15.8
Middk East
Egypt 23.6 9.9 36.6 20.4 21.1 133 12.1 13.5 7.6 5.4
Jordan 393 49.6 89.8 66.7 51.6 5.1 11.0 20.8 19.3 15.6
Pakistan 15.6 14.5 19.7 19.6 18.4 73 14.3 10.1 8.8 9.9
Syrian Arab Republic 22.6 233 29.7 19.6 18.7 10.9 133 12.4 7.7 5.3
Western Hanispbere
Argentina 7.0 5.8 7.4 5.7 6.0 15.0 8.2 7.2 12.7 8.7
Barbados 64.6 68.9 61.9 50.0 44.1 45.6 21.7 21.0 28.9 20.6
Brazil 53 8.8 8.8 5.8 5.2 3.9 7.8 8.3 11.3 8.6
Chile 11.4 8.0 19.5 17.1 17.3 123 8.9 12.0 23.9 25.0
Colombia 103 10.3 14.3 18.7 11.2 8.0 9.9 8.1 10.2 14.8
Costa Rica 24.1 29.8 46.1 28.8 263 183 22.5 38.4 25.6 25.9
Dominican Republic 18.3 20.9 23.1 335 26.8 17.3 18.9 16.4 16.6 13.4
El Salvador 22.4 28.0 28.5 16.8 21.7 22.7 26.9 23.0 11.8 18.0
Guatemala 13.6 16.8 19.4 10.5 6.1 12.1 17.3 143 8.8 6.2
Honduras 23.2 27.7 35.9 25.6 23.4 20.3 27.6 28.7 71.0 22.9
Jamaica 28.8 35.8 493 55.2 39.6 2.5.8 20.6 32.7 27.0 243
Mexico 8.0 6.9 10.0 7.9 ... 6.2 4.1 8.1 12.5 ...
Panama 32.3 34.7 39.7 28.4 24.0 10.7 93 8.5 6.8 ...
Paraguay 9.9 12.3 10.7 14.0 15.0 10.3 123 5.3 6.9 5.0
Peru 19.0 11.0 17.2 12.5 ... 18.4 11.3 15.9 20.9 ...
Source:	 International Monetary Fund, Data Fund. (Reproduced by Kelly et al. December 1988)
Some of the ratios shown are distorted by large fluctuations in the real exchange tales of the countries concerned.
Calculations based on purchasing power parity would yield different results.
1964.
Av erage 1962-64.
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TABLE 43.23	 SHARES IN WORLD MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, 1963-86'
(In percent)
1963 1973 1977 1981 1985 19861
Taal F-spocts 100.0 103.0 100.0 Imo 100.0 Iccio
Developed countries 67.6 70.8 64.6 63.0 66.3 69.6
European Community' 33.7 36.7 33.7 30.9 31.1 34.5
Intra-EC 15.2 19.8 17.1 15.8 17.0 19.7
Japan 3.5 6.4 7.2 7.8 9.1 9.9
United Stales 15.7 12.0 10.2 113 10.7 9.7
Other developed countries 14.6 15.8 133 12.8 15.3 15.6
Developing countries 203 19.2 25.7 27.6 22.9 19.5
Four Asian NIEil 13 2.9 3.1 4.3 5.9 63
Other developing countries 18.8 16.4 23.6 23.4 17.0 13.3
Eastern trading area 12.1 10.0 9.7 9.4 10.8 10.8
Sources: GATT, IMF, UN, UNCTAD; and Fund staff estimates. Based on GATT
classifications.
Reproduced by Kelly et al, December 1988.
Based on nominal U.S. dollar values.
2	 The most recent year for which comprehensive data are available.
3	 EC(10): Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
4	 The newly industrializing economics of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan Province of China.
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TABLE 43.2.4.	 SHARES IN WORLD EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES,'
1963-862
(In percent)
1963 1973 1977 1981 1985 1986
Total Exports 100.0 100.0 103.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Developed countries 80.9 83.1 82.6 80.8 79.0 79.6
European Community' 44.0 45.5 45.0 40.1 39.9 42.6
Intra-EC 20.6 22.8 20.9 18.9 20.3 23.0
Japan 10.0 11.9 13.3 14.2 14.1
United Stales 12.3 12.0 13.9 12.0 10.9
Other developed countries 14.3 13.8 13.4 12.8 12.6
Developing countries 5.8 6.9 8.0 10.7 12.2 11.8
Four Asian NIE34 3.7 4.2 6.2 7.9 7.9
Other developing countries 3.2 3.8 4.5 4.2 3.9
Eastern trading area 13.3 10.0 9.3 8.6 8.9 8.6
Sources: GATT, IMF, UN, UNCTAD; and Fund staff estimates. Based on GATT
classifications.
Reproduced by Kelly et al, December 1988.
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) categories 5 through 8 minus
68.
2	 Based on nominal U.S. dollar values.
3	 EC(10): Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
4	 The newly industrializing economies of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan Province of China.
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Among the developing countries, the combined share of world exports of the four
Asian NIEs has risen steadily from 3 per cent in 1973 to 4.3 per cent in 1981, and
to over 6 per cent in 1986 (table 4.3.2.3.). During this period, their exports grew
at an annual average rate of 17 per cent and at a rate of 10 per cent a year since
1981. However, the Asian region is to be regarded as an exceptional case.
Exports of other geographical regions of developing countries declined during
1981-86, at an annual average rate of 8 per cent in Africa, 2 per cent in the Asian
developing countries, 5 per cent in Latin America and 17 per cent in the Middle
East. This compares with a growth rate of world exports of about 2 per cent.
Trade policy in industrialised countries continues to be characterised by
bilateral/sectoral approaches to liberalisation of trade (and dispute settlement).
Such approaches may be at the expense of solutions to larger problems on a
multilateral basis, and sometime have adverse effects on Third World countries.
In practice, and far from being true defenders of "liberalism" much heralded by
almost all trade theories originated in the capitalist world, the industrial countries
continue to defend protectionism using different arguments. Such arguments may
include macro—economic imbalances among the major industrial countries,
associated exchange rate changes and instability and 'level playing field arguments'
(difference in cost factors between them and the developing countries owing to
lower wages in the latter).
Many examples could be given to highlight the magnitude of the protectionist
tendency among the leading industrial countries:—
1.	 At the scctoral level, reference could be made to the lack of commitment
to eliminate the multifibre arrangements, on the basis of what amounts to
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a weak and unconvincing justification: lack of reciprocity on the part of
the developing countries who restrict certain high—valued textiles and
clothing products in which industrialised countries are competitive;
2. The increase in non—tariff measures may have largely offset the liberalising
effects of tariff reductions in the post—war period. As estimated by the
IMF, the economy—wide tariff equivalent of U.S. non—tariff barriers on
textiles, steel and automobiles, is about 25 per cent, bringing protection to
its early post—war level. [IMF, December 1988, p.10.] Non—fuel imports
of industrial countries subject to selected non—tariff measures, are
estimated by UNCTAD to have increased from 19 per cent of total imports
in 1981 to 23 per cent of the total in 1987;
3. The European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), with its built—in
restrictive measures against imports of agricultural food, and the implied
non—tariff barriers against outside competition, is a monument of protection
and a clear violation of GATT principles and spirit, and the liberal free
trade in general;
4. The industrial policy of all industrialised countries, which often
encompasses government actions to foster specific sectors, includes a
number of protectionist measures: tax concessions, subsidised credits,
capital grants, regional aids, import quotas, VERs, tariff quotas, import
licensing, health standards. export subsidies, .... ctc. In the U.K. alone, aid
to industry doubled in 1976-81; steel, shipbuilding and mining, together
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received one—fourth of total aid to industry in 1982-83, against 7.5 per
ccnt six years earlier. [IMF, 1988, p.161;
5. The industrial countries' arguments for protection, include the need to
encourage mature industries (counter—argument to the notion of infant
industry protection) i.e. strategic sectors (such as high technology
industries), as well as sectors important for security and defence (such as
coal in Germany and agriculture in Japan);
6. There is a growing tendency in some advanced nations to practice
"managed trade", in which quantitative targets are employed to divide up
markets. The export success and low imports of Japan are the principal
justification. [Porter, 1991, p.6691.
4.3.3 Multilateral Trade
The current round of trade negotiations under GATT, launched in September 1986
in Uruguay, offers a major opportunity for the intcmational community to come
to grips with the implication of extending the frontiers of free trade to the hitherto
disapproved of sectors of agriculture, tropical products, textiles and other
manufactured exports of developing countries, as well as to services.
An important agreement, reached in the Uruguay round, is to strengthen the
institutional framework of GATT, and to enhance its rolc in monitoring trade
policies. This could potentially have far—reaching deterrent effects on nations
contemplating various forms of rcstrictions on trade. At a time when
protectionism is taking new and cvcr more insidious forms, such as managed trade,
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voluntary restraints, unilateral determination of unfair trade practiccs, and the
evolution of discriminatory trading arrangements, a strengthened international
machinery is vital for upholding and applying established principles, carrying out
necessary policy surveillance and providing for dispute settlement.
Most recently there have been some encouraging signs of an enhanced
commitment among the Western leaders, to a speedy, successful conclusion of the
protracted Uruguay Round. The following extracts from the July 1991 London G7
Economic Summit Declaration, show that such commitment is much more than
mere rhctoric, as is usually expected from summit declarations:
"No issue has more far—reaching implications for the future prospects of the world
economy than the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. It will stimulate
non—inflationary growth by bolstering confidence, reversing protectionism and
increasing Trade flows .... we therefore commit ourselves to an ambitious global
and balanced package of results .... with the widest possible participation by both
developed and developing countries .... We shall each remain personally involved
in the process, ready to intervene with one another if differences can only be
resolved at the highest level". [Financial Times, July 18, 1991.]
Having closely followed up the deliberations of the economic confcrcncc, the
author is of thc opinion that the seven leaders have meant business this time, and
that the 1991 G7 Conference has marked a significant turning point in overcoming
the stumbling block which has prevented the negotiating parties in GATT from
concluding their much protracted trade negotiations. The strong wording of the
declaration suggests that, it is not yet another statement which is high on words
and low on action.
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4.3.4 GATT and the Generalised System of Preference (GSP)
GATT membership has increased from the original 23 signatory parties in 1947
to 96 at the end of 1988 — 28 more countries maintain a de facto application of
the GATT, pending final decisions as to their future commercial policy. Only four
Arab countries, namely E gypt, Kuwait, Morocco and Mauritania are among the 96
contracting countries, while Tunisia was provisionally acceded (in 1988). Five
more Arab countries, namely Algeria, Bahrain, Qatar, U.A.E., and Yemen (PDR),
maintain a de facto application of the GATT, thus bringing the number of Arab
countries directly associated with GATT' to ten (about 50 per cent of the total
members of the Arab League).
While GATT is today the major world trade regulating body, its policies and
decisions are not legally binding to its members, but in practice it has emerged as
an organisation to formulate ways of maintaining the set of trade principles. Its
original agreement covered four main subjects, namely the most—favoured nation
principle (whereby any favour to any member should be extended to all); the
reduction of tariff barriers (on the basis of general agreement reached at
negotiations held inten;ally between members in what became known as 'rounds');
non—tariff barriers to be abolished and arrangements for membership and
resignation.
Because the less developed countries (LDC) have long argued that their pressing
development needs required special and differential treatment by developed
countries to improve the competitiveness of their products, the GSP has been
incorporated in the GATT Treaty of 1979, allowing the industrial countries to
grant tariff preferences to developing countries. Trade preferences are also granted
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to selected developing countries under various regional trading arrangements, i.e.
Lome' Convention and the Mediterranean countries under association and
cooperation agreement with EC. Under most GSP schemes, "sensitive" items such
as textiles, clothing and footwear, are excluded from preferences, while others,
such as certain petrochemicals, receive limited GSP coverage. In the case of EC
petrochemical imports from Middle Eastern exporters, the quota level is typically
reached early in the year. The textile and clothing sectors, the products of which
represent about 17 per cent of all industrial tariff lines, account for about half of
industrial products excluded from all GSP schemes taken together. [Aujaria,
Kirmani, and Peterson, 1985.]
4.3.5 Euro—Arab Dialogue
At the time of early Euro—Arab dialogue, initiated at foreign ministers level,
efforts were made on a policy for introducing further cooperation agreements. The
Maghreb States had special status vis—a—vis the EC from its inception, with trade
preferences granted for Morocco's citrus produce and for clothing and textile
exports from Tunisia, although quotas were applied if exports cxcccdcd a certain
level. The Eastern Arab (Mashraq) countries covered by the cooperation
agreements were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, the agreements being signed
in 1976 and 1977. The arrangements under which Maghreb produce entered into
the EC were also formalised under separate agreements with Morocco, Algeria and
Tunisia during the same period. These agreements were not extended to non—
Mediterranean countries other than Jordan, as it was believed that this would be
contrary to the spirit of the EC's Mediterranean Policy, and would make the policy
meaningless. [Sec Table 4.3[4]
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TABLE 4.3[A] EXAMPLES OF THE DISMANTLING OF TARIFF BARRIERS
FOR MEDITERRANEAN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE DURING
THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD, 1986 - 1996
(% TARIFF).
'85 '86 '87 '88 '89 '90 '91 '92 '93 '94 '95 '96
SPAIN 12 10.8
ORANGES,
9.6 8.4
small
7.2 4.2
citrus
2.4 1.92 1.44 .96 0.48 -
MOROCCO 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.4 1.92 1.44 .96 0.48 -
ISRAEL 8 8 8 8 7.2 4.2 2.4 1.92 1.44 .96 0.48 -
TOMATOES
SPAIN 11 9.9 8.8 7.7 6.6 3.85 2.2 1.76 1.32 .88 0.44 -
MOROCCO 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4
1
3.85 2.2 1.76 1.32 .88 0.44 -
ONIONS
SPAIN 12 10.9 9.8 8.7 7.6 6.5 5.4 4.3 3.2 2.1 - -
MOROCCO 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.3 3.2 2.1 1 -
Source: Memorandum present6 par le Royanne du Maroc en vue des negociations
d'adaptation de L'accotd Maroc-CEE, February 1986. [Reproduced in
'Euro-Arab Trade; Special Report No. 1105, The Economist Intelcgence
Unit, 1988, p.85.]
TABLE 43[B]	 EC TRADE WITH ARAB STATES" AND OTHER
DESTINATIONS (1986)
EC EXPORTS
TOTAL: ECU 807bn
EC IMPORTS
TOTAL: ECU 796bn
INTRA EC 57.0% 58.0%
EFTA 11.0% 10.0%
USA 9.0% 7.0%
ARAB STATES 5.0% 4.0%
EASTERN EUROPE 3.0% 3.0%.
JAPAN 1.0% 4.0%
OTHER 14.0% 14.0%
100% 100%
* All members of the Arab League except Bahrain and Yemen.
Source:
	 Eurostat External Trade Statistics [EIU Special Report No. 1105, January
1988, p.111
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	.011111n11.1.	
The Gulf Statcs (GCC) have recently requested negotiation of trade and cooperation
agreements with the EC, providing for a free trade area covering all industrial products
— including petrochemicals. Imports of petrochemicals from the GCC countries into EC
are presently governed by the Community's GSP Scheme, the operation of which has been
the focus of a dispute between the two parties as covered in some detail elsewhere in this
study. In fact, the EC's GSP Scheme, which provides non—reciprocal tariff concessions
to developing countries, as well as its different preferential trade agreements with other
countries and country groups, have always been under question from some GATT
contracting parties as to the consistency of these agreements with GATT articles, which
stipulate that the formulation of customs unions and free trade areas is subject to certain
requirements. These requirements include their formation "within a reasonable period of
time" and their coverage of "substantially all trade" among the partner countries. [GATT
Article XXIV.]
Others, such as P. Nicolaidcs even question the principle of the GSP, arguing that
"expanding the GSP without implementing any form of trade liberalisation, is a misguided
strategy for promoting LDC growth.... while the GSP has enabled some exporters to gain
windfall profits,' but overall it has been relatively unimportant, both in terms of the
benefits it generates and the boost it gives to LDC exports". [Nicolaidcs, 1988, p.53.]
This argument, however, may not be supported by the figures stipulating the considerable
benefits encountered by the developing countries as a result of the tariff preferences under
the GSP. According to a study undertaken by M. Kelly et al [IMF occasional paper No.
63, 1988], in 1986, $36 billion of exports from developing countries received preferential
treatment by OECD countries, compared with $25 billion in 1980 and $10 billion in 1976,
when GSP schemes came into full operation.
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Recent trends indicate a new willingness on the part of major powers, including the so—
called super powers, to cooperate more closely, not only on the political level, but even
more so on the economic fields. In the past, without an internationally accepted regime,
trade has often become a source of tension and conflict among nations. The scramble for
raw materials and markets in the nineteenth century led the Great Powers into intense
rivalries and even wars. Those lessons of the past must be recalled at a time of rapid and
unprecedented change in the world political and economic scene.
4.4	 Theories of Economic Development and growth and their application in the
Arab World
Development is now increasingly perceived as a much more complex process than merely
raising per capita income: its social constituents, in terms of income equality and also of
better nutrition, housing, literacy, etc., would not necessarily be achieved by economic
growth. Increasing attention is also paid to self—reliance in the developing countries.
The categories of developed and developing countries have been becoming more
heterogenous and thus now overlap, whatever dimension one looks at. The per capita
income of some developing countries, e.g. United Arab Emirates, is now higher than that
of the U.S.A., and Singapore is more urbanised than most of Western Europe — Argentina
and Brazil have become, in many economic dimensions, including technological capacity,
more developed than Greece or Portugal.
4.4.1 The Concept of Development
While this thesis emphasises the necessity of modern technology to realise
economic development in the Arab World, we must be aware of the many factors
which could potentially prevent the appropriate usc of technology. Prominent
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among such factors in the Arab region, is the backward conditions of its countries,
which can negatively affect the final outcome, such as low level of literacy among
the rapidly increasing population, and the quality of their education. In fact, there
are numerous criteria for comparing levels of development, some of which are
economic and others social and cultural. However, development as such can be
defined in many ways and in order to set the scene for a brief discussion of the
levels of economic development in the Arab World, it might be helpful to provide
a few examples of such definitions for more illumination.
"Development" could be defined as "taking the steps to break the chains at many
points, or making a big push forward to break the vicious cycle of poverty".
[R.Gabrowski, 1989.1 According to this definition, development is a process of
transformation, where the traditional sector is displaced with the modern sector.
Kindleberger distinguishes between development and growth by stating that,
"growth refers more to change in size of economy — more output, more inputs,
more efficiency, etc. While development goes further beyond, implicating a change
in the structure of outputs and in the allocation of inputs by sectors. In short,
'growth' concerns with size addition, while 'development' concerns with functional
capacity" [Kindleberger, 1965, p.1].
4.4.2 Elements of Development in the Arab World
In the Arab countries, there has been a reasonable increase in growth over the last
two decades or so, while development has occurred only at a modest level (Table
D4 in Appendix D). In fact, development in the Arab countries could be looked
at from different angles: as a tool for modernisation (modern technology), as
distinctive justice (social angle) and combincdly as socio—cconomic transformation.
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In considering the most important elements of development in the Arab context,
one could refer to the following:
1. Human resources: while scarce in some parts (countries) they are abundant in
other parts of the Arab region, and the shift has already taken place in the past to
fill the gap. This has been one major area in which some sort of economic
integration among the Arab countries has successfully taken place;
2. Natural rcsourccs: exist abundantly in the vast majority of the Arab countries.
Energy, mineral and agricultural resources arc certainly more than sufficient to
cater for the requirements of development;
3. Capital formation: shortage of capital was an obstacle in the past. This particular
problem has been largely overcome thanks to the oil—generated revenues of the
1970s and beyond. What is yet to be seen, however, is an increase in labour
productivity, owing to the use of modern machines. The availability of capital, at
least in the oil producing countries, has contributed to the expansion of the
infrastructure: buildings, inventory, schools, hospitals, roads, railways, ports, etc.
While a great deal of the intermediate back—up materials of these projects have
been imported from outside (associated technology), it would not have been
possible without the usc of the local capital to have this task done;
4. Technology: is available only in its physical form, but not in know—how.
Buckly and Casson 11989, p.51 stated that, "a necessary condition for development
in any locality, is that there are resources with a potential for exploitation". In
concluding our review of thc major elements of dcvclopmcnt, we would only say
95
that such conditions are almost fully met in the Arab World, with only one
exception — technology, and its exploitation. All other pre—rcquisitcs for a
successful socio—economic transformation of the Arab World are already in
existence. Technology transfer, therefore, has and will remain to be, at the centre
of the Arab priorities if any economic or social development is to be seriously
contemplated. As for the fact that a number of less resource—endowed Arab
countries are still living in poverty, with some of them even below subsistence
level, such as Somalia, Djibouti, Mauritania, Yemen and Sudan, this might raise
the question of 'distribution justice', a subject which will remain outside the scope
of this study.
The rationale to the oil producing Arab countries' development, is best summed
up in a few simple words: oil is an exhaustible wealth. Only sincere, human
determination is capable of accepting the challenge to convert this exhaustible
wealth, in the time available, into a lasting one, by developing human resources
and economics. In fact, the full rcalisation of the potential of these countries
depend on two major pre—rcquisites — the development of human resources (via
enhancing technical and managerial skills and capabilities) and the exploitation of
existing economic resources, and the diversification of their use.
4.43 Stages of
There has been a great deal written on economic development and the broad
question of how an economy progresses. The literature cmphasiscs such questions
as to how an economy moves from one stage to another; from agrarian to
industrial and the various conditions that are associated with each developmental
stage. Rostow's 'Stagas_of Economic Growth' first published in 1959, and
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reprinted in each of the following years until its second edition was published in
1971 with no alteration of its original text, which preserved its basic approaches
to the stages of Economic growth', was widely heralded as the "most stimulating
contribution to political and economic discussion made by any academic economist
since the war", to paraphrase the 'Economist' Magazine.
In fact, it is hard to imagine every country necessarily fitting a particular stage of
economic growth or development exactly. As Michael Porter stipulates, each
nation goes:
"through its own unique process of development. The mix of industries and
trajectory by which the economy passes (or does not pass) through the stages is
a reflection of each nation's unique circumstances, with respect to the 'diamond'
(determinants of national advantage). The nations' history plays an important role
by shaping such things as the base of skills that have been created, the prevailing
values and norms of behaviour, the needs, tastes, and preferences that will
underpin demand patterns, and the challenges that have been set or confronted".
[Portcr 1990, p.562].
It is on the basis of such argument that we find particular industries providing the
starting point for development arc heavily dependent on the nations natural
environment, i.e. mineral and agricultural resources, in the general case of the
Arab countries. Naturally, the development process in such countries is, and has
to be, focused on resource-based industries, such as petrochemicals (Gulf States),
textiles (Sudan and Egypt), agriculture, and phosphates (Morocco), etc.
Economic prosperity, according to Porter, will tend to rise as a nation moves
through the first three of (his) stages of (competitive) development, which arc: (1)
factor-driven development, (2) investment-driven, (3) innovation-driven, and
(4) wealth-driven. Porter attributes this rising tendency to the fact that upgrading
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leads to increasing national productivity. A nation with unusually abundant natural
resource for its size, however, his argument goes, can enjoy high national income
despite a position in the factor-driven stage, though it is not likely to be
sustainable indefinitely. Good examples would be, according to Portcr, Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, which may enjoy high income per capita for decades because
of an abundance of oil. It is interesting to note here that Canada is also cited as
another nation whose remarkable natural resource endowment has long supported
a high standard of living, though few industries, outside of resource-intensive
areas, possess international competitive advantage.
Porter's vision of the stages of development is, in fact, not much different in
principle, from that of Rostow's "Stages of economic growth", which identifies all
societies in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories
(stages): the traditional society (where a ceiling exists on the level of attainable
output per head); the pre-condition for take-off (in the process of transition from
the traditional society to taking-off towards modernisation); the take-off (where
the old resistances to steady growth are finally overcome); the drive to maturity
(when some 10-20% of the national income is steadily invested, permitting output
regularly to outstrip the increase in population); and lastly, the age of high mass-
consumption (where the leading sectors shift towards durable consumer goods and
services). [Rostow, 1971, pp.4-11]
While the Arab oil-producing countries, particularly those in the Gulf region, arc
to be regarded in the early stages of factor-driven development, according to
Porter's theory, some of these countries can be located in Rostow's last category
of high mass-consumption. In fact, because high mass-consumption depends on
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income per capita, one can have nations moving into that stage before they have
absorbed fully and efficiently the tcchnologies that go with their versions of
technological maturity. Once again, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait may well be called
on to illustrate the point.
Without going into much detail about the implications of these theories of
developmental stages on the bulk of the Arab countries, it might suffice our
purpose to point out that according to the arguments advanced by Rostow, it might
be reasonable to regard the process of development now taking place in the bulk
of the Arab world, as analogous to the stages of preconditions and take—off of
other advanced European societies in the late eighteenth, nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. What the theory does not prccisely explain, however, is
whether such analogy would necessarily lead us to conclude that, in order for the
Arab world (and indeed the majority of the developing countries of the world) to
advance towards the stages of development already achieved by the leading
industrial countries such as the G7 for instance, they may need the samc span of
time or more precisely, about two to three centuries before they can be in similar
stages.
The spccd by which technological progress is advancing and the technology
transfer is likely to proceed, makes one much more optimistic about the future
prospects of the developing world than such theories of development and growth
implicitly lead us to believe.
Rostow himself admits that "the classical theory of production is formulated under
essentially static assumptions which freeze — or permit only once—over change
— in the variables most relevant to the process of economic growth. As modern
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economists have sought to merge classical production theory with Keynesian
income analysis, they have introduced the dynamic variables: population,
technology, entrepreneurship, etc. But they have tended to do so in forms so rigid
and general that their models cannot grip the essential phenomena of growth as
they appear to an economic historian" [Rostow, 1971, p.13].
The same argument can as well be advanced to explain the fact that, however
comprehensive any theory of development or growth may be, it would be always
short of fully explaining various phenomena which are themselves a function of
the increasingly changing economic and political environment. The speed of such
changes can hardly be predicted by any theory the validity of which is often
overtaken by time. Who could have, for instance, predicted the spccd by which
today's communication and information technology have shaped the business
environment, only a few decades earlier?
On the question of the applicability of development theories to real life situations,
it was Hutton who, in his analysis of the major theories of development, suggested
that "there can be no neutral theory of development, since each alternative
necessarily has a political dimension" [Hutton, 1988, p.139]. The three theories
of development which Hutton is referring to in this context arc: Laissez—faire
individualism, collectivism, and scientific technological change. Without involving
ourself into details, the three perspectives of development are best summed up per
the following diagram, taken from Hutton [1988, p.140].
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DIAGRAM 4.4: THREE PERSPECTIVES OF DEVELOPMENT
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4.4.4 Devclopment Prioritie 
Because the devcloping countries in general havc limitcd rcsourccs, they havc to
choose between many development options and make the appropriate choice as to
which particular industry or sector they have to concentrate on. These options
may be many and some of them will be considered hereunder:
1. Import—substitution. The idea is based on the notion that freed—up foreign
exchange can be used for more advanced purchases, feeding the process of
upgrading industrial skills. Criticism against this option is usually centred
around the tendency to draw a nation into unattractive industries which will
lack advantage in international markets, despite the fact that protection can
guarantee the home market;
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2. Development stratcgy based solely on identifying industries where the
nation has only basic factor advantages — this option also runs the risk
of unsustainability and vulnerability to economic cycles worldwide;
3. With whatever industrial sectors are opted for as a base, the next step is to
stimulate the development of upstream, downstream or related industries,
in which advantage is less factor sensitive. Investments in education,
research and infrastructure should be a focus of attention. Indigenous
companies should be encouraged to become multinationals, to acquire
technology and skills and to gain direct access to foreign markets.
While admitting that foreign MNCs are an important part of the process of
economic development in developing countries, particularly in its earlier stages,
they cannot ultimately be the sole engine for such development. "A development
strategy based solely on foreign MNCs may doom a nation to remaining a factor—
driven economy" [Porter, 1990, p.679]. At the same time, multinationals can
relocate when factor costs shift, or if wages get too high. Therefore, foreign
MNCs should be only one component of a developing nation's economic strategy,
and an evolving component. At some stage in the developing process, the focus
should shift to indigenous companies. As emphasised elsewhere, joint venture
may be the appropriate channel through which MNCs can operate in the
developing countries of the Arab world. The Arab Governments' strategy should
be based on seeking the help of several multinationals in a given industry, instead
of only one or a few, to encourage rivalry that will spill over to benefit the nation
and to stimulate supporting or related industries. Governments should also
encourage the formation and upgrading of indigenous companies in related and
supporting industries to those in which multinationals operate.
4.4.5 Dependency Theory 
This theory emphasises the importance of the economic, political and cultural links
that come with certain types of capital, especially that which arrives via the
MN Cs.
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The point that no government is entirely free to shape its own policy without
regard to external influence, as contended by The Dependency Theory School,
carries a great deal of relevance in the Arab World. The dependency theory, with
its emphasis on the factors limiting the "room to manoeuvre", can clearly be seen
at work in the Arab countries. The Theory stipulates that no room to manoeuvre
at all arc practically left for a government with several of the following liabilities:
a small population, ethnic divisions, location next to super power, few natural
resources, a culturally subverted bureaucracy, high consumer expectations and a
narrow technical base. Almost all of such liabilities befall on most of the Arab
countries; hence a limited room to manoeuvre, with the question of direct or
indirect intervention by the MNCs, being only obvious.
The limitation of any theory of development such as the dependency theory, could
be sccn in the light of what someone in Dudley Seer's stature has stipulated that:
"Human reality is so construed that no model can be devised for its analysis which
is both realistic and simple enough to provide a universal development ideology
that could be applied with safety in any nation at all, especially if we allow, as we
surely must, for demographic and geographical factors as well as a range of
economic and cultural ones". [Sccrs, 1983, p.135]
Whatever differences there may be in assessing the dependency theory, one fact
remains intact; no contemporary nation—state will tolerate unlimited penetration by
an alien enterprise, in which control is vested in a management headquartered in
another nation—state, and making decisions possibly insensitive to the allocational
priorities of the host country. The point is that a firm operating across frontiers
must fit into the national identity in a tolerable fashion, wherever it does business.
It must not permit itself to be seen as disturbing national priorities in an important
manner.
Dependency theory manifests itself in the Arab World, which has always
maintained some association with Europe and was integrated into the world
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capitalist system, as a dominated periphery, at an earlier stage than the other
regions of thc Third World, with the obvious exception of Latin America and The
Caribbean. To illustrate this statistically, Samir Amin [1982, p.51] assessed the
contribution of imports to consumption and investment in the Arab World to be
twice as important as in Black Africa, three times more important than in Latin
America and the Caribbean, and 3.3 times more important than in South and East
Asia. In othcr words, the Arab economy is more externally oriented — and hence
more dependent — than the economies of the rest of the Third World.
The external orientation of the Arab economy is further manifested in the high
ratios of imports and exports to the GDPs of some eight selected Arab States, as
can be seen from Table 4.4.4 following. The Arab oil producing countries are
particularly vulnerable to foreign markets, with Kuwait's and Oman's 1986 foreign
trade (exports and imports) accounting for 73.1% and 68.2% respectively of their
GDPs. The equivalent ratios for Jordan, Tunisia and Saudi Arabia are 67.2%,
52.7% and 52.1% respectively. Syria, Egypt and, to a lesser degree, Morocco,
arc relatively more self dependent, as can be shown from Table 4.4.4.
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TABLE 4.4.4	 SELECTED ARAB COUNTRIES: RATIOS OF IMPORTS
AND EXPORTS TO GDP, 1963-86 (PERCENT)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1963 1973 1981 1985 1986 1963 1973 1981 1985 1986
KUWAIT 17.0 19.4 28.9 28.8 31.0 59.8 70.4 66.7 52.7 42.1
OMAN 10.9 24.0 33.3 33.6 34.6 4.5 68.1 64.4 46.9 33.6
SAUDI 16.6 18.0 22.9 24.9 23.6 53.1 71.3 73.7 33.3 28.5
ARABIA
MOROCCO 19.1 18.8 29.6 32.4 25.6 16.4 15.0 16.1 18.2 16.6
TUNISIA 21.4 24.4 45.6 33.1 32.7 12.1 15.2 30.2 20.3 20.0
EGYPT 23.6 9.9 36.6 20.4 21.1 13.5 12.1 13.5 7.6 5.4
JORDAN 39.5 49.6 89.8 66.7 51.6 5.1 11.0 20.8 19.3 15.6
SYRIA 22.6 23.5 29.7 19.6 18.7 10.9 13.5 12.4 7.7 5.3
Source:
	 Compiled by the author from In cmational Monetary Fund - Data Fund [as
cited in IMF, Occasional Paper 63, by Kelly ct al, December 1989].
4.5	 Eclectic Theory of International Production
The Eclectic Theory [Kumar and McLcod, 1981, and Dunning, 1985] postulates that the
propensity of a country's enterprises for engaging in foreign direct investment, is
determined by ownership, internalisation and locational advantages that are available to
them, as compared to other nations. In so far as these three advantages arc not evenly
distributed between countries, the activities of MNCs will affect the disposition of
resources in both the home and host country and between them. This approach to
explaining international production has been called Eclectic, due to its embracement of
the three main forms of foreign involvement by enterprises, namely direct investment,
exports, and contractual resource transfers such as licensing, management contracts,
technical service agreements and so forth.
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As such, thc Eclectic Thcory offers an explanation as to which route of exploitation of
each of the three advantages is prcfcrrcd. In all three vehicles the possession of
ownership advantages is a necessary prerequisite for involvement. However, the
possession of internalisation advantages suggests that firms will exploit these advantages
by way of exports or foreign direct investment, rather than by a contractual resource
exchange; whereas the equity investment route, rather than exports, will be chosen where
locational advantages favour a foreign, rather than a domestic, production base.
The main limitation of the Eclectic Theory in the author's view, seems to be that its main
concern is confined to how best a particular MNC can maximise its advantages, regardless
of any possible negative implications on the host country's interest, which seems to be
overlooked. The theory is based on the assumption of seeking the best available option
for the MNCs and it apparently assumes that the recipient host countries are waiting and
available, ready to go along with whatever scheme the technology supplying MNC decides
best suits its own interest. To sum up, the Eclectic Theory is designed to explain the
international production strategy of the developed world, without due regard or attention
to the developing countries, without whose cooperation no international production would
be likely to achieve its sought after goals. This analysis will be taken up further in our
last chapter, when the theoretical implications arc considered.
4.6	 Future outlook of the economic situation in the Gulf Region
In view of the fact that the 1990s do not promise a major resurgence of oil revenues on
the scales witnessed during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Arabian Gulf countries are
expected to maintain their policy of import—substitution and economic diversification.
The growth in imports is likely to be restrained and more emphasis will be put on
maintenance and the efficient utilisation of resources — protective tariffs selectively
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provided for locally produced commodities may be needed, together with other incentives,
to encourage domestic invcstmcnts. The rise in exports of petrochemical products,
aluminium and natural gas, among others, may offset to a large extent, the drop in oil
revcnues. The region is expected to maintain its historic trade surplus, albeit with some
deterioration in the respective countries' export—import ratios.
Changes in the size and nature of the Gulf markets in recent years, however, have
important consequences for foreign suppliers. Shifts have taken place between demand
for capital and intermediate goods and demand for finished consumer goods, largely as
a result of industrialisation, with the completion of the massive infrastructural schemes.
However, the Gulf countries will continue to look out for foreign partners to provide them
with the necessary imports and technological know—how, albeit their reliance will no
longer be confined to their traditional trade and investment partners. It is against this
background of changing conditions and needs of the Gulf markets, that a new era of
foreign MNCs involvement in the region, is to be anticipated: An era in which respective
market shares of each of these companies will be determined by the extent and degree of
success they can achieve in developing the new strategic capabilities which Section 5.3.2
of Chapter 5 will consider.
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CHAPTER 5
STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
AND THE ARAB WORLD
5.1	 Introduction
The scale of inward investment in the Arab World is important as a backdrop to any
discussion of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, official figures on the value of the assets
involved are a statistical minefield. Figures vary from the different sources, according
both to the coverage of the surveys conducted and to the methods used to evaluate the
assets and liabilities under conditions of inflation and fluctuating exchange rates. Today,
negotiations with MNCs inevitably focus on issues concerning the extent of their
value—added contribution to the host countries. Questions of investor's protection need
to be taken into account as well.
Evaluation of the MNCs' activities in the third world, raises the question of world
economic integration. With exports rising as a fraction of GNP, the world is supposed
to be effectively becoming more economically integrated.
This leads us to the question of the interaction between MNCs and the host countries.
How the present ZniEn1Cs work in different Arab countries, and the ways in which they may
be changed, have major implications for the Arab World. The purpose of this study is
to describe the background to MNCs' activities, and to analyse these with particular
reference to their implications for the future development of the Arab World, both in
industrial and trade sectors.
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The SOAS conference in May 1981 on "Third World Governments and Multinationals"
concluded that:
"There was still a pressing need for primary research about the Multinationals—Third
World interaction. Until more fieldwork is done in the host countries, the conference
participants cannot be fully supported in their claim that a new spirit of pragmatism runs
through the Third World, permitting a new relationship between MNCs and host
economies, to the ultimate benefit of them both".
Partially, at least, this study on the Multinationals in the Arab World is meant to respond
to such a call. However, it is not just economic calculation that we are dealing with, but
the balance sheet must also involve non—economic factors, and may well vary from
country to country within the Arab region.
The fact that foreign MNCs are willing to accommodate the economic nationalists, by
accepting some dilution of their control over subsidiaries, suggests that companies'
relationships with the Arab governments could well be heading towards a new stability
in the near future. However, this proposition needs to be verified and further supported
by clear evidences. Two factors nevertheless seem to justify this new spirit of optimism:—
a) The disappearance into history of colonial regimes would help in creating a new
environment, whereby greater pragmatism is to prevail. The bitterness towards
colonial powers is bound to die out — in time — to the point of pursuing mutual
interests.
b) Governments that once feared the Multinationals are now trying to court them.
Admittedly, over the intervening period, they have learned to bargain with the
MNCs to make them better serve their objectives. Maybe this is no more than a
temporary attitude which is likely to change, given the fact that it is probably the
109
recession which seems to have softened the contrasting positions between
governments and the MNCs.
5.2	 Investment Vis-a-Vis Trade
The striking differcnccs in the very definitions of MNCs, pose a considerable challenge
in the attempt to assess their relationships with host countries. In fact there is only little
which could be said about MNCs' direct investment in the Arab region. The author has
therefore chosen to tackle the issue from a different angle; namely focusing attention on
the practices of the MNCs in their attempt to capture a great deal of the Arab market
share. In this respect, we need to draw a line between exporters to the Arab market and
the foreign companies with production facilities in the region.
A tentative review of the number and types of foreign companies involved in most of the
Arab countries seems to suggest that, it is not the major, widely-known MNCs which arc
necessarily playing a leading role in the region, but rather the companies with major
exporting facilities. (See Table 5.2[4. During the 1970s, the construction industry had
greatly boomed in the Middle East and a number of MNCs in the construction field have
bccn directly involved. The role of local sub-contractors, who gained a wide support and
protection by local regulations must have been considerable.
Table 5.2[1)] demonstrates that the activities of the MNCs have been primarily directed
towards exports as opposed to real investment in the Arab countries. Therefore it would
be possible to conclude that MNCs in the region have been out of line with the widely
accepted belief that, exporting has long been played down and overseas production of the
majority of the MNCs is now many times their level of exports. Lipscy and Weiss (1981)
explore the determinants of 1970 U.S. exports to 44 destinations, and conclude that the
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foreign affiliate activity of US firms appears largely to complement US exports and that
the local sales of US firms often come at the expense of exports from Third World
countries. There is, thus, evidence that US outward foreign direct investment tends to act
as net complement, rather than a net substitute, to US exports in the industry. Some
writers [Stopford and Turner, 1985, p.118] tend to argue that:
"As nationalist and communications barriers are falling, a globally targeted exporting
strategy may, for some industries, be better suited to today's conditions, providing there
are some supporting investments in overseas distribution systems. Even where exporting
is gaining power, investments are still needed, where there are regulatory obstacles, or
in certain key markets, where the lessons to be gained from active participation can be
used throughout the whole company."
In the Arab World, protectionism has not yet taken roots, as is the case in the industrial
countries. Perhaps it is because of that, the MNCs, rather than investing in the Arab
States, arc exporting their products to them. Even in Europe, political barriers arc real
against imports. Japanese electronic and automotive companies know they can invest in
Europe and the USA to get behind the protectionist quotas erected against them. As for
the Arabs, they depend on importing the Japanese products, rather than giving facilities
to Japanese investment. Of course the size of the market is, among other factors, one
major limiting factor. That having been said, one does not underestimate the attraction
of a number of Arab countries as potential locations for foreign MNCs' investment. This
is particularly so given the remarkable achievements of the Arab Gulf States in
completing their infra—structural development as a basic pre—requisite to any forthcoming
industrial development.
Emerging trade barriers had the effect of creating a new stimulus for foreign investments.
Faced with a loss of demand from an export territory, the supplier could set up a local
manufacturing subsidiary, or else license his technology. A rather different story, it
ill
seems, would have to be told about the Arab market. The changing face of the Arab
World, in the wake of the oil boom of the seventies, is likely to create new strategic
problems for managers of the MNCs working in the region. For firms and governments
alike, the tests will be those of establishing competitive positions in markets that can no
longer be controlled by traditional one—country measures.
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TABLE 5.2[2]	 SABIC CORPORATIONS AND THEIR FOREIGN
PARTNERS, UP TO 1985
(SABIC: Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation)
No Name of
Corporation
(Industry)
Date of
esublish
meat
Main Products Foreign Partner Commencement
of operations or
projected
commencement
1 Hadeed 203.79 Reinforcing rods and
bars
D.EG. (W. Germany) January 1983
2 Sulb 1962
(expanded
1979)
Reinforcing bars Kurt Mandel
(W. Germany)
Early 1960s
3 SAFCO 1965 Urea, Sulphuric Acid,
Melamine
None 1969
4 SAMAD 1979 Urea Taiwan Fertilizer Co. 1983
5 Ar-Ruzi 1979 Chemical-Grade
Methanol
Mitsubishi (Japan) 1983
6 Ibn Sins 1981 Methanol Celanese and Texas
Eastern (USA)
1984
7 Sadaf 1980 Ethylene, Ethylene
dichloride gyrene,
ethanol, caustic soda,
low density
polyethylene
Celanese and Texas
Eastern (USA)
1984
8 Kemya 1980 Low-density
polyethylene
Arabian Pecten,
owned by Shell
(USA)
1984
9 Yanpet 1980 Ethylene, Ethylene
glycol, Polyethylene
Mobil (USA) 1984
10 Petrokemya 1981 Ethylene, Polystyrene,
Blothin 1
None 1985
11 Shaul 1981 Polyethylene, ethylene
81 Y col
Japanese Consortium
led by Mitsubishi
1984
12 Gas 1983 Nitrogen, Oxygen None 1984
13 Ibn haiyan 1984 Vinyl-chloride-
MOTIOM1/
Lucky (Republic of
Korea)
1986
14 Ibri al-Bitar 1985 Ammonia None 1988
15 Ibn Zahr 1984 Methyl-teniary-butyl
ether
Arabian Api Corp,
Neste Oy (Finland)
and Enichem (Italy)
1988
Source: Compiled from various SABIC Publications.
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TABLE 5.2[b]	 FOREIGN TRADE STRUCTURE OF THE ARAB WORLD, 1988
II
EXPORTS (%)	 I	 IMPORTS (%)
ICountry A B C D E MB C+D+E F G H I 1 F+G+H 1+1
Algeria 96 1 0 1 3 97 4 30 2 5 27 35 37 62
Bahrain .. .. - - .. .. .. - .. .. .. .
..
Egypt 69 12 12 . 7 81 19 19 2 8 29 41 29 70
Iraq .. - - - - - _ - -
-
Jordan 43 10 5 6 36 53 47 19 16 5 23 38 40 61
Kuwait 90 1 - 4 5 91 9 17 1 2 39 41 20 80
_ „ -
- -
..
Morocco 21 29 18 2 30 50 50 12 13 17 24 34 42 58
Libya 1 99 2 15 1 2 33 49 18 82
Oman 91 2 - 5 2 93 7 15 3 2 41 39 20
Qatar - - - - .. - - - - - - - „
Saudi
Arabia
SO 1 - 4 5 91 9 17 1 2 34 46 20 80
Sudan 13 80 .. 3 4 93 7 7 19 2 36 36 28 72
Syria 50 25 6 3 16 75 25 17 11 5 28 39 33 67
Tunisia 19 17 30 6 28 36 64 18 7 14 22 39 39 61
U.A.E. 79 4 .. .. 16 83 16 4 3 1 43 49 8 82
North &
South
Yemen
88 3 - 7 2 91 9 25 15 5 22 32 46 53
Somalia .. 95 .. .. 5 95 5 22 4 8 39 27 34 66
.. .. .. .. .. .. - -
Maui-
, tank
32 65 „ .. 2 97 2 21 5 2 36 36 28 72
AMY:	 A • Reif and Minerals
B • Other Primary Commodities
C • Textiles & Clothing
D • Machinery and Transport Equipment
E • Other Manufactured Gccds
MB • Total Primary
C+D+E • Total Manufactured
F • Food
G • Fuels
H • Other Primary Commodities
I • Machinery & Transport Equipment
/ • Other Manufactured Goods
F+G+H • Total Primary
1+1 • Total Manufactured
Source:	 Annual Report 1989/1990, ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK,
pp.46147, Citing World Bank, International Development Report, 1990
Data not available; Data about countries with population size less than one
million arc also excluded.
• 4,
	
Totals do not add up to 100%, due to approximation and rounding of figurcs.
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53	 Strategies of Multinationals
The answer to the question of why MNCs place factories or offices in particular countries
or regions can be grouped into three main business strategies: a) market; b) supply;
and c) demand. This study will have to find out in some precise terms the real motives
of foreign MNCs in their choice of given Arab states as locations for their operations.
This will be discussed at length in Chapters 9 to 10.
a) Market Strategy: to avoid tariff and non—tariff barriers placed on their exports
(much of Japanese investments within the EEC is of this type).
b) Supply Strategy: to ensure that their countries of origin are well supplied with
raw materials like oil, minerals and tropical crops. The domination of MNCs in
this primary sector is under threat from the governments of less developed
countries such as the Arab States, who have set themselves the task of taking over
the control of their resources, as will be considered in some detail later in this
study. In response, the MNCs arc:—
i) moving out of the business of extraction;
ii) and involving themselves more in the transport, processing and
marketing of these raw materials (oil being a typical case in point);
iii) because NINCs have never ceased to offer their technical skills and
managerial assistance, even in those cases where national assets have
been nationalised (Arab oil), they still exercise considerable control in
the primary sector.
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c) Production Strategy: MNCs move overseas as part of a global strategy to reduce
labour and material costs. Some set up free-trade zones where they can hire
cheap labour to produce components which are then assembled elsewhere,
resulting in the absence of any positive impact on the rest of the economy.
While tariff barriers against MNCs' products do not as yet exist in the Arab countries,
particularly those in the Gulf region, and the free-trade zones are almost irrelevant, (or
at best only rudimentary) the raw material supply strategy, as well as the part of
production strategy regarding the reduction of material and labour costs, do apply in the
case of a number of Arab countries.
53.1 Global Business Environment
No one doubts the fact that MNCs arc continually changing their strategics on an
ongoing basis in order to adapt with the changing realities of the global business
environment. It was Levitt [1983, HB11] who once predicted that "MNCs are
coming to their end and new global companies are emerging and operating with
low cost as lithe entire world would be a single entity". The same voice has been
more recently echoed by Business Week' in its cover story, May 14, 1990, under
the title of "The Stateless Corporations":
"The multinational of the 1970s is obsolete. Global companies must be more than
just a bunch of overseas subsidiaries that execute decisions made at headquarters.
Instead, a new type of company is evolving. It does research wherever necessary,
develops products in several countries, promotes key executives regardless of
nationality and even has shareholders on three continents. As world markets
consolidate further, the trend will accelerate and that will raise some critical
questions about sovereignty, national interest and potential conflicts between
companies and their own governments".
In fact many of the above-stated symptoms have already shown signs of
occurrence in the Arab world, albeit other developments such as the promotion of
local Arab executives arc yet to be materialised.
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5.3.2. Historical Background of MNCs
The historical development of MNCs could be traced back to about a century ago.
Many stages of their evolution can be identified as follows:—
1. Prior to 1880, most industries were locally or regionally based,
reflecting that the role of MNCs was limited to classic comparative
advantage criterion. Exports of locally produced goods was the major
form of MNCs activities.
2. After 1880, fuel power machines prompted the appearance of the first
real MNCs — Ford, Singer, and Gillette, who used some advanced
technology, and in a business environment with no international barriers,
operated with worldwide strategies.
3. 1920-1950 The first wave of globalisation slowed down rather quickly,
due to the growth of nationalism and protectionism, coupled with the
_
great depression and the Second World War. This period witnessed the
growth of import—substituting investment, leading MNCs to establish
production facilities in overseas markets they have previously exported
to.
4. In the aftermath of the Second World War, and particularly after 1950,
advanced technology led to the rise of economies of scale and mass
production. This was particularly facilitated by the removal of tariff
barriers, inspired by GATT's efforts and the disappearance of cartels, all
resulting in reduction in the real cost of transportation and much higher
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sharc of international trade and investment in general. This is a period
during which MNCs had a real chance to expand their global activities.
Historically, most of today's MNCs have adopted strategies that were shaped by
their home—country culture and their subsequent internationalisation. In many
European companies, for example, management mentalities have been rooted in
the pre—Second World War environment, in which overseas businesses were first
built. Expanding into their colonial markets when the barriers to international
commerce were high, these companies usually set up self—sufficient national
operations that were highly sensitive to local needs and opportunities. These later
became the true multinational companies — literally a portfolio of national
companies, each responding to its own operating environment.
In contrast, the strategies of most American companies were established during the
1950s and 1960s, as post—war reconstruction demand drew them offshore and their
strategies gave rise to the international product cycle theory that explains overseas
expansion in terms of a company's ability to transfer innovative products from the
most developed to less developed markets.
The management mentality in Japanese companies was shaped by a very different
administrative heritage. Expanding into a world of lowered trade barriers in the
1960s and 1970s, and constrained by strict Japanese government—imposed
limitations on overseas investment, these companies internationalised through an
export—based strategy. They treated the world as one single market and were thus
able to capture economics of scale.
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All three of these classic strategic models are seen to be out—dated in the
international environment of the 1990s. A new competitive game has emerged
which requires MNCs to develop three diverse — often conflicting — strategic
capabilities, simultaneously:
1. The multinational flexibility to respond to local market needs;
2. The global competitiveness to capture efficiencies of scale;
3. The international learning ability that results in worldwide innovation.
As a consequence of these changes, a new model for the worldwide company is
emerging in the 1990s — one which could be more appropriately called
"transnational", in line with the definition of the term as stipulated in Section 4.2.1
of Chapter 4.
53.3 Changing Patterns of International Competition
According to Mustoneu [August 1990], the mid-1950s brought some significant
changes to the strategies of the MNCs. Markets have recovered from the war and
the growth of world trade took off. The next decade (1960s) brought along a
growing interest in investment in developing countries. The third major change
was the invasion of Japanese companies to Europe, South East Asia and the
U.S.A. This started a fundamental change in the international competitive
environment, the most important elements of which are the creation of the single
European market, and most recently the collapse of the communist bloc countries
and the continuous efforts of GATT to remove various subsidies.
"In the past, MNCs subsidiaries have generally been formed to resemble miniature
versions of their parents, that is producing and selling substantially the same
products and pursuing similar forms of management practice — that was when
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MNCs were dealing with unchallenged technology. This has changed, however,
and MNC strategies are changing to adapt to the new competitive environment."
[Frechting, 1990, p.22]
'Exporting', also in the past, was generally chosen by MNCs as being in response
to spare capacity, skills and resources. Knowledge agreements (Jicences) were
recognised as being appropriate where it was more profitable to sell knowledge
than a product, and where exporting was proving inappropriate, such as where
tariffs and import restrictions were in place. Equally, knowledge agreements were
seen as applicable where direct investment was not, such as where the risk was
unacceptable, or the desire to move quickly was paramount Direct investment
was the third stage and generally arose as a defensive measure where competitive
aggressiveness deemed it necessary to safeguard markets 	
"As a result of pursuing 'incremental approach', product development has
traditionally been tailored to the domestic market. This approach is no longer
applicable. With the arrival of globalisation, what is required is for the product
to be internationally, as well as domestically, oriented at the time of design."
[Brooke, 1990, pp.58/59]
Most recently MNC,s have been preoccupied with the rapidly changing patterns of
international competition and development trends in the world markets, which kept
them busy formulating new theories of global strategy. The question is one of
how best to adapt the corporate—wide set of standards and strategics, both to the
changing pattern of competition, as well as to the changing needs of the host
countries, particularly in the developing world.
Since the 1950s there has been a marked change in the competitive environment,
whereby the old core of industrialised nations such as US and UK have been
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increasingly challenged in both traditional and high technology industries, by Japan
and the NICs. 'Globalisation' is now a reality, not just a trend. All MNCs can do
if their rivals are doing the same activities as they arc, is to do so better.
The relationships between MNCs' headquarters and subsidiaries, and the degree of
delcgational power passed from the former to the latter, are prominently featured
in the literature about MNCs in general. Mustoneu [1990] contends in his paper,
that such relationships depend on the nature of the business of MNCs and that
economic, technological and comparative characteristics have to be considered.
However, many strategists focus their attention on the pressure for global
operational integration which stems from many factors , such as:
a. technology intensity;
b. pressure for cost reduction; and
c. access to raw materials and energy.
However, the counter pressure for local responsiveness, as opposed to operational
integration, arises from the following reasons:
a. differences in customers' needs and distribution;
b. the need for substitution and product adaptation;
c. differences in market structure; and
d. host governments demands.
The internationalisation of business, however, does not necessarily mean that all
MNCs should pursue global strategics. The idea of global markets is mainly based
on the economics of scale in R & D and the tendency of people to buy
standardised brand products. But according to Mustoncu, with whom the author
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tends to agree, there are also other forces to the contrary affecting the development
of the markets:
a. New flexible manufacturing techniques have made possible smaller
production units producing customised products according to
specific customer orders;
b. Even the big national markets (such as US market) are not
homogeneous. Various ethnic groups are prone to stress their
special nature as customers;
c. Brand names arc not that strong world—wide. This is shown by a
recent study of familiarity of some brand names. Mustoncu
outlines some examples to illustrate this new development: Coca
Cola is ranking 6th in Europe, 1st in US and 2nd in Japan;
corresponding figures of McDonalds are 78, 5 and 26; and of
Mercedes cars 1, 37 and 151; and of Sony 16, 68 and 4
respectively.
The new strategy which has emerged to claim some consensus, is manifest in the
slogan "think global and act local". This is a call to adapt to various local
markets, rather than to adopt the policy of a standard product with standard
marketing. Such a strategy is not only to the benefit of the MNCs, but also of
those developing countries, such as the Arab States, who will naturally enjoy the
benefit of competition among MNCs, resulting in better quality and lower prices.
This compares with operational integration, which implies a type of oligopolistic
attitude among MNCs, to cooperate and coordinate their standard policy to the
detriment of the host countries, whose lack of bargaining power renders them
vulnerable to rules and practices imposcd on thcm by the powerful foreign MNCs.
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Strategic planning by different MNCs varies and no particular system is
necessarily regarded as better than anothcr. Each MNC adopts its own approach
to strategic planning that it deems fit, to maximise its own resources and
competitive advantages. The main concern is the development of global strategics
to deal with the uncertain events that will hinder a given NiNCs operating plans.
Such problems as plant location, cross—border transfer pricing, exchange rate
fluctuations, its own profitability, g,rowth and diversification situations, may not
necessarily coincide with the strategic planning of host countries, which might be
focused on their national development schemes. Of course, a part of the MNCs'
strategic planning also takes into account local national host governments
viewpoints, as they seek to optimise their resources on a global scale within the
political and social constraints of operating in different nation states. It is on the
basis of such corporate plan strategy that policies such as the type and
combination of exporting, licensing or direct investment are undertaken, and how
the MNC elects to utilise its managerial, technological and financial resources,
taking also into consideration the best balances of opportunities against likely risks
in the host countries.
5.3.4	 • 0	 U h	 I II !
MNCs arc often faced with situations in which their operations in some host
countries arc restricted by various forms of trade and investment barriers. In order
to overcome such barriers, some MNCs elected to make some tactical changes in
their strategies. Some examples arc given below to highlight such changes of
strategy, which by the passage of time have proved to be more than just tactical
changes.
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Taiwan, South Korea and Israel have traditionally been off—limits to Japanese auto
companies. Taiwan and Korea ban importing of Japanese cars and Japan observes
thc Arab embargo of Israel. But thanks to its US output, Honda Motor Company
found a way to circumvent these problems. It ships four—door "Accords" to
Taiwan and Korea and "Civic Sedans" to Israel — all from Ohio.
Thc Canadian telecommunications giant, Northern Telecom Ltd, has moved so
many of its manufacturing functions to the US that it can win Japanese contracts
on the basis of being a US company. Japan favours the US over Canada
telecommunications companies, because of the politically sensitive US—Japanese
trade gap. The reality is that the Canadian company probably could not have
penetrated Japan out of Canada.
Also, to avoid licensing and regulatory hassles in the largest markets, Western
Europe and the US, different MNCs establish mergers and acquisitions to get
around such problems. The merged company (US—European) can idcntify itself
as an inside player in both Europe and the US.
5.4	 Strategies of The Arab World
5.4.1 The Diversity of the Arab States
Their common interests and endless calls for unity notwithstanding, we find
governments of the Arab countries ideologically split on their attitudes to foreign
private investment. We also find that the bargaining power of countries will vary
given the relative abundance of their natural resources, and given the size of their
populations; Saudi Arabia, with its oil, is in an incomparably stronger bargaining
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position than say, a resource—poor country such as South Yemen, or an under-
developed, though resource—rich, country such as Sudan.
MNCs survive by making profits. Given this, any MNC considering an
involvement in the Arab region would start by applying normal investment criteria,
such as return on capital, risks attached to specific investments and pay—back
times. If the project looks unlikely to meet these minimum criteria, it will be
rejected. It is in line with this view that one attributes the considerable selectivity
among the MNCs. They have concentrated their investment on a handful of
already prosperous Arab countries primarily made up of the OPEC members of the
Arab States. It would seem that a systematic reciting of production to less
advanced countries in the Arab World, where wages and the productivity
equivalent are much lower, would seem a normal reaction on the part of
entrepreneurs. This movement has taken place but only on a very limited scale.
The scenario of the recycling of Arab petro—dollars to stimulate the take—off of
the less developed Arab countries did not quite work as was widely hoped. It is
only through promoting closer economic and investment strategies amongst
themselves that the Arab countries, as a group, could collectively put themselves
in a stronger bargaining position vis—a—vis foreign companies, if they arc ever to
prosper.
5.4.2 The Nature of Arab Industrial Development Planning
In the overwhelming majority of the Arab countries, the industrial development
strategies pursued by their governments arc at best vague and ill—defined. It is
obvious that the industrial development stratcgy is much wider than the objectives
to, or targets of, a development plan. Unfortunately, it is the latter which is the
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sole concern of the decision makers in the Arab world. Their concern seems to
be concentrated only on the industrial development plans, to the exclusion of a
wider industrial strategy capable of establishing the basis on which periodical
plans can be derived. In a number of Arab countries which are endowed with
agricultural resources, the most thrust of development will have to be made in the
agricultural sector of the economy. Industrialisation is to be seen more as an
accompaniment to this thrust, than as a prime mover in its own right. Such
strategies should be well spelt out and MNCs seeking business in those countries
are to adapt their strategies accordingly. Llyter et al [1977] states "the corporate
strategy can be used to appraise an existing strategy by relating it to the external
environment and the internal resources". Since a clear corporate strategy simply
does not exist in the Arab States, the MNCs will naturally be faced with a difficult
situation in their attempts to adapt their own strategy in a business environment
which lacks a clear sense of direction.
Sudan can be cited as a text—book example of a developing Arab country, with no
apparent strategy for industrialisation. The purpose behind the creation of the
Public Corporation Act 1976, does not even attempt to define the objectives of the
activities [Farah, 1982, p.43]. Moreover, the word "stratcgy" itself is seldom used
in the Sudan (and indeed elsewhere in the Arab world). "Planning" is the word
which is rather synonymously used, although in practice even planning does not
exist, given that planning as a management function includes "the setting of
objectives and choosing of policies, programmes and procedures leading to the
attainment of goals. It should also be seen as a decision—making process in
which choices are made from among different alternatives" [Llytcr ct al, 1977].
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To quote an example of the deficiency of objective setting within the framework
of a wider strategy formulation, the following are excerpts from the 1971 Act of
Public Corporations in the Sudan:
"With the aim of liberating the national economy from the grip of international
monopoly ... the elimination of bureaucratic routine ... the establishment of the
basis for a socialist economy ... In order to serve the public interest and get rid
of the selfishness and greediness of private exploitation".
It is evident from the above that the government of the time did not seem to be
clear of what it wanted from public enterprises, or at least not to have articulated
its goals. Similarly, there seems to be little by way of formulation of criteria for
the future divestment of many industrial undertakings once they have been
established. In short, a good deal of the existing and planned public enterprises
seems to be in the public sector for somewhat arbitrary reasons. Within the Arab
countries, Sudan is by no means an exceptional or extreme case as far as
misconceptions in the strategy formulation or implementation are concerned.
5.4.3
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Some people argue that national regulations arc no longer suitable since the nature
of the national state has been changed by the phenomenon of multinationalisation
itself. On the other hand, regulations based exclusively on the multi—nationals,
without state support, would be too fragile and unstable. This double deadlock
requires a new solution which will never be provided by either of the current
actors alone, i.e. the states and multinationals. Rather it will be the outcome of
their dialectic.
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In the same way that economic frontiers between states are becoming less clearly
defined, thosc between undertakings are becoming more vague. The multiplicity
of co—operation agreements, join production, cross holdings between firms of
different nationalities, belonging to both the same sectors or different sectors, often
in competition with each other, makes it necessary to redefine the concept of the
undertaking itself.
In the Arab World there seems to be little evidence to assume that there are
separate legislations to deal with foreign MNCs as opposed to other foreign
companies. This suggests that the only distinction in that respect is between
foreign and local companies. A different set of regulations governs the activities
of joint ventures, whereby a number of concessions are offered to motivate both
foreign and local undertakings to promote this much favoured form of partnership.
However, in some selected fields, and in harmony with Arab League instigated
co—operation agreements, Inter—Arab organisations arc favourably treated, i.e.
abolishing customs on joint—Arab commodities, unified Arab custom barriers and
practices against commodities from outside the Arab World. Nevertheless, one
can generally assume that regulations organising the activities of foreign
companies operating in different Arab states, apply equally, irrespective of their
varying degrees of multinationalisation. According to Al Moajil [Arab Gulf
Industry Vol 1, No.1, January 1984
"The Arab Gulf States must look to wider strategy and the establishment of
joint—ventures linking Gulf resources of capital and energy to the manpower and
markets available in the larger, more densely populated Arab countries, whose
development has been impeded by lack of financial resources".
Various agencies already exist to promote such Inter—Arab co—operation in a
number of different investment sectors.
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5.4.4. Islamic Ilankingand Sharia Taw
Our account on investment regulations will be incomplete without considering the
Islamic banking system, the introduction of which has created a considerable
degree of conflict with the western banking system. Islamic banks in London, for
instance, can only be classified as investment institutions not banks? Western
banks provide guarantee to the capital for depositors while Islamic banks do not.
In an Islamic country like Saudi Arabia, the unhappy mixture of commercial and
religious codes does create a degree of uncertainty in agreements between local
and foreign companies, because the government has been forced to introduce a
body of secular law particularly for dealing with foreign corporate entities. (Sharia
Law is the ultimate source of all legislations). Many people coming . to do
business in the Arabian Gulf States for the first time have, in the past, expressed
concern over the applicability and influence of Sharia Law. They seem to have
formed the opinion that the Sharia would somehow work to their disadvantage.
This is emphatically not the case. In fact, in all Gulf States, Sharia is stated to be
only one of the sources of law, and where its main application is to be found in
the areas of personal law, for example divorce, inheritance and guardianship.
Regarding the bargaining position of the MNCs, it is assumed that a multinational
company will make few concessions, depending on how badly it actually wants
to invest in a given Arab country. The more attractive the host country appears,
the more concessions which can be forced on the foreign company. Naturally, the
Arab countries offer varying degrees of such attractiveness depending, among
other factors, on the prevailing political system in a particular country, as well as
on governments' perception of the likely outcome of foreign investment and its
implications on domestic development strategies.
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5.4.5. Oil and The Arab World
The multinational oil companies, each of which has long developed into an
integrated oil company, controlling not only its own oil production in the Arab oil
producing countries, but also transportation and marketing, and more recently oil
products — became new kinds of industrial organisations — in some aspects the
forerunners of the modern multinational corporations. The impact of these MNCs
on the Arab World has been clearly demonstrated throughout the modern history
by the fact that, it was the Seven Sisters, who could decide how to allocate
economic growth between one Arab State and another and who imposed their own
characters on the emerging nations. It was Anthony Sampson (1985) who said
in his most informative and pioneering book "5even Sisters".
"Financing whole nations (in the Arab Gulf), fuelling wars, developing deserts,
MNCs had seemed often enough like private governments to which the western
nations had deliberately abdicated part of their diplomacy."
The 1970s were testing years for the relationship of MNCs and the Arab World.
The rise of OPEC under the Arab leadership and the expropriation of oil and other
resource—based companies were their world's response to a pattern of investment
which was widely felt to be oppressive and unfair.
The fact that technology and industrial development witnessed in the 1950s and
1960s depended substantially on cheap oil, reflects that the Arab oil producing
countries have offered tremendous sacrifices in actually substantiating the world
economic development by allowing their oil to be sold at least at a lower price
level than the market could actually bear. In 1951, coal accounted for 51% of
fuel in the USA, while in 1973 it was 19% [Anthony Sampson, 1985]. In western
Europc the change was even more evident. Because of cheap oil, all alternative
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energy sources were being neglected. In 1974, the Seven Sisters, according to the
Fortunes list of the biggest US corporations published in 1975, were all among
the 15 biggest MNCs in the world. It is no wonder then, that the Arabs have to
rightly argue that their non-expensive oil was really in the best possible interests
of the west. After all, it was only when their repeated calls for a fair share of the
fruits, realised by the MNCs have fallen on deaf ears, that they unilaterally
decided to increase the prices of their sole natural resource - oil.
5.5 The New Power of The Third World
The fact now seems irreversible that much of the world's wealth had suddenly shifted
from its traditional western industrialised world to new locations. Apart from the NICs,
the oil-rich states, who are to be counted amongst the newly-emerged category of
wealthy countries, have not been well prepared to exploit their financial surpluses. The
Third World could not be readily rewarded by the newly acquired wealth pertaining to
some of its members. No serious attempts have as yet been made to invest the huge oil
returns of the 1970s where they could have been ideally placed. Instead, these surpluses
have reversed back to the western financial institutions which have reallocated them
partially in a few NICs. The absence of long-term, well coordinated strategics as to the
best viable way of exploiting the financial surpluses of OPEC would have to bear a large
share of the blame. But the critical question still remains: what next?
The Arab oil-producing countries, on account of their limited investment absorption
capacity, have had petro-dollar surplus until mid-1980s, but falling crude oil and other
..
raw material prices since then, together with rising interest rates and the slow-down in
world trade, have placed these countries in a very difficult situation and hence dashed the
hopes that OPEC - which at one time did not need all its new money - may prove a
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more effective bridge between the rich and poor countries, than all the earlier aid—giving
institutions of the west. To what extent do the MNCs have to be associated with this state
of affairs remains outside the scope of this study and needs to be explored at some
considerable depth in future researches.
5.6	 Research Facilities and Technology Transfer
The contributions by MNCs towards research and development facilities in the Arab host
countries, particularly in respect of adaptive research appears to be limited by lack of
necessary personnel and lack of very specific long—term reasons for researching.
Moreover, MNCs' traditional strategy is keeping fundamental research close to corporate
headquarters. This has the effect of precipitating the accusations by the Third World
countries that foreign private investment does block off or pre—empt possibilities for
domestic investment. The question here, is one of enabling the Arab governments and•
companies through joint ventures or any other alternative forms of participation to learn
how to manage MNCs and other patterns of relationships. A practical illustrative example
to be cited, is the futurc of steel production in the Arab World and the likelihood of a
successful transfer of technology in this field. Saudi Arabia and Algeria, for instance,
would benefit from cheap energy supplies and being newcomers would have to be able
to introduce the most efficient techniques, provided that MNCs are willing to assist in
transferring their technology and know—how.
5.7	 MNCs of Different Nationalities
The Arab market is now widely open to different competitors worldwide. Different
developing countries have different attitudes towards MNCs from different parent
countries. Whatever such differences may be, some facts about the MNCs remain
undisputable, at least from the viewpoint of the developing countries. One such solid
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conviction is the fact that what is decided in MNCs' boardrooms can and does have an
immediate effect on the national economy, as a whole, of the host country. The attitudes
of western MNCs in the Less Developing Countries (LDCs) are such that proposals to
extend in these regions may be dismissed on two grounds: either because they are seen
to be too risky, or that sophisticated technology is too complex for their people to
produce. That perhaps explains the concentration of their corporate investments in the
safe countries of Western Europe and North America. Such attitudes have paved the way
for a gigantic newcomer — Japan — who has been faster to adapt in a region like the
Middle East, because it was quicker to avail itself when the need arose. The result soon
became evident: what were to be the much more rapid growth markets of the western
MNCs were left wide open for Japanese MNCs' investment at precisely the time when the
Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) were seeking their partnership and assistance. In
fact the Japanese industrial structure based on government—sponsored vision had
convinced the LDCs that comparative advantages in their mature product sectors was
passing to the Third World. This is particularly so in view of the widely held belief that
British and American MNCs have an institutional orientation towards short—term financial
results (maybe due to frequent predominance of accountants in management and of
financial institutions as shareholders) as Stopford and Turner (1985) claim.
The Arab market is also open to foreign companies of the socialist block of East Europe
• and the Soviet Union, which often exist in the form of Joint Venture as a result of
intergovernmental agreements. Some of these companies are obviously welcome in
particular Arab countries, given that the goals of most of these companies are far from
making higher profits, and in most cases they arc believed to share none of the negative
characteristics of western MNCs. However, in view of the recent political (and economic)
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developments in the Socialist bloc, it is not as yet possible to speculate on how the
relationship between the two regions is likely to develop in the years to come.
5.8 Japan and the Arab World
No analysis of MNCs could possibly be complete without a thoughtful reference to the
Japanese experience. The most important multinational production of Japanese firms arc
those in the low labour—cost, fast growth and above all, export—orientated economies of
the less developed newly industrialising countries, most of which are situated in South
East Asia.
The Japanese major handicap of sheer distance from the most important foreign markets
for their products, can work to the advantage of the Arab countries, given their relative
proximity to Japan. By steering their international production location decisions towards
the NICs, Japanese MNCs gained both the advantage of very low cost yet highly
productive labour and also the advantage of participating in the world's fastest growing
markets. The Arab countries could soon be an obvious target to the Japanese companies
so long as they show signs of steady growth in their industrial development. Investment
in manufacturing has long been orientated towards developed countries for the western
MNCs. Japan seems to be the favourite choice for the Third World countries in respect
of technology transfer, much required to meet their industrial aspirations. Moreover, the
telling experience of the NICs demonstrates the effectiveness of co—operation with Japan
as opposed to other western countries when it comes to questions concerning the
transformation of their economies.
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The Japanese, moreover, tend to deliver a higher specification than required for targeted
devices and customers, apparently without passing the added cost on to the final prices.
The basic foundation for co—operation with Japan has already bcen laid in the Arab
World. Japanese goods are showing an increasing presence in the Arab markets, including
cars, electrical appliances and electronics. Also an increasing number of Japanese
construction firms are actively involved in some Arab countries. The temptation to
promote co—operation with Japan is further highlighted by a number of other factors:
a) Cheap technology;
b) Politically — Japan has no history of colonisation — hence the absence of fear of
political influence or interference;
c) their easy—going, business—like manner of partnerships;
d) advantage of the quality of Japanese engineering steel production, given their long
experience in supplying steel know—how to Brazil and elsewhere in the Third
World. (An increasing number of Arab countries have recently undertaken large
steel production facilities, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Algeria, Libya and Egypt
among others. Qatari Steel Company (QASCO), which was established as a result
of a joint venture agreement between Qatar government and two Japanese steel
companies in 1974, was the first integrated steel plant in the Arabian Gulf.)
The Arab countries would prefer the Japanese to work through joint ventures or, even in
a purely contractual relationship. Timing is crucial, and perhaps the Arab countries would
better have to make the move before it is too late, in case the protectionist pressure from
western competitors succeeds in weakening the Japanese economy, hence its ability to
maintain its technological superiority.
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5.9 The Future of MNCs in the Arab World
Trade and industry are closely related to each other. In one sense, the location of industry
is an integral aspect of all international trading arrangements. Trade occurs, after all,
because industries are situated away from their sources of raw materials, their markets or
both. International industrial location is influenced principally by national comparative
advantages in relation to historic raw materials and/or labour costs. Issues of industrial
strategy, however, change considerably and become less familiar when comparative
advantage is also assessed in terms of countries' relative access to energy, capital,
technology and other immaterials. A considerable number of Arab countries enjoy the
advantage of both energy and capital, as well as vast areas of abundant agricultural land
and other natural resources. Lack of technology with which western MNCs are primarily
associated is the principal weakness of the Arab economy. It is with this in mind that the
Arabs are looking forward to a new era of friction—free cooperation in the international
market place — where their industrial development can be attained at a reasonable cost.
Friction in the international economy and rising protectionist pressures, reflect many of
the current problems affecting industrial strategy. Traditional arguments about who is
entitled to sell what, in whose national market, at which price, arc being increasingly
transformed into arguments about who is entitled to make what, in which country or
region — in other words, into disputes centring on international location of industry itself.
The issues that surround basic petrochemical production in the Arab Gulf, automobile
assembly or manufacture by Japanese companies in Europe, illustrate the point. The Arab
countries can hardly be insensitive to the outcome of such disputes about the location of
international industrial activity, and their relationship with MNCs is bound to be
eventually determined accordingly.
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MNCs' influence in the Arab countries are restricted by many factors. The key variables
are the growth rate of the chief OECD economics, the value of the US dollar, the course
of trade and protectionism in the US and elsewhere, world interest rates, and above all,
the price of oil. The prospects for these are mixed, so are the future strategies of MNCs
and the host Arab countries alike. The fall in the oil price by nearly 50% during 1986,
was ambiguously good news for oil importing Arab states who paid less for their oil.
They benefited from the subsequent boost to OECD growth rates. They have also gained
from the falls in interest rates and the lower dollar. Such gains for the poor Arab
countries are dependent on, and will follow those for the industrial countries. It is
through the MNCs that these industrial countries channel their presence, hence investment
activities in the developing countries.
One also needs to explore why foreign MNCs choose to locate some of their activities in
particular Arab countries and how their behaviour resembles or differs from that of local
firms. One also needs to deal with the different question of what might have happened,
had they not invested before attempting to answer the basic question of whether or not
the Arabs have bcncfittcd from their presence. Another central question is the one posed
by Stopford and Turner (1985) as to whether the MNCs have created or replaced trade
in the particular case of Great Britain. Similar issues may apply in the case of the Arab
World. Our own survey in the Gulf Region has dealt with such implications as can be
shown in Chapters 9 and 10.
5.10 Possible Future Strategies for the Arab World
The seventies witnessed the strength of OPEC. In the late sixties they began to concern
themselves with the idea of gradual nationalisation under the tactful slogan of participation
— the notion that a producing country was entitled for partnership of the concession — as
137
opposed to merely taxing it. In the seventies they achieved big successes and gradually
national companies started to play their effective roles.
It is the author's belief that, inevitably, all activities pertaining to the present multinational
oil companies are bound to be eventually taken over by the producing countries. It is,
nevertheless, hard to tell when that stage will have to be reached in precise terms.
As the rate of return on oil industry is higher than on other industries, the Arab countries
can, in the long—term, establish integrated national companies capable of financing most
of their own exploration — tanker fleets, refineries, tank farms, trucks and filling stations
together with their expansion into the new business of petrochemicals, the foundation of
which has already been laid. It might be well argued that gone are days when—the oil
multinationals had built themselves up into some of the biggest corporations in history,
primarily through the ownership of concessions in developing countries, and
predominantly in the Arab Middle East.
The only requirement for such transformation to take place is to carefully adopt a
long—term view as to the crucial question of technology transfer without which the region
will remain dependent on the industrialised world.
Among the Arab oil producing countries arc those who arc complacent enough to the
extent of failing to distinguish between the long and short term strategies and the trade-
off between them. Some of them would simply ask: "why abolish the oil companies when
they can find the markets for us and regulate them?"
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The short—term tactics forced upon the producers under pressure, to which they have no
option but to put up with, should not necessarily dictate or determine the long—term
strategy. It is for the Arab producers to leave no stone unturned in their pursuit of
strategies that will enable them to rely on no—one but themselves, lest the present fragile
partnership is suddenly over. This is particularly so, given the findings of Church
Committee (set up to investigate in the policies of American oil companies after the first
oil shock in 1973), which published its report aftcr some discussions between Senators in
1975. The report clearly stated that "the US government should seek to cut the companies
loose from this system of mutual dependence with the producers, and the government
should try to create uncertainty among the producers as to their access to the consumer
markets." Although the report was not acted upon, yet it attracted a great deal of support
at the time among American officials and decision makers and Congressmen. This
attitude of scepticism demonstrates the great vulnerability of a complete dependence on
foreign MNCs, particularly if the fate of a strategic commodity, such as oil, is at stake.
It is more so for the Arabs who almost entirely rely on oil — at least at present — as a
major if not sole earning resource upon which their whole economy depends.
The argument inviting the Arab World to gradually take full control of the integrated
operations, assumed at the present by the oil MNCs, could be further supported by the
recent development in the oil companies' strategies; although oil remained MNCs biggest
business, and as the recession continued through the early 1980s, all the Seven Sisters had
to shut down their refineries, cut back their tanker fleets and reduce their petrochemical
plants. They started diversifying their interests and now like to see themselves as energy
companies rather than just oil companies. All the Sisters now own coal mines which arc
seen as the most obvious long—term replacement for oil.
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What does this new trend on the part of oil MNCs imply? The MNCs are diversifying
their products into commodities which are natural substitutes to their main product — oil.
This marks a crucial turning point in which a situation is created whereby a company
produces two different products which are in competition with one another. One does not
doubt the obvious choice of such company as to which product to favour, if a situation
of trading off between alternative choices was ever to arise. Naturally any company's
loyalty goes first to its parent country, and it is this divided loyalty which is likely to
interfere with the natural development of any business.
Against this background, the oil producing countries do seem to have limited options to
pursue. Their long—term vision must always be focused on the best viable means to take
control of their natural resources. The author believes that they should be more concerned
with the time dimension involved in the evolution of management control of different
sectors of economy and less with the dcbate on whether or not such evolution is necessary
at all.
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CHAFFER 6
IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
ON INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARAB WORLD
6.1	 Introduction
This chapter has been mainly prompted by a debate which took place in Oxford during
a Conference held in September 1987. Discussion at that time focused on the potentiality
of development, based on industry in the Middle East. While the main theme of argument
revolved around advocating the model adopted by Kuwait over the last decade or so, a
model based on a strategy to enhance and promote outward direct investment (0.D.I.) on
the grounds that basic conditions of industrialisation inside Kuwait are unfulfilled; the
author took a rather different view. While admitting the many obstacles which any
industrialisation process is bound to face in the Arab countries of the Middle East, it is
the authors view that industrialisation based on self—sufficiency, and one which opts for
the maximum exploitation of the domestic natural resources within the Arab World,
should, and will always be, the cornerstone to offer the right answers to the numerous
challenges which the region faces.
One such problem to be confronted within this context, is the reliance of the Arab
countries on the outside world in virtually everything. The realisation of a strategy which
allocates a central role to the domestic institutions and capital, will have to necessitate the
adoption of policies which essentially restrict the outflow of Arab capital to the minimum
levels, while every available avenue would be pursued in order to optimise it's internal
use, but without resorting to policies which may be sccn to be identified with total
protectionism.
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Industrialisation, as a vehicle for economic development, should be looked at differently
when applied to developing regions such as the Arab world. There are essential needs in
such countries, without which no development can take place. While in normal
circumstances, schooling, health services, nutritional programmes and other provisions of
basic needs, will naturally be considered as services, the development of these services
via the introduction of basic manufacturing industry to render such services available,
ought to be paramount. Moreover, the provision of these basic needs, which are essential
to elementary human welfare, eventually earns high economic returns. It is therefore
important to look at these services as basic industries for the developing countries to
embark on, right at the earliest stages of their development. For illustrative purposes, one
can reasonably refer to the manufacture of school and hospital needs (paper manufacture,
stationery, hospital beds, textiles and essential carpentry, etc.) using domestic resources
as raw materials. Not only will such a trend substitute imports, but could also present
earlier opportunities for a promising manufacturing industry in the future. Indeed, it helps
lay the foundation for a potential industrial future.
Industrialisation, as part of the Arab development, is a dominant choice, according to
A. A. Kubursi [Arab Affairs, Winter 86/87, p.47], who stipulates that in many Arab States
there is little else to develop. On the other hand, it is as a source of income that
industrialisation fulfils its most felt and remarkable role, given the value added component
of domestic production it tends to raise.
The special development problems of Arab countries have not been in the mainstream of
the literature on economic development, and students concerned with multinationals'
involvement in this region have not therefore had much reason to look at Multinational
Companies (MNCs) in activities other than oil production. However, it is not the
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intention of this study to focus on the oil sector, as it would have to address itself to the
magnitude of the contribution of the Multinationals to the development process which is
now taking place in the Arab World. It will attempt to explain how the existing
international investment position in the Arab World has recently evolved, and how it
might be expected to change in the foreseeable future. Multinationals, of course, are not
the sole actors in the economic development process, but a policy which accords the
multinationals a central role must recognise their influence in forging the path of
development. It should not be denied however, that, the reluctance of the industrialised
countries, seriously and sympathetically to consider the Third World's problems (the Arab
countries arc part of that world), has strengthened the belief that the Arabs must seek
independent solutions for their problems particularly through mutual cooperation among
themselves. One possible and perhaps the most desirable form of such cooperation, might
be facilitating the relatively independent paths of development. This appears even morc
prcssing in view of the expanding protectionism in the western countries, which has been
clearly demonstrated in the widely reported dispute between the Arab Gulf States and the
European Community over the flow of Arab petrochemicals to Europe.
A century of increasing integration with the western industrialised countries, primarily
shaped by the activities of the MNCs, has left the Arab region deindustrialized and more
technologically and institutionally backward than any other region of the world, with the
possible exception of Sub—Saharan Africa. Likewise, attempts at promotion of trade
within the region exemplified by the Arab Trade Conventions of 1953 and 1982, the Arab
Economic Agreement and The Arab Common Market, have been remarkable, primarily
for their inability to transfer the attractive phraseology of the written agreements into
practical accomplishments.
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62	 Objectives of Industrialisation
Before dwelling on a detailed analysis of different alternative strategies to adopt, one has
to emphasise the importance of having a clear vision of the broad and precise objectives
that any industrialisation process is deemed to accomplish. In the author's viewpoint, such
objectives are to revolve around the following main ideas, insofar as most of the Arab
countries are concerned:—
a. To cease playing the old traditional role as extensive market for manufacture
originated elsewhere, and as sources of the primary products to the industrialised
markets. This might be reinforced by the main economic expression of Arab
nationalism, i.e. industrialisation;
b. As mentioned earlier, industrialisation of the Arab States has to cater for the
supply of such basic needs to support schooling, health services and nutritional
programmes and avail them as one of its first priorities;
c. Some obvious objectives for industrialisation arc export—diversification, —
particularly relevant to the Arab world, having been dependent for so long on
primary commodities for their exports — and the learning of technological and
managerial skills. One must, however, hasten to add here that export—
diversification as an objective, should not be misinterpreted as being equivalent
to advocating export—led economics. As will be elaborated in some detail later,
it may well be appropriate for most of the Arab countries — at least in the short
term — to pursue policies leading to import—substitution, provided the loopholes
and the many disadvantages it can possibly invite could be avoided. (Detailed
account of such disadvantages arc dealt with elsewhere in this chapter.);
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d. Lawrence G. Franko (1978) argued that
'the European MNEs appear to have avoided, or have been unable to obtain a
significant direct role in, the fulfilment of the Arab countries industrial
aspirations".
Irrespective of whether that was due to deliberate avoidance or inability, it is the
Arab countries collective responsibility to correct this situation. Whether through
self—reliance or obtaining assistance from whoever expresses readiness to offer
help, a formula has to be struck which can somehow rid them of the excessive
reliance on outside supply of what they can potentially produce domestically;
e. In March 1983, The Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) introduced a unified
economic strategy, the aim of which was to increase the pace of industrialisation
within the GCC, so that manufacturing industries would be contributing not less
than 25% of member countries' GDP within the next years leading to the turn of
the century. The need to avoid any duplication of projects was clearly recognised.
Such objectives need to be carefully scrutinised and followed up through specific
plans of action, as opposed to the present tendency of resorting to rhetoric and
obligation—free declarations of intent;
f. One more objective to be realised by industrialisation, could also be to combat
the negative effects of Ens (Export Processing Zones) which have been set out
during the 1970s as special manufacturing enclaves to attract foreign investors
through lavish tax, customs and labour incentives. While some such zones have
boomed, i.e. Hong Kong, with varying degrees of success, no such success has
been particularly noticed in the Arab export zoncs, at least insofar as the expansion
of industrial sectors is concerned. In fact they have been no more than an indirect
way of inviting foreign investment through tax and tariff incentives on imported
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raw materials, at the very time when the main thrust of the industrialisation
process we call for is the appropriate exploitation of domestic natural resources,
and the restriction, as far as possible, of imported materials in both primary and
product forms.
	
6.3	 Opportunities and Strengths of the Arab Industry
Many Arab countries have recently adopted various policies to accelerate more industrial-
isation via a number of certain incentives, particularly for manufacturing projects or
projects which combine manufacturing with contracting. These can include:—
1. Long tcrrn loans from industrial banks at low or minimum interests;
2. Equity participation by banks when needed to stimulate investment in new
industries;
3. Land in industrial areas at minimum rent;
4. Tax holidays (for up to 5 — 15 years in most of the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia)
and the export—free zones of Egypt);
5. Low cost utilities e.g. Electricity, water, etc.;
6. Protective tariff barriers, and in selected cases restriction of competing imports for
stipulated number of years after the year of establishment;
7. Preference in government purchases to local production of comparable quality at
prices up to (in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) 10% higher than imports;
8. The waiving of custom duty on imported raw materials or equipment.
The opportunities for industrial developers in the newly emerging industrial regions of thc
area, i.e. Jubail and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, could be threefold:—
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a) Primary industries: utilising its rich endowment of hydrocarbon and mineral
resources. This industrialisation programme features world—scale primary
industries, both capital and energy—intensive manufacturing products;
b) fiecon..ry industries: downstream manufacturers who, from foodstocks and
resources available in both regions, will produce a broad range of added value
products such as petrochemical intermediates, plastics, steel, copper, aluminium
products and agrochemicals;
c) Support and light manufacturing industries.: wide array of opportunities to
manufacture essential products and provide services for the ever expanding needs
of both industrial cities, as well as other growth areas. Numerous other
opportunities are also available in commercial and residential developments which
arc all necessary parts in the continuing growth of the region.
Beside proximity to the growing markets of Asia, Africa and Europe, other advantages
offered by the industrialisation process in the Arab region include:—
— fully serviced industrial sites with a complete range of industrial infrastructure,
particularly in the oil producing Gulf States;
- convenient access to domestic and world markets by air, sea and land;
- plentiful and reliable fuel and feedstock supplies.
In view of the many opportunities and strengths enjoyed by industry, as could be clearly
seen from the several incentives, both at internal and external levels, and given patience
and dedication, the Arab countries have a reasonably good chance of making their massive
development plans pay off. However, the easy days of the oil boom arc now behind us,
and from now on, only hard work and dedication may produce the desired results as far
as the fulfilment of the Arab aspirations for development, based on industrialisation, is
concerned.
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6.4 The Arab World's Financial Management
The end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, witnessed the growing discontent
of the Arab oil-producing countries over the structure of their investment. Due to
increasing inflation, and high political risk (e.g. the freeze of Iranian assets in USA and
of Iraq's assets in Europe), they became dissatisfied with the high proportion of their
investments in short-term, high interest rate bank deposits and began a series of
qualitative changes in their investment policy. The key elements in their new policy
included the following:
(a) Reduction in the relative share of investments denominated in US dollars;
(b) An increase in the share of non-financial investments and within this
framework, an increase in investments in developing countries in general
and non oil-producing Arab countries in particular;
(c) An increase of Arab financial institutions' involvement in the recycling of
financial surpluses. These institutions have one common characteristic in
that they are, by and large, inter-governmental institutions.
The co-existence of a great supply of, and a great demand for, funds would appear to
offer significant potential for financing the development of the poor countries within the
Arab World itself. It would seem, however, that the mobilisation of Arab capital surplus
for development finance in the Middle East, has always been subject to the more
fundamental constraint of lack of appropriate economic and financial institutions. While
they arc still in their early stages of development, one remains optimistic about the recent
surge of such institutions and the potential future role they might play in creating
cooperation between individual Arab States, which is so often desired. Such cooperation
can ideally be allowed to take place within the framework of what is often referred to as
triangular trade - Arab oil money, western technology and the labour and resources of an
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oil—poor Arab country. A clear example would be by combining the skills of western
agribusiness with Egyptian labour and Saudi capital, in order to harness the agricultural
potential of the Sudan.
6.5	 Industrialisation as a Mechanism to Achieve Self—reliance
There seems to have been a misconception among some quarters and groups of decision
makers in the Middle Eastern countries, that exports of primary products, i.e. crude oil,
can compensate for developing an industrialisation strategy that is capable of boosting
different sectors of the economy. "Because of the limited local value—added contents of
oil exports, export revenues exercise a limited effect on the rest of the economy" [Al-
Fayez, 1986]. In fact, the response of industry and agriculture has, for so long, been kept
minimal and their contribution to the GDP limited in the vast majority of the Arab
countries. (Table D5 in Appendix D.)
The economic and political instability that most of the Arab countries have witnessed over
the last two decades or so, demonstrates the extent to which their economies are
vulnerable to forces beyond their control (take the oil prices fluctuations as a typical
example to illustrate the global influence). It is precisely this vulnerability which requires
them to change direction. It is the author's view that such change of direction and
strategy will have to start by leaning more and more towards promoting industrialisation
policies that can withstand the many challenges imposed on the region's countries from
outside.
The most obvious example of the need for local industry can be seen in the petrochemical
industry, as well as in the refinery sector. As notcd by R. Agami (1979), the oil industry
in the Middle East was not integrated with the rest of the economy. That in itself made
149
it an isolated enclave in the national economy, being an export—orientated industry,
managed by foreign companies. If that could be understood, in view of the foreign
MNCs' domination in the past, one can find no justification for it to be so at the present
time, particularly after the return of the oil sector to the national domain of the Arab
countries.
The location of the refinery industry is yet another example to be considered. One only
has to have a glance at the statistics showing the Arab world's share of the refinery
industry worldwide, compared to its share of production of crude oil and the oil reserves,
to realise how poorly the industrialisation process has developed, and its priorities been
made. The Middle Eastern share of world refineries, which has been consistently falling
since the 1980s, stands at less than 5% at the present (see Table D9/D10 in Appendix D).
While the oil sector is not intended to be particularly focused upon in this study, yet, to
relate an assessment of the Arab industrial and agricultural development and investments
to the oil market, prices and production levels, is to deal with reality. Oil resources arc,
without doubt, the major factor determining the future of Arab investments, controlling
national purchasing power and the funding resources of Arab aid agencies, if not those
of international agencies.
Some Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, came to realise that the economic and thus
political price of relying on imports of a necessity can be so high that the avoidance of
dependency had taken the form of turning a blind eye to the doctrine of comparative
advantages. The recent tendency of Saudi Arabia to subsidise cereal production, at the
cost of lower average income (as governments of the industrial world, such as EC
countries, indeed do), is only an expression of such new attitudes.
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6.6	 NINCs and The International Economic Order
The developing countries naturally want structural reforms to an international system to
which they did not participate, given that the International Economic Order has been
devised while most developing countries were still under foreign domination, both
politically and economically. While paying lip service to the notion of free trade, the
governments of the developed countries have each tried to retain a degree of freedom of
national action which, in an interdependent world, produces an increasing incompatibility
with the maintenance of an international economic order. On the same ground, the
developing countries are finding it more and more difficult to comply strictly with the
rules dictated by market forces.
It was J. H. Dunning who once noted that the ...
"interventionist policies are the rule rather than the exception, and that it was only the
nature and degree of interventionism which varies." [Dunning,1985, p.4241
Based on the preposition that further investment beyond a given limit ceases to be fruitful,
and that transfer of resources are best used to support consumption, many of the western
advisers, directly or indirectly, discouraged investment in the Arab countries by the Arab
Corporations, be it via joint ventures with foreign MNCs, or by one kind or another of
collaboration among Arab joint companies. This tendency is often justified by the ever
over-estimated problem of lack of administrative capacity to execute, or entrepreneurial
ability to identify, further investment opportunities. Our view is that this hypothesis is
irrelevant to the particular cases of the Arab States, as it seemingly does not take into
account the fact that transfers of resources should be required in the first place to combat
these very problems, i.e. training of administrators and entrepreneurs, transfer of
technology and organisation of on-the-job training.
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The dependence of the Arab economies on IViNCs has persisted over the years, partly
because the Arabs have not seriously attempted to free themselves from their control, and
partly because of the resistance of the powers behind the International Economic Order
to the introduction of substantial changes. It is necessary at this point to state that
self—reliant development is only possible at the regional level, that is at the Pan—Arab
level, and that such development is essential if the excessive dependence on the advanced
industrial world, and its 18.esICs, is to be effectively corrected. Obviously, the economic/
technological dependence has far—reaching politico—strategic implications.
	
6.7	 Constraints on Industrialisation
The emphasis placed on the industrialisation of the Arab countries, however, has suffered
from many constraints, derived from the haziness of the concept, nature, and role of
industry among decision makers, coupled with the confusion and frequent changes in the
social and economic institutional frameworks within which industrialisation has proceeded.
In more detail, we may point to the following explanations for the modest progress in
industrial development in the region:
— The aims sought for industrial policies varied between import substitution, export,
self—sufficiency, and the transfer of technology via industrial development;
— The ideological and practical conflicts between the pre—eminence of the public
sector, the private sector, or the mixed sector, between socialism and free
enterprise; between the Arab countries adhering to one or other of these systems,
but also within the various groups inside the same country;
— The unanswered questions pertaining to the relationship between national industry
and the international economic system. Should industry attempt to retain its
independence? Should it link itself with the strong chain of international industry
controlled by the MNCs? Should the Arab countries concern themselves with
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questions of dependence on the MNCs at the present stage when they are taking
their first steps in industrialisation, or should they acquire industrial capability
first, regardless of the means or mute, and attempt independence later?
- Indecisiveness on the alternative options between industry and agriculture;
- Questions are also posed with regard to the degree of advancement of technology,
the degree of appropriateness of technology, or the aim of industrialisation in as
much as import-substitution would suggest a different technology from that of
export promotion.
Arguments commonly cited by industrialists against the tendency among some Arab
scholars to enhance the pace of industrialisation in the region, are as follows:-
1. Sizeilf _palliation: The small population size of most of the Arab countries,
renders them vulnerable to depend heavily on foreign trade. (With the exception
of Egypt, Sudan, Morocco and Algeria, no individual Arab Country has a total
population exceeding 14-15 million people; two thirds of the 21 Arab States have
populations less than 10 million each.);
2. J imited absorptive capacity: Low literacy rates, lack of trained industrial workers,
technicians and managers, as well as small population, have always been cited as
proof that the countries in the region have low capacities to absorb their vastly
increased oil revenues through industrialisation efforts. [Business International,
Lelyveld, 1975.]
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3.	 Comparative lack of profitability: The lack of profitability that most recently
established Arab investors often complain about, is attributed to a number of
factors: a)	 Many investments have been made in the wrong activities;
b) Insufficiently trained managers and politically motivated investment
decisions;
c) Excessive haste to demonstrate prompt and highly motivated investment
decisions;
d) Excessive replication of some relatively simple, and originally profitable
activities, leading to over-investment, as has been the case for cement
industry in the Gulf States;
e) Engaging in industrial investments without sufficiently investigating the
appropriateness and comparative efficiency of alternative institutional
mechanisms for undertaking economic activities, and for accomplishing
technology transfers such as by the mechanism of licensing, franchising,
sub-contracting and tradc.
The extent to which each of the above factors has contributed to the problems of
industrialisation is analysed in somc detail in Chapters 9 and 10, which deal with
our own Gulf Survey findings.
4. Lack of co-ordination: The much talked about Arab economic integration has left
much to be desired: joint-ventures on a regional basis arc only patchy and even
in the very few cases of joint-ventures, the absence of efficient and clear sense
of purpose is evident. The consequences arc always manifest in thc duplication
of efforts and projects, owing to the apparent prcfcrcnce of some Arab countries
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to act independently of other countries, when it comes to taking decisions relating
to industrial strategies.
5. As stated by A. S. Nofal [1987, p.1241, the widening gap for the poor (Arab)
countries, between their exports and imports, (due to increased interest rates and
the unfavourable terms of trade imposed upon them from outside trade partners)
has severely limited their ability to develop their own potential through
industrialisation. It is now a well known fact that foreign borrowing by an
increasing number of poor countries is not used, on the whole, for investment, but
rather for servicing existing debts. The majority of external debt falls on the
shoulders of 12 of the Arab States, which constitute the majority of the Arab
nation. Therefore the problem does not concern only one specific Arab country.
It is basically an Arab problem.
6. According to S. Amin [1982, p.57], there is an inherent weakness in the Arab
mode of industrialisation which accentuates dependency on outside. Light
industry, remains preponderant, as it represents about 60% of industrial
production. The recently established basic industries in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
States arc more often geared to export than to the satisfaction of the internal needs
of production. This is true, for instance, of fertilizer manufacture, of the
production of petrochemical materials (plastics) and of the aluminium industry.
The development projects of the last decade have accentuated this extroverted
orientation of industrialisation, which is based entirely on natural resources, mainly
energy. This is particularly true in the Arabian Gulf States.
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	6.8	 Factors Limiting Technology and Knowledge Transfer
Apart from the scarcity of skilled workers, engineers and managers capable of absorbing
new technology, technology transfer to the Arab World is particularly hindered by the
following factors:
(a) Because of the high rate of technology obsolescence and the frequent inappro-
priateness of that technology in relation to existing factor endowments and scale
requirements, the potential Arab recipients of the technology may not want to learn
the technology, even if they could;
(b) Because of the small size of the domestic market (that is individual Arab
countries, since the establishment of a collective common market is yet to be
achieved) and the high start—up cost and delays required in making it possible to
take advantage of learning by doing, direct participation is likely to be avoided in
favour of continuing dcpcndcncc on foreign consultants, engineers and foreign
managers;
(c) Individual expatriate employees of MNCs may try to prolong their own usefulness
to thc Arab host country by impeding the transfers of such know—how, even if
their employers (MNCs) want to facilitate them.
Against this background, and in view of the failure of the policy that relied for so long
on MNCs as a prime instrument for technology transfer, the fundamental question as to
whether the MNCs are the right institutions to promote the interest of the Arab countries
still remains unanswered. Some people view MNCs as an inevitable evil that can hardly
be dispensed with, while others promote the idea of restricting their involvement in the
domestic development process to the minimum possible level. Various alternatives arc
still talked about, but with no obvious conclusions, as to the best route to pursue. The
question of existing forms of partnership between individual Arab states and the foreign
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MNCs and the possibilities for change arc apparently in the forefront of the Arab elite's
thinking. While joint ventures are seen as an obvious, and the most advocated form of,
partnership between the Arab host country and overseas MNCs, there has always been an
extremely strong case for joint ventures among Arab investors from different countries in
the region as a means to further the economic integration of the Arab World.
It is tempting to refer in this context to the distinguishing feature of the investment
strategies by MNCs in general, which is manifest in their preference for joint ventures.
Such preference is even more justified in the case of the Arab MNCs, which are basically
involved in activities, either within the Arab region itself, or the Third World countries.
They particularly benefit from the local partners' knowledge of local conditions, access
to distribution channels and capital, management and political connections as an additional
advantage. Moreover, affiliates founded by developing countries' firms in general arc
much more flexible, drawing on domestic materials more extensively than their developed
countries counterparts. Other advantages may include acceptance of lower equity
participation, satisfaction of host countries which aim to exercise economic and political
control over their national resources, opening more development options and choosing
between alternative strategies for development.
According to Nugent [Khan, 1986, p.171], Arab MNCs numbered almost one thousand
by early 1980s and accounted for capital investments of at least $36 bn, thereby
accounting for more capital than all the rest of the Third World's multinationals put
together.
It is rather difficult to predict the future of the newly—formed Arab multinationals, but it
can be stated for certain that they arc substantial in number and in their range of activities,
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and capital deployed. They were financed with a portion of the proceeds of the 1973/4
and 1979 oil price increases. It could reasonably be said that they have some unique
characteristics, in that there is nothing like thcm in other regions. Such characteristics
may include the following:
1. Multi—country ownership and control;
2. Have taken a broader view of objectives than enterprise profit;
3. Are a part of a broader regional economic co—operation project;
4. Have potential for altering regional and national production structures.
There arc, nevertheless, inherent weaknesses which limit the degree of success. One can
mention many of these, but will only point to a few: Loose definition of the regional
cooperation project and the failure to define non—profit objectives sufficiently to give clear
orientation for evaluating the performance of management. The most recent problems of
funding, in view of the decline in the oil boom, especially as few of these corporations
have generated surpluses for reinvestment, have also curtailed the natural progrcss of such
corporations.
There is no doubt, however, that an Arab multinational can promote economic and
technical cooperation among the countries of the region and make a significant
contribution to their development. They can be very useful in establishing economic
complcmentaritics among the Arab countries, discovering new areas of inter—linkages,
pooling their resources, extending the economics of scale through larger scales of
production across borders, thus imparting a new dynamic to the development process of
the Arab World. The author would like to emphasise here the importance of the
experience of Arab multinationals accumulated over years, in closing the technological
gap. In fact, the failure of the industrialisation efforts so far, and the fact that almost all
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projects remain dependent on foreign firms and consultants for virtually everything,
constitute the most important reasons for looking to the newly-emerging MNCs within
the Arab World, as well as other parts of the Third World, as a means of reducing the
existing technological gap.
6.9	 The special role of Manufacturing Sector
According to Nugcnt [Khan, 1986, p.7], ...
"manufacturing constitutes the largest sector in which multinationals of the south have
placed their direct foreign investments in other developing countries". Some recent
estimates put over 55% of their foreign direct investments in this sector followed, by
30% in service and finance. For the Arab countries, the finance and services constitute
30.6% indicating an exceptionally higher orientation towards services at the expense of
the manufacturing industry, which represents only 8.8% of GDP (see Table D5 in
Appendix D). In contrast, manufacturing absorbs a relatively small share of investment
abroad by the western industrialised countries, much smaller than in the case of
investments by developing countries' firms. America's manufacturing direct foreign
investments in the period 1979-81 was 23.4%, while thc share of other OECD countries
was 28.5%. Primary industry accounted for 50.4% of American direct investment abroad
and services for 14.9%. [Khan, 1986, p.70.1
As for the Arab world, and according to Nugent [Ibid, p.172], about one third of Arab
MNCs arc involved in manufacturing (in terms of both numbers and volume of capital
invested), and another one third in finance. In terms of volume of capital however,
Multinationals of the multilateral type, originating in the public sector and operating in
the transportation, manufacturing and financial services sectors, have dominated.
159
Moreover, many of these are centred in the capital—abundant, labour scarce countries of
the region, such as those of the Arab Gulf.
In 1979, the US ownership share of the manufacturing sector in the Middle East was
49.1%; the UK 21.5%; Germany 10%; France 6.3%; the Netherlands 2.6%; Japan 2.2%;
and Canada 0.5%. [Agami, 1979.]
S. Amin [1982, p.56] maintains that the share of manufactured products as a whole in
total household consumption, is lower in Africa and Asia than in the Arab World (20%
as against 32%). He attributes this to the lower level of urbanisation in non—Arab Africa
and Asia. Also the general level of consumption is lower and the structure of income
distribution less regressive. Imports of manufactured products for consumption are thus
a relatively less heavy burden for the national economy in those areas than in the Arab
World, in terms of the ratio of their imports to the G.D.P., and the respective countries
import capacity.
Some positive trends, however, have been recently witnessed in a number of Arab
countries, regarding policies particularly geared to attract and encourage local
manufacturers, through various types of incentives. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, a
number of steps have been taken since 1983, which were mainly designed to protect and
encourage local industry. Regulations dealing with this, state quite categorically that
Saudi manufactured goods are to be preferred over similar foreign goods, even if the
quality is lower than that of foreign products. Similarly, contractors working on
government projects have been warned against importing goods which can be
manufacturcd locally. In addition, government departments and public organisations arc
now legally obliged to buy Saudi products, for as long as they rcmain satisfactory for the
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purpose required. The government has given these resolutions strong backing by allowing
Saudi's tenders 10% price margin over those of foreign competitors, both for supply and
works contracts. Similar policies are now being adopted in a number of othcr Arab
States.
All these and other similar policies in the Arab States, mean that many foreign countries,
essentially MNCs, are going to find it extremely difficult to maintain their positions in the
market, unless they elect to establish joint ventures in the Arab countries with local
registered companies, as against operating on their own or with local agents.
6.10 Import—substitution versus Export—orientation Policies
Import—substitution policies generally ignore built—up advantages of particular economies
or countries), which make them subject to criticism by the developed countries, on the
grounds that, they necessarily lead to the decline of world trade share. One more
misgiving is also that they are thought to be conducive to neither high levels of
employment and capacity utilisation, nor to reduced dependence on foreign supplies. The
inherent difficulties usually cited, regarding the adminstration of import—substitution
policies, indicate something of the problems of moving towards export—oriented policies.
Four of these problems could be cited as follows:—
1. As domestic industries grow used to protected domestic markets, the entrepreneurs
engaged in them are inclined to lobby individually and collectively for the
maintenance of protection;
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2. 'Rents' accrue to the beneficiaries of import licenses, monopoly rights, public
subsidies and so on, provide another incentive for business efforts to be diverted
into lobbying;
3. Even if bureaucratic decisions are formally guided by a plan, they are hardly ever
informed by published — and therefore predictable — economic criteria and
consequently entrepreneurs face considerable uncertainties in planning new
development;
4. The whole system of controls administered in a discretionary, and therefore
indiscriminate fashion, creates a bureaucratic vested interest in its continuance.
The need for import—substitution in the Arab countries, can be particularly felt in the
agricultural sector. Food imports in the Arab States constitute a sizeable drain on the
foreign exchange positions of a number of countries (see Table 6-10). Efforts to
substitute local production can be expected to be given emphasis and official
encouragement. In relation to the results that can be attained, expenditures for agricultural
intermediates represent a fairly small proportion of the final product.
A comparison with Japan reveals a remarkable contrast , whereby Japan's lack of natural
resources and food has been converted into an advantage, since it forces Japan to import
in order to survive, and to export in order to import. It is therefore reasonable to suggest
that while import—substitution policy has been irrelevant in the case of Japan, it is
apparently an indispensable option, which every Third World Country has to go through
at one stagc of its development. By its very naturc, import—substitution encounters the
development of traditional means of exploiting domestic rcsourccs. But it is only by
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limiting the inflow of imported goods, via resorting to local resource exploitation,
traditional though the means to achieve that target might be, that a developing country can
hope to lay a strong foundation for a future export-orientated economy. Hence,
import-substitution is seen as complementary rather than a substitute to export-lcd
economy. Perhaps one can put it the other way round: The export promotion that many
oil rich Arab States are inclined to pursue, should be seen as a compliment to
import-substitution, and indeed, dependent on it.
"Few countries" in the words of AA.Kubursi [Arab Affairs, Winter 1986/87, p.49] "have
been able to move directly to the export of manufactured goods, without a rather long
period of learning and preparation, through import-substitution. The experiences of
Canada and South Korea are illustrative of this sequence. Besides, export-dependent
countries often find themselves in real troubles when external demands falter, the
existence of a complementary regional (Arab) demand increases the flexibility and
confidence of domestic exporters".
TABLE 6.10:	 FOOD IMPORTS (% of Total Imports) - 1988
ARAB COUNTRY %
ALGERIA 30
BAHRAIN ..
EGYPT 19
IRAQ ..
JORDAN 19
KUWAIT 17
LEBANON ..
MOROCCO 12
LIBYA 15
OMAN 15
QATAR ..
SAUDI ARABIA 17
SUDAN 7
SYRIA 17
TUNISIA 18
UA.E. 4
YEMEN
(North & South) 25
SOMALIA 22
DJIBOUTI ..
MAURITANIA 21
Source: Islamic Development Bank - Annual Report 1989-90, p.47.
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6.11 Some Recommendations and Conclusions
There is no lack of bright ideas in the Arab World regarding industrialisation and
development questions. What is missing however, is the determination and will to
transform such ideas into specific plans of action. It is the strong belief of the author that
the basic foundation for economic cooperation between the countries of the Arab World
has already been laid and that the great efforts exerted in establishing the institutional
framework have produced a number of joint agreements which are sufficient enough to
transform Arab dreams into reality. Such agreements inclvde "Arab Joint Economic
Action Agreement; The Agreement on Developing Inter-Arab Trade; The "United
Agreement On Arab Capital Investment In Arab Gauntries"; 'The Arab Economic Unity
Agreement", and the decision to set up the "Arab Common Market".
The Arab World is, so far, a nation of consumers and it is about time they showed the
signs of their capability to emerge as a nation of producers. However, it is going to take
imagination and considerable effort to evolve and produce the new products which arc
going to sell in the new market of tomorrow.
The codes of conduct for MNCs of the developed countries operating in the Arab World
have yet to be clearly formulated. There is certainly a need to develop a formal
understanding among the Arab countries to determine how MNCs can achieve their
objectives as well as those of the host Arab states to the mutual benefit of both.
As to the newly emerging Arab companies operating outside their home countries, a
network of relationships between them and South-South issues has still to be worked out,
either in terms of a quantitative increase in economic relations among themselves or of
a qualitative clarification of these relations. A further step would be to identify the
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initiating forces and appropriate institutions for realising the chosen objectives. In
general, one can reasonably be safe in concluding that southern-based and adapted skills
and technologies are likely to be easier to transfer and are more controllable and
appropriate when transferred among southern economics. They also involve lesser
inequality in bargaining power.
The Arab region with its strategic geographical location between Europe, Asia and Africa
has enjoyed and will always continue to enjoy, the benefit of economic interaction with
the outside world. This factor, coupled with the strong European drive for colonisation
in the last two centuries, which witnessed the continuing, strength of the industrialisation
process, played a significant role in protecting the region against isolation. It is a proven
fact, however, that things did not develop in the Arab's favour as their resources were put
under the control of the European powers. The relationship that followed was one of
exploitation, since all facilities were used basically to the advantage of the colonial
powers. Against this background it would appear quite understandable for the Arab
countries to seek more, and primarily new, partners to assist in their development process
and to consider, at the same time, independent paths for development. Individual Arab
countries might, however, pursue different approaches from others in their perception of
cooperation with the outside world. In the words of Y. A. Sayigh [1982],
"some people might even question the very existence of such a thing as an "Arab
Economy"; that it is both artificial and unacceptable to aggregate data relating to the
individual economies and to consider the totals as presenting an account of one regional
economy. Moreover, just as the approaches of individual Arab host countries to the
MNCs and foreign investment in general are likely to differ, so will the responses by the
individual companies involved".
Whether or not to endorse the view of Peter Nccrso [Skully, 1978], who claims that
"generally the quasi-socialist governments have had more success in coping with the
multinationals than the capitalistic governments" is beyond thc scope of this work. Such
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a view is based on the assumption that socialist governments have a clearer view of the
problems with more coherent policies and they are less open to influence by local
business interests and outright bribery and have therefore had some success in reducing
the cost of foreign investment.
As to the comparison between manufacturing industry and the agricultural sector, and the
relative emphasis on one at the expense of the other in the process of achieving
development process, far-reaching implications are to be drawn from the activities of the
multinationals involved. In many cases, manufacturing subsidiaries of the MNCs compete
with locally-owned companies. Due to this competition, many locally owned-handicraft
and small-scale industrial enterprises have had to close down or have been blocked in
their development. MNCs' activities outside the oil sector in the Arab region have been,
as demonstrated earlier, of exceedingly limited scope. Outside the obvious link between
agriculture and energy - fertilizer - there is little evidence for likely long-term
multinationals in agriculture.
It is the author's view that by the time oil ceases to play the only dominant role in shaping
the economies of the region, as is clearly the case right now, many things will have to
change. The prosperity of the oil producing Arab countries, together with the non-oil
producers, ought to be targeted without much dependence on oil, so long as the Arab
World enjoys the ownership advantage of the wide range of natural resources, be it the
vast cultivable lands, minerals, animal husbandry or hydrocarbons. The collective strategy
of the Arab States needs to be geared to monctisc the resources from oil to boost their
productive capacities, so that they can march towards self-sufficiency, not only in the
production of petroleum products, but also in the achievement of a balanced development
of agricultural and industrial sectors and thcir manpower and technological resources. The
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outcome of the industrialisation process, which is gradually taking place, must develop
on a scale which is capable of transforming the region into a new leading industrialised
and developed one.
We can hardly emphasisc the need for the priorities and structures of Arab investments
locally or abroad to be reviewed in such a way that long term capital yielding industries
will have to be in the centre of focus. In the process, the Arab World will have to be
prepared to wait for a relatively longer period of time for their investment strategy to pay
off in normal commercial terms. This is in contrast to the other option of having their
capital tied up in western financial institutions who arc recycling them lb accordance with
strategies that are naturally geared to serve their interests, which might not necessarily
coincide with those of the Arab States to whom the capital originally belongs. A paradox
to be recalled in this context, is the British GovernmtnVs tone= with ICtvraiti inttatsts
in British Petroleum (BP). It Is obvious that at a time when investments in equity are
continually eroded by inflation and dollar depreciation, the appropriateness of this
particular path of investment becomes enormously doubtful. One must also cmphasisc
that the management of such long—term strategy as opposed to short—term, quick return
investments, can only be undertaken by governments. It is the public and not the private
sector which is to assume the leading role in laying the right foundation of the type of
industrialisation strategy that this chapter has highlighted.
In the 1990s, the Gulf countries arc poised for a decade of unprecedented economic
growth. Energy will supply the resource base. Mobilisation of private sector resources,
economic diversification and job creation are government policy in the Gulf States, but
a new and entrepreneurial attitude by Gulf businessmen, hitherto used to quick profits
from trade, will be needed to bring industrialisation about.
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To meet the challenges of 1990s, plans have been announced by Gulf producers, to
increase production capacity of oil-related industries (mainly petrochemicals and
refineries) on a scale which will stretch world engineering and production resources
available to meet this. The Gulf producers are developing their own refinery capacity and
buying down-stream facilities in world markets, i.e. Kuwait. They are creating a fully
integrated industry of the Seven Sisters, which will enable them to manage the world oil
market from well head through refineries to the retail petrol station. This enables the Gulf
producers to develop local technical skills, expand employment and add value to the crude
oil produced. Only the Gulf States among the Arab Countries have the financial capacity
to pursue such policies during the 1990s, when further efforts arc expected to be made to
acquire downstream capacity in the USA, Europe and South East Asia.
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CHAPTER 7
JOINT VENTURES AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BY
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD
7.1	 Introduction
Contributions of the Multinationals to technological change and technology transfer are
arguably their most important influences on national and global welfare. The Arab World,
while enjoying the advantage of the availability of both energy and capital, as well as vast
areas of abundant agricultural land and other natural resources, lacks the technology with
which western MNCs are primarily associated. It is with this in mind that the Arabs have
always looked forward to foreign companies in the belief that they are well suited to bring
about modernisation via pursuing efficient methods of transferring technology. The
concept of technology transfer, however, must, in the words of Dr. A. H. al—Moajil
[1986], be ...
"better understood to eliminate the false idea that it is achieved by importing machinery
and installing plant on a turn—key basis". Technology transfer needs to be associated
with the development of the creative ability to install, maintain and further enhance
production processes through gaining education and undcrstanding into thc working of the
machinery and the processes. To achieve this end, it is necessary to develop research
capabilities with the specific target of developing new technological processes for the
industries of the Arab World, while creating the engineering systems and services
necessary to install and maintain these processes.
7.2	 Joint Ventures as a Means of Attracting Foreign Investments
The attraction of a number of Arab countries as potential locations for some industrial
development, could stern from the remarkable achievements of the Arab Gulf States in
completing their infrastructural development as basic prerequisite to any forthcoming
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industrial growth. Many foreign MNCs, faced with a loss of demand from export
tcrritorics, are increasingly tempted to set up local manufacturing subsidiaries, or else
license their technology. Historically, the role of the Arab Governments has been
instrumental in capturing the sort of opportunities that had arisen in such circumstances.
Joint ventures are often seen to be the answer to fulfil the aspirations of most of the Arab
countries to acquire technology and technical know—how. In addition to obtaining
managerial and organisational skills, the joint ventures alternative can also render access
to markets of the foreign partners. The predominance of joint ventures could be
associated with a deliberate government policy of restricting foreign ownership to less
than fifty percent, as is the case in the overwhelming majority of the Arab States. In
some cases, however, foreign investors themselves prefer joint ventures in order to take
advantage of local resources. This could be particularly so in the Arab World, given the
numerous and diversified natural resources which it enjoys.
The changing face of the Arab World, in the wake of the oil boom of the seventies, has
created new strategic problems for managers of the MNCs operating in the region. For
firms and governments alike, the test has been one of establishing competitive positions
in markets that can no longer be controlled by traditional one—country measures. In fact,
the Gulf States (GCC) have already introduced regular guidelines to organisc their
management of their domestic investments. While ad hoc measures are occasionally
regulated on a single country to country basis, there is now a strong tendency to mutually
organise the scale of production for economic operations within the region.
A survey conducted by the author, in 1984, in which a number of British businessmen
involved in the Arab market were approached and interviewed, clearly indicated that Joint
Venture was the best, and in many cases the only, vehicle for doing business in the Arab
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region. Foreign partners in joint ventures appear to benefit substantially through access
to various types of concessions, while avoiding, at the same time, the risk of going it
alone. A Saudi partner, for instance, usually holds at least equal ownership in a joint
venture, making it easier to obtain the heavily subsidised medium—term loans for up to
50 per cent of capital requirements available from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund.
Of course, not all Joint Ventures are necessarily successful, but the Joint Venture route
still offers the best, and sometimes the only, means of building on the vast amount of time
and money already invested in the Arab market. To bring into perspective the extent of
joint ventures and their share of contribution in several investments in the major Arab
markets, it might be useful to highlight the experience of Saudi Arabia throughout the
decade prior to 1984. From 1970 to 1982, the number of Saudi companies incorporated
in the Kingdom grew fivefold to 3,806, and the number of joint ventures with western
firms grew tenfold to 1,260. The amount of capital invested by these firms grew by a
spectacular 52 times to SR 54 billion ($ 15.6 bn). [The Economist, July 28, 1984.]
Licensing and wholly owned subsidiaries are often used as a means for the transfer of
technology from the developed to the developing world. Joint ventures differ from
licensing arrangements in that, licensing does not involve the sharing of equity. However,
a joint venture can be structured so as to be a party to licensing, franchising, contract
manufacture, industrial cooperation agreements and management contracts, as well as joint
assembly and manufacturing operations.
While in the early 1970s, the MNCs 100 per cent equity ownership of their subsidiaries
in the Arab World (as indeed elsewhere in the developing countries) was common and
almost universal, there is now a variety of arrangements between MNCs and their hosts,
ranging between Joint Ventures and partnerships with MNCs, equity participation ranging
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from 25% ownership and little management control, to 80% and full control. There is
a considerable evidence of a further move away from equity stakes towards even more
flexible arrangements, such as management contracts, buy—back deals (particularly in the
oil sector) and production sharing (Kcnana Sugar Company in Sudan).
In many cases of Joint Ventures, indigenous partners can provide some protection, making
further attacks more difficult, since more restrictive government policies will be hitting
local citizens, as well as foreign multinationals. It is not even obvious that NINCs will
always resist being pushed into completely non—equity situations. After all, selling
management and technical expertise on contract, can avoid the commitment of vulnerable
capital in an uncertain political environment, especially in the more underdeveloped Arab
countries such as Sudan, Yemen and Somalia. The converse of this is that a developing
country's government may find it worth forcing MNCs to keep at least a minority equity
stake in a venture, because this does give a company a more substantial longer—term
commitment to a project than a basic management contract does. Again Kenana Sugar
Company of Sudan (KSC) is a classic case in point.
One frequently hears the opinion that foreign MNCs that wish to sell equipment should
generally take an equity stake in the venture, as a guarantee of good faith and continucd
interest. Turn—key plants in the Middle East have something of a bad name and stories
of difficult start—ups arc common. Two typical examples the author happened to be
closely familiar with are Sennar Sugar Factory and Port Sudan Textile and Weaving, both
set up by the Industrial Production Corporation of Sudan in the mid-1970s, in conjunction
with foreign multinationals. Even Algeria moved as early as in 1978 to adopt a similar
view of foreign equity participation, in an effort to try to combine its preference (at that
timc) for 100% local owncrship with MNCs commitment by seeking "product in hand"
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as opposed to 'key—in—hand" terms for plant sales. In fact the efforts to transfer advanced
European technology in the 1970s to the Arab World have failed, mainly because they
essentially meant the mere sale of equipments and turn—key plants, without providing the
know—how. The 1970s also saw the setting up of costly projects, characterised by the use
of intensive capital and advanced technology, which was often inappropriate. Halwan
Steel factory of Egypt, which was set up in the 1960s, stands today to exemplify an
outdated technology that can hardly meet today's requirements. However, despite the
many misgivings associated with import—substitution strategies, which were adopted in
the region in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the socialist Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and
following independence in Algeria in 1962, there have been obvious achievements. Not
only have there been benefits on social grounds (i.e. employment, etc.) and economic
levels, i.e. local value added, but more importantly, the then new ventures formed part of
a learning experience for all those involved. This mean that the inevitable mistakes were
not necessarily repeated. Apart from altering the composition of imports, the
establishment of import—substitution activities has brought technological transfers which,
limited though they might have been, would not otherwise have occurred.
In general, license agreements and management contracts imply lower dependence than
direct investments, because they only run for an agreed period of time. In the Arab
World, however, renewal of the contract may always be unavoidable, because the
multinationals often fail to transfer the core elements of their technology or fail to train
local counterparts to take over the posts of foreign managers. In future, and after the
Arab countries have succeeded in educating and training sufficient numbers of their
economists, managers and technicians, the relative importance of management contracts
may probably diminish. On the other hand, the importance of license agreements (and
similar technical cooperation contracts) may increase, particularly in the oil exporting
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countries and any other countries with no need for importing capital. The multinationals
naturally prefer to have full control over the use of their technology in foreign countries,
but a license agreement may be acceptable to them because it represents an easy and safe
way to earn money. It would be reasonable to assume that MNCs will rathcr want to
transfer their technology by way of license agreements and similar contracts more to the
quasi-socialist Arab States, with relatively higher risk of nationalisation. However, some
of these socialist Arab countries (Libya and Iraq) may consider that license agreements
may also imply much dependence on MNCs. This induces them to elect for the provision
of technology transfer rather via direct purchase of sophisticated machinery, if they can
afford the high costs with which this type of investments is usually associated.
It is imperative that, while licensing offers an important alternative for MNCs wishing to
develop their penetration of Arab markets, it will not succeed unless there is a tangible
benefit to both licensor and licensee. From the liccnsoes viewpoint, the motivation may
stem from a number of factors pertaining to product characteristics, restrictions placed on
foreign dircct investments or the repatriation of profits, access to raw materials or
essential imports, local entrepreneurial involvement and othcr marketing strategy
considerations.
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Table 7-2[a]
	
FOREIGN EQUITY PARTICIPATION IN THE INDUSTRIAL
SECTOR OF OMAN BY 30.6.1986.
Country of
Origin
Number of
Companies
Involved
Foreign
Equity
Investment
1000
Share in
Total
Foreign
Investment
Share in Sectors
total equity in
foreign and Joint
Venture Projects
%
Kuwait 1 1,580 17.7 6.5
Jordan 3 861 9.7 3.5
Holland 1 990 11.1 4.1
India 7 508 5.7 2.1
TOTAL 12 3,939 44.2 16.2
Others 24 4,965 55.8 20.4
Total Foreign 36 8,904 100.0 36.6
Oman — 15,445 — 63.4
Sector's Total 24,349# 100.0
• R.O. = Omani Riyal
Source:
	
Derived from Ministry of Commerce and Industry — Directorate General
of Commerce data.
# Out of the total investment in the industrial sector of R.O. 24.3mn "Raysut Cement
Company" alone had an equity investment of R.0 8 million, or 32.9 per cent, of
which R.0 1 million or 12.5 per cent was Arab owned and another R.0 1 million
or 12.5 per cent was owned by the other GCC countries. [ESCWA, U.N., 1988,
pp.17-18.1
Table 7-2[b] COMPANIES WITH FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN OMAN, 1986.
Percentage in
Sharcho ding
Name of Borrower Loan Amount 1000 R.O. Oman Foreign
Chain Link Fencing 70 51 49
Premix LLC 300 60 40
Ready Mix Muscat 300 60 40
NAbis Al—Shanfari Gases 420 60 40
Oman Drilling Mud 500 75 25
Oman Lubricants LLC 1500 45 55
Furniture Makers LLC 130 51 49
TOTAL	 3220
-DevelopmentS ourcc:	 The Oman	 Bank.
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	7.3	 Channels of Technology Transfer
A survey among some Western Multinationals, undertaken by Mansfield et al [Dunning,
1982, pp.78-79], addressed a number of important relationships about the extent to which
transfer of technology to foreign affiliates is favourable/unfavourable as a mode of
international transfer. Its main findings could be summarised as follows:—
1. In the 5 years of use of the new technology, transfer to a foreign affiliate was the
principal channel for 85% of the firms (surveyed) in the first sample, and 62%
of the projects in the second sample;
2. Exporting was used somewhat more often than international licensing in both
samples;
3. Licensing became somewhat more important than exporting in the second five
years of use, but transfer to affiliates remained the major channel;
4. Usc of affiliates (and licensing) is higher for product than for process technologies,
while use of exporting is higher for process technologies. Firms indicated that
they were less willing to send new process technologies to their affiliates, in part
because it is more difficult to limit subsequent diffusion to foreign competitors
once the process technology is transferred.
In general, predominance of transfer to affiliates is affirmed in a study by Vernon and
Davidson [1979] who also found that U.S. MNCs became quicker to transfer new
technology into production abroad as they gained experience with multinational
operations.
This leads us to focus our attention on the Arab World and the extent to which the above
findings relate to the actual situation in thc Arab rcgion, insofar as the channels of
technology transfer by forcign companies arc concerned. Our own survey, conducted in
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1984 among some British companies operating in the Middle East, failed to establish any
meaningful findings in this regard. As for the general belief expressed by John Dunning
[1977], stipulating that direct investment in the developing world will be a less important
channel for technology transfer, giving way to more licensing and management contracts,
the experience of the Middle Eastern Arab countries seems to conform with this trend, as
confirmed by the findings of our own Gulf Survey in 1990 (sec Chapter 9 of this study).
7.4	 Existing Patterns of Foreign Investments in the Arab World
While some Arab Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, established heavy industries with
participation of foreign companies as share holders, in order to guarantee collaborator
.commitment, market success and technology transfer, others such as Kuwait generally
built their plants on a turn—key basis and contracted the required technical assistance.
According to Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Industry and Electricity [Gulf Economic and
Financial Report, Manama, Bahrain, April 1988], at the end of 1986 there were 1900
industrial projects in production with an estimated capital investment of SR fill bn. Nearly
400 of these projects are joint ventures with foreign partners, with a total invested capital
around SR 311 bn. This contrasts sharply with the number of industrial plants in 1975,
which stood at just 461, with an invested capital of only SR 2 bn. Of the 66 loans
approved by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF) in 1986, 17 projects with a
total SR 239 million were for enterprises with a foreign partner. By the year end, the
cumulative number of joint venture projects funded by SIDF was 311, with commitments
totalling SR 5.5 bn and representing 39% of the Fund's total loan approvals. The foreign
capital in these projects amounted to SR 1.6 bn.
177
To round up our discussion on Joint Ventures and foreign investment in the Arab World,
it would be worthwhile attempting to look at the general trends from a statistical
viewpoint. To this end, the following tables may shed some light on the phenomenae
statistically:
Table 7[a]	 Shows the number of foreign corporations registered in Saudi Arabia by
nationality during the period 1977-1985.
Table 7[b]	 Shows Joint Ventures in the Arab World by economic sectors as at the end
of 1983. These are broken down into two distinctive types of Joint
Ventures: Inter-Arab Multinational Joint Ventures (IAMJVs) and Arab-
International Multinational Joint Ventures (AIMJVs).
Table 7[c]
	 Complements Table 7[b] by giving percentage distribution of the two types
of joint ventures in 1981.
Table 7[d]	 Shows total loans granted to Joint Ventures in Saudi Arabia up to the end
of 1986.
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TABLE 7[2]	 NUMBER OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS REGISTERED
IN SAUDI ARABIA 1977-1985 BY NATIONALITY
Nationality 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Total
United States 10 9 19 22 24 15 10 7 1 117
Japan 1 3 4 7 s 9 3 1 3 36
Federal Rep.
of Germany 11 18 15 14 12 14 4 8 1 97
United Kingdom 9 11 16 15 20 11 3 3 4 92
France 6 8 12 13 2 10 5 2 9 67
Other Etuopean
Countries 18 29 29 19 16 32 18 12 10 183
Arab Countries 6 3 2 2 4 4 1 1 — Z3
Other Asian
Countries 10 17 11 18 7 9 5 6 3 86
Multinational 8 s 8 6 10 6 7 4 5 62
Other Countries 6 6 7 3 4 7 3 1 — 37
85 112 123 119 104 117 59 45 36 800
—
Source: Compiled from figures supplied by the Saudi M nistry of
Commerce, Riyadh (cited by U.N. ESCWA Study prepared in
Arabic by Said S. Martan, Oct. 1987, p.17.)
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TABLE 7[b]	 JOINT VENTURES IN THE ARAB WORLD BY ECONOMIC
SECTORS AS AT THE END OF 1983
IAMJVs
Inter—Arab
M,Ilriv•Ifirnsal
Joint Veannes
AISLIVs
Joint Ventures
with Foreign
henCs
TOTAL
(1) (7) (1 + 2)
Economic Sector Number Capital Number Capital Number Capital
of 1000 USS of 1000 USS of 1000 USS
Projects Projects Projects
Extraaive 22 1,442.540 16 461,187 38 1,903,727
Manufsauring 53 3,787,131 76 5,356,064 129 9,143,095
Agriculture 28 1,747,146 24 307,756 52 2,054,902
Finance 69 6,252,856 97 5,264.156 166 11,517,012
Tourism & Hotels 24 514,100 15 436,8410 39 950,900
Transport & 24 3,405,925 11 159,100 35 3,565,025
Communications
Building & 21 541.170 15 87,730 36 629,100
Construction
Services 11 190,849 15 191,400 26 382.249
TOTAL 252 17,881,617 269 12.264,393 521 30,146.010
Source: Study Cut Arabic) entitled "Role of the Multinational Corporations
in the Economic Development of the Arab World" undertaken by
the general secretariat of the Union of Arabian Gulf Chambers —
Damarn, Saudi Arabia, January 1989.
180
TABLE 7[c] PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INTER-ARAB
MULTINATIONAL JOINT VENTURES (IAMJVs), ARAB
INTERNATIONAL MULTINATIONAL JOINT VENTURES
(AIMJVs) AND ALL ARAB JOINT VENTURES BY SECTOR
(1981).
1AMIVs AIMNs TOTAL
Sector No. Capital No. Capital No. Capital
Agriculnue, Forestry, 6.3 5.3 2.6 0.3 4.7 3.2
Fishing
Mining 3.0 11.1 3.7 0.4 3.3 6.9
Manufacturing 35.9 23.3 25.8 36.4 31.2 28.7
Construction 8.4 3.7 3.7 3.1 6.3 3.2
Transport and 3.0 27.5 1.1 20.2 2.1 24.6
Communications
Commerce and Tourism 8.4 1.1 7.9 1.6 8.2 1.3
Financial Services 31.2 27.0 42.6 37.2 36.5 31.2
Other Services 3.8 1.0 12.6 0.8 7.7 0.9
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source:	 Masoud, 1981, (Cited by Jeffrey, B. Nugent 1987, p.51.)
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TABLE 7[d]	 TOTAL LOANS GRANTED TO JOINT VENTURES IN
SAUDI ARABIA UP TO THE END OF 1986
(MILLIONS OF SR1s)*
Sector
Number
of
Projects
Total
Loans
Expenditure Foreign
Putner's
Share
Total
Project
Costs
Construction Materials
(excluding cement)
63 923 635 256 1965
Cement 2 800 1245 380 31'72
Chemical Products 68 997 757 282 2223
Consumer Products 60 863 699 267 1793
Engineering Products 110 1833 1337 404 3598
Other industrial 6 as 55 18 188
Projects
TOTAL 309 5500 4728 1607 12939
•	 SRLs = Saudi Riyals
Source:	 Compiled from data supplied by the Saudi Industrial
Development Fund.
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According to H. Azam [July 1988], the nature of the joint ventures required in the Gulf
region today, differs from what it used to be in the past. In the early stages, joint
ventures were mainly in construction or construction—related sectors. Later, concentration
was in heavy industries, such as those of petrochemicals, steel and aluminium. Nowadays,
the emphasis is more on downstream industries. To give some examples, the potential
is greater for downstream petrochemical industries high technology, consumer product
industries, engineering plant assembly industries, services and operations and maintenance.
As the standard of living improves, so there are new amenities: shops, sports facilities,
supermarkets. Different types of joint ventures arc created to suit and cope with the
improved standard of living. Such joint ventures may involve industrial development and
transfer of technology. The best time to invest may be when the region has reached its
floor, when incentives are high, as they are today, and when future prospects are
promising (relevant to Iran—Iraq post—war era in the Gulf).
Technological requirements of the Arab World may vary from one country to another,
depending on the availability or otherwise of various natural and strategic resources. An
oil producing Arab country may obviously need different types of technology compared
to another country such as Sudan or Morocco, whose main concern is related to the
agricultural sector. R. Agami [1979, p.102] attempted to match different groups of
individual Arab countries with relatively similar conditions, according to their appropriate
technological needs. The following table sheds some light on matching these groups and
their appropriate technological requirements.
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Table 7[f]	 MATRIX OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
Manufacturing Service-Commercial
Group 1
[1]
Group 2
[2]
Group 3
[3]
Group 4
[4]
Capital and energy-intensive process
technology for petro-relatecl,
export-oriented industry.
Capital-intensive, import-
substitution manufacturing
technology; agricultural technology,
Agricultural technology; intermediate
manufacturing technology with low
capital intensity, import-substitution
products.
Light manufacturing, export-related
technology,
Software, hardware;
foreign exports.
Software, hardware;
upgrading of indigenous
managerial and technical talent.
Upgrading of indigenous
managerial and technical talent
Banking, insurance and related
services; commercial
technology.
Source:	 Compiled by R. Agami [1979].
	
Key: [1]	 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar & UAE
[2] Algeria, Iraq, Libya.
[3] Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia.
[4] Jordan, Lebanon.
The factor endowment of the Gulf region, with a relative abundance of capital and a
relative shortage of labour, practically dictates the capital intensive orientation of future
industries. Besides, the financial and tax incentives and the advantage of having low
energy and other utility costs, among other factors, should help offset the relatively higher
unit costs of production. Industries based on the Arab regions' mineral resources (iron
ore, potash, copper, phosphate, gold, limestone, etc.), which exist in economic quantities
in Saudi Arabia, Oman, U.A.E., Jordan, Morocco, Sudan and many other Arab States, arc
naturally characterised as being capital and energy intensive. Developing such primary
industries normally creates external economies and forward linkages that would render
investments in derived secondary product industries more profitable.
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7.5	 Research and Development Issues
Three major influences on the location of R & D can be identified as follows:
1.	 Factors favouring centralisation of R & D efforts in the Multinational's home
countries (effectively their headquarters). These include:
a) Economy of scale in R & D;
b) The need to avoid duplication of effort;
c) The extent of importance of interchange with top management who
determine company strategy;
2. The importance of close contacts among R & D, marketing and production
personnel favours decentralisation of R & D, especially for development and
adaptation efforts;
3.	 More common location factors, including the cost and availability of R & D inputs
and government policies may also influence the location of R & D.
According to "J INKS - Third Worldfirst" [April 1986], only about 2-3% of world total
R & D capacity arc located in the Third World. Technology transfers arc therefore one-
sided with Third World nations exercising little influence on the type of technology
developed. In the Third World, the Arab countries among them, local affiliates of foreign
MNCs merely act as packages for products imported from the parent company (routine
assembly of components manufactured elsewhere). What the Arab World obtains are
strictly end products, not the capacity to develop them. Not only that, but imported
technology may even replace local technology developed throughout history and adapted
to local conditions, such as pearls trade in the Gulf, leather industry in Sudan, and small
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handicraft industries in Egypt and elsewhere. All could potentially be improved and
further developed had it not been to the competition from imported technology, which had
substituted rather than complemented them. Some of these imported technology may
involve negative effects on natural resources, the environment, employment, use of local
materials and the balance of payments.
Productive research, which provides the profitable licenses and patents, should indeed be
done closer to the manufacturers and not necessarily in MNCs headquarters, as is clearly
the case at present.
Advanced technology has made products increasingly knowledge—intensive, and despite
attempts by MNCs to refrain from transferring R & D facilities outside their headquarter
bases, in an attempt to prevent imitation and diffusion, it is increasingly becoming
uncontrollable to limit the transfer of tangible technology, such as technical data and
computer software.
President Rcagan's first National Academy of Sciences panel — which produced The
Corson Report — [Whyman 1988], concluded that:
"The free flow of information, ideas and people did result in some loss of technology to
the Eastern bloc. However, the benefits derived from additional controls were
overweighed by the costs to the maintenance of a vigorous research base and an
innovative R & D community. Efforts to control intangible technology, not only run
counter to the western world's ability to innovate, but conflict with other basic values
(such as freedom and openness to society), so highly valued".
The increasingly changing attitudes following the perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet
Union, are likely to lead to the creation of a new environment whereby the risk of
technology transfer can be rendered insignificant. Likewise, the growing usc of facsimile
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machines and other enhanced tciccommunications services, means that tcchnology transfer
is an increasingly common part of business practice. All this suggests that the expansion
and competitiveness of technology markets has made technology transfer more prevalent
and export controls problematic. However, the eventual outcome of all these recent
developments is yet to be felt in the Arab World. Another development which deserves
mentioning in this regard, is the fact that the source of technology has now shifted away
from government controlled entities, to the private sector. The direction of commercial
development is being decided by market demand and other commercial considerations.
Consequently, control problems will soon be confined to the dual use list of commercial
goods that have military application, such as Technology and Development Group (TDG),
an Iraqi company said to be involved in the purchase of the Lear Fan factory in Belfast
in 1988, with the intention of training Iraqis in high technology processes to manufacture
composite materials which can be used in missiles, (allegations which subsequent events
seem to have affirmed).
The role of the public sector in the Arab countries with regard to the question of
technology transfcr, needs to be emphasised in this respect. Public scctor enterprises havc
accumulated significant technological expertise and know-how; yet there is still a long
way to go before they can tap their expertise to make effective adaptations and
modifications in technologies, which they receive from multinationals on the basis of
their operating experiences, and the research and development activities undertaken by
them. However, three main characteristics of technologies acquired by some public sector
enterprises in the Arab World can be identified: First, they can be used on a smaller scale
than those supplied by MNCs based in the industrialised world. Small farms in Sudan
have bcnefitted from some simple technologies and agricultural know-how, provided by
"Shambat Food Research Centre", an independent research institution which is sponsored
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by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Faculty of Agriculture of Khartoum University.
Second, as in Egypt, they are usually labour-intensive and do not involve huge capital
outlays. This type of simple technology could be particularly visible in textile, leather and
small handicrafts sectors. Finally, they can better utilise some of the raw materials that
arc locally available. This can be demonstrated by the manufacture of some locally
produced drugs in small pharmaceutical factories in Egypt and Sudan, using indigenous
herbs and other materials supplied by local markets.
The most telling illustration of the leading role that the public sector can play in the
promotion of the industrial development in the Arab World, is the experience of the Saudi
government, which responded to the needs for basic industries by setting up the Saudi
Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC'), in 1970. Similar corporations have been
set up in many other Arab countries to monitor and supervise the public industrial
enterprises. In Sudan, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) was established in
the 1960s, only to be renamed "The Industrial Production Corporation gpq in 1970, in
the aftermath of the wave of nationalisations of previously privately owned companies.
Towards the mid 1970s, IPC was to be dissolved and replaced by scctoral corporations,
which were previously under its corporate supervision (financially and administratively)
following the re-nationalisation dccisions. Today, leather, sugar, food, oil, building
materials, textiles and mining industry corporations operate as quasi-governmental entities
in Sudan.
This emphasis in the Arab World on the role of state-run industries to compete effectively
in the modern world, probably contrasts with thc main thrust of the economic philosophy
of the western world, which is based on the efficiency of the private enterprises which,
in their view, better regulate and encourage competition to the benefit of all.
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	7.6	 Cooperation Among the Arab States Through Joint Ventures
There is a general belief in the Arab World, indeed in many other developing countries
as well, that MNCs are reluctant to transfer their technology to ensure their
indispensability. They avoid having more than a token number of nationals in key
positions, albeit most if not all recent concession agreements contain provisions to the
effect that ?4,INCs should give preference to nationals, wherever possible, in both initial
employment and promotion. While overall statistics show a predominance of nationals,
in the Gulf States their presence in middle and upper management is notably lacking. A
new trend is gradually gathering momentum among the Arab decision makers, which
advocates the adoption of a strategy to establish Arab MNCs to be instrumental in closing
the technological gap between the Arab World and the industrialised countries. A joint
venture among Arab investors, is seen as a means to further the economic integration of
the Arab World and to avoid duplication of industrial and other projects. It is also a
useful device for bringing together investors from the rich and poor countries in a single
project, thus facilitating the flow of funds betwccn the capital exporting and capital
importing states of the Arab World. Moreover, it permits the development of projects
which require large amounts of capital or extensive multi—country markets. Thrcc types
of Arab Joint Ventures can be identified in this regard:
1. Project Joint Ventures: such as Kenana Sugar factory in the Sudan (involving
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lonrho Company and Sudan Government);
2. Sectoral Joint Ventures: which seek to promote and develop projects in a
particular field and then to act as holding companies for the enterprises actually
established; examples being the Arab company for mining and the Arab company
for development of animal resources;
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3. Geographical Joint Venture: whcrc governments of two or more Arab countries
form a company to identify, develop and manage investments and enterprises
within the geographical limits of one or both of the states concerned. Many
examples can be given in this regard, particularly within the context of the
geographically—based sub groups within the Arab World, i.e. GCC and Maghreb
Union. An interesting example of what could be achieved, is the proposal for
joint Maghreb Airline, which could offer a wider network of destinations, while
avoiding duplication of routes. Others arc Algerian—Tunisian Transmediterranean
Pipeline, a 2,500 kilometre link between Algeria's southern gas fields and Italy,
which was completed a few years ago. The pipeline crosses Tunisia, which
receives some of the gas as transit fee payment. The success of this project has
paved the way for a proposed inter—Maghreb pipeline, to supply gas from Algeria
to Western Libya (450 kilometres link), to pipe about 3,500 mn cubic metres of
gas a year from Qued Safsaf in Algeria to Zuwara on the Libyan coast, where an
aluminium smelter is planned. [Arab—British Commerce Journal, July/August
1988.]
7.7	 Trade in Goods with Military Applications
The Middle East is, no doubt, one of the most lucrative arms markets. A substantial
portion of the USA high technology exports is in military goods, which indicates the
character of America's strategic ties, perhaps more than its strategic competitiveness.
In March 1989, British Aerospace announced that its arms deal with Saudi Arabia might
ultimately be worth £150 billion, the largest export contract ever negotiated by Britain and
among the biggest defence deals ever. [The Observer, Sunday 19th March, 1989] While
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the quoted figure turned out later on to be grossly exaggerated, nevertheless, no one
doubts the fact that it is to be one of the largest contracts of recent history.
What concerns us in this regard, is the way Saudi Arabia is going to cope with and
administer such a large contract. As widely reported, a major offset agreement has been
concluded with the UK for 35% of the value of a $7.6 bn contract, to supply Tornado
military aircraft to Saudi Arabia. At least 60% of the foreign half of the venture should
be made through the provision of working capital with the balance of the investment used
as the Joint Venture deems appropriate.
Another offset investment programme was introduced in Saudi Arabia, to ensure that the
Kingdom benefit more substantially from the large contracts it was rewarding abroad.
Major foreign suppliers arc expected to offset the cost to Saudi government by investing
35% of the contract value in Joint Ventures in the Kingdom. This policy was first put
into practice with agreement on the $33 bn "Peace Shield" early warning radar package.
The main contractor, Boeing, on behalf of itself and its US sub—contractors, came up with
nine potential projects with a combined investment of $700 million; five of which were
under implementation by early 1990.
Our account on military technology and how individual Arab Countries cope with the
challenges posed by the technicalities of use and transfer of knowledge of this type of
sophisticated technology, will be incomplete without due reference to the Iraqi experience.
Iraq has established an extensive network throughout Europe, to acquire military useful
equipment and skills. According to press reports [Financial Times, September 13, 1989]
the network is believed to spread through Spain, France, Britain, Wcst Germany and Italy.
(As no denial of any kind has been issued by any of the parties concerned, wc have no
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reason to assume that these reports arc unfounded). It includes more than a dozen British
Companies on the continent. The one thing they have in common is high technology.
British officials say that while the Iraqi network is not in itself illegal, it is a source of
concern because of the proliferation of missile technology in the Middle East, and Iraq's
intensive efforts to build its own high technology armaments industries.
Of particular concern to western governments, are Iraq's attempts to acquire technical
skills, by sending trainees to work at European—based companies. This way Iraq can tap
the west's most sophisticated industrial and military technologies, without necessarily
breaking the law by exporting prohibited products. One specific area of concern to
western governments has always been that Iraq, along with Egypt, may have been
attempting to obtain materials and technology through a network of companies, mainly
in Europe, for the manufacture of both conventional weapons and for the production of
a nuclear—capable missile, the CONDOR 2, on which the two Arab countries have
cooperated with Argentina. (CONDOR 2 missile is believed to have a range of 900 km.
The two—stage solid fuel missile would be capable of carrying a small nuclear or chemical
warhead.) Also, Matrix Churchill, the British machine tool company based in Coventry,
which is the subsidiary of an Iraqi trading company, has been recently a focus of
attention. It is an Iraqi—controlled company and Iraqi technicians have undergone training
at its site in Coventry. (It was bought—out in 1987 with finance channelled through a
network of companies established by Iraqis.) Iraqi directors set up a series of companies,
one of which, Technology and Development Group (TDG), was involved in the purchase
of Lear Fan Factory in Belfast in 1988. Here too, British officials were concerned that
Iraqi's could be trained in high technology processes to manufacture composite materials
which can be used in missiles. The only legal control which Britain can exercise against
training in sensitive industries, is through immigration laws. As a matter of fact, Iraq
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made no sccrct of its determination to acquire equipment and technology. Nor is it in any
way a secret that Iraq has always been assisted by foreign companies in its endeavour to
establish and improve its military industrialisation programme. More than a dozen foreign
companies, half of them West German, were said to have been involved in the
establishment of the al—Qaqa Complex, south of Baghdad, where an explosion at a
munitions plant in August 1989 is believed to have killed hundreds of workers. (The
foregoing assessment was made about a year before the start of the Gulf War, which later
provided real evidence of the validity and the correctness of the, then unconfirmed,
reports.)
..
7.8	 The Use of Comparative Experiences
The question has to be addressed as to the extent to which the Arab World can draw on
the experiences of other nations, who at one stage of their development, perhaps similar
to that of the Arabs today, have demonstrated the ability to transfer technology to support
their own industrial programmes. Some Third World countries, such as Cuba, India and
China, established their own companies originated locally. Others, like Japan and perhaps
some South East Asian newly industrialised countries (NICs) followed different courses.
We have to consider the extent to which such models can be somehow repeated or
emulated, with or without the need to adjust to different local conditions of individual
Arab Countries. Some people would argue that, as long as a number of Arab States can
afford to meet the financial commitment involved in the acquisition of technology, they
can opt for the transfer of technology via outright purchase of the appropriate technology.
We arc more concerned here with "knowledge" when referring to the world "technology"
and not the "hardware", it is obvious that the ability to purchase is not necessarily
synonymous with "transfer of technology", as it will not resolve the problem of
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transferring the knowledge required to manufacture a product, to design a bridge, to
undertake micro-surgery or to construct a dam.
7.8.1 India
In 1985, India attempted an industrialisation policy with the lowest possible
reliance on the technology of industrialised world, that resulted in an export
performance markedly poorer than other NICs, but India is regarded to be the
largest NIC exporter of turn-key projects, and as one of the leading exporters of
industrial technology specifically designed for the Third World. By its policies,
India has obtained a greater technological autonomy, as compared to other NICs,
albeit this independence has been paid for with slower growth.
7.8.2 Korea
Korea compares as an intermediate case, between the highly restrictive Indian and
the very liberal Singapore economic policy. In most of the Arab countries, which
in a way are similar to the Korean example, foreign ownership can be permitted
only in special cases, such as for the export-oriented or lightly technology-
intensive projects, and only when entry of foreign firms is considered compatible
with the government development strategies. While some efforts arc being made
to train local staff on new technology undertaken in some of the Arab countries,
there has been little achievement so far in the way of investment in research and
development in industrialised nations, to gain access to sophisticated technology.
In their Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy, Korea invested in resource-rich
countries to gain raw materials, as well as undertaking manufacturing in
developing nations to serve local markets. All these support the motivation of
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expansion and diversification of Korean exports, to maintain the dynamic industrial
growth at home. In the author's view, the Arab countries need to do just that.
7.8.3 hpan
The initial post—war industrial policy of Japan, was based on the strategy of
learning advanced foreign technology, but without being dependent on direct
investment by western corporations. The Japanese government restricted FDI at
home, but encouraged technology imports through licensing agreements, which
became a vehicle of knowledge transfer, than direct investment. It is needless to
say that the Japanese imported the technology and commercialised it through
adaptive R & D, creating in the process many significant improvements,
particularly in the area of production processes. Japan now has trade surplus in
medium and low technology goods, since its comparative advantage in high
technology is defined as less than that of USA. The latter, however, now faces
a problem: the rent from innovation — that is the exceptional gains on which high
profits and high value addcd are based — arc realised in producing the goods, not
in selling the technology. The underlying secret behind the Japanese technological
success, can be implicdly detected in what the "Economist" once stated [November
9, 1985]:
"The average American 17 year—old knows half as much mathematics as the
average Japanese 17 year—old 	
 Given such science and maths scores, it should
come as no surprise that Japan produces twice as many engineers per capita as
the US, and that with twice as many engineers in the payroll, Japanese products
seem to be a little better engineered"
Table 7.8, attached at the end of this chapter, shows that potential scientists and
engineers per million population, was approximately 60,000 in Japan, as compared
to a mere 15,000 (25%) in US in 1986.
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The Japanese innovation is based on making things as light in weight, thin in
width, short in length and operating time and as small in size and cost as possible
- all designed to economise on energy, raw materials, time and space. This
compares with heavy, thick, long and big products of Europe and the US.
Moreover, the US high technology is concentrated in a limited number of sectors -
aircraft, computers and agricultural chemicals and a substantial portion of high
technology exports in these sectors are military.
7.8.4 Application to the Arab World
It would be worthwhile to reflect here on the statistics pertaining to the number
of engineers and basic science graduates of the Arab World. The following table,
which the author has constructed from figures provided by Dr. Zahlan's paper,
presented at a seminar organised by the British Foundation for Science and
Technology, London, in October 1989, shcds some light on the potential research
capabilities in the Arab World.
Table 7.8.4 POTENTIAL RESEARCH CAPABILITIES IN THE ARAB WORLD
Year Number
Number of Universities 1989 85
Number of Students emoted 1989 3,000,000
Number of Graduates of Engineering 1985 27,000
Estimate number of Graduates of Engineering in 1992 54,000
Number of Working Engineers 1988 500,000
Holders of BSc Degrees in Basic Sciences 1985 19,000
Arab Engineers educated abroad 1988 100,000
Arab Professionals working abroad 1988 250,000
Arab University Students outside the Arab World 1988 250,000
Source:	 Dr. Sahlan.
N.B. The theme of the Seminar was "Transferring Technology with The Arab
World" - jointly organised by The Foundation and The Arab-British
Chamber of Commerce on 3 October, 1989.
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The various practices adopted throughout the Arab World during the past three decades,
initially emphasised turnkey types of contracts. These modalities were justified on the
grounds that Arab professional manpower and experienced organisations to participate in
serious programmes of technology transfer were not available.
With time, variations on these patterns were introduced, according to country and
conditions. As the above table shows, there has been a significant transformation of Arab
technological capabilities. Since independence, the Arab States have made great strides
forward in education: qualified manpower is no longer a constraint. Today, there are
more than 85 Arab Universities, which enrol 3 million students. An indication of the
scale of their activities is that they graduated 27,000 engineers in 1985, and are expected
to graduate 54,000 in 1992. By comparison, universities in the UK graduate 11,000
engineers a year; those in the US 80,000; and in Japan the figure is 75,000. There were
approximately 500,000 Arab engineers working in the Arab World in 1988; this is a figure
comparable to the US manpower pool of 1.5 million engineers. In addition, there arc
large numbers of university graduates in most other fields of knowledge; in 1985 for
example, 19,000 students received a BSc dcgrcc in the basic sciences. Some 20 per cent
of Arab engineers have been educated abroad, and many more have had international
experience. There arc some 250,000 Arab Students cnrolcd in universities outside the
Arab World. Furthermore, there arc large numbers - estimated at 250,000 - of
professional Arabs now working abroad. But the modern world of technology thrives on
specialised, productive and innovative corporate organisations, and not only on a pool of
professional manpower.
Here again, considerable progress has been made. Institutions and organisations capable
of providing consulting, contracting, rcscarch, engineering and industrial services have
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been established during the past two to three decadcs. These firms, however, have only
limited R & D and corporate capabilities. Nevertheless, given the requisite environment,
they would be able to participate in the process of technology transfer. An extensive
infrastructure now exists for the adoption of very different methods for planning and
executing infrastructural and industrial projects. The Arab countries are not only capable
of pursuing technology transfer programmes in the years ahead; they are also highly
motivated to doing so.
7.9	 The Potential of Arab Scientists
In support of his optimistic view on the tremendous potentials of the technological and
scientific capacity within the Arab World, the author has compiled a number of statistical
indicators from the UNESCO statistical year book — 1988. Aided by the statistical tables
7.1 to 7.8, provided at the end of this chapter, one can reasonably conclude the following:
1. The estimated number of potential scientists and engineers of the Arab World for
the years 1980 to 1985 (Table 7.1) suggests an impressive increase of 50% (from
1.15 million to 1.72 million) in the course of five years. Compared to the
respective numbers in the entire developing countries, the share of the Arab World
stands at 5.6% in 1980, and 6% in 1985. More insight can be gained by looking
to the number of scientists and engineers per million people in the Arab World.
This was 7,046 in 1980 and 9,143 in 1985. The figures indicate a profound
improvement of the research and scientific capacity, particularly when compared
with the equivalent average in the developing world, which records 6,272 in 1980
and 8,263 in 1985.
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2. While scientific and technical manpower potential in the Arab World (Table 73)
can hardly be comparable to the corresponding number in the industrial countries,
that of Egypt seems to be particularly impressive (492,470 scientists and engineers
in 1976 and no doubt many more today). It is worthwhile noting, however, that
around 80% of potential scientists and engineers and 75% of technicians in
Kuwait in 1980, were forei gners. Similar proportions of foreigners are also known
to be recorded in other Arab countries, particularly in the oil—rich states (91% for
Libya). While reflecting the extent to which scientific researches are dependent
to a considerable degree on foreign expertise, these figures still highlight the
commitment of these countries to promote the scientific capabilities within their
territories. Moreover, we should not loose sight of the fact that the vast majority
of these foreign experts is largely derived from other sister countries within the
Arab World.
3. As for the scientists and engineers actually engaged in research and experimental
development (Table 7.4), the number corresponding to Egypt, by far the largest of
the Arab World in this regard, is a mere 28,000 in 1986. This compares poorly
with that of Japan (677,000) and even Israel (53,000 in 1984). Yet, it still sounds
reasonable by international standards, particularly among the developing countries.
4. If the type of research and experimental development and the branches of
economic activities in which these researches are conducted are all considered, one
soon comes to the conclusion that, applied research features remarkably,
particularly when compared with fundamental research (76% to the formcr, as
opposed to 18% to the latter in Sudan's case; 80% and 8% in the case of
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Kuwait). These figures reflect percentages of the total expenditure on R 8c D (see
Table 7.7).
5.	 Rcgarding the sectors in which experimental development is performed, it is
imperative that different emphasis pertains to the varying degrees of importance
and types of economic resources among individual countries. While in Egypt, for
instance, about 58% of scientists and engineers arc involved in R & D in the
sector of agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing, only 13% and 11% do so in
Kuwait and Qatar respectively. By way of comparison, it is rather interesting to
note that 95% of the Japanese scientists and engineers who are engaged in R &
D perform their researches in the manufacturing industries (Table 7.6).
According to Thomas A. Pugel [Dunning, 1985, pp.70-71]
Wet exports across industries are positively related to the employment of human capital
and relatively related to raw or unskilled labour. Net  exports are often found to be
negatively related to the use of non—human capital, although this relation is usually not
as significant as the former two [Stern and Masts, 19811. Whenever these influences are
controlle4 net exports are positively related to one or another measure of the importance
of new technology in the industry, such as the R & D intensity or number of scientists and
engineers employed as a fraction of the labour force."
Unfortunately, the only relevant information available about the scientific and research
potentials of the Arab World are the statistics identifying the overall number of engineers
and scientists, as shown in the tables (7.1 to 7.8), provided at the end of this chapter.
7.10 US Government Policies on Technology Transfer
In a meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science [South
Magazinc, August 1987], tightcr controls on US technology transfer were demanded and
USAID was attackcd for turning Brazil's soya bean production into an export success,
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through its work on new varieties, and thus damaging the market share of US producers.
Similar criticism was also echoed against the US support for Philippines rice research, and
even the aid to famine—stricken Sudan, in improving sorghum production. The complain
is part of the ammunition of a mixed lobby of farmers, big business and security
specialists, pushing Washington for tighter transfer controls. A paper presented for the
American association, assessing the transferability of various technologies, found that
"spill—out" of US agricultural technology was quite limited. Chemical technology was
found to be more transferable. However, most of this is produced by private, often
transnational companies, and most of the transfer takes place via licensing and technology
agreements.
One characteristic of US policy in technology transfer, is its concern with the policy on
trademarks, patents and proprietary processes, where, unlike the case of agricultural
technology transfer, domestic sentiments arc likely to result in significant policy changes.
The main argument raised is that the US bears the development costs for a product, while
foreigners cream off the markets before they can be recouped (at first complaints were
aimed at Japan and Europe). In 1984, Congress ordered that a country's record on
protecting intellectual property be a consideration in granting generalised system of
preferences trading benefits.
On the other hand, criticism is always voiced against US use of the affiliates of its MNC,s
in the developing world as "listening posts" to monitor and, where desirable, to obtain the
technology knowledge through license or otherwise, for transfer back to the parents.
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7.11 Arab Misgivings towards NINC's Policies on Technology Transfer
The intellectual climate in much of the Third World does not accept that their citizens
should pay heavily for technology provided by NCNCs. on the ground that academic
information should be freely available to humanity. In addition, there are growing
demands that the MNCs should carry out R & D in the developing countries, such as the
Arab World, where the resultant products will eventually be sold and used.
The constraints on technology transfers to the Arab countries, have already been dealt
with elsewhere in this study (section 6.9 of Chapter 6). On the theoretical level, some
people in the developing countries would argue (rightly or wrongly) against the present
patterns of technology transfer on the following grounds:
1. Transfer tends to infringe on a country's sovereignty;
2. Possibility of tension between the aims and interests of technology givers and
receivers;
3. The paradox inherent in most of the joint ventures which arc characterised by
inequality of management, leading to one party being constantly over-ruled. This
eventually results in the ceasing of cooperation. In this context, it is always
pointed out that directors from the Arab side of joint ventures are just figure-
heads on the boards of local subsidiaries, while full executive directors are
confined to parent companies.
7.12 General Conclusions
Aid to industry ought to concentrate on aspects that should have catalytic effect, such as
research, training and studies. The emphasis here is on the improvement of skills and
management and the transfer of technology. The creation of effective industrial and
market-oriented research with technological applications, remain at the forefront of the
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Arab thinking, as does the creation of scientific institutions capable of interacting with
industry and contributing to its development. Cooperation deals should be struck
between science and technology institutions in the industrial world and similar Arab infant
institutions, if enhancing the quality and level of technological development is to be
sought in the Arab World.
If there is one single positive outcome to be gained by cooperation between the Arab
World and the western MNCs, be it through joint ventures or otherwise, it should be the
successful transfer of technology and the creation of a business environment that will
assist the Arab countries adapt themselves to the increasingly changing world of
technology. Unfortunately, the Arab countries have, as yet, failed to make any tangible
headway in that respect. Their financial power, notwithstanding, they have not succeeded
in generating a great deal of technology to be adapted to their local conditions, thus
leaving themselves much lagging behind in the technological field.
The development of technology depends on a number of factors, some of which arc
favourably at the disposal of some Arab States, while some others could potentially be
made available on a joint basis. The favourable economic factors, for instance, may
include the availability of capital, a requirement which could be reasonably met by the
oil—rich states. The skilled labour whose presence can be sought in countries such as
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Sudan, among other Arab countries, patchy though that might be,
is not to be considered as a major constraint either. After all, opting for the appropriate
type of training in order to upgrade skills, is not a hard endeavour to contemplate.
Neither does the Arab World lack the type of political stability required to develop
technology, given the fact that the politically troubled areas do not necessarily constitute
the whole of the region that forms the Arab World.
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Among the countries of the Arab World, Egypt is by far the most advanced of all in a
number of respects. On the one hand, it is the most densely populated country, with its
educated personnel and educational infrastructure impressive enough to give the Egyptians
a different outlook on technology than the rest of the Arab countries. Their relatively .
sophisticated technological base gives them an incentive to seek to share in the
development of technology, rather than to opt for mere imports, particularly in view of
their inability to pay for the massive technology imports. In this regard, Egypt is, in a
way, like India, another country with limited financial means . but an impressive
technological capacity. Halwan Steel and Ore Factory and Nasr Car Assembly Company,
together with other technologically sophisticated projects, such as Aswan Darn, stand as
monuments to the Egyptian technological capabilities. Also, Egyptian Universities, by far
the largest in terms of both number and the size of intake, are well developed to
accommodate researches in different technological fields.
The experience of Egypt will have to be an appropriate starting point for other Arab
countries to follow suit, as well as to support financially and in any other way. The
eventual target to accomplish must, however, remain to be the assumption of a positive
role in the management and development of technology, as opposed to merely buying
some.
At the peak of their great civilisation (from the 8th to the 12th centuries), the Arabs
practised technology transfer on a large scale. The foundation of Arabic science and
technology were laid down in the era of Caliph al-Ma'mun (reigned 813-833); the 10th-
century Philosopher al-Farabi (d.950) devotes a chapter in his Enumeration of
&Isla= to Hiyal. Hc includes arithinetics and algebra in his category; the 14th-century
Egyptian scholar al-Qalgashandi (1355-1418) included among his list: construction of
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large buildings, optics, burning mirrors, centres of gravity, surveying, the discovery of
(hidden) waters, moving of heavy weights, the science of water clocks, water machines,
and the science of pneumatic machines. [Arab Affairs, Vold, No. 2. Winter 86/87.]
Science, technology and trade travelled along the same route in Arab history. Islamic
teachings promoted openness, tolerance and the pursuit of knowledge. At first, the Arabs
were engaged in a vast programme of learning, research and acquisition. This was
followed by a period of intensive scientific research and application. The transfer of this
knowledge to Europe then followed. The international transport system established by the
Arabs made it possible not only to sustain a flourishing economy, but also to facilitate the
movement of ideas. Thus, what this chapter has attempted to highlight is the need to
continue with a long Arab tradition: the simultaneous transfer of goods and ideas.
TABLE 7.1 ESTIMATED NUMBER OF POTENTIAL SCIENTISTS AND
ENGINEERS FOR 1980 AND 1985
YEAR ARAB DEVELOPING % ESTIMATED ESTIMATED %
WORLD WORLD OF (1) NUMBER PER NUMBER PER OF (4)
TO (2) MILLION IN MILLION IN TO (5) .
ARAB WORLD DEVELOPING
WORLD
(I ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1980 1,146,000 20,284,000 5.6% 7,046 6,272 112%
1985 1,721,000 29,513,000 6.0% 9,143 8,263 111%
TABLE 7.2 ENROLMENT OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN THE ARAB
WORLD
YEAR ARAB
WORLD
STUDENTS
DEVELOPING
WORLD
STUDENTS
%
OF (1)
TO (2)
ARAB WORLD
(TEACHER
STAFF)
DEVELOPING
WORLD
(TEACHER
STAFF)
%
OF (4)
TO (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1970 444,000 7,318,000 6% 25,000 613,000 4%
1975 896,000 12,846,000 7% 44,000 953,000 4.6%
1980 1,446,000 18,096,000 8% 73,000 1,303,000 5.6%
1985 1,956,000 25,351,000 7.7% 104,000 1,725,000 6%
1986 2,112,000 26,798,000 8% 112,000 1,846,000 6%
—
Source: Compilcd byte author front UNESCO Stausuca Cal Ikok, 1988. fa e 2.2.
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TABLE 7.3 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL MANPOWER POTENTIAL IN
SELECTED ARAB STATES
SCIENTIPM NnALSTS AND
I
ENGINEERS
POTENTIAL
TECHNICIANS
COUNTRY YEAR TYPE OF
DATA •
TOTAL
(1)
TOTAL
(7)
FEMALE
(3)
TOTAL
(4)
FEMALE
(5)
ERYPt 1976 ST - 492,470 96,200 - ...
Di ibotgi 1973 EA 35 35 4 - -
Libya 1980 EA 35,751 43,737 1,142 9,020 439
Sudan 1971 EA 11,229 9,708 - 1,521 -
Bahrain 1981 ST 22,362 10,747 3,184 11,615 4,215
Iraq 1972 EA 68,334 43,645 10,901 24,689 2,950
Jordan 1977 EA 17,232 11,575 1,623 5,657 704
Kuwait 1980 sr 181,923 78,795 - 103,128 ...
Lebanon 1972 ST - 28,350 - - -
Qatar 1983 EA 15,236 6,302 1,701 8,934 2,346
Saudi Arabia 1974 sr ... 33,376
Syria 1970 EA 44,909 24,523 3,473 20,386 7,176
N. Yemen 1974 EA 2,074 1,394 18 680 18
Tunisia 1974 EA 11,135 3,421 - 7,714 ...
Japan 1982 EA 37,050,000 7,046,000 881,000 30,000,400 13057,000
Israel 1984 EA 349,410 174,518 - 174,792 ...
USSR 1986 EA 34,600,000 15,000,000 8,115,000 19,600,000 12642,000
•	 EA	 =	 Economically active qualified manpower.
ST	 =	 Stock of qualified manpowcr.
Egypt:	 Data refer to persons aged 25 years and over with an education at
the third level (University or above).
Libya:	 32,135 of potential scientists and engineers arc foreigners.
Also, Bahrain 7,464, Kuwait 63,339 (of potential scientists and engineers in Col
(2) and 77,188 of the technicians in Col (4) are foreigners.
Qatar 4,782 (Scientists and Engineers), 6,032 (technicians).
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TABLE 7.4 NUMBER OF SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS AND TECHNICIANS
ENGAGED IN RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL
DEVELOPMENT
SCIENTISTS
AND ENGINEERS
TECHNICIANS
COUNTRY YEAR TOTAL TOTAL FEMALE TOTAL FEMALE
(FIE)
SET
Egypt' 1986 28,524 20,893 — 7,532 —
Libya 1980 2,600 1,100 -. 1,503 ..
Sudan 1978 7,077 3,806 ... 3,271 ...
Jordan 1985 4.45 270 — 175 ...
Kuwait 1984 2,072 1,511 334 561 113
Lebanon 1980 186 180 ... 6 ...
Qatar 1986 290 229 58 61 2
Japan 1986 677,153 575,292 46,187 101,861 19,453
Israel 1984 53,735 39,749 — 13,986 ...
USSR 1986 — 1,500,000 598,100 _ ...
_	 _
'Egypt:	 not including military and defence research and development.
SET =	 Scientists, Engineers and Technicians
FTE =	 Data are in full—time equivalent.
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TABLE 7.5 NUMBER OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS ENGAGED IN
RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT BY THEIR
FIELD OF STUDY
COUNTRY
--,
YEAR SEX TYPE
OF
DATA
TOTAL
(1)
NS
(2)
E&T
(3)
MS
(4)
AS
(5)
SS
&H
(6)
OF
(7)
1982 INF FT 9,950 1.605 2,605 2050 3,143 547 -
MR Pr 29,967 8.152 3,735 6,390 2.382 8,908 -
ME' FEE 19.939 1.322 3.850 1.186 4.070 3.517 -
F FT&PT 11.503 3.075 1.189 3,109 1.186 2,944 -
FIE
Mr 1993 ME 1.160 230 198 130 221 321 -
Fr
Sodas 1973 ME 3,266 513 686 222 560 1.218 67
Jordan 1982 ME
FT&Fr
1777 NW
FIE
Fr
1,241
606
310
109
-
102wilt
340
165
118
9
92
52
381
271
& PT
Oatar 1966 ME 229 160 53 2 5 - 9
F 58 57 - 1 - -
lir= 1981 PAF FT 379405 93442 142316 61108 26598 11316 24325
F FT 22475 2277 775 7850 934 1108 6561
	
KEY: NS =	 Natural Science
	
E&T =	 Engineering and Technology
	
MS =	 Medical Sciences
AS	 =	 Agricultural Sciences
	
SS&H =
	
Social Sciences and Humanities
	
OF =	 Other Fields
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TABLE 7.6 NUMBER OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS ENGAGED IN
RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT
PERFORMED PI THE PRODUCTIVE SECTOR, BY BRANCH OF
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY (FULL TIME EQUIVALENT)
BRANCH OF ECONOMIC ACTIVTTY
COUNTRY YEAR %
TOTAL
( 1 )
AF
H&F
(2)
El
(3)
MI
(4)
u
(5)
C
(6)
T&C
(7)
OA
(8)
EV/Pe 1982 5,527 3,194 651 1,327 210 111 34 -
100% 57.8% 11.8% 24.0% 3.8% 2.0% 0.6% -
Kuwait 1984 296 13 - 67 - 2 42 172
100% 4.4% - 22.6% - 0.7% 14.2% 58.1
%
Oaur••• 1986 44 5 7 8 7 4 -
100% 11.4% 15.9% 18.2% 15.9% 9.1% - 13
29.5
%
Japan 1985 311,678 294 1,095 297,249 -I- 7,232 5,808 -
Mk% 0.1% 0.4% 95.4% -I- 2.3% 1.9% -
KEY AFH&F
El
MI
U
C
T&C
OA
=	 Agriculture, Forestry, Hunting and Fishing
=	 Extracting Industries
=	 Manufacturing Industries
=	 Utilities
=	 Construction
=	 Transport and Communications
=	 Other Activities
•	 Egypt not including military and defence R & D.
1.•	 Data refers to the number of FT and FT scientists and engineers engaged in
scientific and technological activities.
••• Also FT & Ft. (Full—time and Part—time)
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TABLE 7.7 CURRENT EXPENDITURE FOR RESEARCH AND
EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT BY TYPE OF
R & D ACTIVTTY
CURRENT EXPENDITURE BY TYPE OF R de D ACTIVITY
034.I1IRY REFER— CURRENCY ALL TYPES FUNDAMENTAL APPLIED EXPERIMENTAL
ENCE OF R & D RESEARCH RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT
YEAR ACTIVITY
( I) (3) (3) (4)
1978 Pound 5115 917 3920 278
100% 17.9% 76.6% 5.4%
1977 Dinar 6254 506 5076 932
100% 8.1% 80.8% 11.2%
1984 Yen 7152918 1009651 1793723 4349565
103% 14.1% 25.1% 60.8%
JA 1983 Dollar 862134603 10787933 21949703 53467003
100% 12-5% 25.5% 62.0%
UK 1978 Pound 2792 198503 650600 1943700
Sterling 100% 7.1% 23.3% 69.6%
Ságagore 1984 Dollar 144703 4903 37903 101503
100% 3.4% 26.2% 70.4%
I
Source:	 UNESCO Statistical Year Book, 1988, Table 5.11 (5-64).
Amounts shown are in thousands.
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TABLE 7.8 SELECTED INDICATORS FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
MANPOWER POTENTIAL AND PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN
RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTAL DEVELOPMENT
Qualified manpower Perso mm	 D.l engaged in R & 
Cormtry Year Type
of
Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)	 I
EDP( 1986 ST 13,196 — 435 157 0.4 —
Libya 1986 EA 14,711 3,034 370 505 1.4 2.5
Sudan 1978 — — — 217 186 0.9 —
Bahrain 1981 ST 30,273 32,718 — — — —
Jordan 1985 EA 4,194 2,050 77 so 0.6 —
Kuwait 1984 ST 57,305 75,002 877 329 0.4 —
Lebanon 1980 — — — 67 2 0.0 —
Qatar 1986 EA 23,341 33,089 702 187	 . 03 —
Japan 1986 EA 59,636 253,941 4,743 840 0.2 —
USA 1986 EA 14,777 — 3,282 — ... —
Israel 1984 EA 41,821 41,886 9,525 3,352 0.4 =.8
Source:	 UNESCO Statistical Year Book, 1988, Table 5.18 (5-111).
NOTE:	 Data for qualified manpower relate to 1976 for Egypt; 1977 for
Jordan; 1980 for Kuwait and 1983 for Qatar.
	
KEY: EA =	 Economically active qualified manpower
ST	 =	 Stock of qualified manpower
	
S&E =	 Scientists and Engineers
(1) =	 Potential Scientists and Engineers per million population.
(2) =	 Potential Technicians per million population.
(3) =	 Scientists and Engineers per million population.
(4) =	 Technicians per million population.
(5) =	 Number of Technicians per Scientist or Engineer.
(6) =	 Scientists and Engineers in R & D as % of potential S & E.
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CHAFFER 8
INTRODUCTION TO FIELD WORK RESEARCH
UNDERTAKEN IN THE ARABIAN GULF REGION
8.1	 Introduction
As correctly noted by J. P. Killing [1983 : p.87] ...
'nearly every book which deals with the subject of ALVCs and joint ventures; or licence
agreements, does so from the point of view of the firm which has technology and is
Kyndering how best to exploit it".
This study has intended from the outset to devote a great deal of its attention to explore
the possibilities of maximising the advantages to the Arab host countries of their dealings
with foreign MNCs. It attempts to do so with the full understanding that, the Arab
countries are now witnessing a critical stage of their development, whereby they can no
longer afford to go along with schemes readily made by foreign KNCs without
questioning the minute details that are associated with such schemes, particularly if joint
venture arrangements are under consideration.
8.2	 Objectives of the Study
It is hoped that this study will illuminate the phenomenon of MNCs in the Arab World
by raising some critical issues, identifying important hypotheses and suggesting in the end
some profitable paths for empirical and theoretical analysis.
MNCs play a crucial role in the process of economic restructuring of the world economy
through their operations in many host countries, making use of the particular opportunities
which cach of thcsc countries is offering to their activities. This study attcmpts to answer
the question on whcthcr the role of MNCs, as active agents in thc process of perrnancnt
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and accelerating restructuring of the economic development of the Arab World is a
positive or negative onc.
The study attaches central emphasis on the commonly assumed transfer of technology by
MNCs to the Arab countries and attempts to analyse the conflicts resulting from the
present mcchanisms by which technology is transferred. It is hoped that a study of this
kind will be of some help in solving some of these conflicts to the ultimate benefit of the
technology recipient Arab countries, since available evidences now reveal that most of the
benefit of technology transfer has thus far been accrued to the technology suppliers; the
MNCs.
There are three main reasons why there is an urgent need to find solutions:
Firstly, the available evidence strongly suggests that MNCs represent a permanent
feature, particularly in .the field of manufacturing industry in the Arab World, a
sector on which our study has particularly emphasised;
Secondly, since MNCs arc a major world—wide source of modern technology, it
is highly likely that most of the technologically underdeveloped Arab countries
will continue to depend for quite some time upon technology produced, owned or
controlled by these global firms;
Finally, the Arab countries have become increasingly dissatisfied, not only with
the terms and the conditions of technology transfer through MNCs, but also with
the results of such transfer over the last two dccadcs or so.
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It is the author's hope that when contacts have been persistently made over six years of
time, with a cross—section of people who are directly or indirectly involved with the
MNCs' operations in the Middle East, and with a clear sense of purpose, such contacts
must have contributed to the theoretical advancement of knowledge and set the scene for
the formation of appropriate strategies by the Arab countries on the basis of undergoing
changes in the investment positions of both MNCs and the Arab countries themselves.
His overriding concern to ensure an even—handed approach in dealing with various
viewpoints, is hoped to have assisted the upgrading of the quality of the final outcome of
the research analysis.
	
83	 Main hypotheses used in the Research
It is generally contended that the contributions of MNCs to their host countries' economic
fortunes arc either positive, negative or neutral. In the particular case of the Arab World,
their contributions arc seen to be a mixed blessing, as they reflect a combination of both
positive and negative implications in a number of various respects. It is therefore
important that the Arab countries should formulate their policies towards foreign MNCs
which arc to be limited to one or a combination of three options:—
. 1. More of the same policies if the present performance of MNCs is seen to be
satisfactory in serving the economic development aspirations of the particular Arab
host country;
2. Adopting a "u—turn" policy that might entail completely radical changes of the
existing policy (or set of policies), including the option of turning elsewhere and
possibly opting for nationalisation or confiscation if the MNCs role is seen to be
clearly damaging to the national economy (or sovereignty); or
3. Adopting a middle ground stance between the two extremes.
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The foregoing premises may lead us to a series of assumptions and hypotheses, many of
which have emerged during the literature searching stage, as well as during the
preliminary contacts made throughout the first stages of objective formulation. The model
used in this study hypothesises that certain factors determine the degree of responsiveness
in the Arab World to certain activities and operations carried out by MNCs, while others
indicate the extent of satisfaction by the host Arab countries from such activities. The
attractiveness of the Arab countries to foreign direct investors in manufacturing and other
sectors is also associated with certain other factors, such as their level of development,
their resource endowments, investment environment and strategies adopted towards foreign
direct investment in general.
The main research hypotheses revolve around and stem from the strong debate which has
been going on for a good part of the last two decades, about the influence of MNCs on
development in the Third World. Supporters. say they positively influence development
by:
1. Providing private capital which is not available locally. By transferring resources,
MNCs can become a spur to economic recovery;
2. Creating employment and frequently offering better working conditions than local
companies;
3. Transferring technology, skills and experience not otherwise available and
contribute to industrialisation; and
4. Increasing revenue to governments through both direct and indirect taxes and
contributing positively to the balance of payments.
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Critics however, say that MNCs:—
1. Are accountable only to shareholders in their home base;
2. Arc motivated by profit rather than social need and balanced economic growth.
Thus, technology, skills, and expertise transferred may not contribute to broader
development;
3. 'Amur is plentiful in the Third World; in many industries MNCs' investment is
capital and technologically—intensive;
4. When MNCs need labour—intensive production, they locate subsidiaries in Free
Trade Zones, taking advantage of low paid workers and poor employment
conditions;
5. /VINCs exploit raw material and agricultural resources for the benefit of their home
countries and have transferred toxic and hazardous production to the Third World
where fewer regulatory procedures operate;
6. MNCs repatriate profits, management and consultancy fees. In some cases,
governments borrow more capital than they receive in income from taxing the
companies, in order to attract the investment.
83.1.	 • e ItvrSIS on the role of MNCs in the industrialisation of the Arab
Countries
Under the implicit assumption that the main thrust of development in a developing
country is to fulfil the basic needs of its society, most technologies which MNCs
provide to foreign affiliates based in the developing countries, are seen to be
inappropriate. They seem less inappropriate, however, under the more relaxed and
perhaps more realistic assumptions that:
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a. The industrialisation process per se represents over the long—term the most
important way out of under—development; and
b. Practically all developing countries arc characterised by a considerable
degree of openness vis—a—vis the world economy, a trend which has lately
increased by the emergence of KNCs.
Under these assumptions, the appropriateness of Multinationals' controlled
technology would have to be judged by the degree to which it contributes to the
broadening of the industrialisation process and/or the expansion, and diversification
of the hosficountry's export trade and the improvement of its terms of trade with
the outside world. With regard to the Arab countries, while MNC—provided
technologies are barely appropriate for the broadening of the industrialisation
process in most of these countries, they are often appropriate from the viewpoint
of the second objective (diversification of their exports, albeit not necessarily
followed by any associated improvement of its terms).
Some Arab countries, attracted by the mirage of the easy import—substitution
strategy, have accepted at face value most of the MNC arguments that any attempt
to interfere with the scales of given technologies would lead to diseconomies.
This has also induced them to offer MNCs very generous concessions and
subsidies in the form of tariff protection in cases where the use of technologies
inappropriate to the size of the local market resulted in the construction of plants
with excess capacity and unduly high fixed capital investment. The cement
industry in the Gulf region is a clear example that comes to mind in support of
such contention.
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83.2.	 Free market mechanism vis-a-vis pmtectionisrn
While the contemporary economic theories no longer regard the interests of
different nations as incompatible, there appears to be some sense in the
mercantilists central assumptions pertaining to the incompatibility of interests
among nations in reality. Today, the advocates of free trade base many of their
arguments on the adverse repercussions of protectionism. The latter, in their view,
benefits only the protected areas (or countries) but only at the expense of others
who are harmed in the process. Besides, the gainers are relatively less, compared
to the majority who would loose out. Protectionists, on the other hand, use the
infant industry argument, which is most appealing when applied in developing
countries such as the Arab States. Its main assumption is that if a country cannot
produce a given commodity at a lower cost than its rivals, it may develop an
ability to do so by choosing to erect barriers (tariff or non-tariff). By so doing,
it can allow its labour force to acquire necessary skills which, in turn, will help
in the expansion of production facilities sufficiently enough to yield economics of
scale.
The research hypothesises that, in the Arab World competition is harmful and
should be replaced wherever possible by regulations; that collectives arc preferred
to individual ventures; and that the public sector's leading role in most of the Arab
countries should be preserved.
This hypothesis favours a scenario which apparently suits the interests of the
overwhelming majority of the Arab countries, but in the sicwpoint of the
world and its MliCs operating in the Arab World it is rather unacceptable.
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The responses that have emerged from our Gulf survey, together with our
assessment of the role played by governments and other state-controlled
organisations in the realisation of development strategies of the Arab countries, do
confirm the validity of the above hypothesis. Another dimension which seemingly
adds to the strength of the argument is the nationalistic attitudes (Pan-Arabism)
which advocates policies geared towards self-dependence, that necessarily entails
less reliance on outside cooperation.
8.3.3.	 Cultural implications.
Buckley and Casson contend that,
"There are main areas in which conventional economic theory appears to be
deficient in explaining MNCs behaviour in less developing countries .... Cultural
factors are obviously at work and can explain what economic factors have failed
to do in that respect" [Buckley and Casson, January 1989, pi].
In the Arab World, cultural factors can always be cited to explain the failure of
some well established theories to be applied in reality. While, for instance, the
traditional concepts of resource endowments, such as land, labour and capital have
particularly proved to have only limited success in explaining why there are
remarkable differences in the material economic performance between the Arab
World and, say, the NICs of South East Asia, one obvious factor comes to mind
to offer a reasonable explanation: differences in educational level and quality of
training. However, most of the economic theories, including the "Eclectic theory
of international production" seem to ignore the significance of this factor, as well
as other cultural and social ones.
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Buckley and Casson [p.11] claim that cultural constraints inhibit entrepreneurship,
both directly by discouraging individual initiatives and indirectly by encouraging
political leaders to distort incentives and over-regulate the economy. Such claim
is not supported by the real experience of most of the Arab Countries, in that there
is little regulation of their economies. Moreover, individuals are freely allowed
to exercise their business activities, so far as they are within the framework of
investment and commercial laws, which are often flexibly regulated. One also
notes that Buckley and Casson seem to regard the lack of individualistic thinking
in the developing countries, as a major cultural weakness. In the Arab context,
and far from being a sign of weakness, such cultural heritages arc often considered
to be a source of strength, particularly in the less economically fortunate Arab
countries (non-oil states), in which self-sufficiency of basic food is common. The
recent phenomenon of the expansion of famine-stricken areas in the rural areas
of the Sudan, has been mainly attributed to the spread of "individualism" - rather
than to the lack of it - which has been reflected in the tendency to emigrate to the
urban areas, leaving behind the productive sectors of agriculture and other
traditional local handicrafts. In view of the constraints on foreign currency
resources to cater for the imports of food, a natural consequence of urbanisation
is the lack of locally produced food supplies, hence famines.
While cross-cultural barriers can partially explain why the spill-overs from
MNCs' operations in many Arab countries are so limited, the capacity of
indigenous competitors to imitate - let alone adapt or improve upon - imported
technologies, is limited not so much due to cultural considerations, as by their lack
of scientific outlook, which in itself is a function of the development stage they
have hitherto reached.
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It is generally hypothesised that, the deeper the cultural roots of a nation or a
group of countries, the stronger is their resistance to foreign style products or
consumption patterns, and hence the lesser is their dependence on imports from
MNCs' base countries. In the Arab World, particularly in the Arabian Gulf, this
hypothesis is irreconcilable with the real life experience. Beside the economic
factors that pull the countries of that region more and more towards the outside
world, the wealth that came with oil revenues has drastically changed the
consumption patterns of people in that particular part of the Arab World. While
the contention that "interests of all human beings are basically common", claims
some acceptance at face value, the argument that "interests of different nations
from the economic perspectives do conflict and not overlap" as it is sometimes
ostensibly assumed does attract much stronger appeal.
8.3.4	 Joint Venture and technolory transfer
There are three schools of thought on the role played by MNCs in international
technology transfer to developing countries: orthodox, radical and reformist.
Orthodox viewpoint sharcd by the MNCs themselves maintains that technology
produced in the advanced countries is appropriate to the needs of developing
countries and the most efficient mechanism for its transferring is through MNCs.
The rationale for this viewpoint is based on a number of prepositions; prominent
among which is that the whole "technology package" is closely integrated with
management, marketing and financial skills and as such covers many stages
including site selection, decision on plant size, plant construction, etc. It is
stressed that such knowledge cannot be acquired in the market separately through
licensing, technical literature or imitation. Practically all premises advanced by
the orthodox viewpoint arc rejected on many political, social and cconomic
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grounds by the radical school, which maintains that the only way to brcak out of
permanent technological dependence is to drastically limit imports of MNC—owned
and controlled technology and to return to inward organising broad technology
import—substitution programmes. The reformist school takes a middle ground and
contends that developing countries need an appropriate mix of technologies and
that MNCs have a useful role to play, provided some conditions are fulfilled, and
that at the present the technology transfer through MNCs is far from being an
unmixed blessing for the host developing countries.
The above premises and assumptions are tested by the study in the context of their
appropriateness in the Arab World. Many of the arguments embodied in the
different and contradicting viewpoints of the three schools have been accounted
for by the questionnaires of the main research survey conducted in the Arabian
Gulf region.
83.5. 11 es	 1	 I	 $ .	 6 .	 to II	 I
The study tests two hypotheses with regard to the impact of forcign workers on
the economies of the Gulf region. While some economists maintain that
remittances sent home by expatriate workers represent a loss of spending power
for the Gulf economies and a financial drain on the invisible trade account, others
argue that in the industrial sector which is a main concern of our study, the value
added to the economies by the expatriate workers far outweighs the negative
impact of their tendency to remit a high proportion of their earnings home.
More important for the purposes of our research is the impact on the technical
skills of the Gulf nationals. The presence of expatriates is sccn by many as
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depriving the nationals from acquiring technical experience and so obtaining a true
transfer of technology. This seems more valid, particularly in the case of the
higher-level European and American expatriates who occupy senior positions, for
which trained nationals (from the Gulf and other Arab States) might be recruited
from the many new national universities and training institutions. A counter
argument to this claims that there is a need for caution in this area; over-rapid
replacement of expatriates by nationals at the senior administrative and technical
levels may act as a net bar to the effective transfer of technology. The research
reaches the finding that, flexible, gradual transition could take place through
assistance from neighbouring Arab expatriates as a necessary first step towards
complete indigenisation of the work force. (Pan-Arab nationals' level as a mid-
way stage before work force is completely replaced by nationals of each respective
Arab country.)
83.6.	 The Relationship between MNCs and the Arab Governments
Arab governments that once fcarcd the MNCs arc now sten to be trying to court
them. They seem to have learned to bargain with MNCs to make them better
serve their objectives. The assumption is that, maybe through more and more
contacts and interaction, previously contrasting positions have softened and the
balance between the advantages and the disadvantages of the MNCs might have
tipped in favour of the advantages. Within the Arab context, some argue that such
tendency is due to the emergence of a more pragmatic attitude, while others
explain it within the framework of the dependency theory; meaning that the
Multinationals having the upper-hand have forced such cooperation.
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8.4	 Methodology and research strategy
8.4.1	 Ouestiannaircs and interviewS
The research stratcgy is based upon structured questionnaires and interviews of
three types of participants. The open—ended interviews have capitalised on the
Arab norms of hospitality and their general orientation towards face—to—face
exchange of views and discussions: this has been further supported by the many
responses to the questionnaires which a two month visit to three Gulf States has
produced.
For its comparisons with experiences of MNCs in other regions of the world and
even in other Arab countries outside the Gulf area, the study relies rather heavily
on the published literature on such regions/countries.
Although formal questionnaires were initially sent to many companies, only a few
of them were satisfactorily completed. As a result, most of the information
gathered from those who were eventually interviewed were obtained from semi—
structured but relatively open—ended interviews. Both because the latter
information contained relatively little quantitative data and because the sample was
not a randomly selected one, more emphasis is placed on qualitative than on
quantitative analysis.
In order to gain a spread of opinion, selection of potential respondents was drawn
from a wide variety of functions, disciplines and economic sectors. Every effort
was made through a number of personal contacts and through the involvement of
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many friends and research associates to raise the response level so as to ensure
that the pattern of opinions received was as representative of the targeted sample
as possible.
Since the assessment of the impact of policies on outcomes is prominently featured
as one of the basic aims of the analysis, some emphasis is placed on describing
the policy settings that arc assumed. To relate practice with the theoretical set—up
of the MNCs and international joint ventures and direct/indirect foreign
investment, some related theories such as 'Dependency Theory', 'Eclectic Theory
of International Production', 'Laissez—Faire' and 'Protectionism' have been assessed.
The aim is to attempt to establish the right balance between theory and practice,
as far as possible.
8.4.2.	 Pilot Survey
In 1984, the author conducted a number of selected interviews with some British
firms which had business links with the Arab World. While the interviews were
intended at that time to serve purposes of a slightly different nature from those of
the 1990 survey in the Arabian Gulf, insofar as the emphasis is concerned, the
outcome and the findings could have hardly been more relevant to the subject
matter of the present survey. The questionnaire and interviews conducted in 1984
have well served their purpose as a pilot survey for our 1990 Gulf survey, as they
proved to be productive in revising the contents and scope of the questionnaire
itself. In fact the previous experience has established beyond any doubt the fact
that response rates tend to be low when questionnaires are sent by post, or even
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when personal contacts are attempted without carefully arranged initial
communications through telephone contacts or introductory letters. Other purposes
served by the 1984 survey for the benefit of those of the present one, could be
briefly identified as follows:
a. The conclusion was reached as early as in 1984 that the lack of data and
the clear reluctance of people involved in providing any sensible
information on Invisible" investment and trade, made it impossible to
contemplate opting for MNCs involved in construction, engineering or
consultancy sectors. This fact has been, in effect, a signal to disregard the
invisible investment sector and to focus the research attention on Nflk:Cs
involved in the manufacturing industry in particular;
b. Open—ended questions proved to have produced either misleading or no
results. They were therefore omitted from the questionnaire set of our
present survey;
c. The original design of the questionnaires has been subjcctcd to extensive
revision and reduction in size, upon the advice of some experts, including
the research tutor.
On the basis of the experience gained from the first endeavour, which was mainly
concerned with British firms involved in Arab—British trade and business in
general, it was seen appropriate not to use up a great deal of the intended research
potential population for a pilot survey, which was dispensed with in our present
survey. All the above led to the design of a set of questionnaires, largely modified
from their original versions, greatly reduced in size and in shape, and excluding
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open—ended questions which were reduced to only one out of an average of 17
questions for each of the three questionnaires, designed to address three types of
potential participants, namely Arab Companies, Foreign MNCs and Arab
Professionals. In fact, though not identical, the sample of the pilot study of 1984
was comparable in its knowledge and way of thinking, to that of the present
survey. It thus saved much time and effort which would have been necessary had
their duplication been deemed inevitable.
8.4.3.	 Other Sources of Information
Every possible use was made of the data made available from various sources, i.e.
official publications, proceedings of seminars and conferences, many of which the
Author has attended in his official capacity at an Arab Embassy in London. Apart
from the information made available by the extensive questionnaires and
interviews on a formal level, other types of qualitative information was also
obtained through a number of informal contacts and meetings with some senior
officials, of decision making calibre, both in the Arab countries and at the MNC
managerial levels. Other sources include:
a. Semi—official contacts with employees of some organisations of relevant
concern to the subject matter of the research topic, including Arab—British
Chamber of Commerce, and similar trade organisations, i.e. Committee for
Middle East Trade (COMET), the Council for the Advancement of Arab
British Understanding (CAABU), Middle East Association, etc.;
b. Extensive literature search into articles and surveys, academic thesis,
specialised journals, reports, bulletins, directories and periodicals;
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C. Numerous field visits were made in a number of industrial factories,
economic and academic institutions in three Gulf States, and various
models of MNC operations in the rcgion, were reviewed from the literature
survey;
d. Other information relevant to the study has also been gained from the
Author's professional knowledge as a formal industrial manager in a poor
(but potentially rich) Arab country (Sudan) and from his present capacity
as an economic advisor at an Arabian Gulf Embassy in London.
8.5	 Scope and Limitations of the Research
The Multinationals are major actors, whose operations profoundly impact on the world
economy, as they perform both as investors and traders. This study is particularly (but
not exclusively) concerned with the first category (MNCs as investors).
There are large gaps in the available statistics on the operations of MNCs in the Arab
region, and indeed elsewhere in the Third World, due to their well—known reluctance to
publish data or provide researchers with it. There is also a general lack of comprehensive
and reliable data on the efficiency performance of the Arab firms dealing with MNCs.
The major reasons for the inadequacy of data are the reluctance of Arab firms to make
their data public, the use of ethnic and kinship links as informal channels for their
investments and the well—known fact that many developing countries still do not maintain
complete and accurate data on the investment activities of their national firms. Therefore,
our treatment of the findings of the study is necessarily constrained and our conclusions
regarding the quantitative analysis should be treated with caution: In fact, the quantitative
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estimates and data which arc compiled and presented in such a way geared to best serve
the purpose of the study, should be considered of an illustrative character of use, but not
necessarily to be taken as forecasts of actual developments.
The limitation on the existing data base on MNCs has been further exacerbated by the
limited responses of the survey participants to particular questions which sought
quantitative answers. From the earliest responses to the questionnaires sent by post, it
soon became clear that the very questions which intended to provoke numerical answers
were those mostly responded to with reluctance. Further experience acquired via personal
contacts and interviews, reiterated the fact that such questions arc most likely not only to
be neglected, but also to deter potential participants who would otherwise be prepared to
complete the entire questionnaire, from doing so. It was for this reason that during the
face-to-face interviews conducted in the Gulf region, direct questions seeking quantitative
information were deliberately avoided, in an attempt to maintain an atmosphere of rapport
which is paramount in stimulating and probing the interviewees to release as much
information and personal views as possible.
Moreover, the author was at a disadvantage of lacking the sponsorship of a prestigious
institution, or the support of any official or semi-official body. The initial attempts to
link the study with an Arab organisation in London have failed and the idea was soon
abandoned. Financial problems encountered, as the author was entirely self-sponsored,
constituted a major factor in the repeated delay of the research completion. It was held
back owing to the lack of resources needed to undertake original enquiries, which did not
materialise until the summer of 1990, when the research main field work was eventually
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undertaken in three Arabian Gulf States. The geographical coverage of the survey was
originally contemplated to include also three other Middle Eastern countries, namely
Egypt, Iraq and Morocco, but that idea had to be dropped in the circumstances.
8.6 The Survey sample
While the sample selection of the survey participants was meant to be at random, due
attention was given to ensure the coverage of a wide variety of functions and disciplines,
both at the company and people levels. The Arab professionals were drawn from different
backgrounds, as detailed in Section 8.7, while the Arab and multinational companies
incorporated a variety of sectors, ranging from foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, electronics,
and paper, as well as aluminium, cement, leather, sugar and steel manufacturing. While
no claim is made here for a perfect representation of the entire population of the sample
chosen for the actual survey, a fair amount of cross—section was possible to approach.
However, there is inevitably a degree of subjective bias and the element of convenience
in actually reaching out some companies has also been one of the determining factors in
the selection process, while the Author was touring the Gulf States.
One possible limitation which the author is prepared to accept, is the fact that those who
actually responded to either of his questionnaires or interviews could well represent the
firms which are less likely to be vulnerable to competition. Conversely, those who either
responded negatively, only partially, or who did not care to respond at all, may have done
so out of their sheer concern to protect their business competitiveness. The findings are
thus not intended to, nor arc they portrayed as being, a statistically accuratc report. They
should be viewed as indicative, rather than predictive, of the attitudcs and operations of
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NLNCs in the Arab World, or the reactions of the latter to the policies and strategies of
the former.
The strategics of various MNCs and their Arab host countries, mainly drawn from
published documents and industry sources, arc identified by this study and analysed using
published information and selective interviews. The Author is, of course, well aware of
the limitations and difficulties of this type of research. The factual richness of interview
data cannot all be reduced into a few operational hypotheses or propositions and still be
preserved. In order to lessen the magnitude of such limitations, he opted for some
supportive case studies, but detailed presentation was deliberately avoided, otherwise it
would have ended up in an unacceptable length and probably it would have made tedious
reading.
8.7	 Responses of Arab Professionals
It is not always wise or appropriate to jump to hasty conclusions, based on what other
people perceive through their own experiences, and respond to attitude questions. Yet,
some general understanding of the nature of MNCs role and operations in the Arab
countries ought to be sought in the offices (or minds) of the people who arc directly or
indirectly involved in the decision making machinery which influences (or is influenced
by) the strategies or performance of MNCs. It is the author's view that the views
expressed by this type of technocrats should be highly accounted for, as an essential
ingredient for the proper evaluation of the role played by MNCs, especially if
circumstances arise that necessitate policy revisions due to ever changing conditions. It
is in line with this understanding that particular attention has been duly given to the
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responses provided by this category of survey participants: the Arab Professionals, who
are mainly comprised of academics, economists, managers, engineers and high ranking
government officials of various disciplines and numerous functions.
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CHAPTER 9
FIELD WORK ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: PART 1
CONTRIBUTION OF hINCs TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN THE ARAB WORLD
9.1	 Research Scope and Methodology
The main findings of this study are based on a survey conducted during the summer of
1990 in three Arabian Gulf States; namely United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Qatar and
Kuwait. The survey targeted three distinctive groups as the main focus of the study. The
majority of the respondents have been directly approached and provided with extensive
questionnaires following a brief introduction explaining the nature and objectives of the
survey. Some of the targeted sample were interviewed and a few more were sent the
questionnaires for completion as mutually arranged over brief telephone communications.
It must be emphasised here that while the response level of those approached through
direct contacts (personally and by telephone) was remarkably high, those who were
contacted by mail have produced disappointingly poor responses, both quantity and quality
wise.
Three different sets of multiple choice questionnaires were designed to address three types
of respondents and the positive responses received at the end of the survey period were
comprised of the following:
1. 92 Arab professionals presently working in different economic, financial,
engineering and academic institutions and ministries in the three Gulf States. They
are drawn from different sectors and disciplines including industry, oil, engineering
and financial sectors as well as research ccntrcs, universities and othcr similar
academic institutions. 62 of the total number of the group of professionals (67%)
233
are economists, while the balance (33%) is constituted of a cross—section of
engineers, legal advisors and managers or executive directors at varying levels of
decision making status and responsibilities;
2. 18 Arab Companies (effectively Gulf Companies) performing their operations in
cooperation with foreign multinational corporations in one way or another'. 15
of this sample are involved in manufacturing (83%), while the remaining three are
involved in software development, telecommunication and engineering consultancy
services. Those directly contacted (hand delivery of questionnaires following brief
introduction) and the others with whom face—to—face interviews have been
undertaken, were mainly either general managers or executives closely associated
with top management. In the sample selection stage, emphasis was primarily laid
on the manufacturing industry and a special attention was given to the nccd for
broadening the diversity of sectors within the manufacturing industry'.
3. 14 foreign multinational corporations operating in the Gulf region with varying
ranges of partnerships with local (Arab) firms or governments. 9 of the total who
responded are based in the U.A.E. (and indeed elsewhere in the Arab World as
well) and 2 in Qatar. Those were directly contacted and the author was fortunate
to be able to conduct interviews with the resident managers of some of these
corporations in their Gulf offices. The remaining 3 were the only positive
responses received from a total of 96 who were sent the questionnaires by post;
two from Britain and one from Belgium. It was clearly evident from the outset
69 Arab Companies cooperating with multinational companies were sent
questionnaires by mail; 18 of them at their U.K. office addresses.
The sample included manufacturing in cement, plastic, aluminium, steel, fertilizers,
petrochemicals, leather, beverages, flour, etc.
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that the level of response would not be promising, as many of those approached
elected to decline the initial invitation to respond, giving all sorts of excuses. As
the choices were extremely limited it was necessary to approach whoever was
lady to respond meaningfully, notwithstanding the extent of closeness to the
idealistic sample target set out at the outset. Joint venture corporations particularly
in the manufacturing industry or other multinationals with some direct working
relationships with local counterparts have been originally targeted but those are the
very corporations whose cooperation proved to be difficult to secure. It was then
seen that whatever information could be gathered must be of some value — no
matter how scanty. This is particularly so in view of the magnitude of time and
effort spent in persuading a number of potential candidates well before the start
of the author's visit to the Gulf region, but with no apparent success. Prior to the
successful visit to the Gulf, some 96 multinationals' were sent questionnaires by
post but only 3 cared to return them completed. It is in view of these
circumstances that positive responses received from II foreign multinationals
based in the Gulf States were seen as a reasonable success. Some of these
corporations happened to be involved in engineering consultancy and contractors
with little to contribute in the general areas of joint ventures, technology transfer
and training which have been set to reflect the main focus of the survey.
However, some useful information could be derived by interviewing a number of
senior executives working for those corporations.
3 72 British Multinationals based in U.K. and 24 European and American Multinationals.
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While thc overwhelming majority of respondents elected to choose one answer to
indicate their views or preferences in response to the multiple choice questions as
was expected, a few others gave more than one. This does not cause any
problems at the analysis stage as it is natural to expect a combination of different
factors and this was fully taken into account when the questionnaire was designed.
Answers to some other questions asking for preferences to be indicated included
in some few cases a voluntary scaling to show a descending or ascending order
of preference choices. This was easily accounted for by taking the most
significant choices as their selected ones'.
The rate of responses to some particular questions proved to be considerably low.
This may be due either to the lack of information on a particular subject or an
apparent lack of clarity. Such questions, together with those which produced
inconsistent answers, were omitted in the analysis stages and have not formed any
basis for conclusions.
Some respondents, on the other hand, have pioneered to hypothesise questions
which were not raised in the questionnaires or during interview sessions, together
with their attempted answers. Such initiatives and similar comments have no
doubt enriched the magnitude of information provided and of course, the findings
and conclusions.
For example, in questions 6 to 13 of Questionnaire E (Sec Appendix E) thc most
signific:ant three of a possible six choices were taken as their selected choices, since
on average three choices proved to be the main pattern as shown by the average
rcspondcnt.
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A number of British Consultants, whom the author was able to meet with in
UA.E., indicated that as they arc mainly in the business of consultancy services
and not involved in joint venture investments, their answers to most of the
questions, ideally meant for manufacturing or other similar corporations, might not
be particularly helpful to the purpose of the survey. While such comments were
carefully taken account of, many of their comments expressed during relaxed
debates (on two occasions at least) were extremely relevant and usefully integrated
into the general analysis and assessment of the multinational's operations in the
Middle East. From the author's point of view, it was seen quite appropriate and
in place to draw on these consultants companies' vast international experiences,
which have clearly influenced, and in some cases accelerated, the development
process of some parts of The Arab World.
9.1.2	 languagc_ansLCommunkationIkthosIE
The questionnaires were deliberately designed in English language. Had they been
written in Arabic in an attempt to match the common language of almost all
respondents of thc two groups of "professionals" and "Arab Companies" that
would have been at the risk of forgoing the qualitative requirements of the targeted
sample. The only obvious criterion to guarantee the minimum requirement of the
competence of various respondents was set to be the good command of English
language. As an Arab national himself, the author was particularly keen to hedge
against the known tendency of some Arab executives to deal with such matters
routinely by assigning the work to some junior staff member, perhaps with
relatively less work burden. The outcome proved to be a remarkable success, as
it is now quite evident that no less than 90% of the total respondents arc holders
of university degrees as minimum requirements. Out of thc total of 92
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professionals, 17 (18%) are university professors, 45 (50%) Doctorate degree
holders, as well as an unspecified number of Master degree holders. It is therefore
hoped that the high calibre of the sample would at least partially compensate for
the likely disadvantages stemming from the small size of the sample, particularly
for the two groups of Multinationals and the Arab companies.
Having said all this, it would remain to add that conversations during interviews
with Arab respondents were, of course, conducted in Arabic language, thus
benefiting from the depth and quality of information and views provided at length
and in the most amicable and informal atmosphere.
The overwhelming majority of the professionals who have taken part in this
exercise are drawn from different countries of The Arab World, mainly Sudan,
Egypt, Iraq, Jordan as well as a few Gulf nationals. On this ground it would be
only reasonable to assume that the responses have reflected a broad consensus
from Arab professionals, as opposed to any other assumptions that would explain
it in a rather narrower perspective. This is particularly so in view of the fact that
almost all of them have drawn their ideas and conclusions not only from their
present experience in the Gulf States which host them, but also from their past
experiences as former experts in their own countries of origin in respect of their
different and wide range of specialisations.
The following is a detailed account of the responses received and an assessment
of what would constitute the basis for the main findings of the entire survey.
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92 Impacts on the Arab Countries of the Activities of Foreign Multinationals
While far more respondents among the professionals group s
 indicated "positive impacts
pertaining to the contribution of multinationals in respect of exports, imports, job creation
opportunities, capital investment, technology transfcr and management/technical training
within the Arab economics, ''negative" impacts were reported with regard to somc other
aspects; those include promotion of research capabilities, structure of the Arab economics
and the appropriate exploitation of domestic resources. A relatively high proportion of
the respondents reported "neutral" effect for the role of multinationals in promoting
research capabilities (34%), management/technical training (29%) and to a lesser extent,
their role in technology transfer (20%).
Table 9.1 overleaf gives a summary of how the Arab professionals generally view the
impact of multinationals in respect of the various issues in question.
5 Acadcmics, economists, managers, financiers, engineers, public figures, businessmen
and government officials.
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Table 9.1:	 IMPACTS OF MULTINATIONALS
Arab Professionals Arab Companies I
Pos. Neg. Neut. Great Fair None Neut.
a. Exports 55% 32% 13% 31% 54% 15% -
b. Imports 57% 36% 7% - - - -
c. Jobs 58% 27% 15% 13% 60% 27% -
d. Capital
Investment
60% 22% 18% 14% 29% 57% -
e. Technology
Transfer
61% 19% 20% 36% 43% 21% -
f. Promotion of
Research
Capabilities
30% 36% 34% 31% 39% 15% 15%
g. Managerial
& Technical
Training
43% 28% 29% 27% 47% 20% 6%
h. Structure of
Economy
38% 50% 12% 23% 54% 23% -
i. Appropriate
Exploitation
of Domestic
Resources
38% 53% 9% 50% 21% 14% 14%
j. Competitive-
ncss of
economy
- - - 23% 46% 23% 8%
Note: percentages shown pertain to the total number who responded.
Pos. = Positive Neg. = Negative Neut. = Neutral
As can be seen from the above table, the responses given by the Arab professionals,
which largely equate the positive and negative impacts in a way that would render them
neutral on balance, contrast with those given by the Arab Companies cooperating with
multinationals. The latter registered "great" or "fair" impacts to almost all of the ten
factors with a possible exception of the impact on capital investment, as a clear majority,
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(57%) of the companies, expressed their dissatisfaction by assigning an adverse effect in
that respect.
9.2.1	 Views of The Mohjeltionsis
As could be seen from Table 9.2.1 following, foreign multinational companies, or
their representatives in the Gulf States, were asked the same questions but in a
rather different format. Since no foreign company is likely to voluntarily admit
that it's activities have negative effects on the economy of their host country, it
was seen appropriate to ask them to point out whatever they consider as positive
effects, stemming from their business operations in The Arab World. A list of
possible alternatives was provided and the responses received from 13 companies
were as follows:—
— 85% indicated "positive" effect on the Arab economics of the
multinational's role in creating new jobs;
— 62% regarding each of "efficiency enhancement" and "provision of training
to local nationals";
— 6 out of 13 (46%) positively view their contributions in promoting exports
and also local added value;
— Only 2 (15%) and 1(8%) referred to the provision of foreign capital and
the payment of taxes (respectively) as areas to which they have contributed
positively.
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Table 9.2.1	 POSITIVE EFFECTS OF MNCs' BUSINESS OPERATIONS
IN THE ARAB WORLD
a. Creation of new jobs	 85%
b. Promotion of exports 	 46%
c. Local added value	 46%
d. Enhanced efficiency	 62%
e. Provision of foreign capital	 15%
f. Payment of taxes	 8%
g. Provision of training to local nationals 	 62%
The Multinationals also assessed different factors according to their relative
importance with regard to their contribution to the development of The Arab
World. This was expressed by placing their preferences on a descending scale (0—
6) to emphasise relative significance as depicted in Table 9.2.2 below:
Table 9.2.2 FACTORS INFLUENCING CONTRIBUTION OF
MULTINATIONALS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ARAB WORLD
Total
Number
(a)
Average
(b)
To
(c)
a.	 Host government's policies towards Multinationals. 58 4.5 75%
b. Environment for disseminating new technology 50 3.8 63%
and management skills.
c.	 Domestic & International market structure. 43 3.3 55%
d. Type of Foreign Investment. 32 2.5 42%
e. The strategy of your (MNC) company. 61 4.7 78%
Total number allocated by all (15) respondents
Average of a possible maximum of 6 (6 being more significant than 1)
Percentage of a possible total maximum of 100%
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The most important factor influencing Multinationals' contributions, according to
multinationals themselves, is the strategy adopted by their headquarters in the
parent country. This factor was emphasised by 78% of a possible maximum of
100% (4.7 points out of 6 points). Second in their priority (75%) was the host
government's policy (particularly those specifically directed to the multinationals).
The environment for disseminating new technology and management skills came
third with 3.8 points (63%), while market structure came in the fourth place with
33 points. The type of foreign investment was considered to be the least
important factor with only 23 points (41%).
It is evident from the above that, albeit with varying degrees of significance, all
factors in question do affect the extent of multinationals' contributions to the
development of the Arab countries, with "strategies designed at the parent
headquarters' office" being the major determining factor. This might reflect
something on the question of where the priorities of these companies actually lie.
It appears that top priority goes to the pursuance of their own objectives and
interests. Interests of host countries must then follow afterwards.
If we arc to draw any conclusion from these responses, it would have to be that
the multinationals own testimony confirms the misgivings expressed by the Arab
professionals that their contributions to the development process that has recently
characterised the Arab region are, if any, only marginal and in most cases
negligible, owing to the fact that MNCs' concerns lie somewhere else; their own
corporate stratcgy.
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On the other hand the multinationals tend to consider themselves as a major source
for new jobs as well as contributors to efficiency enhancement and providers of
adequate and appropriatc training facilities to local nationals. Provision of capital
or payment of taxes are clearly not among their concerns, as these objectives do
not feature prominently among their contributions.
Those 15 Arab Companies operating in the Gulf, with some degree of cooperation
with foreign multinationals, were also asked to assess the possible impacts of
multinationals on various factors and their responses revealed some contrasts with
those of the professionals. In general, the positive impacts according to them tend
to outweigh those of negative ones. 14 out of 15 (93%) believe strongly in the
positive impact in respect of changing work practices while 80% suggest that
productivity has been increased as a result of their presence. As for changing life
style (culture, traditions, etc.) 53% consider the impact as positive, while 33% sec
the impact in that respect as neutral. Only 2 (13%) fear the impact is negative.
There seems to be no conclusive evidence about their role in bringing about access
to capital with 40%, 20% and 40% indicating positive, negative and neutral
respectively. The impact on local technology is seen to be positive for 43%;
negative for 29% and neutral for yet another 29%. Far more respondents can sec
only neutral effect for both national sovereignty (57%) and net return on taxes
(45%), while the balance is equally divided between the two other extremes of
"positive" and "negative" impacts.
In neither of the seven issues shown in Table 9.3 has the feeling of adverse effect
outweighed that of positive one. It is apparent therefore that, unlike the Arab
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professionals, the attitudes of Arab Companies are rather favourable towards
foreign multinationals.
The above findings are detailed in Table 9.3 which follows:
Table 9.3
	
IMPACTS OF MULTINATIONALS IN RESPECT OF:
IArab Professionals	 Arab Companies
Pos. Neg. Neut.	 Pos. Neg. Neut.
a. Changing work practices 68% 27% 5%	 93% — 7%
b.	 Changing life style — — —	 53% 13% 33%
c. Access to capital — — —	 40% 20% 40%
d.	 Productivity 84% 15% 1%	 .80% 7% 13%
e. Net effect on tax returns 19% 68% 13%	 27% 27% 45%
f.	 National Sovereignty 14% 70% 16%	 23% 15% 62%
g. Local technology 45% 46% 9%	 43% 29% 29%
Note: Figures shown represent per= ages of the total who actually responded
to the respective questions.
9.2.2.	 Interviews and Comments
On the question of multinationals' impacts, a number of interesting issues were
raised. It would be beneficial to highlight some of those idcas which were
emphasised by different respondents with a view to supporting the survey findings,
based on the outcome of the two—way discussions between the interviewees and
the author.
Arab Professionals: Some respondents elected to cite the indcbtcdncss and
financial deficits encountered by a number of Arab countries as one major
rcpercussion of the activities of foreign multinational corporations operating in
thosc countrics. In fact it is not quite clear how such an argument can be justified
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and on what grounds it would be based. What is to be emphasised however, is
not so much the strength of the argument itself, as the mere fact that this attitude
is persistently and strongly =pressed by the Arab professionals. It has been also
stated during interviews that the impact has been particularly positive when
multinationals' involvement was required to exploit natural resources ideally
suitable for exploitation, such as oil for instance. Cement industry has also been
cited as another example in that respect. Left to themselves the multinational oil
companies would have continued to keep the prices of oil at their minimum levels.
According to such argument, what happened in 1973 and thereafter was not so
much an increase in prices, as it was a natural development to correct and readjust
what was believed to be an unfair level of prices for the producing countries.
Moreover, the oil companies tended to keep the strategic and important jobs to
themselves, thus refraining from offering a fair share of top decision making posts
to the nationals.
In the past, multinationals, in the words of a former governor of an Arab Central
Bank, were 'arrogant and domineering', but at present they arc faced with a
situation whereby they are being left only a limited room to manoeuvre. The fact
that many of these companies have now adopted more realistic, accommodating
and cooperative stands is reciprocated by the Arab host countries who have learned
to co—exist with foreign companies rather than to confront them. This DCW
attitude, emanating from both sides, is apparently the outcome of the recent
emphasis on joint venture partnerships which arc primarily meant to realise
objectives which arc conducive to the interests of both partners.
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While the impact of foreign multinationals is generally seen to be positive, such
impact is largely marginal for the Arab countries, but considerable for the
multinationals themselves. In fact the positive impact is only up to a small degree
in terms of job creation, capital investment, technology transfer, management of
technical training, changing work practices and, productivity increases. It is
apparent that, when left with the option of expressing their attitudes, either
positively or negatively, many interviewees tended to avoid emphasising the
negative side, preferring instead to take a neutral stance.
However, it would obviously be premature to suggest on this basis that all those
who expressed themselves by indicating a "neutral effect" should be considered as
unhappy about the activities of the multinationals. After all, nobody has suggested
that these foreign companies have to contribute in every aspect of economic life
in The Arab World. Any such suggestion would be against the highly heralded
aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the Arab professionals for self
reliance.
As for the role of multinationals in technology transfer, many professionals have
mentioned that it is far slower than it was originally assumed and there is a great
deal which is yet to be desired, but "something' as one respondent put it, is
"anyway better than nothing", meaning that whatever little is there, is due to the
cooperation with foreign multinationals.
This is certainly true for many other aspects of the impacts and contributions of
the multinationals in thc region. Thc message appears to be that, only little (but
not nothing) has been achieved so far.
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Theoretically, the impact of multinationals on an economy is not affected by the
fact that it is an "Arab" economy or otherwise. Empirically this might not be
quite the case for the particular Gulf States on which the survey was focused. In
that region, foreign multinationals have been directing a great deal of their efforts
towards the production of consumer goods that are meant to be consumed
domestically and by neighbouring (Arab) markets, in countries characterised by a
high propensity to consume, thanks to the abundance of oil revenues. This
amounts to concluding that multinationals have encouraged consumption and hence
discouraged savings, thus pulling down domestic investments along with them.
This might have possibly been one of the adverse impacts of multinationals, which
was overlooked by the original survey.
A number of Arab engineers who the author happened to interview in U.A.E. have
complained that decision makers in the Gulf region have for so long ignored the
environmental factors which needed to be taken into consideration, in conjunction
with foreign multinationals involved in constructing various projects in engineering
or industrial fields. Today, many multinationals do not pay much attention to such
environmental considerations in the Third World, as they usually do under
statutory obligations in the Western World to which these companies belong. This
is particularly true in the Arab World in view of the absence of obligatory rules
which regulate the performance of construction and engineering companies with
regard to such vital issues. Even if such regulations exist at all, at best they arc
either in a rudimentary form or left to be dealt with in a harmfully relaxed and
arbitrary manner.
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A British senior expert in marketing and feasibility studies provided some useful
comments on the impact on the Gulf States of foreign multinationals. That
impact, according to him, is generally positive, given the fact that hydrocarbon
resources were initially discovered, developed, exported and marketed by foreign
multinationals. In his view, this has started the development process and the
opinion therefore is that since the economic development is naturally
indispensable, so the contributions of the multinationals must have been positive.
If some of the factors mentioned in Table 9.1 appear not to be very positive at
present or in the past, they are bound to be so eventually, i.e. promotion of
research capabilities, national sovereignty, etc.
In an apparent contrast to this view expressed by a foreign expert, one Arab
economist emphasised the need to distinguish between the long term and the short
term impacts of multinationals. According to him, the short term impact is
generally positive while in the long term, the impact(s) will have to hinge on
various factors, the most important of which is the bargaining capability of the
local companies involved. Many other professionals have emphasised the
importance of strcngthcning the bargaining skills and power. Others indicated that
the impact is generally neutral on balance, as some positive contributions arc
outweighed by negative ones.
9.2.3.
	 National Sovereignty
While many Arab professionals (about 70%)6
 have expressed their misgivings on
the role of foreign multinationals in undermining the ability of an Arab Country
to maintain its national sovereignty, others indicated that multinationals do not
6 Sec Table 9.3.
249
directly interfere in issues related to national sovereignty, but they certainly
influence them. In fact it is unwise to judge all the Arab Countries on the same
scale owing to the wide variations in their backgrounds. It might be more
reasonable, however, to assume (as one respondent put it) that national sovereignty
could be adversely affected by the activities of foreign multinationals only in case
of weak nations. If weakness is synonymous with smallness as it might be
suggested, then a great number of small oil—rich Gulf States can hardly be
excluded from this category. Theoretically, wealth should assist in strengthening
the prospects of any given nation having its national sovereignty secured.
However, the small Gulf States, wealthy though they might be, are apparently
more vulnerable to outside influence than those other Arab Countries with
relatively poorer resources but with larger population sizes. It could be concluded,
therefore, that among other factors, population size and not the degree of wealth
or per capita income, is more akin to hinge against the vulnerability of national
sovereignty. It might even be said that, far from having been used as a defensive
shield, wealth could even lure foreign powers through their multinational
companies to pursue particular strategics within the framework of their target of
maximisation of their interests that could possibly undermine the national
sovereignty of defenceless states, such as those of the Gulf region, if there are any
reasons to believe that their own interests are in jeopardy.
93	 Degrees of Satisfaction with Multinational Performance
Professional Arabs as well as those representing different Arab Companies, were asked
to indicate the degree to which foreign multinationals have generally satisfied the
economic development objectives of the Arab World. 86 professionals and 16 companies
gave their responses as follows:
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Table 9.4
	
DEGREES OF SATISFACTION WITH MULTINATIONAL
PERFORMANCE
HIGH MODERATE LOW NONE
Professionals
Arab Companies
6%
31%
30%
50%
51%
19%
13%
0%
From the above, the contrast between the two groups is sharply evident. While the
professionals are clearly dissatisfied with the role so far played by multinationals towards
the fulfilment of the Arab economic development aspirations, those whose contacts with
the multinationals are more direct (the Arab Companies) believe that they have positively
contributed towards these objectives, with a reasonable degree of satisfaction. While only
6% of the professionals believe that the contribution of foreign multinationals was high
and 30% consider it moderate, more than 50% expressed dissatisfaction or low degree
of satisfaction. 13% of them registered a "nil" satisfaction, which in a way means that
they are not only dissatisfied but rather outraged by the outcome of the partnership
between the Arab World and foreign multinationals.
The Arab Companies on thc other hand had sent through their responses a rather different
message. 81% of them are either highly or moderately satisfied, leaving only 19%
expressing a low degree of satisfaction. None of this group indicated that the
multinationals contribution was non—existent as some professionals did.
In attempting to find out the reasons behind the sharp differences of opinions between
various groups of Arab economists, academics and other professionals on the one hand
and those of thc Arab industrialists on the othcr, one would need to consider the true
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nature of each of the two groups and their vested interests on both personal and national
levels.
As a similar study conducted some ten years ago in Kuwait and Iraq has concluded, the
above findings also confirm one or both of two explanations: either (a) that direct
contacts with foreign multinationals bring about an awareness and appreciation of each
others' constraints and problems or (b) that the interests of the businessmen - especially
those involved in joint venture arrangements with multinationals, converge with the
interests of multinationals and thus produced satisfaction.
It will be reasonable, however, to take the factor of self-interest into account; those in
contact with multinationals are generally more likely to derive some benefits from that
contact, and they are thus more likely to favour and welcome its activities. If somebody
is involved in joint venture arrangements with multinationals he is almost certain to
answer favourably to the multinationals activities (that they perform in accordance with
national interest). 'Otherwise, by agreeing to the contrary, he indirectly will be agreeing
that he too also operates in ways that are contrary to the national interest." [Agami,
1979.]
It might be tempting to assume that academics and professionals are rather theoretically-
minded in their assessment, in view of the fact that their experiences arc not necessarily
closely linked with the performance of multinationals, while the industrialists are better
placed to make the light judgcmcnt, given their direct involvement with foreign
companies. Although this argument sounds logical and makes a great deal of sense, it
does not necessarily undermine the equally sensible proposition that many of the highly
qualified professionals, particularly the engineers and some economists, are by no means
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less knowledgeable about the subject matter of the survey. Many of the academic staff
of the Arab Universities, particularly those in economics and business schools and
faculties arc closely attached with the practical side of the subject, through their
membership of different committees, feasibility studies, assignments dealing with
performance assessment of industrial and other concerns. Beside their leading role in
shaping policy issues and decision—making assignments, university professors and senior
economists of The Arab World often participate actively as members of the boards of
directors of different corporations and institutions.
In order to reflect on the wide knowledge and contributions of various professionals, we
need to look no further than to the diversity of disciplines and institutions from which the
majority of the survey sample of professionals were drawn. About 90% of that sample
belonged to the following institutions and professions:-
- GOIC — Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultancy
- Business schools and economic departments of three Gulf Universities (U.A.E.,
Qatar and Kuwait)
- Industrial and investment banks, ministries of industry and commerce
- Arab economic development funds (both in Kuwait and U.A.E.)
- Research and Technology Institutions i.e. KISR (Kuwait Institute for Scientific
Research)
- Economic and legal advisors, primarily in the industrial and financial sectors
- Project engineers (mainly civil) involved with foreign multinationals in
construction and related fields.
Given the diversity of theoretical knowledge coupled with practical experience, thc views
expressed by these professionals would not be taken lightly. In many respects, they arc
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even better qualified for an even—handed assessment of the role played by foreign
multinationals than the industrialists whose daily preoccupation with their businesses does
not leave them much time to reflect on and engage in a neutral performance assessment.
Particular weight must also be given to the sheer size of the sample from the professionals
group, compared to that of the Arab companies, as the former constitutes a size five times
greater than the latter (92 professionals compared to 18 companies).
To conclude this section, one is bound to cmphasisc what the above statistical analysis has
confirmed; the majority of the Arab professionals who effectively arc the real decision—
makers, do not rate highly the contributions of foreign multinationals in general. In itself
this fact reflects the failure of these companies to successfully convince their partners in
the Arab World of their usefulness in a manner which could support the suggestion that
their continued presence in the region is to be taken for granted. If anything, this might
suggest the need for some elements of "Multinational's" strategy to be reconsidered and
perhaps revised in such a way as to reassure the Arab partners that their long—founded
cooperation, particularly during the last three decades, has not been in vain. Otherwise,
alternative strategics could possibly be adopted on the part of the Arab countries, a subject
which is to be dealt with in the following section.
9.4	 Strategies to limit the degree of reliance on MNCs
The question of overdependence on foreign multinationals and the potential strategies
pursued by the Arab countries to limit the degree of such dependence, has been a real
concern among many intellectuals in The Arab World. The ongoing debate is one of
many current issues frequently raised during conferences, intellectual gatherings and press
reports. As there is no lack of ideas, at least at theoretical levels, as to the various
alternatives or combination of strategics geared at limiting the adverse effects of
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overdependence, a long list of potential strategies was provided for respondents from the
three groups covered by the survey.
They were then asked to select whatever they deemed appropriate and the table which
follows (Table 9_5) depicts a summary of their responses, indicated as percentages of the
total who responded to that particular question. It is to be noted that, as respondents are
naturally likely to choose more than one strategy, the total percentages will not add up
to 100%.
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Table 9.5
	
STRATEGIES TO LIMIT OVERDEPENDENCE ON
FOREIGN MULTINATIONALS
'
Professionals Arab
Companies
MNCs
a. Policies geared to improve
bargaining power.
b. Regulation of conduct of
42%
47%
46%
33%
27%
18%
MNCs.
C. Emphasis on equity
participation.
d.	 Indigenisation of
management and technical
personnel.
e. Restrictions on MNCs
areas of operations.
f. Procurement of technology
through licensing, direct
purchase and management
control.
g. Requiring exports as a
condition of importing.
h. Favourable terms for
domestic enterprises over
foreign subsidiaries.
i.	 Reliance on local capital
and technology.
j. Threat of nationalisation
or confiscation.
k.	 Erection of barriers
62%
37%
41%
34%
33%
26%
22%
3%
9%
8%
46%
8%
31%
—
23%
15%
8%
—
64%
55%
9%
27%
9%
45%
9%
9%
36%
,	 against imports.
It is noted that while the Arab professionals tend to favour a combination of most of the
above mentioned strategies, the Arab Companies have elected to disregard most of them
as they rcfcrrcd to only a few strategies as deserving significant weight, such as the
improvement of bargaining powcr, indigcnisation of management and tcchnical personncl,
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and to a lesser degree the regulation of the conduct of MNCs. The professionals gave
greater emphasis on equity participation (62%), conduct regulation, bargaining power
improvement and also on the call for restricting the areas in which MNCs are allowed to
operate.
Judging from the proportion of respondents favouring each of the different strategies, it
can be seen that one—third of the total number of 92 professionals significantly favoured
seven out of eleven strategies, while only three such strategies were favoured by a similar
percentage of the Arab companies.
Both groups however, rejected almost categorically the suggestion that the threat of
nationalisation or confiscation could be taken as a means to achieve the required end.
They also declined to support the policy of systematic favouring of domestic enterprises
over foreign subsidiaries. Neither do they appear to have much faith in local capital or
local technology to rely on as a way out. Erection of barriers against imports and the
requirements to link multinationals' imports with its exports from the host country, have
both been received with a total rejection by the Arab Companies, since none of them (not
even one single company) has expressed a preference for these particular two strategics.
From the foregoing, it is clear that, whatever attitudes the Arab Countries may have
against foreign multinationals regarding their negative impacts, which in their views would
outweigh those of positive ones, no one seems to be prepared to rush to the conclusion
that radical policies such as barrier erection or threat of nationalisation would be the
appropriate answer. Even the usual sentiments frequently voiced by intellectual gatherings
calling for systematic favouring of domestic enterprises over foreign subsidiaries have not
been vindicated by the survey, as Table 93 clearly shows.
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The main conclusion one can come up with on the basis of these responses is the iteration
of the fact that the Arab people are neither satisfied with the role presently played by
forei gn multinationals, nor have the confidence in themselves that they can manage
without them. The dilemma appears to be that while a series of new regulations and
commercial laws were being constituted in many countries, particularly in the Arabian
Gulf, with a view to encouraging and accommodating the activities of foreign concerns
(see Appendix B) the outcome appears to be quite far from their expectations. A number
of questions needs to be addressed in this context:
1. Have the Arabs been too over—simplistic in their expectations for positive short—
term results out of a partnership that needs a long—term gestation period before
any fruits could be reaped?
2. Could it be that multinationals arc too reluctant to over—emphasise — as their Arab
counterparts often do — the mutual interests and elect instead to confine their
prime concern on their own interests, even if that can be achieved only at the
expense of the Arab side of partnership?
3. Is it perhaps true to say that both partners arc desperately doing their level best,
but with results that are unsatisfactory to both, which could possibly suggest the
existence of some major loopholes in the structure of their partnership that need
attention and remedial steps to overcome?
While attempts will be made at a later stage to attend to these questions, let us now turn
to thc multinationals themselves to sec how thcy assess their relationship with The Arab
World. Multinationals were requested to indicate what particular stratcgics they think thc
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Arab host countries pursue in order to subvert their overdependence on foreign partners.
11 out of 13 multinationals responded to this question and three main strategics, according
to them, were emphasised by the Arab Countries. 64% of them believe that the Arab
Countries/Companies lay particular emphasis on equity participation, while 55% referred
to their tendency towards indigenising their management and technical personnel. 45%
think that the Arab partners systematically favour domestic enterprises over foreign
subsidiaries. As for the erection of barriers and restriction against imports, which was
overwhelmingly rejected by both professionals and the Arab Companies, a relatively high
percentage of the multinationals (36%) believe that has been one of the strategies the
Arab Countries have pursued so far to achieve the objective of self—reliance.
What is evident from the above is that emphasis on equity participation is much favoured
by the Arab professionals, but the fact that only 8% of the Arab Companies appeared to
have actually adopted this strategy seems to suggest that a wide gap exists between desire
and action, effectively between theory and practice.
Arab professionals favour equity participation perhaps as a means to commit the foreign
multinationals more towards a mutually beneficial partnership. Different government
regulations and policy declarations to the same effect may have left a mistaken impression
on the part of multinationals that such policy is vigorously pursued, notwithstanding the
limited success which the actual performance reflects. In itself, this reflects a typical
phenomenon in the Arab World; there is always a considerable gap between declared
policies and real action. In a traditional society such as that of most of the Arab
Countries, changes do take place very slowly and many declared policies have the
tendency of taking a considerable length of time before they arc fully operational. This
fact can also partially explain the previously mcntioncd need for long waiting times before
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positive results of cooperation arc felt. Also, it would be appropriate to associate the
phenomenon of pursuit of quick returns from different trading and investment operations
in the Middle East with the traditional trading nature of many businessmen in the area.
The Arab people of the Gulf region in particular have been historically traders whose
main trading experience in the long past has been associated with the tendency to achieve
quick returns on their trading activities; a phenomenon which is incompatible with the
recent developments in the Gulf region that are mainly based on industrialisation and the
service sector that goes with it.
Responses from foreign multinationals also revealed the existence of sharp differences in
their assessment of the situation compared to that of the Arab partners. While, as
previously shown, the Arab professionals and companies see no need for erection of
barriers against multinationals, the latter (multinationals) express their fears that such
desire is not reflected in real life (36% of multinationals believe that barriers already
exist). Similar fears arc equally expressed regarding the favourable treatments received
by domestic enterprises at the expense of foreign subsidiaries. Again 45% of
multinationals believe this to be the case in the Arab World, whilc those concerned do not
advocate this policy as expressed by both Arab Companies and professionals.
What is evident, however, is that some kind of agreement between the three groups of
respondents has emerged regarding the inappropriateness of strategics, such as
nationalisation and confiscation and the possibilities of reliance on local technology (and
local capital). There has also been a broad consensus regarding the undesirability of
requesting multinationals to export in order to have the permission to import.
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9.5 Technology Transfer
Extensive training of local Arab staff, both domestically and abroad, is seen by the Arabs
as the most appropriate policy to achieve the relevant transfer of technology. That was
the most conclusive evidence received from the Arab Companies and professionals alike
when the question of technology transfer was raised. Other policies are also advocated
but less emphatically and with varying degrees of emphasis, as Table 9.6 shows. The
responses expressed as percentages of the total respondents indicating their preferences
read as follows:—
Table 9.6
	
HOW BEST CAN THE ARAB WORLD REALISE THE
TRANSFER OF APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
Arab
Professionals
Arab
Companies
a.	 Extensive training of local staff
domestically and abroad.
b.	 Emphasis on less sophisticated, easily
operated technology.
60%
45%
79%
36%
C. Requiring contractual commitment of
licensor's training and permission of
horizontal transfer of technology by
licensee.
d.	 Motivation of Engineers, Scientists and
technology—related staff.
e. Enhancing Research & Development
45%
37%
39%
43%
43%
36%
Programmes.
f. Resorting to licensing as opposed to outright
purchasing of technology.
15% 21%
With the possible cxccption of "transferring technology through licensing as opposcd to
outright purchasing of technology", which received little support, the othcr strategies
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prescribed in the above table have been generally advocated with more or less equal
emphasis. It might be understandable that emphasis on less sophisticated technolo gy has
been received with less enthusiasm among the industrialists compared to the professionals.
Only marginal differences among the two groups are reported regarding the other
strategics i.e. motivating technology—related personnel, horizontal transfer of technology
and enhancing research and development programmes. The last of these has surprisingly
received low preference by both groups (36 — 39%). While the least important of all, as
viewed by the respondents, was the trade off in favour of licensing as opposed to outright
purchasing of technology.
The fact that research and development programmes were not keenly favoured is
apparently attributed to what some professionals who were interviewed by the author have
stated that human knowledge is universal and as such, R & D programmes successfully
carried out elsewhere should be capitalised on by the entire human race and that
duplication of efforts would only be wasteful. R & D in the Arab World should therefore
be confined to adaptive technology rather than to attempt inventing new systems or
procedures to those which already exist elsewhere. On this basis, it would be quite in
place to cmphasisc the need for extensive training in order to grasp and deal with existing
technology. Such trend would involve only limited time, effort and cost and release
resources to be directed to realise the appropriate adaptation to local environmental
considerations. Commitment of licensors' training and permission of horizontal transfer,
adds one more dimension to iterating the importance of the central issue of local staff
training which has received an overwhelmingly high support (60 — 80%).
As for motivating Arab engineers and scientists, perhaps through carefully designed
incentive schemes which was modestly supported, the idea is simply to keep them within
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the Arab region and to circumvent the consequences of the brain drain that many Arab
Countries have experienced in the past. This is particularly so in view of the considerable
gap which exists between the inducements which the Arab scientists working in their own
countries can get and what they are actually offered elsewhere outside the Arab World,
i.e. Europe and U.S.A. The names of many Arab scientists and successful professionals
whose exceptional performance records outside the Arab World have hit the headlines in
the past, have been frequently mentioned during interviews in the way of illustration. It
would not be appropriate to mention names in this respect. It is always suggested that
the ideal way of keeping such talented Arabs within the Arab World to maximise the
benefits derived from their contributions is to strike the right balance by motivating them
through various incentives so that they can be compensated for any possible loss of
prestige or financial status. Their professional association with reputed international
institutions should, of course, be maintained and further strengthened in order to guarantee
the continuity of their talents and to keep them up to date with any new developments in
their own fields of specialisation.
9.5.1
	 Protection of Local Technology
Different measures can be taken to protect local technology and reduce payments
to foreign licensors. When the Arab professionals were asked to air their views
on such measures, 54% of them favoured the "undertaking of close scrutiny by
local authorities" when dealing with the technological needs of the Arab Countries
to ensure that indigenous technologies are not being excluded. 51% advocated the
permission of horizontal transfer of technology by the licensee. Only 29% and
20% referred to the reduction of the life of licensing agreement and the
application of prescribed royalty sales consecutively, as appropriate measures to
protect technology.
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When multinational companies were asked similar questions to indicate the
measures of local control that they believe are designed by the Arab host countries
to protect local technology, their responses were muted. Only 8 of the 14
companies approached elected to respond at all and 6 of them (75%) concluded
that the Arab Countries prefer licensing arran gements to direct investment, while
3 (37%) have indicated both measures. It is thought unwise to attempt to reach
any definite conclusions on the basis of such responses, in view of the
exceptionally low level of response. This is clearly an inconclusive outcome on
which no weight or value should be attached.
However, some useful remarks were made by those who were interviewed on this
subject. One such remark emphasises that the reduction of the life of licensing
agreement as a measure to protect local technology could be recommended only
insofar as it does not jeopardise the success of the project concerned. Also, this
method can only be effective in areas where technology development is rapid.
Having said all this however, we should not over—emphasise the significance of
local Arab technology in such a way as to give the misleading impression that
they are available at any significant scale. As one British expert working in Qatar
put it to the author ....
"There is no local technology in the Gulf region and indeed in the Arab World in
general. In the very rare cases in which they exist, they are often inferior and
obsolete and therefore one xvuld even question the very wisdom of them being
perpetuated."
INTERVIEWS
The above findings, which are based on different responses to the questionnaires
completed by the thrcc groups of survey participants, can be further supported by
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different comments and remarks made by those who were personally interviewed.
An account of such remarks would be given below to shed some further light on
the subjects covered by the survey.
9.5.2	 Arab views on Technology Transfer
A variety of different views have emerged during the interviewing sessions
regarding the general subject of technology transfer. The formation of
sophisticated banking systems was reported to be one important requirement to
realise the efficient transfer of technology. As a channel of technology transfer,
turn—key projects have been repeatedly referred to as the least appropriate of all;
licensing instead seems to be seen as more akin to real transfer but all hinges, in
fact, on the availability of financial resources and potential skilled manpower,
which makes manpower planning crucial to any meaningful transfer of technology.
The option of using less sophisticated, easily operated technology is to go about
transferring technology in a gradual way, i.e. establishing assembly, if there is a
limited market as it is clearly the case in the Gulf region, then moving towards
manufacturing part cicmcnts and tools . domestically before reaching full
manufacturing stages. The graduation process gives plenty of access to manpower
training and the accumulation of much needed know—how. A former Sudanese
Minister who was interviewed in Kuwait, disagrees with the notion frequently
advocated by Arab intellectuals, to completely disregard the reliance on foreign
consultancy firms on the ground that they arc less qualified to grasp the Arab
domestic needs. He suggests that joint cooperation with such foreign firms
through a system of restricted tcnders is highly commendable. His dcfcncc of
such argument is based on the presumption that foreign consultants tend to value
their quality of advice very highly, as their international reputation is their most
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valuable asset which they cannot afford to risk. Therefore, it is inconceivable that
such foreign consultants would perform their duties in a knowingly harmful way
to the interests of their Arab partners.
The transfer of technology through the adaptation of imported foreign technology
to local conditions has also been frequently emphasised, as has been the necessity
of local staff training, along with the technical and managerial staff of licensoes
firms to acquire the needed know—how. An important step towards the rcalisation
of technology transfer is the minimisation of the degree of dependency on foreign
staff through motivating locals to stay with the same organisation as a life—time
commitment to stimulate career development; that is to minimise to the lowest
possible degree the manpower turn—over. By so doing, not only will they grow
more loyal to their corporations but also more knowledgeable through experience
accumulated throughout years of dedicated work for one single employer. It may
be worthwhile to recall here that, the loyalty to employer institutions in Japan,
which is heralded to be an integral part of their cultural heritage, has always been
a strong contributing factor in the Japanese success and their technological
superiority.
9.5.3	 Other Views on Technology Transfer
A French Manager representing a French multinational company in joint venture
with a Gulf State, stated during an interview that the transfer of technology to an
Arab Company would ideally take the form of maintaining technical relationships
with foreign licensors. He also indicated that the bargaining power of a local
(Arab) partner could gradually improve as a natural consequence of equity
participation between the two partners. Implicitly this amounts to concluding that
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equity participation, beside its known advantage as a vehicle towards fulfilling
mutual interests, does assist in creating the right climate to improve bargaining
skills and powcr. In other words the latter (bargaining power) is a function of the
former (equity participation). Regarding the same matter, a British Engineer
working for a consultancy firm in U.A.E. believes that the people of the Gulf
States do not need to improve their bargaining power or capabilities. This
argument is based on the fact that Gulf people are basically traders who do not
lack the experience of good negotiators. According to this engineer ...
"they can take care of their interests very well". He then adds "it is for us, the
multinational companies, to make the necessary concessions to keep a reasonable
degree of presence in an area such as the Gulf which is widely open to outside
competitors".
As for the appropriate type of technology, it is imperative that the labour—intensive
technology is clearly not favoured in the Arabian Gulf States, due to a number of
considerations:
a. safety measures arc still in a rudimentary stage;
b. scarcity of local skilled labour force; and
c. capital intensive projects are most suited to areas with capital abundance.
With regard to the trade off between exports and imports, it is evident that most
of the export—oriented manufacturing units in the region arc basically established
to meet local market needs and that only the surplus is exported. The local market
requirements are thus the base for any manufacturing industry, albeit there are
often some exceptions to this generalisation, i.e. fertilizers and other oil—related
industrics.
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9.5.4	 Problems of Technology Transfer to the Arab World
The easy diffusion of technology to foreign competitors based in the Middle East
is regarded in the view of some multinational companies as a negative outcome
of technology transfer and is attributed to the lack of awareness of the importance
of confidentiality attached to particular technology or technological processes —
rather than to a deliberate policy carried out by the Arab Countries to diffuse
technology in favour of other competitors. Another adverse effect of technology
transfer in the region is attributed to the lack of proper maintenance, resulting in
inefficient use and sometimes disuse.
In the aftermath of the oil boom of the late seventies and early eighties, the
general trend in the Gulf region had become one of opting for the latest, most
sophisticated technology. This phenomenon seemed like a fashion trend rather
than a way of pursuance of a subtle policy of using less sophisticated and easily
operated technology that can square with the level of existing training, efficiency
and capital availability. As mentioned earlier, it is the outright purchase of turn-
key projccts which is dominant over license arrangements in most of the cases, a
phenomenon which is not conducive to thc proper transfer of technology.
It would have been inappropriate to ask the Arab professionals or companies to
comment on the negative effects of technology transfer to the Arab Countries, on
the grounds that almost all Arabs believe strongly in the necessity of such transfer.
Possible differences of views were seen to be best propped rather by seeking their
views on what constitute the "appropriateness" of technology and how best to
acquire it. Multinationals, however, wcrc asked to comment on any perceived
disadvantages of the technology transfer to the Arab World and the fact that 12
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Out of the total of 14 responded positively to this particular question indicates that
foreign multinationals have their own misgivings on the uscfulncss of technology
transfer to the Arab Countries, while the latter emphatically take it as a forcgone
conclusion that technology transfer is not only useful but essential and in most
cases indispensable for their economic development.
The 12 multinationals responded to the question on technology transfer and its
disadvantages as follows:—
Table 9.9
	
NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO
THE ARAB COUNTRIES
Total %
a. Easy diffusion to foreign competitors. 2 17
b.	 Improper use — insufficicnt management. 5 42
c.	 High proportion of unexploited capacity of technology. 4 33
d. Low return compared to high cost. 2 17
e.	 Impcdimcnt to development of local technology. 2 17
—
•
	 The total is more than 12, indicating that some respondents have elected
to choose more than one factor.
If any conclusions would have to be drawn from the above table, one can refer to
the following:
a. The fact that 42% of the multinationals have expressed their fear of
improper use of technology by the Arabs, primarily due to insufficiently
trained management and technical personnel, indicates the low confidence
in their capabilities to properly manage the imported technology. MNCs
may have their own reasons to hold such views based on their experience
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'in the region. The question that is to be addressed will have to be the
appropriate way of training and adapting to imported technology by the
Arab nationals; a responsibility which ought to be shared by both partners.
b. Closely associated with the above is what a third of the sample has
referred to as the likelihood of unexploited capacity of technology",
possibly owing to the above—mentioned factor — inefficient management.
It is worthwhile mentioning in this context that "technology transfer" would
not be rightly called so if it is not associated with management and
technical know—how. In most cases the technology transfer that this study
refers to is rather one of technical and managerial know—how than a
physical one. Furthermore, it would seem rather inappropriate to transfer
technology in its physical form without the necessary technical back—ups,
including comprehensive training programmes designed to cater for local
nationals. Management and technical contracts should usually be
associated with any physical technology transfer prior to the ultimate stage
of technology being fully operational.
C. No great significance seems to be attached to the other factors — low
returns on capital, diffusion and local technology impediment. The first
and last of these should rather be the concern of the technology recipient,
not that of the technology supplier — the multinational. The low ratings
which these factors received in fact demonstrate that the interests and
concerns of the local partners usually come only at the bottom of
multinationals' priorities.
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9.6	 Over-dependence on Foreign Multinational Companies
As mentioned earlier, according to many Arab professionals, the requirement of exporting
as a condition for importing does not necessarily constitute a wise policy to limit the
degree of reliance on foreign firms operating in the Arab World; besides, it is not always
feasible or sensible. Neither is reliance on local capital or technology the first best
strategy in that respect. The realisation of self-dependence could be partially achieved,
however, through indigcnisation of products and the banning of imports of those items
which can be locally manufactured. There is no objection to regulating the conduct of
foreign multinationals in principle, albeit it should be done with sense and proper timing
and after ensuring proper reporting of activities. If restrictions need to be imposed on the
areas in which foreign multinationals are allowed to operate, this should be done on a
selective basis and within a limited scale. As for licensing, direct purchase and/or
management contracts, it would not be appropriate to trade-off between these different
forms, as they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The Arab Countries ought to create
the right investment climate and conditions to induce foreign investments (with the
possible exception of weapons and armaments). They should also impose reasonable
environmental conditions. Many professionals appear to advocate joint ventures with
foreign enterprises, with as wide shareholding as possible in favour of the local partner.
Some respondents refrained from favouring domestic enterprises over foreign subsidiaries
on the grounds that such policy is likely to kill the competition necessary for improving
quality and could also create corruption.
Of course the thrcat of nationalisation needs to be confined to extreme cases only.
Likewise, erection of barriers against imports, while theoretically appealing, but in practice
leads to poor results as it necessarily entails government subsidies to local manufacture,
a phenomenon which once started proves to be hard to alter, as local entrepreneurs get
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used to the benefits of concessions without which their very ability to survive becomes
questionable.
9.7	 Local Vis—a—vis Foreign Management
The tendency of some multinationals to rely on local managers to participate in the
running of their operations in The Arab World and indeed in most of their overseas
activities is attributed to a number of reasons. Some of these companies seek to eliminate
language and other local adjustment problems, while others see in local managers a
window of opportunity to reduce their costs of operations, based on the assumption that
they are less expensive than expatriates. Understanding of local feelings about sensitive
and possibly politicised issues can be responded to more appropriately through local than
expatriate managers. The provision of greater employment continuity is yet another
consideration that makes it tempting to appoint more and more local managers.
Multinational companies and the Arab Companies cooperating with them were asked to
rate the different factors associated with the choice of local managers according to
significance. Their responses are epitomised by Table 9.7 following:
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Table 9.7	 ADVANTAGE OF APPOINTING MORE LOCAL
MANAGERS'
Multinationals Arab Companies
Total
rates
Pref nce
scale
Total
rates
Prefncc
scale
a.	 Elimination of language and 30 1 26 4
other adjustment problems.
b.	 Understanding local feelings. 27 / 45 1
c.	 Less expensive than 20 4 32 3
expatriates
d.	 Employment continuity. 25 3 36 2
•	 Significance is indicatcd by the allocation of a number between 0 and 5 (5
being more significant than 0).
The twelve multinationals and fiftccn Arab Companies who responded to this
particular question attachcd varying degrees of significance to their choices. While
language and other local adjustment problems were referred to by the multinationals
as the most important factor behind their preference to local managers, this factor is
the least important in the viewpoint of The Arab Countries. Understanding local
feelings, according to the Arab Companies is reckoned as the major advantage with
45 points, while this comes in the second place in the preference scale of the
multinational companies. Multinationals do not apparently view the issue of local
managers from the angle of cost effectiveness, as this is indicated as the least
important of the four motives. According to the Arab Companies, it is expressed as
the second least important which implies that the Arabs do not attach much
significance to the local managers on the account of cost, as on the principle itself of
enhancing employment opportunities to the locals. This was perhaps expressed
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indirectly by placing the provision of employment continuity as their second best
choice. For multinationals this factor is placed at their third rank of importance.
These figures may not in fact indicate anything of substance other than the fact that
local managers are not sought by multinational companies for their cost effectiveness,
contrary to common belief, but primarily for a perceived or real importance of
breaking language and other similar barriers between foreign companies and their local
partners. Incidentally, local partners do not appear to see eye to eye with their foreign
counterparts in that respect, as they see the significance of local managers in their
ability to cope better than foreign expatriates with sensitive issues which only local
people can fully appreciate and design appropriate policies accordingly.
9.7.1	 DiSadUlltagCL.4111:KaaiallagOIS
The advantages of appointing more and more domestic managers can be
outweighed, or at least balanced, by possible disadvantages. Four such
disadvantages were considered and Table 9.8 summariscs the respondents
assessment:
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Table 9.8	 DISADVANTAGES OF LOCAL MANAGERS
Multinationals
,	
Arab Companies
Total
rates
Prefnce
scale
Total
rates
Prefnce
scale
a. Gap in management understanding 29 1 11 2
between parent company and its
overseas subsidiaries.
b. Limitation in career development 25 2 10 3
opportunities for parent company
managers.
c. Risk of emergence of federation 20 4 3 4
of independent national units
with only nominal links to
corporate headquarters.
d. Unsuitability of local managcrs 24 3 16 1
for technology—based •
multinationals.
The fact that only 8 out of a total of 18 Arab Companies (44% of the total
sample) cared to respond to this question, opposed to as many as 12 out of 14
multinationals (86%) speaks for itself. It reveals that, in the view point of thc
Arabs, little, if any, could be regarded as disadvantageous in respect of local
managcrs' appointment, which is taken for granted as being advantageous. This
is not a view which is shared by the multinationals themselves, whose reaction to
the question confirms that they hold some misgivings about the desirability of
resorting to appoint more local (Arab) managers to run their subsidiaries in the
Arab region. In support of this view a quick glance at the previous table (Table
9.8) reveals the following:—
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The existence of a gap in management understanding between parent company and
its overseas subsidiaries is the most worrying factor that makes the multinationals
unwilling to accede to the pressure for more local mangers to be appointed. This
is closely followed by fear of the limitation in career development opportunities
for successful managers in the parent company. Judging from the magnitude of
significance attached to each of these two factors by the Arab Companies, it is
clear that the Arabs do not seem to take much notice of these factors. This is
even more so regarding the risk of emergence of federation of independent
national units which both multinationals and the Arab Companies see as the least
important of all other factors. Third among the multinational's priorities, but first
in the view of the Arab Companies, is the unsuitability of local managers for
technology—based multinationals. There seems to be a sense of pragmatism among
the Arab companies in admitting the lack of expertise among the Arab managers
in technology—based projects.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis is that while the Arab
partners greatly favour the appointment of more and more local managers as
opposed to expatriate ones, multinationals are clearly reluctant to admit that such
a trend could be advantageous for the partnership. The fact that foreign companies
maintain some local managers to run their subsidiaries would be seen in the light
of their awareness of the locals' high sensitivity to local needs and opportunities.
They are obviously keen to be seen as accommodating the Arab Countries'
aspirations to avail as much training and experience as possible to their nationals
in various managerial fields. This is particularly so in the Gulf region which
during the last few years had an abundance of university graduates of their own,
who arc naturally looking forward to reasonably rewarding jobs in public and
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private sectors. The social and also cultural factors are clearly at work here; to
be appointcd in a managerial post is seen as an inducement to join the workforce,
particularly if that means, as it is usually the case in the Gulf, foregoing more
lucrative and financially rewarding careers in family based trading businesses
which have emerged as a prominent feature within the Gulf economy in the
aftermath of the oil boom of late 1970's and early 1980's. The Gulf heritage of
family ownership businesses has resulted over years in the establishment of
thousands of small companies and businesses that depended more on personal
relationships than on formal organisation.
9.8	 Impacts of Multinationals
While the survey has deliberately avoided raising the political aspects of the various issues
it addressed, respondents kept emphasising the political impacts. In considering
alternative strategics to limit the extent of over—dependence on MNCs, the political
orientation of each individual Arab country has to be taken account of, since such factors
arc highly likely to influence partnership relations. Regarding the degree of MNCs'
contributions to the development process in the Arab World, this should naturally vary
from one country to another.
The negative impacts of MNCs are more evidently felt socially and culturally. The MNCs
have certainly played their due share in shaping new negative attitudes among the
nationals of some Arab (Gulf) States, with regard to the tendency towards achieving
maximum results with minimum efforts. In evidence of that, one only has to consider
new phenomena, such as commissions, and agency regulations whereby a Gulf national
can end up emerging as a millionaire in a short span of time, only by virtue of having
been given the right to be a sleeping agent to a gigantic foreign MNC, whose presence
277
in the region is governed by such regulations. One more aspect could also be that the
absence of discipline in the region, owing to cultural reasons, could limit the degree and
capability of grasping the imported technology that is associated with MNCs.
On balance, the Arab professionals do not hold favourable views about foreign MNCs,
regarding their contributions to the development process in The Arab World. According
to them, such contributions are either neutral, or at best marginal. Of course the MNCs
consider themselves as major sources for all kinds of positive developments i.e. jobs,
efficiency enhancement, ctc. Unlike the Arab professionals, the Arab Companies have
expressed favourable attitudes towards the multinationals but, given the element of self—
interest, this should not be surprising.
The most recent trend to favour joint venture partnerships between the Arab and the
foreign MNCs, seems to have lcd to the development of a new spirit among the Arab
Countries who have gradually learnt to co—exist with foreign MNCs, rather than to
confront them as was the case in the past.
Whatever sharp views some people or organisations may hold against foreign MNC,s, the
survey has clearly established the conclusion that in the Arab World no one advocates
radical policies such as the erection of barriers or the threat of nationalisation against the
MNCs, or the confiscation of their assets. In fact one can reasonably conclude that the
Arab people are neither satisfied with the role presently assumed by the foreign MNCs,
nor have the capability to manage without them. Far from discouraging the MNCs from
playing a role in the Arab World, the emphasis has been focused on seeking the most
appropriate way of courting these corporations and deriving the maximum benefit from
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MISSING
1. The technology transfer is a target that is vigorously sought by the Arab
Governments and professionals to be achieved. It is often seen to be paramount
to all other targets and objectives. The multinationals, however, have their
misgivings as to the usefulness of such transfer and in a way are reluctant to
concede to the pressures posed on them by the Arab World in that respect. It can
be said that the MNCs only resort to paying lip service in contributing effectively
to areas such as training and efficiency enhancement of local managers, and any
other activities geared to the fulfilment of a real transfer of technology.
2. The multinationals arc primarily concerned with the management and marketing
control of investments in the Arab World, as opposed to equity shareholding or
technology transfer. Historically they have been reluctant to contribute with
capital participation, as the return on capital on their investments in the area is
always seen to be less than the fees or royalty accruing to management or
marketing contracts. The fact that these multinationals arc still influential and
mostly indispensable in the Arab region bears witness to their success in pursuing
their well planned and far sighted strategics in the area — technology transfer will
necessarily entail sclf—dcpcndcnce by host countries in the long term and it is a
recipe for a possible diminishing influence or control by foreign MNCs.
3. For the multinationals' branches and subsidiaries operating in the Middle East, it
is paramount to strictly abide by the strategy and guidelines adopted by their
headquarters in their parent countries. This crucial requirement clearly speaks for
itself; the main concern and priority of these foreign corporations is looking after
their own interests first and forcmost. The interests of the host countries comes
as a distant second concern in their list of priorities.
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4. The undesirability of strategies such as nationalisation, confiscation of assets
belonging to foreign MNCs, imposing strict conditions on them to export in return
for permission to import materials, erection of barriers, etc., has clearly
commanded a broad agreement among the overwhelming majority of the survey
sample, which consists of both Arab professionals and industrialists, as well as the
representatives of foreign MNCs operating in the Arab region.
5. Research and development should be confined to adaptive technology in the Arab
World i.e. there appears to be no economic sense in attcmpting to invent new
systems or procedures to what already exists elsewhere.
6. The labour—intensive technology is clearly the wrong type of technology to prevail
in the Arabian Gulf. However, the most sophisticated technology does not
necessarily square with the type most needed in that region. The appropriate type
should be a function of the existing and potential level of training, efficiency, and
also the capital availability. Thc last of these three requirements, however, seems
to have over—shadowed the others as a major determining factor in the recent past.
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CHAPTER 10
FIELD WORK ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS: PART 2
POLICIES AND FACTORS IMPACTING ON JOINT
VENTURE PARTNERSHIPS IN THE ARAB WORLD
10.1 Nature of Partnership
The multinational companies operating in the Middle East tend to perform their activities
through different types of partncrship or joint venture arrangements. The Arab Companies
have their own preferences in the type of such partnerships, while the Arab professionals
have also their different views as to the best way of doing business in collaboration with
foreign companies. Various views of the three groups are depicted in Table 10.1, which
summarises different responses to the question on the most appropriate type of
partnership.
Table 10.1
	
PREFERRED FORM OF PARTNERSHIP
BETWEEN ARAB AND MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES
Type of Partnership Professionals Arab Companies Multinationals
a.	 Equity stake 54% — 75%
b. Management
contract
16% 38% 37%
C. Buy—back deal 16% 8% —
d. Production
sharing
30% 23% 0%
C. Other types 2% 31% 25%
Sample: 92 professionals; 18 Arab Companies; 13 Multinationals
Of different partnership types, equity participation seems to be seen as the most
appropriate type of all, as it was emphasised by 54% of the Arab professionals and 75%
of the multinationals who responded to the questionnaire. Management contract has been
favoured by both multinationals and the Arab Companies with a reasonable degree of
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acceptance, even though it received the support of only 16% of the professionals, whose
second best choice goes to "production sharing" arran gements. This would have to be
taken as an implicit reference to sharing production in proportion to the equity shares of
each partner. This type of partnership however is met with a complete rejection by the
multinational companies themselves who also emphatically rejected the buy—back deal
arrangements. Other types which were emphasised mainly by the Arab Companies,
include license agreements and technical services agreements (as opposed to management
or marketing contracts). Others referred to some particular types of agreements such as
one seeking to guarantee a definite share of the local market, as an integral part of the
initial partnership agreement between a multinational and the local (Arab) partner.
Whatever differences there are, it was quite evident from the outset that joint ventures in
principle enjoy a wide acceptance, tantamount to consensus among the respondents of all
three groups. Buy—back deals appear to be seen as unworkable arrangements to most of
the respondents and therefore, it is no wonder that they have been almost totally excluded
from their list of choices.
Joint venture is certainly favoured by the multinationals compared to foreign direct
investment (FDI) in the Arab Countries. In fact a question designed to prop the views of
Arab professionals as to what their choice will be if an Arab Country has to choose
between accommodating FDI on its soil on the one hand, and opening its markets to direct
imports from outside on the other, has failed to produce any sensible result. Out of 70
professionals who elected to respond to this question, 61% placed their choice with FDI
(with no local participation) and only 39% preferred direct imports. However, an
overwhelming proportion of the 61% elected to qualify their choice either by voluntarily
deleting the sentence in brackets which reads "(with no local participation)" or by
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amending the words to rcad "(with majority equity participation by the local partner)".
This tendency to emphasise the importance of local participation in equity was also
reinforced by the professionals who were interviewed.
It is therefore imperative to rule out the assumption that FDI is favoured on the basis of
the relatively high proportion of respondents who referred to it. It became clear to the
author later on that the question was misinterpreted and the fact that many respondents
have chosen to take the liberty of amending the wording of the question through additions
and omissions, only explains this. FDI by multinationals was almost unanimously seen
by all professionals who were interviewed as a second best choice, while the first
preference went to FDI with local participation, i.e. joint venture.
Direct imports arc not at all recommended as an alternative, except in cases where no
prospects of local investments exist. This would have to be taken to mean that FDI by
foreign MNCs may be only reluctantly permitted if the only available alternative is direct
imports, indicating perhaps the fact that direct imports arc the most unpopular option of
all available possibilities.
Some Arab professionals have expressed concern that multinationals may press for more
FIX without the involvement of nationals, in view of the growing concern about the
environmental effects of industrial projects in their parent countries. It is not as yet clear
whether this new and forthcoming trend would be associated with a similar willingness
on the part of these multinationals to move their R & D facilities (partially at least) to
where their investments arc mainly located. In the author's view, this would be a most
unlikely development to anticipate.
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10.1.1	 Jnterviews:.
With respect to the nature of partnerships, interviews conducted with Arab
professionals established the following:
1. Different forms of partnerships in joint ventures are determined by the type
of investment. It is a matter of case by case assessment which might even
su ggest the application of a combination of more than one type i.e.
management contract and product sharing.
2. Buy—back deal in joint venture partnerships can ideally be suggested as an
option to combat the adverse effects of the smallness of domestic market
size that characterises almost all Gulf States. Oil production (and export)
could be cited as a typical example of cooperation with multinational oil
companies through such agreements.
3. Management contract as a form of joint venture agreement must be
restricted to the marketing of the product, rather than the production
process itself, which should be separately dealt with through different types
of technical cooperation, including extensive training programmes for thc
local staff on the technical know—how and know—why that would
eventually lead to technology transfer.
4. Some respondents believe that buy—back deals could be considered
provided that cost and sale prices have some specific long—term
relationships. Together with production sharing arrangements, buy—back
deals should be based on the full understanding that they are directly
related to the international market prices prevailing at the time.
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Agreements should be bascd on predetermined prices for say the
production inputs, particularly if production sharing will have to be
considered.
5. Management contracts should only be confined to the short term,
preferably supported by specific clauses indicating the possibility of
extending the original period, if necessary.
6. In case of equity sharing of a joint venture, majority stakes (more than
51%) should be retained by the local partner(s) in order to retain
management control.
10.2 Capital Requirements
Multinational companies normally seek to create the appropriate environment before they
present themselves as credible partners in any region or country. In the case of the
Arabian Gulf, the conditions have been generally favourable (abundance of natural
resources (oil) and the availability of capital). Historically, multinationals have succeeded
to avail themselves in the Gulf region without having to participatc in the equity of the
investment projects which have taken place during the last two decades. This was made
possible via agreements, the terms of which have been often favourable to them. The
value of capital has never been an issue of any concern for the local (Gulf) partners,
neither has the resources (mainly oil). This state of affairs resulted in the influx of
multinational companies flooding into the area in their hundreds, but far from leaving any
impression among the host states that they have imposed themselves on them, they were
successful in exposing themselves as kccn partners, willing to offer their help on what
appeared to sound like easy and favourable terms, in the eyes of the recipient countries.
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This was particularly SO with regard to the supply of technology and the technology
transfer which was always seen as an essential ingredient for economic development.
In countries such as China and India, multinationals have performed their activities
without participating in equity, but also without imposing any prices. In the Arab
Countries and particularly in the Arabian Gulf States, the return on multinationals'
investments have mainly been against their contributions in management and marketing
fields and on the basis of an agreed fixed royalty.
It has been repeatedly argued by the Arab professionals (during interview sessions) that
the multinationals have been often reluctant to participate in the capital requirements of
such investments, as the return on capital invested is often less than the royalty rates
accruing to them. This explains, in view of these professionals, the reason why the
foreign companies' concern has been primarily confined to management and marketing
control as opposed to real participation through equity shareholding and technology
transfer. The fact that technology transfer has been minimal (if at all) explains why the
multinationals arc still influential and in many regards indispensable.
In South East Asia, the strategy of western multinational companies was based on the
notion that "if you can't beat them, join them". The Arab Countries can always draw on
lessons learned elsewhere. While the Saudis, for instance, have gained valuable
experiences through their partnership with foreign multinationals in various fields of
management, marketing and maintenance, the multinational companies have always had
the upper hand. Having capitalised on the most favourable terms and conditions
pertaining to cheap resources, various concessions and political stability, MNCs'
advantages have been reflected in high profit margins. Particular emphasis needs to be
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placed on training local nationals in the field of conducting feasibility studies and project
evaluation, so that more local participation could be secured in the decision making
process, leading to the selection of viable investment projects based on the evaluation of
real costs involved. The fact that these feasibility studies are mainly conducted by foreign
consultants — effectively foreign multinationals — deprives The Arab World of the
opportunity to have access to even—handed, unbiased recommendations, which take into
full consideration the Arab national interests as a paramount priority. The fact that
emphasis was particularly focused on the importance of this, by a remarkable percentage
of the survey respondents, demonstrates the Arab concern on the role the nationals need
to play in formulating the investment strategies of The Arab World. In this respect it is
worthwhile noting that 70% of the 92 Arab professionals have indicated that insufficient
feasibility studies account for most of the problems leading to the failure of many of the
Arab industrial projects (see Table 10.8).
10.3 Importance of The Arab World to the Multinationals
The multinational companies operating in The Arab World were requested to indicate the
reasons behind their choice of the Arab region as a location for their investment (or trade).
Having been provided with tcn potential motives for such choice, respective emphasis on
one reason rather than the other was expressed through the allocation of different weights
in a descending order of significance. The numbers given against each reason indicate
chosen weight compared to a possible maximum of 100. The following table (Table 10.2)
is constructed to summarise different responses in a descending order of significance of
each motive.
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Table 10.2
	
REASONS BEHIND MNC's CHOICE TO INVEST
(OR TRADE) IN A PARTICULAR ARAB COUNTRY
Reasons for Investment Order of
Significance
Total Points
(out of 100)
a. An important market in its
own right.
b. Cheap labour force.
1
2
83
77
c. Cheap raw materials,
including energy.
d. Advantageous tax system.
3
4
76
76
c. Freedom of capital movement
and expatriation of profits.
f. A gateway to other Arab
5
6
73
71
Countries.
g. Advantages of familiarity with
commercial and legal structure.
h. Ease of restrictions on
industrial licensing.
i.	 Preferential purchasing of
local products (and services)
by local government.
j.	 Capital loans and grants.
7
8
9
10
65
64
55
47
What the above table reveals is that while multinationals usually extend their business
operations overseas for a variety of different reasons, the most tempting factor in the Gulf
countries is what they are known to offer as a flourishing market, given the remarkably
high purchasing power of those affluent societies. Cheap labour force provided by the
nationals of the poor countries of South Asia and other less fortunate Arab Countries,
constitutes the second advantage; closely followed by cheap raw materials (primarily oil)
and the advantageous tax system that all oil—producing Gulf Countries provide for foreign
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companies. This is followed by yet another peculiarity of the Gulf Countries which,
unlike many other Third World Countries, allow for free movement of capital and do not
restrict the repatriation of profits. The fact that around 70% of the multinationals in the
survey sample are based in the U.A.E. explains the unexpectedly high weight (71%) laid
on the significance of U.A.E. as a gatcway to other Arab Countries. Given that Dubai is
regarded as the most important Arab commercial centre for re—exporting through its well—
reputed Jebel Ali free zone industrial area, it is hardly surprising to note the emphasis by
the multinationals on the importance of this small state as a gateway to other Arab
Countries, in their assessment of the main determining reasons for their investment
location.
Relatively less important, however, although not in a significant way, are the last four
motives (see Table 10.2), with capital loans and grants being the least important of all.
Most of the Gulf Countries have in the recent past years, formulated investment policies
geared to encourage preferential purchasing by national governments of locally produced
products, but this factor per se seems to have played no significant role in attracting
multinationals to establish production units in the area. Thetame could also be said about
the tendency of the Gulf States to ease restrictions on industrial licensing. Likewise,
while many of the foreign companies operating in the Gulf States are now familiar with
the commercial and legal structures of their host countries, it is also true to state that the
Gulf region is not particularly peculiar in this respect. In fact, no multinational company
is likely to commence its foreign investment activities anywhere in the world before fully
familiarising itself with all relevant information pertaining to the commercial and legal
structures of its potential markets. If anything could be emphasised in the way of
concluding the findings of the responses provided on this matter, it would have to be the
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reiteration that the Gulf Countries are highly attractive to international business,
particularly if the field of investment is not of a large scale production nature, with a
possible exception of the oil sector, which was deliberately excluded from the survey
sample.
10.4 Impact of Arab Government's policies
Public sector in the Arab World has both a corporate and a public dimension and thus is
intended to achieve not only economic, but also social and political goals. Among its
objectives, the following could be particularly listed: protection of domestic producers;
domestic price stabilization; export expansion; improvement of the terms of trade;
exchange control; raising revenue for the treasury; implementation of bilateral trading;
health and national security control.
Since it is the state rather than private individuals or institutions, which is the recipient
of oil revenues (in the Arab oil producing countries), the bulk of this surplus is controlled
by the Arab governments and public entities. In fact, the role of government is a vital
ingredient of the structure of resource allocation and the way in which such resources
adjust to changes in supply and demand conditions. To a very large measure, the impact
of MNCs on economic structure will dcpcnd on the policies pursued.
Having said that, one needs to distinguish between two types of government interventions
— "positive interventionism to reduce market distortions" says Dunning (1985, p.423)
"should be distinguished from negative interventionism to counteract one set of market
distortions by an other, or even counteracting the effects of the market for non—economic
reasons."
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Having now considered the main attracting motives inducing multinational companies to
invest in the Arab Countries, with special reference to the Gulf region, it remains to assess
the views of the Arab academics and professionals in general, regarding some policies
adopted by the Arab governments which impact on the multinationals and the
development prospects of the Arab World.
While cheap labour force was ranked by the foreign multinationals as the second most
attracting determinant for their choice of the Gulf region, the Arab professionals who took
part in the present survey clearly expressed their preference of the government policies
which are geared to limit the employment of foreign nationals. Out of a total of 55 Arab
professionals who have attended to this particular issue, 73% advocated such policies,
while 27% believed that the limitation on foreigners' employment was bound to produce
negative results on balance. The freedom to repatriate capital and profits, which is
heralded by 73% of the multinationals, is viewed rather differently by the Arab
professionals: 42% of them have favoured restrictions on repatriation of capital/profits
by foreign multinationals; while 58% of them believe that such policy would have
negative impact. Likewise, Arab professionals seem to be uneasy about the frequent
changes of investment regulations which have characterised the 1970's and 1980's. 79%
of the professionals expressed their misgivings about such changes, while 19% believe
that to be necessary to adjust to new developments, both on local and international levels.
Only 2% think that the effect of regular changes is neutral.
The contrast between the views of multinationals and those of Arab professionals is quite
evident in a number of respects; while the overwhelming majority of the Arab
professionals are themselves forcign employees from other Arab Countries (only a small
minority of the rcspondcnts arc Gulf nationals), nevertheless, they do advocate the slogan
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of localisation of Gulf employees, even though many of them seem to qualify such
demands by suggesting that caution should be exercised to guarantee the adequate
availability of qualified nationals before any replacement to foreign employees takes place.
It is this very fact of foreign work force and their cost—effective advantage, that
multinationals refer to as a major attracting factor for their presence in the Gulf region.
On the other hand, about 42% of the total respondents among the professionals group
favour the restrictions on freedom of capital/profit repatriation as opposed to 58% who
are against. Of course, the nationalistic sentiment is naturally at work here and this result
should be viewed from this perspective. Foreign companies would understandably not
entertain any kind of restrictions and, of course, their responses confirm this. With regard
to the frequent changes of investment regulations, the impacts will vary depending on the
type and magnitude of changes. Obviously some such changes will be in their favour,
while some others will not, depending on whether the new regulations are intended to
encourage or hinder their freedom of manoeuvre. The foregoing figures and percentages
are depicted by Table 10.3 below.
Table 103 IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT POLICIES
Positive Negative Neutral
a. Limitation on the employment of 73% 27% 0%
foreign nationals.
b.	 Frequent changes of investment 19% 79% 2%
regulations.
c.	 Restrictions on repatriation of 42% 58% 0%
capital/profits by foreign MNCs.
Sample: 92 Arab professionals.
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10.5 Peculiarity of Multinationals' positive role in The Arab World
Question: "Apart from technology transfer and management training, what
advantages do you envisage the multinationals are capable of offering that
are not readily achievable by the Arab firms, either on national or regional
levels"?
The above was the only open—ended question which the 18 Arab Companies cooperating
with foreign multinationals were asked to express their views about. Responses received,
either in writing or during direct interviews with some of their managers or leading
executives, emphasised the significance of the new attitudes that came along with
multinationals, which generally led to the improvement of working environment. Various
comments were made regarding this, the most remarkable of which can be briefly
summarised as follows:
1. Better access to international markets (experience gained in the marketing field
worldwide);
2. Better management system and training;
3. Enhanced know—how and systematic planning in production fields;
4. Improved working methods/procedures and administrative approaches;
5. The type of social interaction and understanding most needed to promote
technology transfer;
6. Higher flexibility to adapt to market conditions and higher competitive edge;
7. More relaxed working environment;
8. Less restrictions emanating from culture and traditions, i.e. employment of women;
and
9. Reduction of risk elements, both in production and marketing techniques, including
injuries resulting from insufficient safety procedures.
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In a nutshell, the positive contribution of multinationals can be particularly felt in the
improved working environment. This was also confirmed by different responses given
by the Arab professionals. Out of 77 professionals who responded to one particular
question pertaining to a closely similar issue, 68% indicated that the impact of
multinational companies in respect of changing work practices in The Arab World is
positive, as opposed to 27% who believe it to be negative, with the remaining 5%
indicating "neutral" impact (see Table 9.3). The responses received from the Arab
Companies are even more conclusive and emphatic; out of 15 companies responding, 14
(or 93%) share the view that the impact of multinationals on changing work practices is
positive. Only one (7%) thinks the impact to be neutral, while none of them believes that
the multinationals' performance in this respect has been of any negative effect.
The above list of advantages, which shows what multinational companies can, and actually
do, as opposed to what their national countcrparts can, generally reveals the positive role
in improving productivity levels. Again, this view is shared by 84% of Arab
professionals and 80% of Arab Companies as shown by Table 9.3.
Table 10.4	 WHO MAKES INVESTMENT DECISIONS
IN THE ARAB WORLD
Professionals Arab
Companies
1.	 General Manager on his own discretion. 22% 20%
2.	 General Manager acting on family advice. 20% —
3.	 Decision is made on professional advice. 32% 47%
4.	 Left to the Banker or Stockbroker. 5% —
5.	 Left to Shareholder. 12% 7%
6.	 Board of Directors. 50% 47%
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10.6 Investment Decisions
Whilst the responses of the two groups of Arab professionals and companies to the
question posed in table 10.4 above are naturally not identical, they nevertheless
demonstrate a general trend which reveals that the investment decisions involving certain
degrees of financial commitments are mainly assumed by the Board of Directors of
companies, who base such decisions on professional advice. The above table (Table 10.4)
also indicates that in the Arab World in general, shareholders per se have no direct role
to play in the decision making process. This might be attributed either to the confidence
vested in the Boards of Directors, who are usually seen as true representatives of the
shareholders and a genuine defender of the company's interests, or to the fact that in the
overwhelming majority of the Arab private companies, the major shareholders are
primarily represented in the Boards of Directors. This is also indirectly so regarding the
public sector corporations whose members of the Boards of Directors arc usually drawn
from representatives of the appropriate public sector ministries and corporations, as the
government is effectively the main shareholder.
The concept of entrusting the lending banks or stockbrokers with the task of making
decisions is alien to the Arab World, given that the financial markets arc still
underdeveloped, with a possible exception of Bahrain (and Lebanon in the pre—Civil War
era). The fact that 20% of 92 professionals believe that important investment decisions
are made on family advice, while none of the Arab Companies endorses such views,
would be explained in terms of two assumptions:
a. The professionals might possibly have based their judgement on the assumption
that small family businesses are usually run by family members, whose decision
making process takes the form of consultation and exchange of views among
themselves before being translated into specific actions by the managers and
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technocrats. This is particularly relevant in The Gulf region, in which the family
business is the usual structure, hence the source of decision making; and
b. The Arab Companies which have responded happened to be outside the category
of family oriented businesses and whose decision—making mechanism lends itself
to the more sophisticated techniques which are pursued by professionally qualified
people whose advice is made available to the Board of Directors for final
endorsement.
However, some of the comments advanced by a number of professionals who were
interviewed, arc worthy of being highlighted as follows:
a. Neither of the five groups listed in Table 10.4 makes investment decisions of any
significant scale. Decisions, in fact, are mostly made by those with the closest
access to the influential members of the society. In the case of The Gulf region
this simply means the Shickhs and Princes who belong to the Royal families.
b. The decision making process is rarely entrusted with the General Manager at his
own discretion, unless he is himself the owner, proprietor or the major shareholder
of the company in question.
C. The decision making process depends on the degree of availability of financial
resources. The more these resources arc, the more the decisions are vested in the
hands of the Board of Directors, or someone in the higher hierarchy of the
company; the less such resources are, the more General Managers are likely to be
involved in the decision making process.
10.7 Technology Diffusion
Qucstion:	 "How possible is the diffusion of imported foreign technology to other
competitors in The Arab World?"
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8 — 50%
7 — 44%
1— 6%
a. Fairly possible.
b. Partially possible.
C. Impossible.
TOTAL 16— 100%
The above question was responded to by 16 Arab Companies as follows:—
Table 10.5 DIFFUSION OF IMPORTED TECHNOLOGY
It is somewhat surprising to have an exceptionally high proportion of the Arab Companies
holding the view that imported technology to The Arab World is potentially diffusible.
This can hardly be compared with the results previously obtained from 12 multinationals
operating in The Arab World, who were asked about the negative effects of technology
transfer to the Arab countries. Only two of those companies, i.e. 17% of the total, cited
"easy diffusion to foreign competitors" (see Table 9.9). If that is how foreign
multinationals view this matter, it would certainly seem surprising that 94% of the Arab
companies (as Table 10.5 shows) believe that the diffusion of imported technology (to
other competitors) is either fairly or partially possible. Only 6% (one out of 16) believe
that such diffusion is impossible.
One would only recall what has already been mentioned earlier, that in The Arab World
it is the lack of awareness of the significance of confidentiality regarding technological
secrets which leads to technology diffusion. In fact, there is no reason to assume that
there could possibly be a deliberate policy to diffuse technology to any third party by the
Arab countries or companies.
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10.8 Export Processing Zones (EPZs)
EPZs are the special manufacturing enclaves set up to attract foreign investors, often using
lavish tax customs and labour intensives as bait. Such zones have boomed since the
1960s, despite some economists' doubts about their benefits (as the Arab professionals in
our own survey indicated in their responses).
Free ports where goods can pass in and out tax free, go back centuries. EPZs, by
contrast, offer concessions only where goods passing through the zone undergo some
process that adds value. As the number of EPZs has risen, so has the competition for
foreign investment. All EPZs waive customs duties on imported raw materials and other
goods if the final product is sold elsewhere, but there are other incentives too in almost
all Arab EPZs, ranging from long tax holidays on profits to subsidised rent and services.
Our own survey hypothesised that the Arab export—free zones i.e. Dubai and Egypt, have
shifted emphasis from import—substitution in favour of exports; and hence led to close
integration of the Arab economics with thc world economy.
Only 49 out of a possible total of 92 Arab professionals elected to respond to this
particular question (53%) and 71% of them expressed a general agreement with the above
hypothesis, while the balance of 29% disagreed.
Asked whether the concept of Arab export—free zones is a positive or negative
development, the responses of 64 professionals (70% of the total) were as follows:—
41	 —	 64%	 positive development
10	 —	 16%	 negative development
13	 —	 20%	 neutral effect.
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In general, the above percentages could be briefly interpreted as follows:—
a. The fact that a considerable number of the intended sample has refrained from
responding is probably attributed either to the lack of strong feelings about the
subject, or lack of adequate knowledge.
b. While 41 (44% of the total sample size) have expressed their satisfaction by
indicating that EPZs constitute a positive development, the majority which make
up the balance (56%) are either undecided, neutral or against (view them
unfavourably).
c. As the responses given in writing in respect of EPZs in the Arab World appear to
be inconclusive, we may elect to seek refuge in what the Arab professionals had
to say about the issue in question during face—to—face discussions which ensured
more freedom of expression than might be expected in the more formal case of
answer—provided questionnaires.
There appears to be some consensus among the professionals who wcrc interviewed that
the Arab export—free zones have a neutral effect on balance, because they arc mainly
engaged in re—exporting activities (Dubai in particular) which implies importing from
countries other than those of origin without any corresponding increase in domestic
demand. In fact, the Arab export—free zones cannot be said to have favoured more
economic integration with the world economy, neither have they shifted emphasis from
import—substitution. Their influence in these respects has been neutral, first duc to the
small size of such zones, besides the fact that the five industrial free zones of Egypt arc
mainly dcsigncd to serve local markets and satisfy domestic dcmand. In fact the
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experience of Egypt was an attempt to release some of the internal pressure regarding say,
foreign exchange regulations, etc.
In conclusion, one would say that on balance the effect of the Arab industrial—free zones,
judging from the experiences of Dubai and Egypt, could probably be described as neutral.
These export free zones are unlikely to make any significant impact on the prospects of
economic development in the Arab World.
10.9 Foreign expansion of Arab public sectors
The Arab professionals were asked about the objectives behind the foreign expansion of
the public sector enterprises of some Arab countries such as Kuwait. A summary of their
responses is depicted in Table 10.6, which lists such objectives in a descending order of
priority.
Table 10.6
	
OBJECTIVES BEHIND FOREIGN EXPANSION
BY ARAB PUBLIC SECTOR
1.	 Diversification. 55%
2. To increase market size (limited local market). 45%
3. To gain necessary expertise particularly in technology
management; a step towards technology transfer.
32%
4.	 Promotion of political ties. 21%
5. Undermining dependence on foreign companies. 20%
6. The need to acquire foreign exchange. 11%
Since Kuwait ideally typifies the Arabian Gulf States, it is evident from the above
responses that they primarily reflect the general views pertaining to the Gulf countries.
It is not surprising therefore to find out, as Table 10.6 shows, that the foreign expansion
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of thc Gulf investments are primarily due to the need for diversification (55%) and to the
limited size of the domestic market (45%). About a third of the Arab professionals also
believe that gaining necessary expertise in technology—related activities, which is more
readily accessible abroad, is an important objective to be pursued. The need to acquire
foreign exchange is not regarded as an objective in itself in the Gulf region, while
promoting political ties or undermining dependence on foreign companies are to be
regarded as less important, since such objectives could potentially be pursued through
other means and not necessarily via expanding outwards. However, a sizeable minority
of around 20% of the respondents still believes that such objectives could be achieved
through foreign expansion.
The main factor, by and large, is the limited investment opportunities in the Gulf region,
with the possible exception of the energy sector. Foreign expansion of the public sector
is thus seen in the light of the anticipated decline of hydrocarbon resources, which are
depletable. Some new sources of wealth, to complement the existing ones, arc to be
sought before it is too late. As the recent Gulf crisis has clearly demonstrated, there is
a security factor which is directly involved as well. No doubt the ruling families of thc
Gulf States have, for some considerable time been vulnerable to political changes in the
region and the foreign investments by the Gulf public and private enterprises with key
members of the ruling families maintaining a major share of their equities, could be
explained and viewed within this context.
10.10 Industry vis—a—vis Service Sector
Having now considcrcd the factors which lead some Arab countries to expand thcir
business activities outside their national borders, one needs to consider the reasons why
Multinationals tend to limit their real investments in The Third World, while encouraging
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the expansion of their service industry. The main reasons for such a tendency as given
by the Arab professionals can be seen in Table 10.7 below.
Table 10.7	 WHY DO MNCs LIMIT THEIR REAL INVESTMENTS
THE THIRD WORLD AND ENCOURAGE EXPANSION
THE SERVICE INDUSTRY
IN
IN
1.	 Service sector is risk—free (highly profitable). 58%
2.
	 Fear of competition with their own products. 34%
3.	 A deliberate strategy to keep the developing countries
underdeveloped.
23%
4.	 To avoid technology diffusion. 18%
5.	 Other reasons. 1%
It would suffice to restrict our comments on the one fact that the above percentages
highlight — the achievement of high profits and risk aversion have and will always remain
to bc at the centre of MNCs' strategy; a strategy that will eventually determine the type
and location of their investments in the Third World. This said, let us now reflect on the
comments in this regard which have been made by different interviewees, which can be
briefly summarised as follows:—
a. The Multinationals prefer expanding in the service sector because it requires less
capital investment; whenever they elect to pull out of a foreign market, they can
do so more speedily and with minimum cost incurred.
b. The determining factor with regard to the choice between the service and other
sectors is rather the return on investment, irrespective of the type of sector. The
emphasis on the service sectors by some MNCs is thus not a deliberate policy to
undermine their real investment, but is an investment decision made on purely
commercial grounds.
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c.	 The service industry is not necessarily opted for at the expense of the physical
investment. It would be inconceivable in view of the huge infrastructural
investments that took place in the Gulf region over the last decade or so not to
expect a corresponding level of service sector in an economy which is
characteriscd by a high propensity to spend. Expenditure in physical projects such
as schools, hospitals, roads, airports, industrial factories, etc., necessarily spills
over into the service sector.
d. The political and strategic significance of a particular country or region can also
determine the type of sectors to which various investments are directed. The type
of technology to be transferred to a given country (industrial or service
technology) is thus a function of the degree of strategic importance of that country.
e. The assumption that MNCs deliberately limit their real investments, while
encouraging the expansion of service industry in the developing countries, is in
itself subject to question and can be ttfuttd. St is not in %be intmsts oi \ht. Is4i1ACs
to keep these countries underdeveloped, because to them (MNCs), development
means bigger markets and higher demand. While it is certainly true to say that,
at times the service sector is less risky and easier to get into than to an industrial
project, it is equally true that services arc indeed needed at all levels of
development, while capital investment is not necessarily required at some levels.
f. It is not strictly logical to assume that MNCs arc fearful of competition with their
own products, because if they invest in the developing countries this will simply
expand their product sources, as well as potential markets.
10.11 Consultants
The engineering consultants are the only foreign multi-national companies allowed by law
to operate in the Gulf countries without the obligatory nccd to associate with local
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partners (or agents). In fact they are the only foreign businesses with own subsidiaries
in the Gulf, as they are exempt from having to abide by the Agency Laws of the Gulf
States, as explained in more detail in Chapter 6 and Appendix (B).
In U.A.E. a number of Chief Engineers and residential executive engineers of some three
such contracting and engineering consultants, were interviewed and the following would
be mentioned in brief by way of summarising the main outcome of the discussions which
took place in Abu Dhabi in May 1990:
a. The consultancy firms and engineering contractors usually do not invest, but only
supervise contracts. In one case, such supervision has involved contracts which
were valued in the region of 2bn Dirhams (about £350 million) in Abu Dhabi
alone. This is not to be confused with investment.
b. The consultancy firms in the Gulf do provide training to local employees, but not
necessarily to Gulf nationals. The Gulf nationals do not seem to be interested in
the engineering profession, in the words of a British residential engineer.
According to him, they are interested only in managerial posts, particularly those
with high salaries. They therefore have no particular role to play in the
engineering or consultancy sectors, the majority of which are dominated by foreign
MNCs operating on commercial grounds.
C. In one of those British Engineering firms based in UA.E., the author was told that
many Arab personnel were employed at various managerial and technical levels.
Their main job is to design and supervise the projects. As for the parent company
(in Britain), apart from 4 members of the Board of Directors, up to 10 engineering
staff may be involved periodically to prepare project documents only. This
particular company employs only supervisory engineers to projects worth $100m.
The Government of U.A.E. pays a contracted rate to the company for each staff
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member and the company pays out salaries and other expenses, at its discretion,
from that sum received from UAE. Government.
d_ In the viewpoint of a Senior Engineering Manager (also British), the advantages
of appointing more and more local staff in managerial posts are reduced to mere
coping with Gulf Governments' Policy which generally favours employment of the
locals among the staff.
e. The Engineering Consultants who represent foreign MNCs believe that cooperation
with private sector is much smoother than with the public sector. This is related
to the fact that most work, in consultancy and contracts, is tied to Government
contracts under strict specifications. The Government still effectively controls.
f. Local managers may well be less expensive than foreign expatriates, but the
question is not one of cheapness or otherwise. It is rather one that addresses the
fact that the nationals (in the engineering sector) are simply not available to fill
managerial posts. Of course there is always a minimum requirement of
qualifications to keep up with the MNCs standards and reputation.
10.12 Factors contributing to the failure of some Arab (Manufacturing) Companies
Table 10.8
	
MAIN FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FAILURE
OF ARAB COMPANIES
0 Ranking
a. Investment made in the wrong activity. 48 4
b.	 Insufficiently trained managers. 57 1
c.	 Politically motivated investment decisions. 51 3
d.	 Excessive replication leading to over—investment. 21 6
e.	 Insufficient feasibility studies. 70 1
f.	 External factors i.e. cooperation with MNCs, etc. 23 5
amp Le 92 AraD rro ession s.
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Insufficient feasibility studies are seen by the Arab professionals to be the most important
factor contributing to the failure of some Arab Companies (70%). This factor is followed
by the "insufficicncy of well trained managers" (57%). Just over 50% of the
professionals blame the failure on the decision makers whose investment decisions are
politically — not economically — motivated, which in a way lead to the investment having
been made in the wrong activities (or perhaps wrong locations), a contention supported
by 48% of the sample. The least important of the many factors (sec Table 10.8) were
reported to include the external factors (23%) and the alleged excessive replication that
leads to over—investment.
What these responses clearly illustrate is that, contrary to common belief, the external
factors, and particularly the problems associated with cooperating with foreign
multinationals, do not seem to be of any major significance insofar as the Arab
Companies' problems are concerned. Incidentally however, when the Arab professionals
were asked to comment further on any other factors which could supplement the list
already provided, their main emphasis focused on external factors, even though they did
not refer to them directly as external.
The other factors included three major reasons for failure:
a. Failure to choose the appropriate technology mix;
b. Feasibility studies, particularly those conducted by foreign experts or consultants
and the tendency of such studies to be biased or misinformed;
c. Restrictions imposed by outsiders i.e. EEC against the exports of Arab products
as well as "dumping" policies as one particular respondent put it.
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Clearly the above—mentioned factors are all related to influences which are effectively
outside the real control of the Arab Companies or countries.
On the other hand, many economic experts whom the author happened to interview were
adamant in their rejection of laying the blame on external factors. Their emphasis on
various domestic factors contributing to the limitations of the success of Arab Companies
included: low productivity levels; high cost of production; tedious routine management;
uncompetitiveness vis—a—vis foreign—produced products; preference of local consumers
for imported rather than locally produced products; high transportation and overhead costs;
social and political constraints; and the failure of designing a successful marketing
strategy.
Other factors relate primarily to poor non—oil producing Arab Countries such as poor
infrastructure and the limitation in foreign currency resources required to purchase
intermediary and capital goods from the international market.
Industrial projccts may be doomed to failure, depending on whether a particular factory
or company belongs to the private or public sector domain. Almost every case has its
own reason or set of reasons which determine the borderline between success and failure.
According to an Irish economic expert working as an advisor in an industrial consultancy
organisation in the Gulf, insufficient feasibility studies are often the main reason for the
failure of some projects undertaken by the private sector. The excessive replication which
lead to over—investment does happen occasionally, but is not really a main reason for
failure. His assessment is based on the premise that a good product management
operation can always succeed, notwithstanding the usual constraints. Regarding the
external factors, including possible influence on thc part of multinationals, this also can
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happen, but again the determining factor would always be attributed to the inexperience
and sometimes "unreasonableness" of some local partners.
Generally speaking it is very rare to have investment made in the wrong activity in the
Gulf region, whose inhabitants have a long trading experience; a factor which must have
well met the qualification of having to be commercial—minded in any decision making
process involving investment. It may not be easy, however, to distinguish between
"investing in the wrong activity" and "duplicating successful investment elsewhere", which
in a way makes it a wrong activity if it is viewed at regional (or pan—Arab) level. Taken
on a purely national basis, however, it could be seen as an appropriate decision so long
as domestic markets' requirements arc met by domestic products. What is at stake here
is the long heralded economic integration between the countries of The Arab World; a
strategy well received in theory but with only little in the way of actual achievements.
10.13 The Investment Criteria
Many Arab professionals have emphasised the political stability as the most important
investment criteria in the Arab World. The survey was undertaken during May to June
1990; a short time before the start of the Gulf crisis and the outbreak of war in the area.
Emphasis has also been made on the necessity of proper exploitation of local natural and
human resources. As for the criteria which foreign MNCs will very closely observe
before investing in a given markct, bureaucracy, red—tape and corruption, which are
usually associated with many of the developing countries, seem to have featured
prominently. The multinationals are particularly concerned with performing their
operations in an atmosphere in which quick, sensible and non—bureaucratic procedures
prevail. It is to be highlighted however, that the importance of various investment criteria
depends on a variety of different factors related to each individual Arab Country, with its
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own peculiar investment constraints and problems regarding technology transfer and
social, political and economic considerations, which can vary significantly from one
country to another.
Other issues which have received a noticeable degree of attention and emphasis, include
the following:
a. The indigenisation of management and technical personnel is required wherever
possible, but only under some well-prepared phasing out programmes.
b. In many cases, the type of technology which is imported appears to be either
unneeded or inappropriate. Only the required technology should be allowed to be
imported. It has to be emphasised here that the temptation to go for the most
sophisticated technology should be resisted.
c. It is sometimes thought that the highly influential people in the Gulf (Shickhs and
Princes who have more or less unlimited discretion) are in an advantageous
position, having the ability to make decisions and making them speedily. While
some analysts consider this as a positive phenomenon, insofar as decisiveness is
needed, it could in fact be a double-edged sword. It is imperative that
decisiveness (or decision made in a hurry) is not necessarily compatible with the
most appropriate decision, which is likely to produce the desired results.
Investment decisions made without due consideration and carefully conducted
trade-off between potential alternatives, could possibly lead to devastating results.
10.14 Major Findings
Whilst responses received from different survey groups regarding the various issues
addressed on the multi-nationals and their role have not established any consensus -
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which was not originally sought or predicted — a remarkable degree of agreement amongst
them has emerged in a number of respects, as could be shown by the following:
1. Whatever differences of views have been expressed, it was quite evident from the
outset that joint venture partnerships in principle have enjoyed wide acceptance,
tantamount to consensus among the respondents of the three groups. It is also
generally accepted that it is in the interest of the Arab countries to allow the local
partner of joint ventures to have the majority share in the equity of any such
ventures.
2. Insufficient feasibility studies account for most of the problems encountered by the
Arab manufacturing companies. As these studies are primarily carried out by
foreign IANCs, the failure of many Arab industrial projects is attributed to these
foreign firms (70% of the Arab professionals confirm this assertion).
3. The exceptionally high attractiveness of the Gulf region to foreign MNCs is
attributcd to a number of factors, the most prominent of which arc cheap raw
materials (energy) and labour force, advantageous tax systems and the numerous
concessions given to foreign MNCs (capital and profit repatriation).
4. The positive contribution of MNCs is particularly manifest in their role in setting
up an improved working environment. This is particularly felt in areas such as
management systems, training, working methods/ procedures, and risk reduction.
In short, their deep—seated effects are primarily on the people by transforming
their methods of production and their input cost structure, among other things.
5. Turn—key projects in the Arab World are the least appropriate of all channels of
technology transfer; Licensing is more akin to real transfer, provided that potential
skilled man—power is available at the required quality and quantity.
6. As confirmed by the survey, one can fairly say that the Arab export—free zones,
such as Dubai and the five Egyptian zones, cannot be said to have favoured more
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economic integration of the Arab World with the world economy, neither have
they shifted emphasis from import—substitution objectives. Their influence in
these respects has been mainly neutral, or at best marginal.
7. The desire for diversification coupled with the limited size of local markets are the
major factors behind the tendency of many Gulf public enterprises to expand their
scope of business internationally. (Kuwait being cited as a typical example in
case.) On the other hand, the choice of foreign MNCs between investing in
industry or service sectors in the Arab World (and indeed in the developing
countries in general) is rather determined by the return on investment regardless
of the type of sectors. It is a decision based on purely commercial grounds. In
general, the rate of return for a given investment appears to be better (and less
risky) in the service sectors such as banking, insurance, shipping, etc., than in
industrial sectors.
As a matter of fact, there is no consensus of an ideal economic structure on which to base
an ideal partnership between MNCs and host countries of the Arab World, because the
goals and/or tradc—offs between goals, of various countries of both MNCs homc and Arab
host arc different. There can be no general answer to the way in which MNCs may affect
economic structure or economic development. This conclusion is further underlined by
the fact that government economic policies to which MNCs react also vary widely
between countries. Whether NelCs operate for the good of the Arab World will thus
depend as much on the respective governments' goals and policies as on anything which
MNCs themselves may or may not do.
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CHAPTER 11
FOUR SELECTED CASE STUDIES OF JOINT VENTURES
IN QATAR AND THE SUDAN
11.1 Introduction
Urn Saeal Industrial Estate
The author was privileged to have been given the opportunity to pay a carefully
planned visit to the Industrial Estate of Urn Saeed in The State of Qatar in June
1990, where three of its major industrial enterprises were visited and interviews
and guided tours to various production and marketing units arranged. Some key
decision—makers, virtually general managers, on instructions from the headquarter
offices in Doha, the capital, were quite prepared to explain and readily respond to
the author's questions and enquiries and also instruct others to provide him with
as much assistance as possible in the way of attending to his questions and
furnishing him with any relevant information as would be deemed appropriate to
the subject matter of his enquiry.
11.1.2	 Per Capita Income of Dear
With per capita income in 1989 totalling 17,844 U.S. dollars, Qatar has the highest
per capita income in the Third World and the fourth highest in the entire world.
According to "OPEC. Facts and Fi• Ma", January 1991, Switzerland has the
highest per capita income in the world ($25,933), followed by Japan ($22,841) and
U.S.A. ($20,765). This compares with an average of 1,646 U.S. dollars for the
Middle East region and $517 for the whole continent of Africa (both excluding
OPEC member countries).
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11.1.3	 Industrial Development in Qatar
The overall aim of curbing the drainage of non—replaceable national resources in
the State of Qatar, is regarded as the main feature of the economic policy adopted
by the State. This policy gained considerable momentum during the mid—seventies
when the state began the implementation of its comprehensive development plan
involving large—scale expansion in housing projects and establishment of new
industries reliant on abundance of capital reserves.
The extraction industries, oil and gas, still dominate the industrial sector in Qatar,
but manufacturing industries have grown in importance in recent years as a useful
secondary source of national income. They have achieved international standards
of production and have provided new work opportunities for young Qataris. The
aim of State policy has been to create a firm productive base from which to
expand and diversify sources of national income. The foundations of modem
industry were laid with the creation of special industrial zones, equipped with all
essential services required by industry.
Since it was established in 1973, the Industrial Development Technical Ccntrc
(IDTC) has played a vital and pioneering role in organising and directing the
industrial development process in Qatar. It played a central role in the
development of the industrial port at Urn Saced and the conversion of Um Saccd
into a major industrial centre at the heart of a bustling modern society.
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11.1.4	 Industrial Areas
There are several industrial zones in Qatar, including two in Urn Saeed — one for
heavy industries and one for light industries — and the Salwa Road Industrial
Estate to the west of the capital — Doha.
Urn Saeed — situated on the coast some 35 Ions south of the capital — has become
the industrial heart of Qatar. In the early seventies it was selected as the centre
for the national heavy industries because of its deep, rock free, sea water channels.
Urn Saccd is the export terminal for oil produced from the onshore fields at
Dukhan in the west of the country. The first wharf of the industrial port was
opened in 1976 and this was followed by a port expansion programme, preparing
of factory sites and construction of all necessary port facilities. A number of
heavy industries were set up in Urn Saccd including iron and steel, petrochemicals,
chemical fertilisers and a natural gas liquids complex, in addition to an oil
refinery.
In 1975 dredging work began to deepen the port, and a harbour for tugs and pilot
boats was constructed. Special wharves were built for the discharge of raw
materials and the export of industrial products for the major industries, while a
commercial freight port was also developed. Urn Sued port now counts 11
wharves, covering a total length of 2,800 metres.
The State has provided the city with all necessary auxiliary services to include
customs, immigration, health and police; and set up observation offices for port
traffic and wharves; and established a power station to supply the plants subsidiary
distribution stations.
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11.1.5	 alha_InclustriaL.Zona
Situated on Salwa Road, 7 luns west of Doha, this industrial zone, set up for light
and medium industries, has a well established infrastructure providing all the
necessary services — water, electricity at subsidised prices, and land at token rents,
alongside a modem network of roads linking it with thc capital.
11.1.6	 Four Joint Venture Case Studies
Qatar Steel Company (QASCO), Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO) and
Qatar Fertilizers Company (QAFCO) arc all industrial projects established in Qatar
during the 1970s as joint venture partnerships with foreign multinational
companies, namely Japanese (QASCO), French (QAPCO) and Norwegian
(QAFCO). The following pages will reflect on the experience of the three
factories, as case studies based on the information the author was provided with
during his personal contacts with the factories' personnel, together with some
previously acquired knowledge on the three projects during his long employment
as an economic advisor at Qatar Embassy in London.
As a Sudanese national, the author has developed a special interest in the Sudanese
Kenana Sugar Company (1CSC), which was predicated in early 1970s on
combining the natural resources of the Sudan, surplus Arab oil revenues and
Western technology and has ever since been heralded as one of the largest
integrated agro—industrial complexes of its kind in the world: while a proposed
visit to KSC has not materialised, detailed information was possible to come by
from numerous sources, prominent among which arc various essays and studies
about KSC from academicians, as well as former employees, together with a
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number of annual reports and briefings through visual aids, kindly provided by
Kenana Procurement and Liaison Office in London.
Lonrho, the British MNC, whose role in initiating the project, starting from its
feasibility study stage, and its active partnership role during the first five years of
the projects' inception before its final withdrawal from the partnership in 1977 has
been a subject of controversy, was also contacted and it was possible to gain some
insight on its role and to reflect upon it. Hence KSC has been dealt with as a
main case study, to be supplemented by the three cases of the Qatari Industrial
Estate of Urn Saeed.
CASE STUDY (1)
11.2 Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO)
QAPCO was established in 1974 as a joint venture between the Government of Qatar,
represented by Qatar General Petroleum Company (QGPC) — (84%), and CdF Chimie
(ORKEM) of France with 16% of the total company shares. The plant, which
commenced operation in February 1981 following a long gestation period of seven years,
is one of the biggest petrochemical complexes in the Arab World and the first to operate
in the Gulf region. It was designed to produce 280,000 Tonnes per year of ethylene,
140,000 Tonnes per year of low density polyethylene and 46,000 Tonnes per year of
Sulphur. A drop in oil production since 1980, however, has affected the levels of the
associated gas available for industry.
A new ethane recovery unit was commissioned by end 1985 and formally inaugurated in
early 1986.
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11.3 Performance
The complex has already exceeded by 255 tonnes the design capacity in polyethylene
production (in 1987). A similar trend is forecast for ethylene output after the completion
of the Qatari North Field Gas Project, on which the work is currently underway.
QAPCO's products are marketed worldwide. Ethylene and sulphur are marketed by
QGPC's marketing and transport department, while the low density polyethylene is
handled by ORKEM, under a marketing agreement.
According to the (French) General Manager, who is nominated by ORKEM, ORKEM
operates its activities in accordance with an operations contract as well as management
and marketing agreements.
An interview with the French Manager, in his office at the complex site, was successfully
arranged and the discussion, which lasted over one hour, has established a great deal of
valuable information and provided the basis for the assessment of the nature of the joint
venture partnership and how it proved to be a remarkable succcss ovcr a decade and a half
long cooperation.
In addition to its Qatar business, ORKEM has also a presence in Saudi Arabia since 1985
as a licensor, but with no business commitment. It has also a joint venture project with
a Moroccan Phosphate Company.
11.4 Technical Cooperation
The Ethanol plant was purchased from TECHNIP, a French engineering company, while
the Polycthcnol plant was licensed by ORKEM and erected by COPPEE RUST, which
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is a Belgian company. The utilities (water and electricity) installations were erected by
Japan Gazolin Corporation (JGC).
Qatar Government has acquired some shares in the parent company of ORICEM in France.
This explains why the marketing strategy of QAPCO relies on markets other than that of
France, since it would be inappropriate for Qatar to compete with itself in the French
market (as the French Manager put it).
The export promotion of the company's products has clearly materialised as 99% of
QAPCO's production is exported. Local value added benefits are particularly
demonstrated by the activities of local contractors who are assigned most of the
contracting jobs required by the company. Efficiency has been long enhanced through
proper exploitation of technology, after respective local technical and engineering staff
were provided with extensive training programmes, both in France and Qatar, at the
beginning of the project. The training was then maintained on a continuous on—the—job
training basis.
Pursuance of mutual interests between the two partners of the joint venture was ideally
and characteristically demonstrated by Qatar Government having shares in the French
company ORKEM. This was mainly in a bid to avoid conflict of interests and to promote
and emphasise the mutual interests and commonalities between the two partners. As for
ORICEM, its strategy is designed to capitalise on the importance of being present in a
region such as the Middle East, which in any case is an important centre for the
petrochemical industry at present, as well as in the future. It is in line with this strategy
that ORICEM has managed to expand its markets in the Middle East. (Its presence in
Saudi Arabia and Morocco as a joint venture partner has already bccn highlighted.)
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With regard to development problems and the extent to which the multinational companies
can contribute in the Arab World, the French ORKEM Manager has his own perception
about which he expresses himself in an unmistakeably emphatic tone:
"There is no development in the socialist countries of say, the Eastern bloc. It is only the
capitalist countries which are development prone; so the Arab countries can only hope
w achieve their development targets through cooperation with the capitalist system and
its multinationals" 	  	 "developing and improving technical capabilities
are the most important steps a developing country must opt for, even without reliance on
foreign multinationals. By so doing, it can create real production companies which can
help create added value 	  In Saudi Arabia, businessmen are industry-minded and tend
to produce for the long-term, thus emphasising on future development (agriculture, etc.)
rather than on what could turn out to be tempting short-term profit yielding projects."
Comparison has also been made (by the French Manager) with other oil producing Arab
countries such as Libya for instance, in which locally available resources are not fully
exploited due to lack of cooperation with foreign MNCs. Reference is made to the fact
that Libya still imports canned vegetables and fruits instead of processing them locally,
while some big projects are being built in non-priority sectors. In other words, the
locally available raw materials are not properly exploited, hence no added value is
realised. This is clearly a case for investing in the wrong activity, while ignoring priority
investments which ideally square with available natural resources.
11.5 Type of technology
In response to a general question on the appropriate type of technology, the French
Manager elected to cite Algeria as an illustration of the way he believes the Arab World
is shaping its strategics. Algeria uses technology-oriented projects without labour getting
opportunities for jobs (maybe this is one reason why a large Algerian workforce exists in
Europe). Emphasis on technology rather than on people is not an appropriate path for
economic development for the developing countries of the Arab World. This is
particularly true in view of the fact that the return on investment of highly sophisticated
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technology is not considerable, while the return on investment in training and qualifying
local manpower is much greater in the long term. Greater emphasis should therefore be
focused on people rather than on machines.
11.6 Qatarization
QAPCO's Board of Directors has adopted a policy of gradually reducing the number of
French staff in its joint venture company. From a peak of about 50 French staff members
in 1980, their number is now reduced to only 15 (in June 1990). Most of the local staff
and workforce is derived from other Arab and Asian countries, mainly Indians and
Egyptians and some of them have received intensive training in Europe, mainly in France.
In order to have a general idea about the sort of expertise which is needed, it might be
worthwhile to give a detailed account of the 15 French staff members, broken down as
summarised below:—
Engineers
	
Supervisors
1 x Production Manager	 2 x Production
1 x Maintenance Manager 	 6 x Maintenance
2 x Ethanol Plant
1 x Assistant Methanol Manager	 = a in total
= 1 in total
Plus:
1 x General Manager
2 x Members of the Board of Directors
= Grand total of 11
The French General Manager concluded our amicable discussions by a comment on the
expediency of the replacement process which has vigorously taken place recently under
the banner of 'Qatarization'. In principle he does not question the genuineness of the idea
of nationalising the staff, but he has reasons for caution. Experience and efficiency arc
two key words which should, at the end of the day, win through.
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CASE STUDY (2)
11.7 Qatar Fertilizers Company (QAFCO)
11.7.1
	
General background
A share company with limited liability was originally established by the
Government of Qatar in 1969, to utilise flared associated gas for the production
of ammonia and urea. In 1974, the government transferred its shares to Qatar
General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC), which now holds 75% of the total shares,
while the balance is held by Norske Hydro of Norway which also handles the
marketing of the products as a worldwide agent.
When it commenced production in 1973, QAFC0 was the first industrial complex
in the Urn Saced heavy industry zone and it marked the initial step in the State's
industrial diversification programme. Since the construction of a second unit in
1979, the plant has a daily capacity of 1,800 tonnes of ammonia and 2,000 of urea
— virtually all of it for export. For the year 1987, production for both was well
above the design capacity of 660,000 tonnes (urea) and 594,000 tonnes (ammonia).
Some very useful information was derived via an hour—long interview that the
author was able to conduct with the QAFC0's Norwegian General Manager, who
represents Norske Hydro Company of Norway. A brief summary of the outcome
of that discussion is outlined below.
QAFC0 cooperated in the beginning of the project with many foreign
multinational companies, notably with Unilever and Shell, as well as with other
MNCs from Sweden and Switzerland.
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11.7.2	 The Joint Venture Partnership
The Norwegian, Norske Hydro, which is a joint venture partner with Qatar
Government, has a license agreement with ICI of England and some American
companies. It undertook the training and development of the local workforce,
which is derived from some 20 nationalities; mainly Arabs, Asians as well as other
nationalities. Only a small minority of the qualified workforce (and management)
was Qatari, and still is at present, albeit this situation is gradually changing as the
Qataris have begun to train themselves in different fields of operation and
management, but again only a few of them are with industrial experience.
The basic technology was initially supplied by the British companies i.e. ICI, then
by the Japanese at a later stage. Eventually OAFC0 was licensed to utilise the
technology provided. By that time, the management and operation of the company
had transferred gradually to OAK°. It has been a very slow process of
knowledge and skills transfer, mainly because initially only a very few locals were
educated or had any industrial experience. Most Qataris come directly from
Universities after graduation, but still fewer have had economic or management
backgrounds. Most of the local staff (local not Qataris) are mainly of technical
background.
The problem is usually manifest in the fact that most Qataris are impatient to
climb up the professional ladder as fast as they possibly can. In the viewpoint
of the Norwegian Manager, and due to a number of domestic, political and social
factors, it is in fact very difficult and challenging to attempt to stand in the face
of this increasingly damaging nationalistic trend on the part of Qatari youngsters
who often push for promotion demands in the hope that they can, in record time,
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climb up the managerial and administrative ladder which entails a great deal of
decision making responsibilities for which they lack the essential experience and
scope to cope with.
11.7.3	 The workforce
On the other hand, the majority of QAFC0's workforce (Arabs and Asians mainly)
have been employed for a long time and a great number of them have accumulated
experiences in the factory that date back to its initial establishment. In this
respect, it could be said that there is a steady and stable workforce, many of whom
have been employed for more than 20 years. Experience has thus been built up
over years. As English is the official language of QAFCO, almost all recruitment
takcs place from English speaking communities as a necessary condition. In the
past, language barriers have been a handicap in communication and in performancc
in general; no longer does this problem exist at the present time.
According to the Norwcgian Managcr, there is no particular objection in principle
to "Qatarization" of the staff, but the problem mainly arises from their impaticncc
and unreasonable cxpcctations towards quick and immature promotions. This
creates a situation whereby maintaining a stable structural organisation becomes
difficult to achieve. Recently there have been an awful lot of conflicting interests
at work in the appointment of staff, with an unmistaken eagerness to Qatarisc the
workforce. "If this tendency is pushed too hard, it will certainly produce negative
results", to paraphrase the Norwegian Manager.
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11.7.4	 Management Contract
The managerial contract of Norske Hydro was scheduled to be terminated by the
end of 1990. Depending on the decision of the main shareholders (Board of
Dircctors), the Norwegian company was prepared to renew its contract and
continue with its managerial responsibilities. (The Contract was later renewed.)
Planning for future modernisation of the factory and stocking appropriate spare
parts in appropriate quantities (and qualities) needs special skills and careful
management and technical know-how and it is in this field of knowledge that the
role of the Norwegian company would be most profoundly needed.
CASE STUDY (3)
11.8 Qatar Steel Company (QASCO)
QASCO, the first integrated steel plant in the Arabian Gulf, was established in 1974, as
a result of a joint venture agreement between the Government of Qatar (70%), KOBE
Stccl of Japan (20%) and TOKYO BOEKI Ltd (10%). The actual production came on
steam in 1978.
QASCO employs a blend of 1,000 skilful staff of 12 different citizenship, interwoven with
latest production technology and equipment, who generate an annual production of more
than half a million tonnes (550,000 tonnes per year); that is 167% of the rated capacity
of the plants 330,000 tonnes per day. Its quality assurance is tailored in accordance with
international standards, together with reliable delivery schedules. As an integrated plant,
QASCO enjoys a number of auxiliary facilities which the author was able to see for
himself, as he was taken for a two-hour long guided tour around the factory and its
various production and marketing departments. Those facilities include material
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receiving/handling, main power sub—station, quality control centre, maintenance shops,
beside the other supporting facilities of sea/fresh water, compressed air, natural gas and
a clinic.
QASCO's Direct Reduction plant (D.R.) is the first in the Arabian Gulf area and the
seventh to be installed worldwide by 1977. Its options for D.R. is justified by the
possible utilisation of the abundant natural gas in Qatar as fuel. Besides being easily
operated, its product is solid and easy to handle.
While KOBE Steel Co. Ltd., shares 20% of the total equity of QASCO, it was evident
in view of QASCO's Manager, who represents the Japanese side of the joint venture, that
neither KOBE nor Qatar Government were assessing the foreign stake of shares as a
means of providing capital to the project. Equity participation was agreed on as a means
to ensure mutual interests pursuance by both partners. This is particularly so in view of
the fact that the period of commencement of business, starting in 1974 when the joint
venture agreement was signed by the respective shareholders, and culminating in 1978
when actual production came on stream, coincided with an cra in which Qatar was in no
way short of foreign capital.
Qatarization, which has long been the prime concern of QASCO's Board of Directors, has
received a substantial momentum through the year 1989, when 74 Qataris have been
appointed in various technical and administrative departments. Further training and
upgrading of Qatari staff, at all levels, has been a well attempted goal for which several
specialised training courses have been effected, to keep the Qatari staff informed of the
most up—to—date technology.
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It was very impressive, in fact, to bear witness to the management transformation of such
a sophisticated project, which is on the verge of becoming completely run by Qatari
management. it is no doubt a tremendous achievement in itself, regardless of how
efficient the local management will turn out to be in the not—too—distant future.
Notwithstanding the repeated calls for caution and sometimes misgivings that were
expressed by the foreign partners of QAPCO, QAPCO and QASCO, one has to commend
the enthusiasm and forward—looking spirit that the author detected during the briefings
and the short discussions which were arranged with some Qatari executives at QASCO.
A number of Qataris of middle—age group, with whom the author had exchanged views,
have unequivocally expressed their determination to take it on themselves to turn their
new experience in the field of management into a success. A final assessment of the
degree of their success, however, needs to be given a reasonable period of time before any
conclusive judgement can be passed and a verdict given.
CASE STUDY (4)
11.9 Kenana Sugar Company Ltd. (1CSC)
11.9.1
	 Joint Venture between Sudan and Lonrho
KSC was initially established in early 1970s as a joint venture between Sudan
Government and Lonrho. The basic sugar agreement of June 1972, which came
under repeated revision later on, stipulated the distribution of the company's shares
in the ratio of 51% — 49% between the two partners, with Sudan Government
enjoying the majority shares. Lonrho was to provide a loan to the Sudan
Government to cover its 51% share in the company's equity, in return for allowing
the former (lonrho) to be in charge of the procurement of all the capital
requirements of the project. The Government pledged to offer the project all sorts
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of concessions, including free land, water, exemption from taxes, etc., in addition
to protecting the project's interests in the form of imposition of restrictions on
sugar imports, purchase of the company's products, together with a pledge to
purchase Lonrho's share in the equity on termination.
Sudan Government's strategy for opting for the joint venture model of KSC, was
based on a number of considerations, prominent among which was the
achievement of self—sufficiency in sugar, presenting a commercially viable
development project for the foreign investors, in addition to the other usual
objectives i.e. securing more employment and training to local employment,
infrastructural development and the efficient exploitation of domestic natural
resources. The whole strategy sought to utilise KSC as a model for the trilateral
relationship between the Sudan's natural resources, the capital of the Arab oil—
exporting countries and the technology and managerial know—how of the West.
With its billion dollar multinational financing, KSC represents a unique experience
in public enterprise joint ventures. It was designed to transform the Sudan from
a net sugar importer into a significant exporter of the product, with an eye on the
nearby Arab markets at a time (early 1970s) when Sudan was conceived as a
potential "Bread—basket of the Arab World". By 1977, plans were being laid to
realise Sudan's vast unrealised potential as a source of food, with huge investments
by the Arab oil states in the reclamation of uncultivated lands. Behind this
agricultural performance was the belief that, if the United States were to respond
to any future usc of the Arab oil weapon by cutting off food supplies, as some
American officials had hinted at the time, Sudan might act as granary for the Arab
World.
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The scale was ambitious by any standard, the average sugar plant in the world
having only about half the capacity of Kerkira.
11.9.2	 Si7C of the Project
It would be worthwhile to detail below some basic information related to the size
of KSC as could be seen in more detail in its Annual Report for the year ended
30th September 1988:
Table 11.9.2
	
KSC - BASIC DATA AND FACTS:
1.	 Initial concept:
2. Record production:
3. Estate area:
4. Plantation area:
5. Irrigation works:
6. Estate roads:
7. Workforce:
8. Electricity generation:
a) Import-substitution, 150,000 tonnes p.a. of
white sugar for the domestic market
b) Foreign currency generation: balance of
production for export.
Season 1986/87 : 310,000 tonnes of sugar.
150,000 fcddans (63,000 Hectares)
85,000 feddans (35,000 Hectares)
a) 4 pump stations with a capacity of 44 cubic
metres a second.
b) Waters of White Nile carried along 29 Km
of main canal, fed along some 300 Km of
secondary canals.
c) 800 million gallons per day (irrigation
requirement).
250 Km of major roads supplemented by a 1500 Km
network of infield roads. Maximum length of canal
haul to factory = 35 Km.
7,500 permanent employees, with a further 9,000
seasonal workers engaged for the duration of the
crop.
a)	 During crop = 40 megawatts
b)	 Off-crop = 20 mcgawatts.
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As noted by Ibrahim (1983), the basic agreement referred to earlier, between
Lonrho and Sudan Government, has received very intensive media and political
coverage and more emphasis was made on Lonrho's role in the provision of
capital, advanced technology and required training for the Sudanese personnel and
Lonrho's pursuance of the Sudan's development rather than its own profitability
and growth.
But, during the subsequent years, KSC's initial agreement was subject to several
and radical revisions, starting from 1974 as Lonrho's shares were drastically
reduced and it was completely relieved of its obligation to provide capital loan to
Sudan Government as initially agreed. New sources of capital loans and new Arab
shareholders were introduced and several agreements were signed between various
partners, both on financial and technical levels. The chronology of main events
starting from the Sugar Agreement of 1972, through the Founder's Agreement of
1975, and equity participation agreement of 1975 by the Government of Kuwait
and the major capital restructuring of 1980, culminating in the factory inauguration
celebrations in March 1981, could best be summarised by the following Table,
which gives a share register of KSC as it stood on 30th September 1988.
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TABLE 11.9.3	 SHAREHOLDING OF KSC : SHAREHOLDERS
SHAREHOLDERS
TOTAL
SHAREHOLDING
Ern'
TOTAL
SHAREHOLDING
0.
.0
Government of Sudan 197.1 35.17
Government of Kuwait 170.9 3050
Government of Saudi Arabia 60.2 10.92
The Arab Investment Co. S.A.A. 39.0 6.96
Sudan Development Corporation 31.7 5.66
The Arab Authority for Agricultural 31_2 536
Investment and Development
Consortium of Sudanese Commercial 24.9 4.45
Banks
Lonrho Plc (Britain) 2.6 0.46
Nissho lwai Corporation (Japan) 0.9 0.16
Gulf Fisheries Co. W.L.L (Kuwait) 0.9 0.16
TOTAL 5603 100.00
£Sm — Sudanese pounds (in millions)
Source:	 1.	 Annual Report and Accounts — 1988.
2.	 "The Kenana Sugar Project in thc Republic of Sudan, An
experience in joint venture Financing", by Moncim Khalifa
0 ICPE 1987.
11.9.3	 Scope of the Study
This case study does not intend to give a comprehensive and detailed evaluation
of KSC experience which does, and will remain to, raise a number of controversial
questions. The prime concern of the author, however, is to shed some light on the
joint venture aspects of the project, with special emphasis on the partnership
between the Sudan Government and Lonrho. Other partners, including the major
equity participators such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, will ideally have to be a
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subject matter of a separate and more detailed study, which should remain outside
the scope of the present one.
The fact that Lonrho's role has come to an abrupt termination, long before the
completion of the project, clearly speaks for itself and confirms the failure of the
joint venture experience between the two partners. A brief assessment of the
background against which the partnership came into being in the first place, might
be helpful in our attempt to explore the possible causes of the failure.
11.9.4	 Management Contract and Sales Agreement — 1975 
The Management Agreement which followed the incorporation of KSC in 1975,
has stipulated that Lonrho was to provide the company with general management,
consultancy, technical assistance, training, marketing and purchasing acumen. In
effect, this agreement had put KSC, to paraphrase Ibrahim, (1983) "under the
complete control of Lonrho".
Lonrho had supervised the purchase of all the basic plant, machinery and
equipment for the project before the termination of its Management Contract in
May 1977, by which time its shares in KSC dropped further to 0.46%. This was
due to the escalating costs of the project that necessitated the introduction of the
Government of Kuwait as a shareholder and prospective lender. The termination
of Lonrho's Management Contract, as announced through a press release issued by
the Board of Directors, was due, amongst other reasons, to its failure to fulfil its
promises to finance the project and the failure of its original feasibility study to
estimate the actual costs involved, as it proved to be completely inaccurate and
misleading.
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The Sugar Sales Agreement between KSC and Sudan Government in May 1975,
provides for the sale of 150,000 metric tonnes of KSC sugar production per annum
to the Sudan Government on the basis of a certain "cost plus" formula, which is
not strictly adhered to at present. Any surplus production above the first 150,000
tonnes is earmarked for export, with the aim of earning foreign currency needed
for debt servicing and the payment of imported inputs, etc. At present the whole
volume of production is needed for local consumption, therefore KSC is selling
the balance of its production (above the 150,000 tonnes limit) to the Sudan
Government for hard currency, at a price based on the London Daily Market Price,
plus notional loading, freight and insurance costs. This arrangement is beneficial
to KSC, as it provides a ready—made market in the present climate of global over-
capacity and depressed world sugar market prices, and also to the Sudan
Government which, at a time of acknowledged economic difficulties, is not
required to find lump sum financing for sugar imports.
11.9.5	 Indigenisation of staff:
A lot of emphasis was made on the process of training the Sudanese as one of the
major objectives of KSC in all of its agreements. However, no training agreement
was concluded with Lonrho or any other corporation up to 1982, as indicated by
Ibrahim (1983), while M. Khalifa (1987), on the other hand, mentions "a
progressive policy of Sudanisation" among the successful measures taken by KSC
to achieve cutting costs. Whilst Ibrahim expresses his unhappiness about what he
perceives as a failure even to design a Sudanisation programme up until 1982 of
the technical and managerial posts, and mentions in support of his argument that
by that particular year there were still 534 foreign experts occupying all of the
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middle and high-level technical posts in KSC, the picture which is portrayed by
the 1987 Annual Report tells a rather different story:
"With the Cane Production Division virtually 100% Sudanised and a series of
senior Sudanese appointments made within the factory and elsewhere, the
Sudanisation programme is largely on course at managerial level However,
certain artisan grades within the factory and workshops are a particular cause for
concern with a number of expatriates retained of necessity beyond their scheduled
replacement dates as a result of a dearth of available skilled Sudanese labour.
	  The retrenchment of job opportunities for Sudanese nationals in the labour
markets of the oil-producing states has not brought about the anticipated
improvement in the situation".
11.9.6	 Conflicting_ goals
The Sudan Government's main objectives behind this project were to use the joint
venture model as a channel for acquiring the managerial know-how and
technology of the Western Multinationals; the presence of the latter, in itself, was
a factor that showed credibility and gave some confidence to the Arab investors.
Thus the model would be replicable in other industries or economic sectors.
Lonrho's strategy, in contrast, was based on the following:-
a. to gain control over a macro-economic project without spending too much
capital or requiring too many loans;
b. to use KSC as a springboard to expand towards the wealthy Arab
countries; and
c. to use the fashionable model of international joint venture for economic
growth and profitability linked to the goals of development.
It is inevitable that a joint venture which is based on conflicting rather than mutual
and complementary goals, is bound to confront problems. As for KSC, some such
problems could be briefly referred to here as follows:-
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a.	 The credibility of the feasibility study conducted by Lonrho was
questionable on many grounds:
1) actual cost proved to be far above estimated figures;
2) self—sufficiency predicted has not been realised even to date, hence
no exports or hard currency have been achieved;
3) sugar production was predicted to start in 1975/76 whereas it did
not begin until 1981.
b. On termination of Lonrho's Management Agreement, neither a re-
evaluation of its managerial procedures was made, nor alternative
management contract sought in replacement. Lonrho's management
procedures continued, despite the fact that the termination of contract
coincided with the completion of construction stage. Since the surrounding
conditions of construction and production stages are naturally different, a
new managerial philosophy, procedures, and traditions should have ideally
been promoted.
c. Potential economies of scale led to problems of management control,
exorbitant costs and the complexities and extended length of the
construction phase.
11.9.7	 1 nnrho's view 
The author was able to contact Lonrho and a one—hour long interview with the
Managing Director of KSC before Lonrho's withdrawal, has shed some light on
the circumstances leading Lonrho to pull out of the project in 1977. This section
primarily intends to reflect on the KSC experience from Lonrho's viewpoint.
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The discrepancy between the cost of the project as forecast by the feasibility study
undertaken by Lonrho and the much higher actual cost, was mainly due to the oil
shock of 1973, which led to oil price levels beyond any planner's expectations.
This development necessitated a complete revision not only of the cost estimates,
but also of the basic agreement of the joint venture between Lonrho and Sudan
Government. As a result, the government of Kuwait was persuaded to play a
leading role as a shareholder (30.5%) and a prospective lender. Lonrho's
withdrawal from the project later on, was prompted by the existence of sharp
differences of views regarding major strategic choices between Lonrho and the
new shareholder (Kuwait). The latter demanded to undergo radical revisions to
the earlier agreements, but such demands were not agreeable to Lonrho. The
Sudan Government had, in fact, no option but to go along with the Kuwaiti's
proposals, in view of the fact that Kuwait, at the time, was an indispensable
partner, a major shareholder and prospective lender, whereas Lonrho's role was
solely confined to management and technical advice. Lonrho's views were that its
management philosophy and that of the major shareholder (Kuwait), were clearly
incompatible, and accordingly decided to pull out. In this respect, one might recall
the reasons announced by KSC Board of Directors, to be Lonrho's failure to fulfil
its earlier pledges to assist with financing the project, and the failure of its original
feasibility study to forecast the actual cost of the project.
According to Lonrho, its failure to provide the needed finance was due to a
number of reasons:
1.	 Its failure to persuade the British Government to provide credit guarantee
facilities to Lonrho and hence to KSC.
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2. The reluctance of the western financial institutions to assist the Sudan
Government in view of the political development arising from the
assassination, in 1973, of the American Ambassador in Khartoum, by a
group of radical Palestinians.
3. In view of the escalating financial requirements of the project in the wake
of the 1973 sharp increases of oil prices, Lonrho's efforts have failed to
provide more than token financial loans from French and Japanese
financial institutions. This was far less than the actual requirements to
prevent the project from coming to a total halt.
As for the objectives behind Lonrho's involvement in KSC, Lonrho did not seek
to use Sudan as a gateway to other African countries, nor as a springboard to
expand to the wealthy Arab countries. The Managing Director of KSC has
indicated to the author that their involvement in Sudan has actually followed, and
not preceded, their involvement in the sugar industry business in other parts of
Africa. He further explained that he himself happened to derive most of his
experience elsewhere in Africa, before he was postcd to KSC. On thc other hand,
since there has been no more sugar projects in the Arab countries in which Lonrho
had stakes following the experience in KSC, the perceived objective of its
intention to expand to the Arab World has proved to have no ground either. KSC
was a product of a mutual approach between Lonrho, on the one hand, and the
Sudan Government on the other, to establish a viable enterprise in line with the
declared development policy of Sudan, when the whole idea was initially
conceived and implemented.
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In Lonrho's views, KSC has proved to be a success, even after it ceased to have
a stake in it. In fact, Lonrho's maintenance of its nominal share of 0.46% was not
a deliberate strategy, but KSC, at the time of its withdrawal, was not financially
in a position to pay back Lonrho's share, so it was automatically allocated as
shares pertaining to Lonrho. As to the fact that the ultimate cost of the project has
turned out to be higher than originally anticipated, there is nothing particularly
peculiar, as many similar projects throughout the world have experienced similar
problems and challenges. Moreover, KSC today compares favourably to other
existing sugar factories in the Sudan, namely Geneid, New Haifa, Scnnar and
Assalaya sugar factories, in terms of the quality of the product and the actual
production capacity as compared with the maximum capacity.
According to Lonrho, the accusation that it assumed a dominant role during the
equipment purchase stage, is unfounded. The purchases of all machinery and
factory equipment took place under the direct control and supervision of KSC
Board of Directors and Lonrho simply assumed its responsibilities under the
provisions of its agreements with Sudan Government. Moreover, Lonrho believes
that it has successfully established a good working relationship with Sudan
Government without any major disputes, right up to the stage where Kuwait
Government assumed a major role in formulating KSC's strategy, a strategy which,
as the Managing Director of the project, Lonrho thought to be not conducive to
the interests of KSC and incompatible with its own management philosophy.
11.9.8	 Peculiarity of KSC
KSC enjoys some peculiar characteristics, with rarc similarities in other projects
of similar nature. In this respect the following can be highlighted:—
338
1. Provision and funding by the project (ICSC) of major infrastructure and
social services ($134m — 29.2% of the estimated total capital cost of the
whole project). This is in contrast to the world's sugar industry, which
enjoys the benefit of state support in the provision of such services.
2. KSC represents a case whereby the project is both import—substituting and
export—oriented at the same time.
3. One of the largest integrated projects of its kind in the world.
4. A unique experience in public enterprise joint ventures, in terms of seeking
to acquire capital and technology through tripatriate cooperation.
5. Despite the many problems KSC encountered, it proved an outstanding
technical success, particularly insofar as the quality of its product is
concerned. According to the technical assessment by F. C. Schaffer and
Associates Inc., KSC factory ranked amongst the top 1% in the world in
respect of overall processing efficiencies.
11.9.9
	
Perceived and actual role of Lonrho
In an international joint venture, a diligent promoter can play a prominent role in
the configuration of the venture's shape and future. In KSC, Lonrho had fully
assumed that role, both technically and financially, while the Sudan Governments
role at first was only nominal.
The basic Sugar Agreement of 1972 between Lonrho and Sudan Government,
secured for the former complete control over the company through the exclusive
right of the technical, administrative, financial and marketing management of the
company. But on the termination of Lonrho's Management Agreement, the project
was unfortunately left in 1977 without its promoter and original managing
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company in a real financial crisis, facing a delay of several years in its scheduled
production, with a cost quadrupling the estimation of its feasibility study (3599.2m
in 1977).
While a number of reasons were given for the termination of Lonrho's involvement
in KSC, one particular justification advanced by Ibrahim (1983), seems to have the
strongest appeal of all the others: that real justification is thought to be that, once
the purchase of the plant, machinery and equipment was completed and the
construction contracts were awarded, the primary spending era of KSC was
virtually over. Lonrho's stay to face the hectic troubles of production, with almost
nominal management fees, (Ls.175,000 p.a.) would certainly be incomprehensible.
Another justification may be that Lonrho was no longer expecting more capital to
be poured into KSC.
11.9.10	 Contrave .y about KSC
KSC has for some time been a subject of controversy, as it raises a number of
questions which nobody can claim to have satisfactory or comprehensive answers
to. By the way of attempting to offer a general appraisal, one has to address the
following questions:—
a. Was the project a top priority justifying the usc of the nationally scarce
resources which were allocated to it?
b. What was the degree of awareness on the part of Sudan Government
regarding the roles and intentions of the various partners in the joint
venture, particularly Lonrho, and was there a potential conflict of their
respective interests and objectives?
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c. Was the project envisaged on too grand a scale, given the potential
technical, financial and managerial capabilities of the Sudan?
d. Is KSC likely to contribute efficiently to the development of the Sugar
Industry in the Sudan, in terms of productivity and the spill-over effect
with regard to domestically generated know-how, both at technical and
managerial levels?
e. Is KSC experience generally encouraging or discouraging foreign
investments in the Sudan, having been intended as a model for the trilateral
relationship investment?
To sum up, Sudan in 1991 is still importing sugar and is not even in a position to
pay for KSC and its shareholders in hard currency. While it would be only fair
to say that the experience still frightens the foreign investors, one should not
overlook the positive side of KSCs story. It's performance (in 1988) at around
80% of its nominal design capacity, in the light of the overwhelming constraints
faced, is not a bad achievement and is to be regarded as a target for future. While
KSC's original intention to participate in self-sufficiency of sugar consumption in
the Sudan has not been yet realised, and despite the fact that there remains some
considerable way to go before commercial viability can be assured, and the
chronic shortage nationally of foreign currency be adequately met, KSC in the
long run is expected to be of lasting benefit to the Sudan in terms of:
a. providing a major source of employment;
b. providing training facilities and thus increasing the level of skills of the
local employees;
c. provision of self-sufficiency in a basic food commodity with consequential
saving in foreign currency;
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d. supporting Sudanese manufacturers and supply industries;
e. the expectation that the Sudan's difficulties, reflected in an increased
turnover of skilled Sudanese production and maintenance staff, is likely to
be reversed by the eventual return of its own skilled workers from the oil—
rich Gulf States;
f. some promising expansion schemes presently in the pipeline, including the
use of Molasses (sugar by—product) in manufacturing cattle feed
supplements and in the production of domestic charcoal; and
g. the fact that KSC has substantially contributed to the local infrastructure
and hence to the economic and social development of the surrounding
region. No doubt it will continue to do so for as long as the project is kept
in operation.
In conclusion, it is perhaps pertinent to point out that KSC, which is regarded as
one of the world's major sugar producers, with a considerable technical success,
has a potential scope for recovery which considerably outweighs its downturn.
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11.10 Summary and Conclusions to the Four Case Studies:
11.10.1	 Characteristics of Joint Ventures in the Arab World
The neutral assessment of the foregoing four cases would draw our attention to
some commonalities of the international joint venture experiences which The Arab
World has gone through over the last two decades. While the industrial
environment among different Arab countries varies, sometimes significantly,
particularly between the oil—producing states and those which are not endowed
with such strategically significant resources, some common themes are believed
to have shaped the joint venture partnerships with foreign multinational companies,
with regard to areas such as technology transfer, training of local nationals to
replace foreign experts, management and marketing contracts, license agreements
and the technical cooperation between respective partners.
Each one of the four cases happened to be peculiar in its own right, having been
the first project of its kind in the particular sector and geographical location. They
all share, however, the characteristic of having to enjoy the advantage of utilizing
the abundance of natural resources i.e. hydrocarbon in Qatar and fertile agricultural
land and irrigation water needed for a potentially successful agro—industrial project
in Sudan. Each of the three Qatari factories is heralded as the first industrial
complex of its kind in Qatar and together they represent an important step in the
states' industrial diversification programme. The equity participation in the Qatari
projects has not been inspired by the need for capital finance, while this very
factor was the major motive behind opting for foreign equity shareholders in KSC
joint venture. In fact, the need to attract Arab capital to be invested in the Sudan
was the main consideration behind the original idea right from the outset. The
joint venture which was subsequently established between the Sudan on the one
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hand, and both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the other, was basically an attempt
on the part of the former to overcome its chronic lack of capital resources.
While holding only minority shares in the joint ventures, the foreign partners in
all four cases have been charged with the responsibility of handling the
management and marketing of the production as worldwide agents, with a possible
exception of KSC, whose marketing strategy was initially based on some
inaccurate predictions which have never been fulfilled. The technical cooperation
can best be demonstrated by the Norwegian Norske Hydro of QAFCO, who had
a license agreement with ICI of England and some American companies, thus
ensuring the minimum standard of technical success. Similar arrangements were
also made by the other three factories.
Two peculiar experiences stand out as a sign of departure from thc general pattern
of international joint venture agreements in The Arab World. One is the
acquisition of Qatar Government of some shares in the French company (ORKEM)
with which a joint venture partnership existed in QAPCO. The idea was to secure
a more fruitful relationship based on mutual interests, which have been intcrlinked
as a result of each partners' share ownership in the others' concern. The other
relates to KSC, where Lonrho's initial agreement with the Sudan Government
assured a characteristically dominant role for Lonrho at the outset of the project,
including the feasibility study, through all subsequent stages leading to the plant
erection. It is also noted that in all joint venture cases, apart from the main
foreign partner, a number of other foreign companies wcrc also involved with
some priorities secured for those belonging to the country of origin of the main
foreign joint venture partner. Reference can be made to TECHNIP, the French
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engineering company which was licensed by the Frcnch ORKEM of QAPCO to
supply the main machinery which was erected by a Belgian company, while the
utilities installations were left under the responsibility of a Japanese company.
Similar arrangements were also followed in KSC case, which involved foreign
companies and nationals from as many as 20 different countries. So, if one talks
about joint ventures between an Arab country and a foreign company, one should
exercise caution to avoid a possible misrepresentation; while joint ventures usually
arc established with one major foreign partner, in fact cooperation takes place with
many other foreign companies with or without the pm—knowledge or supervision
of the main joint venture foreign partner.
A striking phenomenon which was revealed by the case studies, is the relatively
long time which elapses between the initial perception of a joint venture project
(feasibility study) and its completion date (start of production). While a clear—cut
yardstick as to the appropriate or average period of construction time of a typical
industrial project is difficult to generalise in pursuit of a meaningful comparison,
it is quite evident that such gestation period was exceptionally considerable in the
cases under consideration. Notwithstanding all the technical complexities of
cooperation agreements and the slow progress of execution, the importance of the
time factor and the exacerbating high cost of delaying the completion date have
been ignored. (The continued erosion in value of the Sudanese pound, a process
that began in June 1978, had a profound effect on KSC's cost structure. From
September 1979 to 1990 the parity of the Sudanese pound against the US dollar
has gone down from LS 1.00 = US$ 2.00 to a low of LS 1.00 = US$ 0.10;
moreover the domestic annual inflation rate is now well into three digit figures.)
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11.10.2	 Indigenisation of work force 
Among the many slogans which arc commonly raised by government officials and
professions in general in the Arab World, indigenisation of the work force is the
one most prominently featured. The case studies have confirmed that what the
Arab professionals in the main survey have emphasised on this matter was not
mere rhetoric. At the practical level, the experience of the four projects under
question reflected the fact that the indigenisation process has proceeded with a
pace which was considered fast enough to call for caution by the foreign partners
of the joint ventures. According to them, too much speed could possibly lead to
unwarranted results. In 1989 alone, 74 Qataris have been appointed in various
technical and administrative departments in QASCO. Similar trends have been
clearly noted in the other three cases. It is worthwhile mentioning that most of
the Qatari projects have benefited from the advantage of prolonged employment
and accumulated experience for the majority of manual skilled and semi—skilled
work force, implying thus the sense of stability and continuity due to the low
turnover rate. What is clearly evident however, is the fact that the foreign partners
in these joint ventures arc adamant in their resistance of the tendency of the local
(Arab) partners to replace particular managerial and technical personnel on the
ground that they have to retain as many foreign expatriates as possible in order to
maintain the high quality of management and products. In most cases the Boards
of Directors, whose members arc predominantly local nationals, are persistent in
pressing hard for accelerating the process of handing over of management to local
managers, particularly at the top and middle managerial levels. Such steps are
taken under the banner of "Qatarization" or "Sudanisation".
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In the three Qatari cases, the author's attention was particularly drawn to the
structure of work force at various levels. At the bottom level (skilled and non—
skilled workers) the foreign workers, particularly Asians, are clearly dominant.
Generally, further up the management hierarchy thc Qatari nationals make their
presence felt. They are more highly visible at the top management level but less
obviously so at the middle and administrative staff levels. At the labourer's level,
the nationals arc completely non—existent. This phenomenon is not only peculiar
to Qatar, but is typical of the industrial sectors of all oil—producing Gulf States.
The likely drawback of management in the Arab World is that, in most cases,
particularly in the oil producing Gulf States, a very high proportion of managers
have risen to their positions, not through their own efforts, but rather through some
inheritance. There is a strong tendency for those people who inherit a secure
economic position to exert little effort for their advancement. The means to
advancement in a large corporation must be through acquiring a sound foundation
in one of the professional skills, because the need to acquire and develop these
skills leaves little time for the pursuit of power as an end in itself and
advancement in large corporations, such as those referred to in our case studies,
must be based on proven professional ability if the corporation is to survive
successfully.
While there is no objection, even on the part of the foreign partners, against the
principle of staff indigcnisation, it is the speed and the abrupt way with which
some countries elect to enforce such policy, which is subject to criticism and
somctimcs resistance. Because many multinationals tend to place the quality of
their operations at the forefront of their strategy, their expressed misgivings arc
347
naturally justified. The question to be addressed, however, is not so much the
reluctance of foreign partners to concede to the pressure for indigenisation on the
ground that not adequate experience has been readily available among the
nationals. It is rather to do with the practical reasons as to why, after all these
years of partnership, we find that adequate qualifications have not been acquired
by the nationals, nor appropriate training supplied. It is apparent that the blame
should equally lie on the shoulders of both partners, as they must have contributed
with their due share in creating this state of affairs, albeit in varying degrees of
responsibility.
The Sudanisation programme in KSC however, has gradually but slowly improved,
since ten years after the start of its first production season, the Sudanese elements
arc dominant in the overwhelming majority of the managerial and technical posts.
Many other divisions, including the Cane Production Division, have been one
hundred percent Sudanised and it appears to be heading towards a complete
Sudanisation of the whole project in a few years time. Of course the joint venture
partners will continue to maintain some token existence, as their representatives
in the factory and elsewhere. It is also expected that a number of expatriates from
the nationals of the industrialised countries will be retained as a natural link
between Kenana and the ever—advancing and technologically changing world.
11.10.3	 Marketing Agreements
The fact that some kind of marketing or sales agreements were concluded with the
foreign joint venture partners of all the four cases, reflects that the Arabs'
experience in international marketing is fairly limited. This phenomenon seems
to suggest that the worldwide marketing of the Arab production should be left in
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the hands of foreign companies. After more than a decade of partnership, in
producing and internationally marketing Qatari products, which are mainly export—
oriented, there seems to be no sign of any forthcoming take—over by the Qatari
partner of the marketing operations. This in itself is a further manifestation that
the role of the foreign multinational partners in the Arab joint venture projects still
leaves a considerable amount to be desired in transferring the marketing know—
how to their Arab partners.
11.10.4	 Capacity Utilisation
In view of the fact that almost all cases revealed that their designed production
capacities were exceeded only a few years after they started production, one is
bound to raise the question of whether such development is due to technological
advance or rather to exceptionally hard work on the part of the projects'
management and work force. Alternatively, one would not exclude yet another
explanation, which suggests that there might have been an error in the theoretical
estimates of the nominal capacity on the part of the designers or feasibility study
consultants. It is rather surprising to find out that all three Qatari factories have
exceeded their maximum capacities, while KSC has operated at 80% of its
nominal design capacity in 1988. Moreover, these industrial projects were all in
a position to expand, both horizontally and vertically, within a few years after their
first production seasons. Again, it is not quite clear whether such a development
was due to an increasing world demand or a result of the need to cope with newly
introduced production technology. As for KSC, one can find an explanation in the
fact that, owing to the financial problems which the project was confronted with
in its different phases of construction, some installations were postponed for future
consideration i.e. Molasses, Charcoal and the Cube Sugar Plant, all of which were
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completed at a later stage following the inauguration of the project in 1981. On
the other hand, there seems to have been no reason to believe that some problems
have occurred as a result of inaccurate feasibility studies in the three cases of
Qatar projects. As for KSC, the feasibility study conducted by Lonrho was
subsequently thrown into question on the grounds of its inaccurate predictions
regarding consumption levels, potentials for raising adequate finance to complete
the project, etc. Such failure to accurately foresee future developments confirms
what some 70% of the Arab professionals in the main survey have emphasised,
when they attributed the failure of some manufacturing companies in The Arab
World to the defective and misleading feasibility studies, mostly carried out by
foreign multinationals or under their direct supervision.
11.10.5	 Final Conclusions
It is difficult to refer to the four cases as success stories or otherwise on the basis
of the limited information made available. In fact, no detailed information was
readily available, or sought, to establish the commercial viability of these projects,
as the prime concern was directed to assess the practises involved in the
establishment of the joint venture partnership between The Arab Governments and
foreign multinationals. The most striking observation, however, may have been
the considerably long period spent on most of these industrial projects before
actual production was realised. While some justifications could be given to
explain this phenomenon, some questions will remain unresolved regarding the
economic and commercial justification of a project, such as KSC, in view of the
known scarcity of financial resources of the Sudan. One particularly pressing
question will always remain unanswered about the actual motivation and objectives
of Lonrho in instigating thc whole projcct, in the light of its pledges given to
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organise its financing as a major partner, only to withdraw a few years later. The
timing of the termination of its contract is also a source of controversy, since it
coincided with a crucial stage in which Sudan Government was left with no other
viable option but to proceed to complete the project at any cost.
One problem which is highlighted by the literature survey (Dunning, 1985, p.425)
and which joint venture experiences such as that of KSC of Sudan have practically
confirmed, is the lack of ability on the part of some developing countries to know
what is the best economic structure to embark on. They therefore cannot have the
necessary knowledge of MNCs' resource allocative decisions to intervene usefully.
It is on the basis of such argument that many of the Arab professionals who have
taken part in our survey have elected to take a neutral stance towards MNCs.
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CHAFFER 12
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
12.1 Introduction
Section 12.2 of this Chapter summarises the major findings of the main survey and case
studies of Chapter 9 through Chapter 11. Section 12.3 identifies the implications of the
research findings on the theories of Development, Trade, MNCs and Foreign Direct
Investment, insofar as their relevance to the developing countries of the Arab world is
concerned. Section 12.4 offers some policy recommendations on how the Arab countries
can create a constructive partnership of joint ventures and other types of cooperation with
foreign multinationals and how to improve the technology transfer prospects. Section 12.5
suggests appropriate future research areas which neither this study nor previous ones have
adequately tackled. The last section concludes the thesis by the inclusion of some
comments on the relationship of the entire work to the many ongoing political, economic
and social changes which are taking place globally, as well as at the Arab regional level.
12.2 Summary of major findings
12.2.1	 Theories and Practices of Development
There are some important phenomena in the area of economic performance of the
developing countries of the Arab world, which existing theory cannot easily
explain. No specific explanation is given, for instance, to the failure of technology
transfer to generate sustained innovative capacity in the Arab countries, some of
which have been involved with western MNCs and western technology for many
decades. Theories of competitive advantages also failed to explain why an
industrial sector such as the petrochemical industry in thc Arabian Gulf, which
enjoys the advantages of both western technology and the low cost of production
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in terms of raw materials and manpower, has as yet not been in a position to
compete worldwide with similar products originated elsewhere, despite the fact
that the quality of the Gulf produce is the same. While cultural factors may
partially inhibit the acquisition of scientific ideas and western working practices
in the Arab world, the failure of foreign investors to develop backward linkages
with indigenous suppliers would be more acceptable as an explanation. As for the
economic factors, the cost of adapting technologies by MNCs to local conditions,
may determine the type of technology used in the Arab host countries. Such
economic considerations (which include the extent of profitability) would possibly
explain the reason behind the use of capital-intensive technologies by MNCs in
labour-abundant Arab countries. The importance of mechanisation in meeting
quality standards in export markets is a possible explanation for particular types
of investment in the agricultural and some industrial fields.
It is also found that, owing to the wide variation among the countries of the Arab
world, and the fact that the country patterns of international competition appear to
differ remarkably (notably between thc oil producing countries and those without
oil resources), no single method or theory would be appropriate to all Arab
countries. They are too diverse in their relationships to allow this. This confirms
other studies' findings, that a unified theoretical approach to be applied
indiscriminately among the countries of the region, would be unworkable.
12.2.2	 The Role of Profits
Central to the debate over MNCs is what the Arab scholars have overwhelmingly
emphasised in our main survey, that the ovcr-riding concern of MNCs is to
achieve maximum profitability in line with their global corporate strategics. This
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analysis appears to conform with the main thrust of the economic and trade
theories in which profit maximisation by economic enterprises is highly featured
as a criteria for their economic success. The ramifications of the pursuit of such
strategy by KNCs on the Arab countries have been identified both by this study
and the literature review. Below is a summary of the main areas of dissatisfaction
from the Arab host countries' perspective:
a. MNCs activities in the Arab region leave a great deal to be desired in
terms of providing new jobs, adequate training opportunities for local
nationals, additional investment capital, etc.;
b. MNCs are often reluctant to transfer their technology, a fact which is
evident in their clear preference for turn—key projects. Their lack of
commitment to contribute positively in the transfer of technology can also
be seen in their reluctance to establish local centres for research and
development;
c. As shown by the survey and the case studies, MNCs often have a
monopoly over marketing operations and marketing know—how, and seem
to regard these activities as well—protected areas which need to be
exclusively under their controlled domain;
d. MNCs preference for capital—intensive technology contradicts the national
interests of many Arab countries, notably those with surplus and growing
labour supply. Capital—intensive projects are often inappropriate and
sometimes unnecessarily more costly than is needed or afforded;
e. On the ground that the return on capital invested in the Arab world is less
than the management (and marketing) royalty fees, the MNCs arc often
reluctant to participate in equity. Even in the fcw cases whcrc equity is
354
undertaken, they often managc to recover their equity shares (as a survey
participant claimed) through inflated equipment and service costs;
f. Inaccurate feasibility studies undertaken by foreign consultancy firms
(MNCs) often result in fatal errors in the process of viable ins..estmcnt
selection and project evaluation. According to ESCWA report on "impact
of MNCs on development in Saudi Arabia", [1988, p.85], some MNCs
have been detected on many occasions in Saudi Arabia carrying out a study
and drawing up plans with specifications matching the products of specific
producers;
g. KNCs often set exorbitant prices for their contracts with their Arab
business partners.
While the above misgivings on the role of MNCs have been strongly expressed
by an increasing number of the survey participants, the study has also established
that the difficulties that have been facing many joint venture undertakings in the
Arab world, arc partially attributed to the limited experience the Arab countries
have in initiating, establishing and operating industrial ventures. The Arab side
of the partnership has certainly its due share of the blame in any failure stories of
their joint partnerships with foreign MNCs.
12.2.3	 The Need for greater Regional Cooperation
This study shows quite clearly that the realisation of greater regional cooperation
among the Arab States is the only way to overcome the many constraints impeding
their development process. Such a conclusion starts from the premise that as the
acquisition and development of technology and technical and managerial know—
how arc strategic elements in the proccss of regional development and integration,
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it becomes necessary to cooperate at the regional level, in so far as technology
transfer is concerned. Such a cooperation would consist of many strategies, which
this study has highlighted. The Gulf Cooperation Council, having initiated the
process of economic integration as a coherent group among the Arab States, has
best exemplified the essence of economic integration at their regional level, by
taking steps to coordinate their industrial and investment projects so as to prevent
duplication, waste and harmful competition. Notable among such projects for
which a regional strategy has evolved, is the petrochemical sector, the coordinated
development of which has materialised with a view to maximising material gains
and competitive advantages in the production and sales of these technologically
sophisticated and capital—intensive products. As for other industrial projects, it is
seen that a regional approach to product specialisation and pooling the markets,
should provide initial relief to the scale—constraints and that, further enlargement
of the markets through extra—regional arrangements (primarily on a Pan—Arab
basis) would be necessary to combine economies of scale with efficiency.
This study finds that many lessons could be drawn from the past experiences of
various regional economic groupings. The establishment of the European Coal and
Steel Community in the 1950s was, in fact, seen as only the first step in what has
been a long, and not always smooth, journey to a single market for the EC in
1992. The differences in language and culture no longer arouse passions of hatred
and war between them. The lesson to be learned by other economic groupings,
and notably in the Arab context is that economic integration is not perceived only
for its positive benefits on the economic level, but also for its potentials in healing
long—standing historic diversities and enmities.
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12.2.4	 International Trade Policies
Today the concept of global free trade is rapidly loosing its relevance. While the
convention is that the industrialised countries trade freely with the world, but in
reality they increasingly trade between themselves, and only selectively with
external markets in second and third world countries. On the other hand, the
production and export performance of the newly industrialising economies (and
Japan) has been impressive enough to encourage an increasing number of
developing countries, including the Arab States, to pursue similar policies, which
include the erection of non-tariff barriers. Practically, the Arab markcts in general
have for long allowed goods of all sorts to enter freely with little, if any, barriers,
while the Arab industrial exports appear to face an uphill task in seeking access
to the OECD markets, which are heavily loaded with protectionism. The
competitive advantages of some Arab industrial products (i.e. petrochemicals), will
not be fully reflected in rising productivity unless these products have access to
foreign markets. A pressing goal of the Arab governments, therefore, is to pursue
open market access vigorously in every foreign market. In fact, many trading
nations continue to call for revisions in some GATT articles pertaining to
negotiation of tariff schedules [Article XXVIII] on the ground that the present
distribution of negotiating rights favours large suppliers and creates disincentives
for small suppliers to enter into tariff-binding negotiations. The past experience
of the Arab industrial development and the trade barriers erected against the
exports of Gulf petrochemicals to Europe and elsewhere, as this study has
highlighted, can only add new dimensions in support of such calls for reciprocity.
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12.2.5	 Joint Ventures and State Companies 
The research finds that the bulk of the joint venture projects which have been
surveyed, and those which were brought to the author's knowledge, have mainly
been between foreign MNCs and the Arab governments or public sector
companies. The reality in the Arab world appears to contradict what most
literature and economic theorists suggest, that private sectors are more favourable
to do business with in view of the fact that almost all MNCs involved in the Arab
markets belong to the private sector. The Arab world is characterised by heavy
statc involvement in the economy, even relative to much of the rest of the Third
World. According to a World Bank Study in 1983, the state owned enterprises in
manufacturing in Egypt was 65 per cent, Tunisia 60 per cent and Syria 58 per
cent. The privatisation programmes which have been recently encouraged in most
of the Arab countries as a part of IMF—inspired structural programmes, with the
target of gradually reducing the size of the public sector, have proved to be
irrelevant in the particular cases of the Arab oil producing countries, in which
major industrial and utility projects are in the domain of the public sector. In fact
there arc a number of arguments against the notion of privatisation in the Arab
Gulf State in particular. Paul Steven [1989, p58] has convincingly advanced some
of these as follows:
a. If encouraging competition through more suppliers and rivalry is the target,
this is in fact inhibited on the ground that national markets are too small,
particularly in the Gulf States.
b. Privatisation is not conducive to successful technology transfer, neither to
upgrading skills and training.
c. Given the nature of the political systems in most of the Arab countries,
privatised enterprises arc not completely free from government interference.
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The probability of the State willingly relinquishing its predominant position
seems unlikely.
d. Far from redistributing wealth, privatisation programmes would reinforce
the existing concentration of economic (and political) power.
e. Preferences to the workers which are usually associated with privatisation
programmes arc irrelevant in the Gulf States, due to the exceptionally high
degree of expatriates' predominance.
Other arguments against privatisation in the rest of the Arab world include:
a. Shortage of domestic investors in many non—oil producing Arab countries,
particularly in those projects which are too large for domestic capital
market to swallow (foreign investment is a sensitive issue in many of thcsc
countries).
b. Although many privatisation supporters see a potential repatriation of Arab
capital (from the western financial markets) as a major gain from such
programmes, the past experience suggests disappointing records in reality.
C.	 Capital markets arc underdeveloped, thus making share distribution
associated with privatisation problematic.
d. If privatisation is on the horizon, it is likely to freeze decision—making in
the enterprises concerned for years until new owners are in place, as
management would adopt a wait—and—see approach.
In conclusion, one can say that regarding privatisation in the Arab world, the
objectives which are desirable are not feasible, and those which arc feasible arc
not desirable. In reality, while 'privatisation' is the slogan, the true watchwords
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are 'reform' and market 'liberalisation', as this study has identified on a number of
occasions.
12.2.6	 Summary of the Gulf Survey Findings 
On the basis of the analysis of the information gathered from our main survey
participants, a summary of the main findings are briefly given below as follows:
a. The contributions of foreign multinationals to the advancement and
development of the Arab economics are not highly rated by the Arab
professionals. In itself this fact reflects the failure of these companies to
impress their Arab partners of their usefulness in such a manner, which
could support the suggestion that their continued presence in the region is
to be taken for granted. If anything, this might suggest the need for some
elements of MNCs strategy to be revised, with a view to reconciling it
with that of their Arab partners.
b. Despite the increasing tendency to hold critical views against the
performance of the MNCs, there is no evidence of any animosity between
the two partners. There is a consensus among all groups of the survey
participants that MNCs are indispensable and that they can theoretically be
relied on, provided that some particular aspects of their strategies are to be
changed to match the national interests of individual Arab countries,
particularly insofar as their economic development plans and aspirations
are concerned. To this end, the suggestion that MNCs should be
threatened through the introduction of tougher regulatory measures against
their operations, is not supported by this study.
c. Technology transfer is regarded by the Arab countries as being an
overriding concern, and MNCs as their best channels to realise this
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objectivc. It has clearly ernaged that joint venture partnership offers the
best option as a favourite type of association with KNICs, as opposed to
other channels of cooperation, while the turn—kcy arrangements are
regarded as the least favourable.
d. For the subsidiaries and branches of MNCs located in the Arab countries,
the strict compliance with the strategies and guidelines imposed on them
by their headquarters in the parent countries, is paramount and often
outstrip any other local considerations. It appears that their room to
manoeuvre is grossly restricted.
e. Labour—intensive technology is not appropriate to prevail in the Arabian
Gulf, in view of the known scarcity of indigenous work force, neither is
the most sophisticated and the latest technology, which does not necessarily
square with the local conditions and nccds. The appropriate type needs to
be a function of the existing and potential level of training, efficiency, as
well as the available capital and manpower resources. The abundance of
capital in some affluent Gulf countries should not determine — as in the
past — the type of technology which could be unnecessarily costly if
based only on this criterion.
f. Contrary to common sentiments expressed on general terms about the need
to acquire research and development capabilities in the Arab countries, this
study shows that it does not make economic sense to attempt to invest
heavily in R & D projects with a view to inventing new systems or
procedures in the Arab world to that which already exist elsewhere. In
view of the general belief that the technological advancement that has been
achievcd so far need not be restricted to the industrialised world, and that
scientific discoveries should be accessible to all, regardless of the extent
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of contribution by individuals or institutions to such discoveries (without
prejudice to patent rights and trade marks regulations and the right to
retrieve the costs involved in the process of R & D); it is widely seen that
research and development efforts within the Arab States should ideally be
confined to adaptive technology. There is no economic sense in the
duplication of efforts and resources to acquire what would be regarded as
a common human knowledge, which should be easily accessible to all.
g. The predominance of the government role in the direction of the Gulf
States' economics, is not only confirmed by the survey, but is widely seen
to be an overriding necessity, in view of the peculiarities of the nature of
these economies, as identified in section 12.2.5 of this chapter.
h. It is generally suggested that, in affluent societies, the manpower cost of
production constitutes a high proportion of the total production cost. Our
Gulf Survey has revealed that, contrary to this generally accepted notion,
which is clearly in place in, for example, Scandinavian countries, this is
not the case in the Gulf States, which by world standards arc regarded as
affluent countries. The reason being the exceptionally high degree of the
predominance of expatriate cheap workers from South Asia and
neighbouring non—oil producing Arab States. (Among ten reasons behind
the MNCs choice to invest in the Arab world, cheap labour force has been
referred to as the second important reason by the MNCs themselves — see
Table 10-2.)
MNCs' contribution in setting up an improved working environment in the
Arab world, has been highly rated by the survey respondents. This is
meant to refer to areas such as improved management systems, training,
working methods and procedures, etc.
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In view of the neutral effects so far of the existing industrial free zone
areas in the Arab countries, this study does not advocate the idea of
expanding on this experience. Free zone areas such as those in E gypt and
Dubai are to be given more time to consolidate their experiences before a
conclusive assessment could be drawn as a basis for future strategy on the
potential benefits of such free zone areas.
12.3 The Relevance of Economic Theories in the Arab context
123.1	 Trade Theories 
As suggested in earlier sections, the theories of international trade which assume
perfect competition, are not truly applicable to the contemporary world. In most
countries of the Arab world, the dominant role assumed by the governments,
despite the liberal policies adopted towards investment and trade in general,
demonstrates the fact that the so-called "perfect competitive market" does not
exist in reality. On the other hand, David Ricardo's "theory of comparative
advantage" regarding the inherent factor abundance, is evidently undermined
insofar as it fails to explain the inability of the vast majority of the Arab countries
- whether producers of oil or not - to achieve their economic development
programmes. This state of affairs, whereby the resource-endowed Arab countries
have not fully made use of their competitive advantage, coincides with yet another
distortion of the same theory when applied to the NICs of South East Asia, who
have done so well with much less resources and less competitive advantages.
The inference which the Arab experience assists us to come up with, is that the
thcory of competitive advantage may have been relevant in the past decades, when
technology played only a minimal role in the advancement of a nation's economy.
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Today, and in view of the increasingly dominant role of technology in shaping and
determining the degree of resource exploitation, the technological superiority and
not the abundant factor resources is the main, if not the sole, competitive
advantage that really matters. To illustrate this, one has to look no further than
to Japan, whose economic success has entirely relied on its superior technology,
and its ability to organise its work force.
"Development through industrialisation", as the examples of the South East Asian
NICs have successfully illustrated, has been a model for an increasing number of
the Arab countries who, over the last decade or so, have embarked on such a
strategy. The major stumbling block against the realisation of the desired results
has always been the lack of technology, without which no more competitive
advantages could be gained. Ironically, the success of the NICs has stemmed from
their policy of erecting non—tariff barriers, a policy which is in clear contradiction
with the competitive advantage theory, as well as with the spirit and efforts of
GATT. The "infant industries argument", on the basis of which such protective
measures were pursued, has led to the success of an industrialisation policy which,
according to the theory, should have been different in that these countries would
have confined their manufacturing efforts only on goods in which they have a
competitive advantage. Because the developing countries in general have the
tendency of emulating the success stories of other developing countrics, the
argument which advocates the adoption of some kind of protectionist policies in
order to safeguard and protect the newly emerging manufacturing industry in the
Arabian Gulf and othcr Arab countries, is understandable.
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As shown above, the operations of the tvLNICs in the Arab World, and indeed
elsewhere in the Third World, cannot be explained in the framework of free trade
theories. As Lall, S. and Streeton [1977] said, "aspects of theory such as profit—
maximising behaviour, may be relevant to the actual performance of MNCs". In
fact, the control of foreign operation can allow a MNC to fully exploit the return
on certain advantages and resources that it possesses. The most important reason
for FDI is to maximise the profits from its specific advantages (technology) under
oligopolistic market structure. The role of oil MNCs (the seven sisters) in the
pre-1973 period in the Gulf region, could illustrate the point.
FDI by MNCs, according to Caves, R.E. [1982], does not only involve the flow
of capital, but also of superior technology and entrepreneurship that the firm
possesses. Our own Gulf survey has demonstrated that neither capital nor
technological know—how and entrepreneurship have been adequately transferred
to the Gulf countries, as technology transfer has been mainly confined to the
physical aspects of the hardware, i.e. machines and equipments. It is thus apparent
that FDI has been mainly pursued by MNCs in order to realise the objective of
profit—maximisation from their ownership specific advantages.
We can now briefly conclude that free trade based on perfect competition is no
longer relevant, that "comparative advantage theory" is now obsolete, that KNCs
performance could only be explained in the framework of their technological
superiority (among other advantages) and their profit—maximisation motives and
that, the only viable alternative for the developing countries of the Arab world, is
to acquire the technological know—how, in order to successfully exploit their
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existing factor resources, which will hardly be regarded as competitive advantage
in the absence of the technological capability to optimise their use.
In order to develop their productive forces and infant industries, the Arab countries
might have to resort to some protective measures, perhaps on a temporary "infant
industry" basis. In fact, by so doing they would not only be emulating the
successful example of the South East Asian NICs, but also performing in
accordance with John Stuart Mills' [1800-1873] classical doctrine which states that
"every nation has a temporary need for protection ... The classical theory is not
absolute and a nation's best economic and commercial policy, depends on its
actual stage of development" [Abdulla, 1991, p.33].
123.2
	
World Trading System and the Developing Countries
For the economically advanced countries of North America, Western Europe,
Japan, etc., the goals and objectives of the post—war economic system, shaped by
Breton Wood institutions, have been achieved to a remarkable extent. Freer world
trade has provided access to extensive, rich and competitive markets, yielding
stable sources of nccdcd raw materials and outlets for the manufactures and
technological accomplishments of, what has become known as, the developed
economies. Four decades of prosperity and growing international trade have
secured the position of Western Europe, North America and Japan, at the forefront
of the nations, in terms of their economic performance.
But there can be no doubt that it is the rise of the developing countries as full
actors on the world stage, that has brought forth the greatest challenges to
prosperity and the multilateral ideals. For the developing countries, it was hoped
that an expanding world economy would automatically extend its bcncfits to them
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as well. The notions of economic liberalisation, free trade and market competition
— at least in theory — suggest that such an outcome is to be expected. However,
while some success is evident in a limited number of the developing countries,
particularly in Asia who experienced sustained periods of rapid growth (due to an
outward orientation that takes advantage of the opportunities for world trade), a
second much larger group of developing countries, including the bulk of the Arab
world, had been less successful, and it can be argued that the international trading
system has not served to spurn their progress. With weak economics and only a
rudimentary industrial capacity, these countries could not gain access to markets
of developed countries on the basis of reciprocity. Despite the introduction of the
generalised system of preference (GSP) negotiated under GATT or other
arrangements such as the Lome Convention, international markets are clearly less
open to their processed and manufactured exports than to their raw materials. The
major part of value—added continues to the detriment of the exporting developing
countries. The terms of exchange have been unfavourable to them.
123.3	 Theories of MNCs and Foreign Direct Investment
John Dunning's eclectic theory of international production, which incorporates a
number of other theories, is now the most widely debated theory in literature on
the phenomenon and operations of MNCs. As has been described in Chapters 3
and 4, its main elements indicate that the extent and pattern of production
undertaken by MNCs outside their national boundaries, are dependent on
ownership locationai and internalisation advantages a particular MNC has
compared to others, and that the response to them by firms will vary according to
industry, country or region (of origin and destination) and firm specific
characteristics.
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It is our intention here to consider the extent to which such theory has any
reflection on, or relevance to, the actual performance of MNCs in the Arab region.
Let us focus our attention on the main three elements of the theory, bearing in
mind that owing to the complexity and multidimensional nature of the MNCs
activities, there could be no one single theory which can fully and satisfactorily
explain the FIJI behaviour of the MNCs.
The locational advantages can partly explain the notion of MNCs investment in
the Arabian Gulf States which have provided a favourable environment for foreign
investors compared to other locations. Such locational advantages arc manifest in
the availability of abundant and cheap energy resources and hence lower cost of
production, marketing advantages (saving transportation cost for the relatively
nearby markets of Asia, Africa and Europe), absence of trade barriers and
government interventions, lower tax ceilings, adequacy of basic infrastructure and
the relative political stability (at least before the recent Gulf War). On the other
hand, in view of the local investment regulations, which tend to encourage
majority share for the local capital, the local manufacture is expanding at a rate
faster than the FIJI, which is mainly undertaken via joint venture arrangements.
What the eclectic theory does not adequately explain, however, is the fact that the
bulk of MNCs' involvement in the region is still taking place via exports and
licensing, rather than the FDI which the locational advantages of the region
assume.
The internalisation a. I • , on the other hand, means that it must bc more
beneficial to the MNC possessing ownership advantages (which in our case arc
assumed to be mainly the technological capabilities), to usc them itself rather than
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to sell or lease then to foreign firms, that is for it to intemalise its advantages
through an extension of its own activities, rather than exercise them through
licensing and similar contacts with independent firms. Again the reality is rather
different, as our research findings have confirmed that the foreign MNCs are
increasingly reluctant to be involved in equity participation in the Gulf States,
possibly on the grounds that the return on capital investment is less than the
royalty rates on management and management contracts on the one hand, and the
turn—key projects on the other. Once again the profit—maximisation motive
explains the intemalisational advantage of the MNCs better as [Itaki, 1989] stated:
"The distinctive feature of the internalisation theory is its recognition that the firm
is an economic institution the objective of which is to maximize profit in the world
of market imperfections. The firm attempts to maximize its revenues and minimize
its costs: the firm maximizes its organisational benefits after remunerating all the
factors of production, R & D, marketing and management." [M. Raki, April 1989,
I3.3.]
The author also shares Itaki's reservations about the "location advantage" regarding
its ambiguity in dealing with the concept of cheapness. "Eclectic theorists" Itaki
states, "talk about the location advantage in monetary rather than in real terms.
It follows that the more depreciated a local currency is the better. However,
cheap inputs owing to currency depreciation also results in 'cheap' profits, i.e. the
remittance is also depreciated in terms of the international currency, say the US
dollar. Furthermore 'cheap' inputs, especially a 'cheap' labour—input has the
adverse effect of shrinking the workers' income and the host country's market".
[Raki, 1989, p.15.]
In attempting to identify the implication of the cheapness of inputs as locational
advantage in the Arab countries, one tends to agree with the above argument
insofar as it reflects the current performance of MNCs in different locations
(countries) within the Arab world. To go by the theory with regard to the cheap
locational factors, one would expect more and more FDI in countries such as
Sudan and other under—developed countries of the Arab world, as compared to the
369
oil-rich statcs, owing to thcir locational advantages of cheaper labour force and
currencies. Our own research findings, however, have established the fact that
FDI by MNCs in those poor countries, is either non-existent or minimal. The
withdrawal of Lonrho Limited from the Kcnana Sugar Project of Sudan, half way
through its implementation, may help to illustrate the point, as the repeated
depreciation of the Sudanese pound, against foreign currencies, was cited to be a
major factor in the events leading to the discontinuity of the joint venture
partnership between Lonrho and the Sudan Government.
We conclude this part of our analysis by emphasising that the essence of any
theory, such as the "Eclectic theory", is mainly in its predictive power to explain
why MNCs engage themselves in FDI. What we can infer from our Gulf Survey,
is that despite the fact that the main elements of the Eclectic theory - ownership,
internalisation and locational advantam - arc reasonably in place, FDI has not
been vigorously pursued by MNCs in the Arab countries. Instead, they elected to
opt for the usual alternatives of exporting, licence agreements and turn-key
projects. The Eclectic thcory does not fully explain why FDI has not taken place,
given that all its conditions arc either fully or partially met. It does not offer
adequate justifications as to why MNCs have a preference to do business rather
via the channels of exports, licensing and turn-key arrangements. The main
question is whether (OLI) advantages are necessary or sufficient conditions for
MNCs to expand their international production. The other question which is also
not sufficiently answered by the Eclectic theory is: "In a poor or underdeveloped
host country with low wage rates in terms of say US dollars (although relatively
high wage rates there), does it indicate a location advantage or disadvantage to
the investing MNCs to expand their FDI?" If the theory allows for answers to
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such vital questions, it could well provide some predictive power, which could be
made usc of by the decision—makers and strategic planners of both MNCs and the
host countries.
123.4
	
Development Theories and the Arab World
As we have shown in Chapter 3, the Arab development theorist, Samir Amin, has
demonstrated how the Arab economy in general is more externally oriented —
and hence more dependent — than the economics of the rest of thc Third World
regions. The "dependency theory", elegantly discussed by Dudley Seers and his
colleagues in his pioneering book Dependency Theory. A Critical Reassessment
[1983], is much heralded in the developing countries as a theory which is well
placed to explain the economic plight of many developing countries, in the fact of
what they regard as "unfair international economic order".
The "Dependency Theory" has evolved since the beginning of the 1960s, from the
Latin American "structuralist school", which claimed that the underdevelopment
of Latin America was due to its reliance on exports of primary products, which
were subject to terms of trade that both fluctuated in the short—term and
deteriorated in the long term. This was a major justification for import—
substitution behind tariff walls which would reduce the dependence on foreign
manufacturers, and thus on the industrial countries.
The realisation that import substitution created new forms of dependence
(increased imports of capital equipments, intermediate products, raw materials,
fuels and technology and capital provided by MNCs), converted the Latin
American "structuralists" into "dependency" theorists. While they did not abandon
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the earlier theories, they changed the emphasis and added other features, namely
that "the world consisted of a core of dominant nations and a periphery of
dependent ones" [D. Sccrs, 1983, p.15.1
Looking at the economic situation in the Arab world today, and in view of what
the findings of our survey in Chapters 9 through 11 have established regarding the
increasing dependence of these countries, either on the technology and technical
and managerial know-how of foreign MNCs (as in the oil-producing Arab States),
or on both technology and capital (in the poorer and much under-deve!oped Arab
States, particularly in Africa), it becomes evident that the body of dependency
theory contains far more relevance than nco-classical economics. Inconveniently
for theorists of any kind, characteristics such as a country's population, resource
base and location, among other things, also affect the degree and nature of its
dependence, as does the quality of political leadership and its ability to motivate
the people to productive effect.
In his attempt to identify the general implications the "theory of dependency" may
have for contemporary development strategy, Gabrial Palma states that:
"Some writers within the dependency school argue that it is misleading to look at
dependency as a formal theory, and that no general implications for development
can be abstracted from its analysis. Some of those who argue that there is such
a theory, flatly assert that it leads inescapably to the conclusion that development
is impossible within the world capitalist system, thus making development
strategies irrelevant, at least within that system". Others, on the other hand, who
speak in terms of a theory of dependency, argue that "it can be operational into
a practical development strategy for dependent countries". [Seers et. al., 1983,
p.20] Palma then concludes his remarks by asserting his own view about the
dependency school of thought: "	  the contribution of dependency has been up
to now more a critique of development strategies in general than an attempt to
make practical contribution to them" [Seers, 1983, p.23].
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Insofar as the main postulation of the original ideas and hypothesis of the
"dependency theory" are concerned, its relevance to the Arab world (as a
periphery) is cicarly evident. The starting point is the idea that the world economy
is composed of two poles, the 'centre' and the 'periphery', and that the structures
of production in each differ substantially (primary products in the Arab world, be
they agricultural or mineral, while industrial, technologically sophisticated products
in the case of the centre — the industrialised world.) That of the centre is seen
as homogeneous and diversified, while that of the periphery — the Arab world
— in contrast, as heterogeneous and specialised; heterogeneous because economic
activities with significant differences as to productivity existed side by side, with
the two extremes provided by an export sector with relatively high productivity of
labour, and a subsistence agriculture in which it was particularly low; specialised
because the export sector would tend to be concentrated upon a few primary
products (oil in the Gulf and agriculture elsewhere), with production
characteristically confined to an 'enclave' within the peripheral economic structure,
or in other words, having very limited backward and forward linkage effects with
the rest of the economy. This, in effect, is the precise situation of the Arab
economy today. It is this structural difference between the two typcs of economy
which lies behind the different function of each pole in the international division
of labour, as the dependency theory postulates. The principal elements of this
system of centre—periphery, according to the theory, could be summarised as
backward structure of production and low productivity in the periphery, generating
low level of effective demand, as well as of prices in the peripheral export sector,
hence leading to deterioration in the terms of trade between the two poles (in
favour of the centre). Both these phenomena explain why levels of average real
income tend to diverge in the two poles, and why there is the tendency towards
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unequal development in terms of the degree of creation, penetration and diffusion
of technical progress (homogeneity), and the degree of integration of the structures
of production (diversification). All this leads to a type of development of the
periphery characterised by unemployment of the labour force, external
discquilibrium and the deterioration of the terms of trade.
All these phenomena are evident from a number of observations in the Arab
countries, as this study has highlighted:
a. Only primary products are exported and the Arab economies arc, in
general, poorly integrated;
b. the demand for manufactured products is oriented in the main towards
imports;
c. imports in the non—oil producing Arab countries tend to grow faster than
the level of real income or of exports. (The opposite is the case in the
centre, where imports consist essentially of primary products, for which
income elasticity is less than unity.)
In conclusion, one can say that the 'dependency theory' lends much of its
characteristics and relevance to the Arab countries and particularly so to the most
under—developed countries among the developing members of the Arab world.
123.5
	 Government Intervention in Industrial Development
Due to the fact that perfect free market competition simply does not exist in the
industrial sectors of the overwhelming majority of the developing countries, the
notion of free trade and liberalisation is always questionable. Many observers and
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analysts therefore see that there is no alternative to a directed industrial economy,
and that market can only be extended by organisation, rather than by liberalisation.
In the advanced industrial countries of the western world, free trade can be
successfully implemented, but in the developing countries of the Arab world, the
government intervention in the organisation of the market is not only preferable,
but rather a necessity; otherwise, if the state does not interfere, the financially
strong and influential people (in the Gulf States these would be mainly the Royal
family members and the influential businessmen), will have the monopoly in
almost everything. The stage of development a particular country or region has
unfolded is thus a major determining factor in the degree of success by which any
economic theory could be judged. Such a stage of development is far more
important than just dealing with theories as abstract. It was Bclassa who stated
that "market incentives in less developed regions have not grown to the point
where they are conducive to development". [Massa, 1967, p.10]
The role of the state apparatus in the Arab countries, be it a direct government role
or through public enterprises is paramount. This is particularly so in view of what
our study has established regarding the increasing role of MNCs and the external
orientation of the Arab economy. Both government enterprises and the MNCs can
be complementary, as each, in its own way, possesses key business assets. For
MNCs the list is a familiar one, including their usual ownership advantages:
technological command, access to financial sources, global marketing power, etc.
The assets of the Arab public enterprises or government (public sector) are perhaps
less well-known, but they arc:
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	1.	 Big in relation to other private firms in the domestic economy, with much
larger share of resources;
	
1 .
	Claim a marked degree of control over domestic market (often holding
legal monopolies over their product markets);
3. Can, in principle, obtain privileged access to investment funds from
domestic public sources and, via the guarantee power of the State, in
external transaction [O'Brien, P. and Kisanga, E., 1984, p.13].
What we meant to show from listing the above characteristics of the governments
in the Arab world, is that while most of the classical economic theories, which are
based on the assumption of liberalisation, free trade and competition, naturally do
not envisage a dominant role for the State and its intervention, and assume the
economy direction to be determined by market mechanism under a perceived
perfect competition, the absence of such "perfection" of market and industrial
competition in the developing countries of the Arab world, necessitate a type of
government intervention which contradicts with the postulations of the main bodies
of economic theories. For countries which arc still in their early stages of
economic development, profit maximisation would not be rated highly among their
objectives, as most of the economic theories imply. Our literature review also
reveals that, countries such as Japan, the NICs of South East Asia and, to a lesser
extent, India, which were listed among the category of the developing countries
not too long ago, have based their successes on pursuing policies which arc less
profit—oriented than their Western counterparts. A great deal of their success also
stemmed from the interventionist policies which their governments have exercised
during and after the take—off stage of their move towards industrial development.
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Following in the footsteps of such countries will always remain an increasingly
desired option for the developing Arab countries to contemplate.
The vital role of government policies in the early stages of development of
nations, is best summed up by Michael Porter, who stipulates that:
"Government has the greatest direct influence on national advantage in the factor
- and investment-driven stages of development (which the developing countries
including the Arab world are now exhibiting). The tools at its disposal, such as
capital, subsidies, and temporary protection, are most powerful at these stages in
a nation's competitive development. In the early stages, government also must
take the lead in factor creation: encouraging savings or foreign borrowing to
accumulate capital, upgrading education and infrastructure, and beginning the
development of technological base .... Government at this stage can play an
important role in such areas as channelling scarce capital into selected industries,
promoting risk taking through implicit or explicit guarantees of assistance,
stimulating and influencing the acquisition of foreign technology, and employing
temporary protection to foster entry leading to domestic rivalry, and the
construction of modern facilities. Government's role in challenging and exhorting
industry to upgrade, is also a vital one, as the Japanese and Korean cases
illustrate .... Government is often prime mover early in the development process
.... as the nation aspires to move beyond early investment-driven to the
innovation-driven stage of development, however, firms must increasingly become
the prime movers ... and government's role mast shift to almost exclusively an
indirect one s [Porter, 1990, pp.671-672].
123.6
	 Economic Integration Through Regional Groupings.
Regional cooperation has been an important clement in the efforts of the
developing countries to overcome their problems. In some instances, the
establishment of regional organisations have helped to alleviate national rivalries.
The creation of CARICOM helped the small newly independent states of the
Caribbean to forge strong economic links and develop a common regional identity,
despite the breakdown of their federation. In East Asia, ASEAN has emerged as
a viable regional organisation, submerging some of the earlier tensions among its
mcmbcr countries. South Asian countrics have established SAARC as they have
realised the need for cooperation, despite a history of mistrust and regional
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conflict. In the Near East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has been set up
as an instrument of cooperation among the smaller Arab nations of the region.
The States of the Arab Maghreb have come together in search of common
advantage, after a long period of tension and mutual suspicion. Moves towards
regional cooperation have recently been revived in other parts of Africa, Asia, and
Latin America as well. These encouraging trends indicate a growing recognition
among developing countries that they have much to gain from practical economic
cooperation.
The Arab world, whose disunity in the past is sometimes cited as a major factor
in their lack of collective economic progress, can learn a great many lessons from
the eventual success of the EC. The message is that economic integration does
help former enemies to turn friends. The EC has gradually emerged over some
35 years from a group of six to twelve. The way this friendship has been
achieved, was basically an economic one. While the eventual aim for the Arab
world (as it is for EC members) is political, the means of integration arc
essentially economic and the development of trade between the European countries
has been a driving force in this respect. It should also be so, not only among the
members of each Arab sub—groupings, but also between these groupings, within
the broader framework of the Arab League.
12.3.7	 Theoretical Models in Practice
In formulating their investment and trade policies, the Arab countries do not
necessarily follow a particular economic model. It seems that, whatever has
proved to be successful, or seen to be so elsewhere, has a strong impact insofar
as it inspircs the desire to emulate. This tendency could be seen at work in the
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Arabian Gulf States with regard to the duplication of industrial projects which, due
to specific market—oriented factors, have proved to be successful. The examples
of the cement and aluminium industries, among others, illustrate the point. Their
strategic planning therefore, is not based on any theoretically—stimulated model,
or even a carefully thought out pattern. The early stage of development of most
of these countries, and the fact that the modernisation efforts of their economies
have only recently begun, make it difficult to adapt to particular economic theories
or models.
Generally, the problem of attempting to postulate models of theories, be it in the
area of greater industrial development or international trade or investment, is the
continual need for adaptation to fit the increasingly changing realities and
circumstances of the countries of the Arab World. In the 1950s, only a few of the
Arab countries had political sovereignty over their boundaries. In the 1960s, even
those who had their political independence were economically dependent on their
former European Colonial powers. It was only during the 1970s and beyond that
the national economic planning has become a common practice. Some countries
have even opted for nationalisation of some foreign and private institutions, such
as Iraq, Algeria and Egypt in 1960s and Sudan in 1970s, but with little in the way
of success. The Arab oil producing countries had gradually assumed control over
their oil resources under the banner of "participation" only after 1973. The joint
venture experience between the local Arab institutions (mainly public enterprises)
and foreign MNCs, is itself a recent development which started in earnest around
late 1970s, through to 1980s. This early stage of industrial development and the
immaturity of the economic experience of the majority of the countries of the
region, coupled with the ever—changing business environment at the global level
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— technological or otherwise — render it difficult to pass a judgement on the real
implications of economic theories and their relevance to the actual performance
of the Arab economy. Theories embody empirical contents, which could only be
verified by specific case studies rather than simply insensitively assumed. The
Arab world has only recently begun to acquaint itself with different theories of
liberalisation of trade and investment, vis—a—vis protectionism. Some countries
in the past have resorted to protectionism, possibly motivated by ideological
considerations, but most recently, the shift towards the market economy has rather
been the general pattern, while protectionist attitudes seem to be gradually
receding. Furthermore, what limit our ability to identify and analyse the extent of
the appropriateness of the main body of economic theories and their relevance to
the economic performance of the Arab countries, is the scarcity, if not the
complete lack, of statistical data on the performance of MNCs involved in the
area, as well as related information. Any attempt to do so is bound to be a
statistical minefield.
12.4 Some Policy and Managerial Recommendations
12.4.1	 Introduction
As has been shown, the Arab world in all its diversities, is endowed with
substantial reserves of fossil fuels, of valuable minerals and other natural
resources, including agricultural land and water. Apart from their known
hydrocarbon resources, the complementary factors of production, land and labour,
in countries such as Egypt, Sudan and Morocco among others, arc considered to
bc in surplus. The land being under—utilised and the people unemployed and
undcr—employed, there is enormous potential for development, particularly if the
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oil—generated capital of the wealthy Arab States is more effectively used to
enhance sound industrial and commercial investments within the Arab world.
As has been shown previously, there are two possible scenarios to approach the
development needs of the Arab world. One school of thought contends that
foreign investors (MNCs), finance institutions and trade partners, have a decisive
impact on the design and implementation of economic and investment policies of
the Arab countries. They affect main decisions concerning the structure of
production and trade, type of technology and industrialisation programmes. It is
on this basis that advocates of this school believe that, if the potential industrial
development in the Arab world is to be realised, there is no other way but to
closely cooperate on the basis of a free—trading principle with foreign
multinationals who have proven experiences and capabilities to successfully exploit
their technological edge and know—how. Joint ventures, which arc a favoured type
of cooperation with foreign multinationals, would be the most appropriate way of
channelling foreign investment into the Arab economics.
The second school of thought suggests that, in view of what some Arab
professionals and scholars consider to be a rather unsatisfactory performance of
foreign companies in their past involvement in the Arab world, and in order to
make a feasible alternative to the strategy of total reliance on foreign
multinationals, the Arab economics have to adopt a more intransigent approach.
They need in fact to "dclink" from foreign actors and institutions in those areas
where the repercussions on the national economics of individual Arab countries
arc most pronounced. This is mainly in trade, foreign investment and technology
acquisition.	 'Dclinking' also implies that foreign investments and foreign
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technologies are confined to those sectors and areas where they may support the
development of a growing internal market, and the implementation of basic needs—
oriented local development strategics, so foreign capital and technologies may be
restricted to areas like raw materials expansion, transport system development,
energy development, some services which are indispensable for communication,
etc. Such a restriction of the role of MNCs and foreign capital may be
contradictory to the economic interests of the foreign corporations and may be
difficult to enforce, because of the weak bargaining power of the Arab countries.
But a process of 'delinking' cannot be set in motion without a careful restriction
and surveillance of activities of foreign investors. In the context of non—oil
producing countries of the Arab world, dclinking requires the compulsion to export
to developed countries (as often demanded by IMF) be gradually removed by an
imports restraint programme. Imports should be restricted to capital goods,
intermediate products, and food items which are indispensable for an industrial and
agricultural rehabitation programme. Special arrangements have to be made with
various international institutions such as GATT, with a view to seeking support for
such policies, which would otherwise be resented.
As noted by Dunning [1985, p.427]. host countries "have often in the past
welcomed FDI but not the foreign investor; the resources have been wanted but
not the control over resources". In the author's viewpoint, which is further
supported by the research findings, Dunning's contention correctly mirros the
precise situation in most of the Arab countries even today, as it demonstrates a
major concern insofar as the Arab World's relationship with foreign MNCs arc
concerned. Thc case could hardly be better put than in Dunning's words to reflect
thc Arab world's attitude towards MNCs.
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It is true, however, that in the late 1980s a new wave of realism and pragmatic
attitudes on the part of both MNCs and their host Arab countries has emerged.
MNCs are thought to be no longer as paternalistic as they used to be in the past.
This is reciprocated by the Arab countries who have gradually learned to co—exist
with foreign companies, a phenomenon clearly manifest in the disappearance of
confrontational policies, including the threat of nationalisation and other measures
of a similar nature. Without both sides having to show signs of their readiness to
accommodate the interests of each other, and to demonstrate such readiness in
terms of practical steps towards revising at least some elements of their strategies,
neither the development potentials of the Arab world would be fully explored, nor
the continued presence of MNCs in the region taken for granted. Of course, any
changes which are made by one side, i.e. MNCs, are likely to be ineffective
without careful consideration of the implications for the other side, i.e. the Arab
States, or vice versa.
With regard to the collective Arab stance and coordination of their strategies
towards foreign MNCs and foreign investment in general, the newly emerged
mood of pragmatism should also be extended to putting up with factual realities,
on top of which is the fact that the Arab world is not a collection of a
homogeneous and similar minded group of countries, no matter what they may
have in common with each other. However, notwithstanding the diversities among
themselves in respect of the level of development, abundance of natural resources,
GDP, population size, technological growth, etc., there can be no real chance of
success to realise any perceived independent paths of development, except within
a framework of some kind of regional cooperation. In order to make it easier to
undertake the investment programmes required for independent development, all
383
promotional efforts should be coordinated on a Pan—Arab basis whenever possible,
if only to avoid the wasteful duplication of resources and administrative structures.
12.4.2	 Technology Tr,ansfct
The question of technology transfer to the Arab world through MNCs, and
particularly via thc channel of joint ventures, has been prominently featured in this
study. On the basis of the detailed analysis of the main survey and literature
review, a number of policy recommendations in this respect are briefly identified
as follows:
a. The role of Arab governments in dealing with the many challenges
emanating from foreign investments, MNCs and joint ventures, ought to be
predominant, because in most cases government and government oriented
institutions arc closely involved, as they often engineer the process of
channelling foreign investments into the national economies, and participate
in joint ventures with often large shares of risk capital as well as loan
capital. In fact, public sector enterprises and institutions in the Arab world
are generally in a better position to facilitate the adaptation and diffusion
of imported technologies, by directly linking them to the national research
and development endeavour. They can more easily mobilise government—
supported research institutions and universities than the private sector firms
can, to benefit from the managerial and technical expertise provided by
collaborative joint ventures. It is therefore imperative that governments,
as opposed to private institutions, should assume the commanding role in
formulating and administering all strategics designed to tackle
multinationals' related problems, particularly in the area of technology
transfer.
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b. Licence agreements and management contracts should be persistently
favoured, as opposed to FDI and turn—key arrangements with NEtiCs.
Lessons in this regard need to be learned from Japan and India.
c. Notwithstanding the economic cost involved, we should not rule out the
prospect of a possible success in the long term, emanating from the pursuit
of a strategy of keeping a low level of technological dependence (drawing
on India's experience), provided that simultaneous efforts are made to
generate a great deal of indigenous technological potentials, drawing upon
the comparatively large pool of technically qualified manpower. Our own
study has found out that the Arab share of scientists and engineers is fairly
impressive, enough to trigger any attempt to explore viable scenarios,
whereby the development and mobilisation of indigenous technological
efforts become a realistic proposition.
12.4.3	 The Promotion of Self—Reliance 
To achieve self—reliance but without completely delinking from foreign MNCs, the
following policies are to be adopted:
a. Formulation of investment strategy, in harmony with national interests.
Feasibility studies and project assessments should be an exclusive domain
of the Arab governments, in which the assistance of foreign MNCs would
only be sought in matters of purely technical nature, the parallel of which
is not locally available.
b. Greater emphasis should be focused on training and qualifying local
indigcnous managers and manpowcr, rather than on physical technology,
as the return on investment on people is much greater than on machines,
in thc long term.
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c. In dealing with MNCs, the Arab countries would need to be cautious in
making decisions to optimise the trade-off between better short-term
profitability, if technology is transferred to MNCs affiliates (less costly for
the host countries), and the erosion of short-term profitability arising from
technology acquisition. In all cases, particular emphasis must be given to
maximise the benefit from the ongoing enhancement of research and
development efforts that speed the pace of technology creation (in the area
of adaptive technology).
d. In the least developing Arab countries, such as Sudan, resources have to
be released from export production and directed towards internal demand.
Industrial development in those countries should embark on a programme
of decentralisation, in order to gain from the resulting advantages in
transport. The small-scale design of production units on a local and
regional level - which lessen the resort to foreign MNCs - may give risc
to the development of indigenous technologies. In fact, ecologically and
socially well-adapted technologies should be designed in cooperation with
these basic producing units, involving people who are familiar with local
and regional problems. In this respect, mechanisation of traditional
agricultural sector may be promoted only where a substitution by labour
is not feasible or reasonable.
e. In the financially prosperous, oil-rich countries, investment strategies may
be designed (with or without cooperation with foreign MNCs) to establish
local corporations which may begin to attract local shareholders, as buying
shares could prove attractive as a way of saving, as an alternative to just
consuming. Certainly the views of shareholders in their having (as
individuals or groups) significant investment interests, will eventually buy
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them control over the decisions of these corporations and probably guard
against any outside influence (from MNCs or other foreign investors).
This will have far—reaching implications on the future role and strategies
of these corporations. Shareholders in the Arab countries are likely to
adapt to the reality of having to be far—sighted in their perception of
investment. Their concern for the future will no doubt motivate them to
question and rectify any investment strategies, if they do not in some way
suit what they believe to be in the best interest of future generations.
f. The long—term objective must be to establish domestic technical
capabilities. In order to fulfil that objective, it is recommended that efforts
should be concentrated on a national science and technology plan within
the framework of a joint Pan—Arab initiative — the author would like to
code name this endeavour as "Arab Science and Technology Park" (ASTP).
12.4.4
	
Economic Integration Between Arab States
In view of what the Arab countries have in common, which give them a distinctive
character in terms of economic, political, social and cultural dimensions, there
seems to be a strong case to argue that a carefully coordinated strategy of
cooperation might work in their favour, even though their past experience may
suggest otherwise. That vision would best be put to test alongside a regional
grouping, as we have suggested (in Chapter 2), as the most viable option of all
types of cooperation. It is always possible to adopt common approaches which
are to be flexible enough to provide for the different contingencies influencing the
international competition within each of thc regional groupings in the Arab rcgion.
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Implicit in such a strategy to adopt a common approach, is that certain efficiency
goals, such as thosc based upon technical or scale economies, and/or dependent
on import of technology, may have to be sacrificed to promote or protect other
objectives.
One way of converting theoretical slogans into reality, in terms of achieving a new
coordinated role between the Arab countries to sharpen their technological edge,
and invest in product development and plant modernisation and expansion, to
capitalise on the strength of their regional market, is to fully utilise the potentials
of their existing Arab institutions. AIDO (Arab Industrial Development
Organisation) is one of such joint institutions which arc involved in project finance
and development. It offers a range of technical services to potential investors,
such as reports of country factors affccting investment, legal and constitutional
advice on project formation, financial planning, administration, management, etc.
Since AIDO is commissioned by all Arab States to act as the umbrella
organisation for industrial development activity, it should be fully supported by all
parties concerned to perform its duties. It should particularly be assisted in its role
as a negotiator, where foreign parties are involved, for the sale and transfer of
technology, as well as in drafting legally binding contracts. It is obviously in the
interest of the Arab countries as a group to make their treatment of foreign
investors as uniform as possible, and to avoid competition among themselves in
granting concessions. Competing concessions would eventually cancel each other
out to thc benefit of no one Arab country, as indccd would the duplication of
projects.
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12.4.5	 Fnhancement of Arab Competitive Advantages 
It has been concluded, in view of our previous discussion on competitive
advantage theory, that such advantages which are based on relative abundance and
cost of factors of production, are not sufficient enough to explain the existing
pattcm of trade and investment between the developing countries of the Arab
world and the industrialised world of today. Notwithstanding the growing concern
among economic and business analysts and governments, the existence of the
protectionist attitudes and policies among an increasing number of countries, can
hardly be ignored. Protectionism seems to be a deeply-rooted phenomenon which
is likely to persist, thus undermining the main thrust of competitive advantage
theory in the process. The lessons and implications that such argument may have
on the strategy of the Arab countries could be far-reaching. Some of such
implications are considcrcd below:
1. It would be dangerous for those Arab oil-producing countries who have
based their comparative position on such advantages as oil, to rcst on their
laurels, in view of the fact that such advantagcs offer, in reality, little
security. In fact the spread with which the international business
environment is changing, leaves no guarantees to any country, to solely
rely on a single competitive advantage, such as oil in our particular case.
This brings us to the second point;
2. On the basis of the above argument, diversification of the sources of
production and income, should automatically be embraced as a top priority
option, if the Arab oil producers are to adopt any far-sighted strategy to
cater for the post-oil era after the depletion of this exhaustible source of
wealth (the unconfirmed reports on the new discovery of water as a
possible cheap fuel for motor cars, which may completely negate the
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importance of oil as a strategic energy source, would only come to mind
in this respect). Together with alternative energy sources such as nuclear,
solar energy, etc., oil will no longer be a competitive advantage in itself;
3. Competitive advantages are not only undermined by competition from
substitutes, but they are themselves changing and no longer sustainable.
Lessons in this respect would be learned from the NICs of South East
Asia, whose competitive advantage in the past was based on abundant
cheap labour, but having been under pressure from new low labour cost
producers (Malaysia and Taiwan for example), they opted for alternative
new advantages, such as the development of more technology-intensive
products (as opposed to labour-intensive technology);
4. For the Arab oil-producing countries, access to abundant factors is less
important than the technology and skills to process their products
effectively or efficiently. This factor, in itself, should be an additional
manifestation to induce them to adopt more vigorous policies to rely on
themselves (in the longer term), via more industrialisation and
diversification of their economics.
5. We have already seen how the world is opting for more and morc
competition among various countries and MNCs. Such international
business competitive environment must be to the advantage of the
developing countries who should seize the opportunity to improve their
bargaining position and dictate their own conditions, in what promises to
be a consumer's (not supplier's) market. It should, however, be emphasised
here that it is not the physical supply of products which is to be pursued,
but rather the transfer of technological skills and know-how.
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6. Joint ventures among the companies or governments of the Arab countries
which, in line with our definition of MNCs, are to be regarded as Arab
MNCs, can best realise their objectives through the adoption of strategies
which do not lay much emphasis on profit maximisation. This does not
necessarily mean that cost minimisation is not to be considered as an
important operational objective, but cost minimisation might not necessarily
lead to profit maximisation in the short-term. Their strategy can target the
achievement of revenues at a reasonable level, or even break-even level
in the short-term. The underlying objective would be to lay the ground for
more self-reliance in the future. While contradicting with the notion of
competitive advantages, such strategy which has been successfully tested
elsewhere i.e. NICs, can aim at the long-term interest of these countries.
It is a case for sacrificing todays interest, even if that means incurring
financial losses on a temporary basis, so long as there are some guarantees
of long-term gin. Such gains could be reflected in:
a. gaining long-term technological know-how through the
accumulation of experience realised in the process of on-the-job
training and trial and error;
b. appropriate exploitation of un-tapped resources to the future benefit
of the Arab partners of these joint ventures;
c. less reliance on outside world implies import substitution and
foreign exchange savings. This objective is particularly conducive
to the interests of the relatively poor or under-developed countries
of the region;
d. by so doing, the Arab Statcs can strengthen their bargaining
position vis-a-vis foreign MNCs, who will deal with thcm on an
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equal footing rather than via their corporate strategics, which can
contradict those of the Arab host countries.
7. The basic cultural diffcrcnccs between the orientation of the western MNCs
towards profit maximisation and the Japanese orientation towards growth
of sales volume and market share, put the Japanese MNCs in a favourable
position in the Arab world. In fact, the Japanese MNCs future prospects
are much brighter than those of their western counterparts in the Arab
region. The cultural difference is also evident in the selling methods.
While western MNCs are used to using high pressure selling methods to
generate quick sales, the Japanese, in contrast, prefer intimate long—term
relationships with their customers, probably built on plenty of contacts,
even before a sale is materialised. Their approach to selling also involves
less pressure and more after—sale contacts. These cultural factors have, in
the main, helped to tip the balance in favour of more involvement of the
Arab countries with the Japanese MNCs, a trend which is most likely to
continue. This can be regarded as yet another advantage in favour of the
Arab world, which just falls short of having the characteristics of
"competitive advantage" — it is the advantage of wider room to
manoeuvre and to choose between more than one alternative. The Arab
States should carefully seize the opportunity to make use of such new
advantage and new bargaining power.
8. The Arab States' strategy towards foreign MNCs needs to take into
consideration the long—term benefits to be realised. Multinationals should
be cultivated whose rationale for locating in a particular Arab country goes
beyond basic factor considerations. If a multinational is locating in a
country solely because of cheap raw materials (energy), or cheap labour,
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the stability of the investment is ultimately suspect. If a particular Arab
country represents a good location for a regional production and
distribution centre, or if local conditions make it a desirable product
development centre in a particular segment (phosphate in Morocco,
petrochemicals in the Gulf, cotton textile or sugar industry in the Sudan),
then the multinational will have more enduring reasons for investing in the
country and upgrading that investment over time. The idea is to make a
particular country or region almost a 'home base'. This strategy is also in
line with the long—term objectives of the Arab regional integration, which
this study advocates.
12.5	 Future Research Possibilities and Needs
The purpose behind this study somewhat falls short of presenting conclusive findings on
the various aspects of the activities of MNCs in the Arab region, as the phenomenon of
multinationalisation in the Arab context is far too recent to permit such an attempt.
Information or data about MNCs performance, structures and the actual costs and benefits
encountered, both by them and the Arab host countries as a result of their activities, arc
insufficient to allow comprehensive quantitative analysis. The main goal has been to
identify what the author considers to be an essential field of inquiry, by presenting
conceptual and substantial contribution on the subject, in the hope that a study of this
magnitude will stimulate the interest of scholars and institutions in and outside the Arab
world and will promote further and more detailed studies. Some possible areas of future
research worthy of further investigation, could be outlined as follows:
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The sketchy information available indicates that the rate of failure among a
considerable number of projects undertaken on a joint venture basis between some
Arab Statcs, is very high. More empirical studies are needed to provida a basis
for examining the question of existing forms of partnership and the possibilities
for change. A cost—benefit analysis of various forms of investment would be
necessary to identify potential prospects for better alternatives. Many issues
pertaining to the strategies pursued in various aspects of managerial, financial,
technical and/or marketing fields, need to be investigated in serious and carefully
planned research projects, since a clarification of such issues is a prerequisite for
the selection of appropriate policy measures to realise specific goals.
123.2	 Kenana Sugar Company as a model for Intra—Arab Cooperation
What prospects are held to replicate the Kcnana Joint Venture Model (Chapter 11)
in other industries or economic sectors (apart from the sugar industry) in the Arab
region? Thc issues under assessment arc to be the potential prospects of
capitalising on an existing experience of a joint venture project, which is bascd on
a triangular cooperation between Arab investors (petrodollars), the western
technology (MNCs) and the natural resources of the host country (Sudan). This
ongoing experience needs to be fully assessed with a view not only to evaluating
the pros and cons of this experience, but also to establish the viability of such
strategy to be taken as a future model for intra—Arab cooperation.
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12.5.3	 DANCs and the Fxisting Technological Gap between 
The Industrialised and Developing Worlds
In the 1970s the oil—rich countries of the Arab States increasingly raiscd the hopes
among the Third World countries that they may prove a more effective bridge
between the rich and the poor countries of the world. While tens of billions of
petro—dollars have been siphoned in various forms of aid and project financing,
in a number of developing countries, the ultimate results were far from being
satisfactory. Not only has the external debt problem among the Third World
countries been exacerbated, but also the oil producing countries themselves soon
came to encounter financial constraints which have outstripped their ability to
sustain the initial momentum, which started to gather in earnest in the 1970s.
To what extent do the MNCs have to be associated with this state of affairs, in
view of the fact that much of the project finances have been channelled through
them (international financing institutions) and the projects themselves were
implemented in close cooperation with forcign MNCs, particularly insofar as the
supply of technology is concerned.
These questions on the rolc the MNCs may have directly or indirectly played in
dashing the hopes of the developing countries in reducing the wide gap that exists
today between them and the developed world, arc to be further explored at some
considerable length and depth in future researches.
12.5.4	 The Need for an Arab Data Bank
Any research which is constrained by the deficiency of basic statistical data is
bound to be subject to limitations. Data banks arc alien to the Arab world and no
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matter how any fact—finding missions are equipped, with whatever resources, the
lack of available data on the actual performance of the Arab economies, such as
the performance levels of MNCs, their commercial profitability stance, degree of
achievement of targets in terms of production, sales, indiginisation of work force,
level of perceived and actual transfer of technology, training, etc., and all sorts of
information which are amenable to quantitative analysis and interpretation by
modern theory, will always undermine the eventual outcome of such researches.
How to successfully establish the right systems of data banks and to make use of
the increasingly important developments in the field of information technology in
the Arab countries, is in itself a significant area for research. This is an endeavour
which would be highly demanding in terms of personnel and financial resources.
Ideally, it is an undertaking which should be left in the hands of an expert
committee. It is hoped that such a projcct would be commissioned by an
intergovernmental body in each individual Arab country, so that necessary
resources can be provided within an agreed framework, and terms of reference.
At a later stage, appropriate plans could be designed with a view to galvanising
the efforts of individual Arab countries, which will then be culminated in the
establishment of what could be called an "Arab data bank". Such a project may
greatly assist our understanding of the rapid development that is taking place, not
only at the multinational corporation's level, but in all walks of economic life
within and outside the Arab world.
125.5	 Impacts of World Regional Blocs on the Arab world
In view of the increasing worldwide trend to establish regional groupings among
countries, on the basis of common geographical, historical and other
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considerations, it has been suggested that cooperation among nations will, in the
future, largely take place between such regional blocs, as opposed to the existing
trading system in which unilateral arrangements between countries constitute the
bulk of world trade and investment. To take the EC after 1992 as an illustration,
the internal market programme of 1992 consists in principle of measures intended
to be neutral with respect to the rest of the world. In practice, adherence to the
principle of neutrality is not automatic, and in some cases, is impossible. The
competition of the internal market is thus likely to affect Third World countries,
particularly those with strong economic relations with Europe, such as the Arab
States. A detailed research project is called for to illuminate the effect on the
Arab economies of the emergence of such economic groupings, with special
emphasis on the influence on the Arab world of a more integrated Europe in the
aftermath of 1992.
12.5.6	 The Interaction between MNCs and the Third World
There is a pressing need for primary research about MNCs — Third World
interaction in general. While some studies covering particular aspects of such
interaction have been cited by this study, it was noted that they reflect biased
views, depending on the origin of those who have undertaken the studies. In order
to ensure neutrality, the suggested research to look into the interaction between
multinational corporations and their host developing countries, would ideally be
undertaken by a combined group of scholars from both the developed and the
developing countries. A major purpose of such a research would be to look into
the potentials of how the strategies of both MNCs and their host countries might
be reconciled.
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12.5.7	 Role of MNCs of the Third World
The MNCs of the Third World, as opposed to those of the industrialised world,
have recently acquired an increasing share of attention. Information and data
about this recent trend among the developing countries to establish joint companies
to undertake their main operations in the developing countries are sketchy. There
is a pressing need for primary rcscarch about these so called "MNCs of the Third
World" and their potential and actual impacts on the future economic prospects of
the world economy in general, and that of the Third World in particular.
12.6 Concluding Remarks and 1991 Postscript
This thesis is being completed at a critical time when the whole world is undergoing rapid
changes. This is more visibly so in the Middle East region in the aftermath of the Gulf
War and the post Cold War era in East European countries and the Soviet Union. These
ongoing global and regional political, economic, social and technological changes, are
clearly shaping both the nature of the Arab World and the possible contribution which
MNCs can make to assisting with the industrial development growth of the Arab region
in the foreseeable future.
The new realities in the field of regional economic and industrial cooperation since the
institution of the Arab sub—regional groupings, have led to the emergence of a new
outlook for regional cooperation in the whole Arab region. In this respect, efforts have
started to focus more on cooperation at the sub—regional or bilateral levels, by
strengthening bilateral tics. However, this approach is bound to widen .the gap in
industrial linkages between sub—regional groupings. New approaches for regional
cooperation arc required; they should draw on earlier succcsscs in other parts of the
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world of similar groupings, such as the EC and ASEAN, to mention only a few, in order
to meet the emerging needs in Arab regional cooperation.
Different types of technology and joint venture partnerships are now needed for different
Arab countries, as technological and managerial requirements vary from one country to
another. With regard to the Gulf region, the nature of joint ventures today differs from
what it used to be in the past. During the oil boom era, MNCs from an increasing
number of countries carried out important contracts through both equity and non—equity
participation. Such contracts included turn—key projects and other contracts involving
various combinations of supply, installation, operation and maintenance of equipment,
machinery and systems, design, supervision and construction, in addition to technical
assistance, management contracts, licenses and franchise arrangements. Emphasis has now
shifted from construction sectors to heavy industries such as petrochemicals, steel and
aluminium and most recently to down—stream industries and service sector, particularly
in the fields of operations and maintenance.
This changing business environment has necessitated the need for a different role to be
assumed by MNCs. Aid by these foreign corporations ought to concentrate on aspects
that should have analytical effects, such as research, development and training. The aim
is to improve and enhance the managerial and technical skills of the Arab nationals and
to assist with the creation of an Arab business and market environment which is more
conducive to achieve a successful transfer of technology to the Arab World.
In a multipolar world, where ideological and strategic alignments may no longer remain
the overriding considerations, and where multilatcralism has come under increasing
challenge (from protectionism), trade rivalries could conceivably once again come to the
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fore as a source of tension and instability. We may hope that such a possibility will not
turn into a reality. The only way open is to preserve and enhance the integrity and
openness of the international system of trade and finance. The former socialist countries
and the developing countries, including the Arab bloc, need to be better integrated into
the world trading and industrial system. Only in this way can they hope to contribute to
its strength and also derive full benefits from the greater cooperation involved.
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APPENDIX A
THE WORLD REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS
1.	 Asia
a. The Association of South Fast Asian Nations (ASEAN) consists of six countries
(Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand). As an
association it has earned considerable respect in thc international community,
despite diversities between members. In terms of economic structure and
performance, the group has mostly succeeded in speaking with one voice. Unlike
EEC, ASEAN does not have a common trade policy. Regulations vary
significantly from country to country. Indeed though ASEAN has emerged as an
important regional organisation, it has so far been more effective as a political,
than as an economic, organisation. Most recently, while progress has been made
towards closer economic cooperation and improved trade relations between
ASEAN member states, these arc still hampered by the mutually competitive
nature of their economies. All member states are industrialising rapidly, with
Singapore far outstripping the others.
increased economic, social and cultural collaboration among the countries of South
Asia, with a view to accelerating the pace of economic development and
enhancing stability in the region.
The association originated in December 1985, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, at a summit
meeting attended by the Heads of State and Government of Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, The Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Regional cooperation is
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envisaged by the Dhaka Declaration as a 'logical response' to the dramatic
challenges posed to the countries of South Asia by 'poverty, underdevelopment,
low levels of production, unemployment and pressure of population compounded
by the exploitation of the past and other adverse legacies'. Effective co—operation
is expected to lay the grounds for optimum use of national and regional strengths,
human and national resources and economic complementarities.
2.	 Europe
a.	 The European Community (EC)
Established by the Treaty of Paris (1951) and the Treaties of Rome (1957), the EC
comprises three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
governed by the Treaty of Paris; the European Economic Community (EEC); and
the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), governed by the Treaties
of Rome. The institutions of these communities were merged in 1965 and are
henceforth referred to as European Community (EC). The original six members
(Belgium, France, The Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) were later joined by the UK, Ireland and Denmark in 1973, Greece
in 1985 and Spain and Portugal in 1986.
Excluding intra—area trade, the EC accounted by the end of 1988 (according to
IMF report, December, 1988), for almost one fifth of world exports and nearly as
much of world imports. Its weight in world trade is somewhat less than that of
the United States and Japan taken together. In fact, the world trading system is
slowly moving from one in which US is clearly dominant, to one in which US, EC
and Japan compete to define the world agenda. Moving towards 1992, the EC is
torn between outward—looking policies and a fortress Europe mentality, and this
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tension is sometimes reflected in inconsistent trade policies. The EC has indicated
that reciprocity will be dependent on concessions from trading partners.
The convention is that Europe trades with the world. But the shifts in trade
patterns have revealed a Europe trading increasingly with itself and, more
selectively, with external markets. Some of this trend, is due to a decline in
overall world trade, but even so, Europe's trading partners of the future
(particularly after 1992) may show significant divergence from the past.
Competition for the Western European markets themselves has come increasingly
from the newly industrialised countries, where lower costs have permitted some
headway in R & D and price competitiveness. In the medium term, European
industry faces the challenge of competing in the new sectors with NICs as well
as with Japan and the U.S.
The decision making process in the EC, takes place at different levels (Council of
Ministers, Commissioners, European Parliament and the Judiciary) and since many
decisions originated in Brussels affect business, many firms and trade associations
retain representatives there, to keep a watching brief and to lobby for their views
and interests.
b.	 The European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
Members of this free trade association include the Western European countries
who arc not members in the EC, namely Swcdcn, Norway, Iceland, Austria, and
Switzerland. Finland is an associate member. They have free trade between one
another and with the EC. They do not have common tariffs with the outside
world. EFTA also has its own competition policy, as well as limited agreements
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on other issues, which are binding on members. The most important agreements
in which EFTA countries have signed thus far, are those with the EC, signed in
1972. They cover trade in industrial and processed agricultural products. Trade
in unprocessed agricultural products remains highly restricted. Since the
conclusion of the free trade agreements, trade between the two country groupings
has quadrupled and in 1988 amounted to about S100 billion, equivalent to 70%
of EFTA trade and one fourth of EC trade with Third World countries, excluding
trade within the two groups [according to the IMF report, December, 19831.
c.	 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
COMECON is an economic organisation. It was established in January 1949 at
the Moscow conference of representatives from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the USSR. (Albania joined a month later.)
Politically it was a reaction of the Eastern European countries to the Marshall plan
and to the beginnings of Cold War policies. In economic cooperation its aims
were to exchange information on economic problems, to extend mutual technical
assistancc, and to grant mutual aid in the form of raw materials, machines and
industrial equipment and other goods needed by the member countries.
At the very beginning, it was declared that COMECON (or CMEA) is an open
organisation to which other Europcan countries may join, but the geographical
limitation was removed in 1962. Its membership was later increased to include,
in addition to the original six members, German Democratic Republic (until
German Unification in 1990) (1950), Mongolia (1962), Cuba (1972), Vietnam
(1978). Yugoslavia participated in the work of COMECON in certain areas and
has an observer status at certain meetings. Finland, Iraq, Mexico and Ethiopia
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have signed special cooperation agreements with COMECON. Albania ceased
to be an active member at the end of 1961 without formally withdrawing from the
council.
Among COMECON's countries there was very little contact before the Second
World War, and they have very little to sell to each othcr. According to Oxford
A n a I y 1 ka [1984], USSR's sales of energy and matcrials (at less than world price)
and Eastcrn European counter-deliveries of engineering and consumer goods (at
above world price) cumulated to more that 100 billion US dollars, in the period
1972-1982.
d.	 Other regional organisations in Europe, which arc of relatively less influence in
shaping economic and trade relations among their members includc:-
i. BENELUX : which is a custom Union between Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg;
ii. Nordic Council, consisting of Finland, Swcdcn, Norway, Denmark
and Iccland;
iii. Consultative Committee (COCOM), is an offshoot of NATO which
operates restrictions on the export to the Eastern bloc of high
technology equipment with military uses.
Regional Groupings in Africa, and I min America
Africa is facing the worst economic crisis that any region of the world has known
since the Second World War. The scenes of mass starvation frequently shown on
television screens around the world, arc not a passing phenomenon. They arc part
of a pattern of economic decline and decay afflicting most areas of the continent,
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from which there seems little chance of escape. With few exceptions, African
governments are now burdened with debt far greater that they can ever repay. The
causes of the crisis are numerous and include: government mismanagement; civil
wars and insurgencies; drought; low commodity prices on world markets; soaring
costs of energy and other imports; and a population growth which has outstripped
food production.
Similar debt problems also face Latin America. IMF figures show that despite the
efforts that have been made to bring the debt problems under control, the regions
long term foreign debt had risen from 231 billion dollars in 1980, to 421 billion
dollars at the end of 1987, [International Business Outlook Conference, Oxford
Andxtica and International Herald Tribune, Oxford, September 1988].
Against this background of economic deficiency which prompted the EC to extend
its duty free access on a non-reciprocal basis to its market, as well as financial
and technical assistance to 66 African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, under thc
Third Lome Convention, we now set out to consider the regional groupings, which
have been established in the two continents of Africa and Central and South
America, with a view of promoting specific aspects of economic development.
3.	 Africa
a.	 The Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS)
ECOWAS consists of 16 member states, mostly along the West African coast.
Established in 1975, they arc now moving towards forming a Customs Union by
1992. These countries, which include Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sicrrc
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Leone, Togo and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Cape Verde, have had an
agreement on the free movements of their citizens since 1979, but due to fears of
mass migration the implementation has been delayed. Nigeria, the largest and
wealthiest member of the community, has expelled a number of immigrants from
other member states, but in 1985, a limited agreement on the movement of people
was signed. Duty—free trade agreement was signed in 1987. It has a cooperation
fund to develop priority projects and a secretariat working on agricultural and
infrastructure development, industrial cooperation and other programmes. Delicate
problems may arise with regard to relations with other economic and political
groupings in West Africa, such as (CEAO). A promising area of cooperation is
represented by the community's growing tics with non—African economic
institutions like the EC and the ANDEAN group.
b. Communante cconomique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO)
CEA() consists of six members of francophonc African countries. They arc all
members in ECOWAS, but CEA() has progressed more rapidly than ECO WAS.
Agreements among these six members (Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, and Upper Volta) which arc currently ratified on the basis of the 1973
Treaty of Abidjan, include the abolition or reduction of duties between the member
states, a development fund, and cooperation programmes for water supply and
transportation.
c. Preferential Trade area for Fastem and Southern African States (PTA)
PTA was formed in 1981 with the purpose of improving commercial and economic
cooperation within the region and to facilitate financial transactions between
member countries, with a view to establishing a Common Market and eventually
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an economic community. Members are Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Somali, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The East African Community (EAC), which was
established in 1967 by three of PTA's members, namely Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda, lasted only for ten years, having been terminated following Tanzania's
invasion of Uganda in 1977.
d.	 Economic Community of Central African States 
iCommunante 6conomique des 6tats d'Afrique ccntralel (CEEAC)
Formed in 1983 to promote economic cooperation, particularly with regard to frcc
movement of citizens, removal of non-tariff barriers, standardisation of trade
documents, and establishment of a fund. Its membership consists of Angola,
Burundi, Camcroon, Central African Rcpublic, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Zaire.
4.	 Latin America
a.	 The Andean Common Market (ANCOM)
ANCOM consists of five countries of South America namely Venezuela,
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador. It is the most advanced in terms of
common regulations and, in that respect, it could come only second to the
European Community. Three of its members (Venezuela, Colombia and Peru),
have abolished all duties on manufactured goods between themselves, while the
other two arc moving in that direction. These two, Bolivia and Ecuador, as the
poorest members, arc allowed to offer special concessions to non-member
countries to increase their trade, but in spite of that, trade is growing much faster
between members than with the outside world. ANCOM has negotiated trade
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agreements with other countries, including the United States, on terms that are
more favourable than individual members would be likely to achieve. (This is,
aftcr all, the essence of common markets in general). The group also has
restrictions on foreign companies. Normally, 100% ownership of local subsidiary
is not permitted, and there arc other regulations attempting to ensure that
foreigners make a maximum contribution to local industrialisation, such as
restrictions on the employment of foreign staff and on the repatriation of capital
and profits, as well as requirements to export and to locate facilities in needy
areas; approvals arc more likely to be given to priority activities. There is also a
programme for improving communications between themselves. [Brooke, 1990,
p.261.]
b.	 The Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).
This consists of twelve states — apart from Belize and Guyana, all are islands in
the Caribbean. This association aims to become an economic community; it grew
out of an earlier free trade area, but economic problems in some of the member
countries have delayed progress. Conflicts of interest occur between mcmbcrs
who show even greater inequalities than most similar organisations. Some, like
Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad, are among the wealthier of the developing
countries, whilst others like St. Lucia and St. Vincent, rank among the poorer.
Another problem, is the small size of each individual market and of the whole;
as a consequence, the area has a problem in promoting trade. The products arc
limited in range, and many of the countries are dependent on commodities which
arc depressed on international markets. Communications arc also difficult, given
the geography of the region; but common efforts arc being made to improve the
infrastructure, and significant achievements have already been recorded.
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CARICOM already has a common external tariff and taxation arrangements
designed to increase the flow of funds to the poorer membcrs.
c. The Latin American Integration Area (ALADI)
In view of problems stemmed by the differences of wealth, the integration area is
sub—divided into three groups: the richest; the less industrialised; and the poorest.
There are eleven members, including all members of ANCOM, who came in both
the less industrialised and the poorest groups; geographically ALADI stretches
from Mexico in the north to Argentina and Chile in the south. The aims are
modest and at present this new organisation provides a framework for what are
effectively treaties between individual members.
d. Central_ American Common Market
This has not progressed far, due partly to political difficulties. Its future is
currently in doubt.
e. The Democratic Community of Central America
Its objectives are mainly political and military.
f. The Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
All its members also belong to CARICOM.
g. The Organisation of American States (OAS)
Is a comprehensive organisation based in the United States, which is primarily
concerned with political and social issucs. It consists of all countries both in
South and North Amcrica.
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Consists of all Central American states.
i.	 URUPABOT,
(Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia).
The last two organisations have no specific commercial aspirations, apart from limited
cooperation agreements.
h.
APPENDIX B
TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES OF INDIVIDUAL ARAB COUNTRIES
IMPACTING ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND MNCs' OPERATIONS
(COMPILED BY THE AUTHOR FROM VARIOUS SOURCES)
ALGERIA
In 1976 a National Charter committed Algeria to a path of socialist management of the
economy. There is a recent campaign for a greater role for the private sector. The
recently revised text gives equal weight to cooperation with the Eastern bloc and members
of the OECD.
The new hydrocarbons exploration law provides some fresh incentives to foreign
companies. Foreign firms arc no longer required to finance the total costs of exploration.
Sonatrach, the national company, can therefore sign individual exploration permits in
which it will contribute to the foreign partners' expenses.
Contracts may be awarded to foreign companies either by "mutual agreement" or by call
to tender. Mutual agreement applies only when contracts are awarded within the context
of an inter—government agreement.
BAHRAIN
Potential investors in Bahrain must obtain the permission of the Ministry of Commerce
and Agriculture. Except in the case of exempt companies (ECs), foreign companies and
individuals may not own more than 49% of any local business, but this requirement may
be waived if a project is considered essential to the economy. Under the ECs law, joint
stock companies may be set up without local participation.
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While foreign participation in the past was allowed to reach up to 49%, the new
amendment (of 1988) stipulates that it may not exceed 25% and that Bahraini
participation should be at least 51%. The rest can be shared by Gulf and foreign
investors. However, in cases where the company was founded in Bahrain, some
exceptions may be made to allow foreign investment capital to exceed 49% of the capital
of Bahraini companies.
IRAQ
The state trading organisations have a monopoly over the import of certain goods such
as machinery and transport equipment, building materials, foodstuffs, and household
electrical equipment. State trading organisations deal directly with foreign suppliers. It
is possible, however, for a foreign supplier to trade with a state importing organisation
through a local agent registered with the Ministry of Commerce. Only Iraqis or other
Arab nationals are permitted to register companies in Iraq. Foreign investors can,
however, participate in joint ventures provided that the majority share is held by Iraqis
or other Arab nationals. Only foreign companies with government contracts are allowed
to set up local branches in Iraq. A fine of 10,000 Dinars will be imposed upon any
branch of a foreign company operating in Iraq, in cases of 'delay in submitting final
audited accounts of more than six months after the end of the financial year for that
company.
Prior to the recent amendment issued in April 1989 to the law covering commercial
agents, article 10 of law No. 11 prohibited the usc of commercial agents or intermediaries
in contracts with Iraqi government and socialist sector departments and popular and
professional federations and organisations. Instead, such organisations were required to
conclude their import contracts by dealing directly with foreign manufacturers or
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suppliers, approved branches of such companies in Iraq, or through Iraq's commercial
offices abroad.
According to "Gulf Economic and Financial Report" (issued by Gulf International Bank,
October 1988), the Iraq—Iran post—war important restructuring measures in Iraq included
de—regulation of the labour force; the sale of several state farms, supermarkets, petrol
stations, repair shops, bus companies and factories to the private sector; the introduction
of incentives for state workers; greater emphasis on quality of output and on exports; and
the abolition of intermediate state organisations.
JORDAN
Because of Jordan's increasing importance as a regional entrcpot, the setting up of several
free zones has been encouraged in recent years. Under the "Control of Foreign Business
Activities Regulations", foreign partners can own only up to 49% of the share capital of
a company incorporated in Jordan. It is no longer possible for overseas companies to
operate within the kingdom as agents in addition to their representation work.
Jordan's industrial activities are concentrated in phosphatc, cement and petroleum sectors,
which arc open for multinational participation. From the beginning of January 1990, the
government has lifted the abolition on imports of luxury goods, including televisions, cars,
videos and refrigerators, which it imposed in November 1988. The reason for this is
mainly the IMFs preference for free trade. In 1989 five targets were identified for
privatisation in Jordan: the largest being Royal Jordanian Airlines (valued at /500 mn);
The Transport Corporation of Jordan; and The Jordan Telecommunications Corporation.
The government's policy is to keep a golden share in such companies.
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KUWAIT
Kuwait, like other GCC members, is free from exchange control and there are no
restrictions on the transfer of profits or dividends abroad. New industrial members may
be granted tariff protection for their first five years of operation but in practice this period
can be extended. Foreign professional firms (MNCs) such as architects, consulting
engineers and urban planners are permitted to practise independently in Kuwait.
Contractors and commercial or industrial companies do not have the same freedom of
action. They may only conduct business in Kuwait in conjunction with Kuwait's interests
in one of three ways:
a. under the sponsorship of a registered Kuwaiti—merchant (agent);
b. through a joint venture partnership;
c. through a Kuwaiti—registered legal entity in which the Kuwaiti partner has at least
50% of the capital and profit distributing rights.
In Kuwait, foreigners may own small businesses. According to an Emiri Decree issued
on 23 July 1989 in Kuwait Official Gazette, non—Kuwaitis may now own and run small
businesses such as retail outlets and service shops, without a Kuwaiti partner. The 1980
Commercial Law prevented foreigners from owning more than 49% of any business in
Kuwait. Foreigners will, however, first have to deposit funds with a Kuwaiti bank,
equivalent to the value of their business. Non—Kuwaiti's may also now invest in mutual
funds and real estate portfolios through local banks.
The Kuwaiti Company Code does not allow foreign participation in Kuwaiti shareholding
companies, unless it is authorised by special decree. All industrial projects with majority
Kuwaiti shareholding arc exempted from income tax for a period of ten years. Locally
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produced commodities are afforded protection by restricting imports to 75% of local
requirements.
LEBANON
Foreign investment in Lebanon is controlled by Industrial Promotion Decrees providing
incentives, including a six-year tax holiday, provided that a newly set-up venture has a
capital of at least fLeb 1 million and that it produces goods not made locally before
January 1971, (the aim being to encourage new industries). Decree No. 3, 1977 allows
business to ensure themselves against war risk.
Both Lebanon and Jordan are poor in terms of natural resources. Generally they are both
supported by service industries, the aid of wealthier Arab States and the help of the
international community. Lebanon was, until its political troubles exploded in 1976, a
haven for private enterprises (both local and foreign). By location and temperament, the
Lebanese are business-minded people and traders. Lebanon's banking laws were as
liberal as Switzerland's, if not more so. Its future will always revolve around private
enterprise and international economic activities.
LIBYA
Libya has, since the late 1970s, abolished almost all private business. Numerous public
organisations, most of which are attached to the country's Secretariats (Ministries) have
been set up to administer industry, trade, agriculture and services. Some of these
organisations are given a monopoly over imports of certain consumer and capital goods.
Although it is possible to use English or Italian in negotiations with Libyan officials, all
correspondence with public organisations must be in Arabic. Contracts, too, must be
B - 5
drafted in Arabic version which will be referred to if a dispute arises. It is important,
therefore, that the Arabic version is complete and accurate. Only public organisations can
act as agents for foreign suppliers. These organisations deal directly with manufacturers,
or producers, thus excluding foreign representatives, agents and other intermediaries.
MOROCCO
Incentives for investment in industry include: guaranteed transfer of dividends and
profits; guaranteed repatriation of capital (if this comes from abroad); refund of any
special tax on import duties for up to seven years in the case of export orientated
industries; exemption from turnover tax and from import duties on equipment designed
to save water or energy or to protect the environment.
The "Morocconisation" of business sector which King Hassan II introduced in 1971,
provided for the transfer of control to Moroccans to be negotiated with adequate
compensation paid to the foreign investors. He indicated that "Morocconisation" was
merely a desire for majority control of business activities by Moroccans, rathcr than
complete disconnectedness from the multinational corporate system. The requirements
for "Morocconisation" were that the chair of the firm, the director, the majority of the
board members, and half of thc shareholders of a firm must be Moroccan nationals.
Royal Decree dated 14th June 1989 intending to conquer bureaucracy, specifies that if an
investment proposal is not approved within two months of the date of application and no
response of refusal is received, then it will be deemed as officially and finally approved
and applicants are authorised to act accordingly. This decree is meant to cut short
approval procedures and remove red tape in a more decisive way.
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Regarding liberalisation of foreign trade, less than 10% of imports in early 1990 required
licences, compared to 70% in 1983, while most foreign exchange controls have been
eliminated. In 1988 Morocco joined thc GATT on Tariffs and Trade. As far as
privatisation is concerned, and in linc with the IMF policies, four sugar refineries, three
subsidiaries of the State Fisheries company, a civil works company and some long
distance bus routes have been privatised during a three year period, extending from 1985
to 1988. In April 1988 a Commission was created to determine targets for further
privatisation.
OMAN
The "Foreign Business and Investment Law" stipulates that investments defined as
"Economic Development Projects" enjoy up to 10 years' tax exemption, provided that the
company's paid—up capital is not less than RO 100,000. Companies with foreign capital
participation in which Omani's own at least 35% of the capital shares, may have a capital
as small as RO 30,000 to qualify for five years tax exemption. Other incentives offered
to foreign investors include income and export tax exemptions, and reduction in or
exemption from customs duties on imported plant, machinery and raw materials.
QATAR
To invest in Qatar, foreign firms and individuals must have at least one Qatari partner.
Such companies must be at least 51% locally—owned, except for those whose funds are
invested in "national economic development projects". Foreign contractors with
government contracts are also exempted. Foreigners providing professional services such
as consultants and architccts for example, do not need Qatari partners providing they have
a Qatari sponsor to guarantee thcir financial liabilities.
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A mandatory condition in all government contracts with regard to disputes, states that all
official contracts and tenders must specify that only Qatari courts are competent to
entertain disputes with regard to these contracts. Foreign companies arc requested to
adhere to these conditions.
SAUDI ARABIA
Foreign companies wanting to maintain long-term links with Saudi Arabia must think of
setting up joint ventures thcrc with local partners. Foreign contractors arc required by law
to pass on 30% of their business there to local firms. A "Cooperative" foreign company
will make sure local firms get a higher share, even if their foreign competitors may be
able to offer better terms. One of the Kingdom's main aims in dealing with foreign firms
(including contractors and joint venture partners) is to achieve a true transfer of
technology. Industrial ventures set up with Saudi Arabian private partners qualify for free
loans of up to half the venture's capital from the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, a
state agency whose task is to help diversify local industry.
Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) is the largest 331 Company in the
world, according to FORTUNE Magazine Report, 1989. Its 1988 sales amounted to
2369.9 million dollars. Its profits in 1988 amounted to 982.7 million dollars, thus making
SABIC the 24th largest worldwide, in terms of profits. As for assets, it was the biggest
118 company (7197.7 million dollars).
Vice-Chairman of SABIC, Mr. I bin Salma stated to an Arab Magazine (Al-Magalla,
15th August, 1989) that,
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"there is no need for .K4BIC to invest outside the Kingdom as it has chosen from
the outset the joint venture with selected industrial MNCs as a mode for its
industrialisation strategy."
Foreign capital can be invested without the participation of Saudi Arabian nationals, but
in such cases, it does not benefit from the various concessions which are usually offered
to foreign investors under the provisions of the foreign investment code (including 10
years exemptions from all income and company taxes). The code stipulates that foreign
participation must not exceed 75 per cent of the joint—venture capital. Industrial projects
licensed under the code enjoy the same privileges granted to national (Saudi) capital under
the "National Industries Protection and Encouragement Regulations". However, in order
to be eligible, foreign capital must be invested in the "development projects" (excluding
the oil extraction sector) which fall within the priorities of the Kingdom's Development
Plan. It must also include an clement of foreign technical expertise and know—how.
While the slogan persistently raised regarding the 100 per cent ''Saudisation", is unlikely
to involve nationalisation, it will entail increasing obligations in terms of local purchase
and training of the Saudi personnel.
SUDAN
The Commercial Agents Licensing and Control Act of 1968 regulates the appointment of
agents for foreign suppliers. All foreign currency payments must be made through the
Bank of Sudan. Exporters normally opt for a confirmed letter of credit to secure payment
in foreign currency. Private and foreign investments are promoted and controlled by the
"Encouragement of Investment Act 1980" which offer several incentives including tax
cxcmption, free transfer of capital and profits and reduced prices for certain requirements
such as electricity and land.
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SYRIA
Foreign investors under Decree No. 84 of 1972 entitled the "Incentive For Foreign
Investors in Free Zones and Free Markets", are given attractive incentives to set up
industries and assembly plants in the country's frcc zone areas — set up in Damascus,
Aleppo, Latakia and Tartous. Only Syrian firms may be appointed agents for foreign
suppliers. Most imports are made through public sector organisations which in many
cases have a monopoly over certain goods. State trading organisations normally deal with
foreign suppliers.
In asserting recently the climate for private foreign investment in Syria, it is safe to
suggest that, although this, and other policies such as liberal legislation covering banking,
tax exemptions and profit repatriation have been instituted, they have not in the recent
past attracted large—scale foreign investment. However, it is most likely that more forcign
investment will be forthcoming in the wake of the new political environment created
following the Gulf War and Syria's reproachment with the western industrialised world.
TUNISIA
Industries set up to produce exclusively for export benefit from incentives including total
exemption from taxes on profits for 10 years with reduced rates of tax for a further 10
years and exemption from customs duties and taxes on capital equipment and raw
materials imports. To qualify for most of these incentives foreign investors must have a
Tunisian partner. In most circumstances it is illegal for foreign nationals to act as agents
or representatives. Many government or semi—government organisations have a monopoly
over the import of certain products although imports arc made also through the private
sector.
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Law No. 88-1 10 of 18th August 1988, laying down regulations for international trading
companies, stipulates:-
a. Exemption from tax on industrial and commercial profits, tax on corporate profits
or tax on non-commercial profits in respect of profits generated by exporting,
international trading and brokerage operations appropriate to the ratio of turnover
on these operations to total turnover (enhancing export-oriented development).
b. Investments made by non-resident investors (MNCs) shall be guaranteed and
protected and the right of non-resident investors to transfer capital invested by
means of foreign currency investments and the earnings generated thereby, shall
be guaranteed. The guarantee relating to transfer of capital invested by means of
foreign investment shall cover the actual proceeds of the transfer or liquidation.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
All foreigners working there must be sponsored by a UAE national (or company) who will
also assume legal responsibility for them. A foreign company can pre-qualify to bid for
tenders only after applying for registration in the Suppliers and Contractors Registry kept
by the Purchase Department. On winning a public contract, a company at least 51%
owned by UAE nationals, will be paid an advance sum of 25% of the contract value
within one month of signing the deal, providing that it submits a bank guarantee after
payment. This, of course, favours national companies, but a foreign company may benefit
from this rule if it sets up a joint venture with UAE partners. Such ventures often permit
the foreign partner (or partners) to undertake managerial work.
Foreign capital participation is particularly encouraged in industrial projects that require
advanced technologies, or that are considered to be important for economic development.
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However, foreign capital should not exceed 49% of total equity in any joint venture
project. Exemption from income tax is limited to 5 years, while required imports of
machinery, equipment and raw materials are exempted from custom duties.
EGYPT
Manufacturcrs engaged in assembly industries are eligible for preferential reduced levy
up to 70%. Through this incentive to the manufacture in Egypt, foreign companies arc
well placed to negotiate deals that will affect not only the actual manufacture in the fields
mentioned (assembly) but also training and other related areas.
President Sadat's open—door economic policy is aimed at economic liberalisation and at
encouraging the inflow of foreign investment (since mid-1970s). New laws have been
passed to allow domestic and foreign private participation in sectors which were
previously the domain of the state. Whereas the private sector accounted for only 23 %
of total planned investment between 1982/83, and 1986/87, the private sector share of
investment over the five years to 1991/92 is projected at 38% (according to EIU, January
1988). Arab and foreign funds invested in the Egyptian free zones arc exempt from
legacy tax and inheritance duty. Such funds arc well protected by law through the
introduction of specific provisions in foreign investment codes, such as the
impermissibility of nationalisation, confiscation, seizure or the imposition of custodianship.
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC
The government has guaranteed the freedom of investment by individuals as well as
companies, whether Yemenis or foreigners, in all the economic projects which aim to
develop a national economy. Foreign capital is to be treated exactly like national capital
with all the privileges attached thcrcto. The government may not confiscate or nationalise
B — 12
any project properly authorised. However, in exceptional cases where such projects are
nationalised, reasonable and just compensation must be paid and the transfer of such
payments will be allowed to be made overseas to the extent of the size of the foreign
capital imported. Local private investors have been instrumental in attracting foreign
participants in many of their projects. Investment guarantee agreements giving protection
to foreign investors have been signed with several countries.
PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
All foreign exchange transactions must be made through the National Bank of Yemen.
Only nationals can be appointed agents for foreign suppliers. A law providing good
incentives to foreign investors was issued in late 1982. Incentives include exemption from
local taxes and customs duties and frcc transfer of capital and profits. Foreigners
working in Yemen PDR are permitted to transfer abroad up to 70% of their taxed
earnings.
APPENDIX C
SAMPLES OF LETTERS AND QUESTIONNAIRES
REGARDING THE MAIN FIELD STUDY UNDERTAKEN IN THE GULF
GEILI M FARAH
26 Highview
Byron Way
NORTHOLT
Middlesex
UB5 6BL
U.K.
March 1990
Dear Sirs
THE MULTINATICNALS AND THE ARAB 10.ORLD
I un currently undertaking an enquiry into the problems associated with
developing better trade and Investment links between the multinational
companies and the Arab countries. The question of technology transfer
and training through joint ventures Is highly featured and occupies a
central position in this enquiry. This work is being undertaken in
conjunction with the postgraduate research programme at Henley, The
Management College and Brunel University, U.K.
The results of this enquiry should, I hope, provide valuable case
material for improving managerial education in the area of international
Investment and trade. The enquiry also provides the basis for my comple-
tion of a doctorate degree.
I should be grateful if you would complete the enclosed questionnaire and
return it as soon as you can. The responses of individual companies and
persons will, of course remain confidential and be aggregated with other
materials.
Yours faithfully
Celli M Farah(Mr)
C(I)-1
The Research and Doctoral
Programme
Henley - The Management College
and
Brunel - The University of West London
Greeniands. Henieron•Tharnes. Oxcn RG9 3AU
Te;echcne: Hen!ey-cn .rnarnes (0491) 5714,Sa
Teiex: 249025 HENLEY G Fax: (0491) 571635
TO ROM IT MAT CONCERN
This is to confirm that Mt G M Perth is registered as a part-time research
student for a PhD on the above programme. We would be grateful for any
assistance that you are able to give him by the completion of questionnaires
or the provision of other information relevant to his research concerning
Multinational Companies operating in the Arab world.
M= I Hutton
Visitimg ?elixir and Tutor Intermational Studies
13.03.90
C(0-2
G.M. Farah,
Henley, The Management College,
(Brunel University),
Henley-on-Thames,
Greenland,
Oxon RG9 3AU
U.K.
Questionnaire
5a221(11 _ 6Eat_gompanies _ coo2erating _ with _ multinational companieg,
1-Name of the company*
2-Year of commencement of business*	
3-Nature of business activity:
Ca) export
(b)import
(c)manufacturing
(d)consultancy/service
(e)contracting
(f)
4-% Number of your company employees
T
	 	 I	 Arab nationals	 I1 non-Arab foreigners
I	 T
1
I
(a)	 managerial
I
1 1
1 1 I(b)middle and
	 technical 1 1
I I
1
(c)workers 1 1 1
1 1 ,
I
I. ,..
C(1)-3
Name of foreign
company EP MC
5-Nature of partnership/cooperation with three main foreign companies:
(a)if joint venture.what is the percentage proportion of equity
participation (EP) and managerial control (MC)
your company the foreign company
EP
1
2
3
L
(b)flexible arrangements:(please tick as appropriate)
(1)management contract
(ii)buy-back deal
(iii)production sharing
(iv)other forms
8-Management development
How is your company's target to develop local skills met by your
foreign partners:
(a)flexibility in providing local management
(b)management through parent company only
(c)management dominated by Arab specialists
(d)product-oriented managers
(e)region-oriented managers
(f)local management development is a domestic issue to which foreign
partners have no contribution or say
(g) 	
7-Who makes the investment decisions involving financial commitments
in your company?
(a)general manager on his own discretion
(b)general manager acting on family advice
(c)the decision is made on professional advice
C(l)-4
•none
negative)
neutral (no
effect)
reat fair
(a) exports
(b)jobs
(c)capital investment
Cd)technology transfer
(e)research facilities
(f)managerial and technical
training
:(g)structure of economy
(h)competitiveness of econom
(i)appropriate exploitation
of domestic resources
(1)
positive negative neutral
(d)left to the banker or stockbroker
(e)left to shareholders
(f)board of directors
(g)
El-How do you envisage the positive impact on the Arab countries
of foreign multinationals' activities in the region in terms of:
9-Is the impact of the multinationals positive or negative in respect
of the following:
(a)changing work practices
(b)changing life-style
(culture,traditions.etc,)
(c)access to capital
C(I) -5
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_ _ _ _
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(d)productivity
(e)net effect on tax returns
(taxes paid vs remittances)
(f)national sovereignty
(g)local technology
(h) 	
10-Which of the following strategies does your company pursue to avoid
over-dependence on foreign companies:
(a)policies geared to improve bargaining power
(b)regulation of the conduct of the multinationals
(c)emphasis on equity participation
(d)indigenisation of management and technical personnel
(e)restriction on the areas in which the multinationals are allowed
to operate
(f)procurement of technology through licensing ,direct purchase
and/or management contracts
.(g)requiring exporting as a condition for importing
(h)systematic favouring of domestic enterprises over foreign
subsidiaries
(1)reliance on local capital/technology
(j)threat of nationalisation or confiscation
(k)erection of barriers and restrictions against imports
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11-What are the advantages of appointing more local managers?
please indicate significance by allocating numbers (1-5):
(a)elimination of language and other local adjustment problems
(b)understanding of local feelings about sensitive and politicised
issues and responding with appropriate policies
(c)less expensive than expatriates
(d)provision of greater employment continuity
•-.1i
12-What are thekdvantages?
(a)problems of the gap in management understanding between parent
company and it's overseas subsidiaries
(b)limitation in career development opportunities for successful
managers in the parent company .
(c)risk of tendency for federation of independent national units
with only nominal links to corporate headquarters
(d)not suitable for technology-based multinationals
13-In order to achieve the transfer of technology,what policies does
your company pursue:
(a)using less sophisticated, easily-operated technology
(b)requiring contractual commitment of licensor to licensee training
and permission of horizontal transfer of technology by the
licensee
(c)extensive training of local staff, domestically and abroad
(d)enhancing research & development(R & D) programmes
(e)resorting to licensing as opposed to outright purchasing of
technology
Mattering more incentives to motivate engineers,scientists and
technology-related staff members
(g)
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14-What are the technological needs mostly appropriate to your
business:
(a)capital-intensive technology
(b)labour-intensive technology
(c)export-oriented manufacturing technology
(d)import-substitution manufacturing technology
(e)agricultural technology
(f)intermediate manufacturing technology with low capital intensity
(g)light manufacturing technology
(h)upgrading of indigenous managerial and technical talent
(i)
15-How possible is the diffusion of imported foreign technology
(a)fairly possible
(b)partially possible
Cc) impossible
.16-Apart from technology transfer and management training, what
advantages do you envisage the multinationals are capable of
offering that are not readily achievable by the Arab firms
• either on national or regional level
17-In your direct/indirect contacts with foreign multinational
companies, to what degree have they satisfied your objectives?
(a)high
(b)moderate
Cc) low
(d) none
Thank you for you cooperation.
Please return the completed questionnaire to the following
address:
G.M. Farah,
28 Highview,
B y ron Way, Northolt,	 C(i)-8
Middlesex UBS 5BL,
U. K.
G. M. Farah,
Henley. The Management College,
(Brunel University),
Henley—=n-Thames,
Greenia=ds,
Oxon ES9 3AU
U.K.
-QUESTIONNAIRE
WELEi_MULIMINN9L_COUNIE5_ g eggAIING IN T HE ARAB wQB41::
1- Name of Company: 	
2- Type of business activity in the Arab World.	
•
(a)exporter
(b)importer
(c)direct investment (production•facilities)
(d)consultancy
(e)other types
3- Channels of business:
(a)agency office(local agents)
(b)joint venture
(c)own subsidiary
(d) 	
( e ) 	
4- What are the main three Arab countries with which your
company is involved and the year of commencement of business
(a) 	
(b) 	
Cc)
C00-1
(a)members of board of directors
(b)staff in managerial levels
(c)technicians and their assistants'
(d)engineers
(e)clerical staff
(f)workers
5-	 If you are involved in direct investment in the Arab World,
please give details of the number of employees at each
level_ =f your company in the Arab country/countries
gNationality of Staff!
:Arab Host TParent 1 Third Country 
,country	 country Arab Non-Arabl
6- Volume of business:(totaI capital invested in the Arab
country/countries)
(a)less than $1 million
(b)1
	 10 million
(c)11
	 20 million
(d)21 . 	50 million
(051 +	 million
7- If your company is involved in direct investment in any of
the Arab countries ,what is the nature of partnership
(a)equity stake
(b)management contract
(c)buy-back deal
(d)production sharing
(e)other types (please explain)
8- If you are a licensor to one or more Of the Arab
countries/companies: what are your returns on licensing:
(a)initial fees
(b)ongoing roya:zies
(c)management services
(d)once-only fees
(e)profit share
(f) 	
9- (Please tick as appropriate)
The positive effects of your business operations in the
Arab World include:
(a)creation of new jobs
(b)promotion of exports
(c)local added value
(d)enhanced efficiency
(e)provision of foreign capital
(f)payment of taxes
(g)provision of training to local nationals
(h) 	
10- The contribution of the Multinationals to the development of
the Arab countries depends on many factors. In your case,
what of the following factors are more important than the
others (please place numbers from 0-6 to indicate signific-
ance; 6 being more significant than o ):
(a)host government policy (particularly that specifically
directed to the Multinationals)
(b)the environment for disseminating new technology manage-
ment skills , etc.
(c)domestic and International market structure
(d)the type of foreign investment
C00-3
' (e)the strategy of your company
(f) 	
11- What are the advantages of appointing more local managers
in your Joint venture(s) in the Arab countries?
(please rank from 1-4 to indicate the degree of importance::
(a)elimination of language and other local adjustment
problems 	
(b)understanding of local feelings about sensitive and
politicised issues and to responding with appropriate
policies 	
(c)less expensive than' expatriates 	
(d)provision of greater employment continuity 	
(e) 	
12- What are the disadvantages?
(a)problems of gap in management understanding between
parent company and its overseas subsidiaries.
(b)limitation in career development opportunities for
successful managers in the parent company.
(c)risk of tendency for federation of independent national
units with only nominal links to corporate headquarters.
(d)not suitable for technology-based multinationals.
13- What in your view are the negative effects of technology
transfer to the Arab countries?
(please tick as appropriate ):
(a)easy diffusion to foreign competitors.
(b)improper use -inefficient management.
(c)high proportion of unexploited capacity of technology.
(d)low return compared to high cost.
(e)impediment to development of local technology.
14- What measures(if any)of local control are designed by Arab
host countries to protect local technology and reduce
C(ii)-4
payments to foreign technology:
(a)licensing agreements rather than direct 1nvestment.
(b)restrictions even on licensing agreements through
1-close scrutiny to ensure that indigenous technologies
are not being excluded.
ii-to apply prescribed royalty rates.
iii-to reduce to the minimum possible the life of the
agreement.
iv-to permit horizontal transfer of technology by the
licensee
•
15-	 Is cooperation typically smoother with state enterprises
or private sector in the Arab countries?
(a) state enterprises.
:	 (b)private sector.
(c)lf (a),what in your view are the underlying factors:
(1)private enterprises are less flexible than the
public sector enterprises
(ii)difficulties in dealing with family-oriented groups
(iii)problems in transfer pricing
(iv)private enterprises are usually sleeping partners
(v)public sector is less precautious about government
guidelines;hence,more decisive
(d)If (b),why?
• (1)private sector is more flexible-less bureaucratic
(ii) "	 n	 "	 " motivated
(iii)"	 "	 " result-oriented, more business-like
(iv) 	
16-	 Which of the following strategies do you think the Arab
host countries pursue to undermine their over-dependence on
foreign partners:
(a)improve their own bargaining power.
(b)regulationof the conduct of multinationals.
•
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(c)emphasis on equity participation.
(d)indigenisation of management and technical personnel.
(e)restrictions on the areas in which foreign multinationals
are allowed to operate.
(f)procurement of technology through licensing,direct
purchase and management contracts.
(g)requiring exports as a condition for importing.
(h)systematical favouring of domestic enterprises over
foreign subsidiaries.
(i)reliance on local capital and technology.
•
(j)threat of nationalisation or confiscation.
(k)erection of barriers and restrictions against imparts.
17-	 If an Arab country opts for a socialist path of
development,can it achieve economic development without
relying on foreign multinationals ?
(a)Yes
(b)No
(c)if Yes, how and what alternatives are there
(i)reliance on local technology and local capital .
(ii)cuts in imports of non-essential goods and services
(iii)establishing own multinationals either on Pan-Arab
or world-wide levels.
(iv)emphasis on export-oriented policies.
(v)developing and improving on indigenous technical
capabilities.
(vi)strengthening role of state.
18	 In descending order of significance,rplease choose from the
following, the reasons behind your choice to invest (or
trade) in the Arab World (please place numbers from 1 to 10
to indicate significance)
(a)an important market in its own right 	
(b)a gateway to other Arab countries 	
(c)advantage of familiar commercial and legal structure 	
C00-6
(d)cheap labour force 	
(e)cheap raw material/9 including energy
	
(f)advantageous tax system 	
(g)capital loans and grants 	
(h)freedom of capital movement and repatriation of pr:fits
	
(1)ease of restriction on industrial licensing
	
(j)preferential purchasing of local products (and services)
by local governments
	
(k)other reasons 	
Thank you for your cooperation.
Please return the completed questionnaire to the following
address:
G.M. Farah,
28 Highview,
Byron Way , Northolt,
Middlesex 1J135 6B1..,
U.K.
C00-7
G. M. Farah,
Henley,The Management College,
(3runel University),
Henley-on-Thames,
Greenlands,
Oxon RG9 3AU
U. K.
QUESTIONNAIRE
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Name*	
2- Job title*	
3- area of specialisation*	
4- What in your opinion is the impact on the Arab countries of the
foreign multinational's activities in the region in terms of the
following
(please indicate by: positive, negative or neutral)
(a)exports
(b)imports
(c)jobs
(d)capital investment
(e)technology transfer
ft/promotion of research capabilities
(g)management of technical training
(h)structure of economy
(i)appropriate exploitation of domestic resources
(j)
C(iii)-1
• • ••n••••••n•n•	 ••••,, • •,••••••••n••••• *Imo* .••• • • •
5- Is the impact of multinational companies poeltive or negative In
respect of:
(a)changing work practices (culture,traditions, etc.)
(b)productivity
(c)net effect on tax returns (taxes paid vs remittances abroad)
(d)national sovereignty
(e)domestit technology
6- How best can the Arab world realise the transfer of appropriate
technology:
(a)emphasis on less sophisticated, easily-cperated technology
(b)requiring contractual commitment of licensor to licensee's
training and permission of horizontal transfer of technology
by the licensee
(c)extensive training of local staff, domestically and abroad
(d)enhancing R&D programmes
(e):esorting to licensing as opposed to outright purchasing of
technology
(f)offering appropriate incentive schemes to motivate engineers,
scientists and technology related staff members
(g)
7- What strategies could the Arab countries adopt to limit the
degree of their dependance on foreign multinationals:
(a)improvement of bargaining power
(b)regulation of the conduct of the multinationals
(c)emphasis on equity participation (to ensure that partnerships
are based on mutual interests
(d)indigenisation of management and technical personnel
(e)restrictions on the areas in which foreign companies are
allowed to operate
(f)procurement of technology through licensing, direct purchase
and/or management contracts
C(iii)-2
i.
(g)requiring exporting as a condition for importing
(h)systematical favouring of domestic enterprises over foreign
subsidiaries
(i)reliance on local capital/technology
(j)threat of natinalisation or confiscation
(k)erection of barriers and restrictions against imports
8- For protection of local technology and reduction of payments to
licensors, the following measures can be taken:
(a)close scrutiny to ensure that indigenous technologies are not
being excluded
(b)to apply prescribed royalty rates
(c)to reduce to the minimum, the life of licensing agreement
(d)to permit horizontal transfer of technology by the licensee
9- How important to you is each of the following investment criteria .
(in a typical Arab country)!
Ca) security
(b)capital growth
• (c)ease of access to capital
(d) industrial diversification
(e)geographical diversification
(f)profitability and return on investment
(g)supply assurance of major essential materials
(h)stable market for products
CI) 	
10- In the event of joint venture of an industrial investment between
local (Arab) and foreign undertakings, what in your view is the
preferred form of partnership:
(a)equity stake
. C(iii)-3
(b)management contract
(c)buy-back deal
(d)production sharing
(e)other types
11- In a typical Arab investment undertaking (industrial Cr trading)
who do you think rakes the investment decisirns involving
financial cormitments:
(a/general manager on his own discretion
(b)general manager acting on famil y advice
(c)decision made on professional advice
(d)left to the banker or stockbroker
(e)left to shareholders
(f)board of directors
12- Hain factors contributing to the failure of soce Arab companies
(please tick as appropriate):
(a)investment made in the wrong activity
(b)insufficiently trained managers
(c)politically motivated investment decisions
(d)excessive replication leading to over investment
(e)insufficient feasibility studies
(f)probleas attributable to external (foreign) factors i.e.
problems associated with cooperation with foreign
multinationals
(g)other factors
C(iii)-4
13- What are the main objectives implicit in the foreign expansion of
some public sector enterprises of the Arab countries, i.e Kuwait:
(a)undermIning dependance on foreign companies
(b)promotion of political ties
(c)diversification
(d)need to accuire foreign exchange
(e)increase market size (limited local market)
(f)gain necessary expertise particularly in technology managem-
ent; a step towards technology transfer at a later stage
14- The Arab export free zones;i.e. Egypt and Dubai have shifted
emphasis from import-substitution objectives in favour of
exports; hence, close integration with the World Economy:
(a)agree
(b)disagree
(c)positive development
(d)negative development
(e)neutral effect
15- Through their multinationals the western countries have the
tendenc y to limit their real investments in the third world while
encourage expansion of service industry; why:
(a)a deliberate strategy to keep them under developed
(b)the service sector is risk-free and highly profitable
Investment
(c)fear of competition with their own products and fear of
reduction of the size of their markets in the third world
(d)to avoid technology diffusion
(e)other reasons
16- If an Arab country has to choose between accommodating foreign
direct investment on its soil and opening its market to import
the product/service from the respective foreign multinationals;
which choice is more akin to the interest of the Arab country:
(a)FD1 (with no local participation)
(b)imports
.	 C(iii)-5
	At
U- The "hege.nonic Stability Theory states that cooperation among
nations requires the presence of a larger. wore powerful country
to exercise a leadership necessary to enforce cooperation between
itself and the other countries:
(a)do you agree that such theory could well apply to a reasonable
degree of success among the nations of the Arab world:
(!)	 Yes
(Ii) No
(b)ii Yes: which of the following Arab countries do you propose
to assume the leadership role:
(I) Egypt
(ii) Saudi Arabia
(it!) Iraq
(iv) 	
Calif No; what alternative strategy is likely to produce desired
results:
(!) collective action on Pan-Arab level
(ii) cooperation between existing regional groupings; i.e.
GCC. ACC. etc.
Mil national identities to seek cooperation as they deea
appropriate
(iv) cooperation between economically like-minded countries
within the Arab world
(v) cooperation between politically like-minded
(vi) other basis for cooperation
18- How do you view the following governaent policies:(40w,cV4cyl.wt.7)
(a) liaitation on the employaent of foreign nationals
(b) frequent changes of investoent regulations
(c) restrictions on repatriation of capital/profits
by foreign oultinationals
(d) 	
C(iii)-6
19-	 In general, to what degree have the foreign multinationals
satisfied the economic development objectives of the Arab world:
Ca) high
(b) moderate
Cc) low
Cd) none
Thank you for your cooperation.
Please return the completed questionnaire to the follcwing
address:
G.M. Farah,
26 Highview,
Byron Way, Northolt,
Middlesex, UB5 681..,
U.K.	
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APPENDIX D
ADDITIONAL TABLES
ETABLE DI
	
ARAB AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS, 1984-86 ($mn)
1984 1985 1986
Algeria 2,419 2,519 2,300
Egypt 4,084 4,072 3,976
Libya 1,525 1,311 1,200
Morocco 1,300 1,230 1,240
Tunisia 596 520 610
North Africa 9,924 9,652 9,326
Bahrain 224 208 228
Iraq 3,085 2,888 2,712
Jordan 700 685 550
Kuwait 1,440 1,285 1,095
Lebanon 601 560 530
Oman 435 485 486
Qatar 227 218 225
Saudi Arabia' 5,357 4,748 4,644
Syria 905 942 830
UAE 1,380 1,240 1,187
North Yemen 809 725 595
South Yemen 240 280 310
Middle East 15,403 14,264 13,392
TOTAL 25,327 23,916 22,718
a: Thc figure for Saudi Arabia excludcs cigarettes, non-alcoholic beveragcs, transport
tradc and high value processcd foods that the kingdom normally includcs in its
agricultural trade figures.
Sourcc:	 The Middle East & North Africa, Situation and Outlook Report, USDA
1986.
TABLE D2
	
ARAB IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
Country Exchange
Controls
Import
Surcharges
Advance
Deposits
Multiple
Exchange
Rates
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iraq
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sudan
Syria
Tunisia
UAE
North Yemen
South Yemen
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No _
Source:	 IMF Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions Annual Report,
1986, Washington, pp350-554.
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TABLE D4
	
INVESTMENT TARGETS UNDER ARAB DEVELOPMENT
PLANS TO THE 1990s.
Country Period Grovnh
Rate
Target %
Total
Investment
-
S bit
Equivalent
Algeria 1985-89 6.6 Al) 550 bit 118
Egypt 87/88-91/92 5.8 LE 463 bit 21'
Jordan 1986-90 5.0 ID 3,175 ran 9
Morocco 1988-92 4.0 Dh 204 bit 26
Oman 1986-90 - OR 2.25 bit 6
Saudi Arabia 1985-90 4.0 SR 500 bit 133
Syria 1986-90
- SL 101.5' bit 26
Tunisia 1987-91 3.5 T1) 10.7 bit 14
North Yemen 1986-90
- YR 38.0 bit 4
South Yemen 1988-92 Y1) 583.0 bit 2
_	 _
a = at free market exchange rate
b = 1981-1985 allocation; 86-90 total will bc higher in real terms.
Source: EIU Compilation from individual plan documents/accouncements
(EIU — Euro—Arab Trade, Prospects to the 1990s, January 1988,
p31.)
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TABLE D6
	
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
SUMMARY OF TRADE MEASURES,
OCTOBER 1985 — APRIL 1988
Tariffs	 NontariLf Measures
Up	 Dawn	 Mixed	 Tightened	 Liberalized	 Mixed	 Memorandum'
Argentina	 x	 x
Bangladesh	 x	 x
Brazil	 X	 x
Chile	 X	 X
China	 x	 x
Colombia	 X
Me dIvoire	 X
Egypt	 x	 x	 c
Gabon	 x
Ghana	 X
India	 X	 x
Indonesia	 X	 X	 S,C
Kenya	 X
Korea	 X	 X
Malaysia	 X
Mexico	 x	 x	 S,C
Morocco	 x	 x
Nigeria	 x	 x	 c
Pakistan	 x	 x
Peru	 x	 x
Philippines	 x	 x	 S
Sri Lanka	 x
Taiwan Province of China	 x	 X
Thailand	 x	 x
Singapore	 x
Tunisia	 x	 x
Turkey	 x	 x
Uruguay	 X	 c
Yugoslavia	 X
Zaire	 X	 c
Zambia	 X
Total	 1	 13	 11	 6	 ' 16	 3
Source: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Review of Developments in the Trading
System (Geneva),
various issues.
C = Comprehensive tariff reform; S = Substitution of tariffs for quantitative restrictions.
TABLE D7
	
EMPLOYMENT CONTRIBUTION BY FOREIGN AND JOINT-
VENTURE COMPANIES IN OMAN BY END OF 1984.
Type of Ownership Total
Grand
Total
Employment 100%
Foreign
Forcign
Joint
Ventures
Non-
Omani
Omani
Omanis 1,907 5,038 6,945 6,584 13,529
Non-Omanis 13,741 34,706 48,447 108,278 156,725
TOTAL 15,648 39,744 55,392 114,862 170,255
% Omanis to total 12.2 12.7 12.5 5.7 8.0
% Non-Omanis to
total
87.8 87.3 87.5 94.3 92.0
Source: Derived from Development Council Data - Oman.
NOTE: Total employment created by foreign companies in Oman was 15,648
occupation by end of 1984. Out of this total, only 1907 occupation (or 12.2
per cent) were filled in by Omanis. In Joint Venture companies, the total
number of employment was 39,744, out of which 5,038 were Omanis,
representing 12.7 per cent. The contribution of both foreign and joint venture
companies to employment amounted to 55,392 occupation, representing 32.5
per cent of the total employment in the private sector; with Omanis being
6,945 or 12.5 per cent of the total (ESCWA report, 1988, p.42).
TABLE D8	 LABOUR FORCE IN KUWAIT, BY OCCUPATION AND
NATIONALITY; 1985
Kuwaiti Non—Kuwaiti Total
Number % Number % Number
Professional and 25,963 23.8 82,963 76.2 108,926
Technical
Administrative and 4,011 37.7 6,624 623 10,635
Managerial
Clerical and related
workers
34,061 41.2 48,676 58.8 82,737
Sales Workers 5,910 15.7 31,679 843 37,589
Service Workers 40,615 213 148,446 783 189,061
Agriculture, Animal
husbandry and
fisheries
2,657 20.4 10,383 79.6 13,040
Production Workers
and Labourers
10,343 4.7 210,257 953 220,600
TOTAL 123,560 18.6 539,028 81.4 662,588
Source:
	 Annual Statistical Abstrac , 1986, (Table 118, p.128).
TABLE D9	 REFINERY CAPACITY - 1986 (1,000 b/d)
OPEC World Excluding CPES" OPEC % of
World
Capacity
Capacity % Capacity %
Crude Capacity 6,648.50 100.00 56,183.90 100.00 11.83
Vacuum distillation 2,077.30 31.24 18,584.30 33.08 11.18
Cat. reforming 600.00 9.02 8,043.80 14.32 7.46
Cat. cracking 366.00 551 9,366.50 16.67 3.91
Hydrocracking 541.90 8.15 2,236.70 3.98 24.23
Thermal operations 383.00 5.76 4,878.40 8.68 7.85
Total Conversion 1,290.90 19.42 16,481.60 29.34 7.83
Hydrotreating 1,794.90 27.00 23,648.80 42.09 7.59
Alkylation 80.90 1.12 1,155.10 2.06 7.00
CPES = Centrally Planned Economics
Source: Annual Report, OPEC, 1986, p.13.
TABLE D10 WORLD REFINING CAPACITY BY GROUP
(MILLION BARRELS PER DAY)
SELECTED YEARS IN DETAIL
1960 1970 1980 1984
OPEC 2.2 3.6 6.1 6.4
OECD 16.0 33.0 47.6 38.4
CPES 3.4 7.9 15.8 16.6
OTHERS 2.9 6.9 • 13.2 12.5
OPEC
(% OF 9.0% 6.2% 7.4% 8.7%
WORLD
TOTAL) 
Source:	 Facts and Figures, a Comprehensive Statistical Analysis, OPEC Secretariat,
Vienna, October 1985, p.13.
TABLE Dll ARAB REFINERY THROUGHPUT AND DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION,
1985186 AND 1995
C000 b/d)
ACTUAL 1985/86 FORECAST FOR 1995
Capacity Throughput Consumption Capaciry Consumption
Algeria 483 445 150 483 MS
Bahrain 255 200 20 255 30
Egypt 445 415 340 700 520
Iraq 618 350 380 750 425
Kuwait 668 590 85 615 135
Libya 315 210 135 315 no
Qatar 57 30 15 57 25
Saudi Arabia 1,815 1,325 595 1,965 1,000
Syria 215 210 145 275 220
Tunisia 30 30 60 135 90
UAE 185 150 155 185 260
Total 5,086 3,955 1,980 5,735 3.160
Source: Abdel—Aziz al—Wanari, The outlook for The Refining Industry and Trade in Oil Products in Oapec and
Opec Member Countries. (Cited in Euro—Arab Trade : Prospects to the 1990s — EIU, Jarmary 1988,
pp.62-63.)
TABLE D12 OPEC's EXPECTED PRODUCTION AND EXCESS CAPACITY IN 4Q91
Capacity
tbpd
Expected
4091
Production
tbpd
Excess capacity
notional
tbpd
likely
tbpd
Saudi Arabia 8500 [1] 8400 100 100
Iraq 1000 [2] 500 500 0
Iran 3700 [3] 3500 200 200
Kuwait 300 275 25 25
Neutral Zone 180 180 0 0
U.A.E. 2500 [4] 2300 200 200
Qatar 400 390 10 10
Libya 1600 [5] 1450 150 150
Algeria 800 800 0 0
Nigeria 2000 [6] 1900 100 100
Gabon 300 300 0 0
Venezuela 2700 [7] 2300 400 200
Ecuador 300 295 5 5
Indonesia 1500 1450 50 50
Total 25780 24040 1740 1040
Notes:
[1] Saudi Arabia is said to be able to produce 8.7 mbpd at present.
[2] Iraq's capacity is calculated as the sum of local refining plus 50 tbpd exports to Jordan
plus 500 tbpd exports of crude permitted by the UN. Local refining has rcachcd 450
tbpd, oil minister al—Hiti claimed recently (MEES, 30/9/91).
[3] Iran plans to raise its production to 3.7 mbpd by end November '91, according to oil
minister Aghazadch (MEES, 7/10/91, page A5).
[4] The Emirates have produced at this level in the recent past. They should be able to
sustain such a level of production.
[5] Libya has tested its surge capacity of 1.6 mbpd; it was able to sustain this level of
production.
[6] Nigeria had planned to have 2.2 mbpd of capacity in place by the end of 1991 (PIW,
19/2/90). It should be able to manage 2 mbpd.
[7] PdVSA's 1990 annual report put its capacity at 2.7 mbpd. A recent article reported
that PdVSA was planning to press ahead with investments to increase the company's
capacity by 0.1 mbpd to 2.96 mbpd by the end of 1991 (PIW, 24/6191)/
Source:	 Centre for Global Energy Studics, London, Scpt—Oct, 1991.
TABLE DI3 ECONOMIC GROWTH IN SELECTED ARAB STATES
Gross Domestic Product (% real change)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Bahrain ... 10.2 -0.1 4.2 -0.3 2.3 1.5
Kuwait -5.5 -11.1 8.2 5.1 -6.7 9.4 ...
Oman 17.0 11.5 16.7 16.7 14.0 2.2 3.0
Qatar ... ... 0.8 6.7 -2.2 -21.1 2.0
Saudi Arabia' 7.9 1.6 -10.7 ... -6.4 -8.7 OS
U.A.E. 2.8 -8.2 -5.0 4.3 -2.3 -22.1 ...
North Yemen 5.8 5.3 10.3 2.4 ... ... ...
South Yemen ... ... 3.5 0.5 1.0 ... ...
A fiscal ending in year indicated, except for 1987 Calender year.
Sources: National sources; IMF, International Financial Statistics.
TABLE DI4 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : TRADE WITH INDUSTRIAL
COUNTRIES AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL TRADE
(In perccnt of area trade)
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1973 1981 1986 1987 1973 1981 1986 1987
Developing COW1tTiCS 66.7 61.4 63.2 64.1 65.1 60.9 60.3 62.8
By region
Africa 77.9 71.9 72.3 71.3 67.2 67.1 69.1 68.3
Asia 66.9 56.6 60.4 59.7 64.0 56.2 58.7 60.9
Europe 54.9 46.5 50.1 54.9 43.8 36.5 44.8 50.1
Middle East 65-5 693 68.1 703 74.3 66.9 59.2 61.0
Western Hemisphere 71.4 62.0 703 72.9 71.2 64.2 70.8 74.3
By major export
Oil exporting coutries 76.7 773 73.0 74.2 77.9 69.9 67.1 68.1
Of which:
Indonesia 69.1 66.9 69.6 753 79.4 73.9 75.9 82.6
Saudi Arabia 643 80.6 76.0 77.7 69.9 72.2 66.8 65.1
Exporters of rumfacturers 58.4 51.4 573 59.6 53.4 47.7 553 59.4
Of which:
China 76.9 74.4 66.8 70.7 43.8 44.0 40.1 473
Korea 81.2 62.5 72.3 73.7 85.9 623 73.7 75.9
By financial criteria
Fifteen heavily indebted
countries 76.4 67.6 69.2 723 71.0 613 68.1 71.9
Of which:
Brazil 73.6 41.8 583 57.2 71.0 53.6 64.9 68.2
Mexico 90.4 87.6 93.0 95.6 77.0 83.4 88.5 91.6
Yugoslavia 61.1 52.1 47.2 56.3 52.9 30.8 34.4 47.2
Small low-income
countries 64.3 533 59.6 57.2 57.0 51.3 633 64.4
Source:	 International Monctary Fund, Data Fund.
TABLE DIS	 AREA DISTRIBUTION OF WORLD TRADE
IMPORTS EXPORTS
1973 1981 1986 1987 1973 1981 1986 1987
Industrial Countries 75.2 673 74.2 74.7 74.1 65.7 73.4 72.9
Developing countries 24.1 31.4 24.7 23.9 25.1 33.1 24.6 24.8
By major export
On el/parting countries 3.6 8.1 43 - 7.1 14.7 5.9 -
Exporters of manufactures 9.4 10.7 11.7 12.1 8.2 9.1 11.6 123
By financial criteria
Fifteen beavily indebted
countries 53 7.4 4.0 3.6 53 6.9 4.9 4.4
Small low-income countries 1.7 1.5 1.3
...• 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.6
Source: International Monetary Fund, Data Fund.
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